




Country Talk: Somalia

30 October 2025

EUAA





Country of origin information



COI QUERY

Country of Origin	Somalia
Title	Major political, security, and humanitarian developments
Reference period	1 April 2025 to 31 July 2025
Topics	1. Political developments 2. Security developments 3. Humanitarian developments 4. Economic and social developments
Date of completion	10 August 2025
Query Code	QOI-2025
Contributing EU-COI units	ItA

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
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Click on RIMA, Country of Origin Information Query for more Major political, security, and humanitarian developments. 10 August 2025. [Link](#)



Somalia: Major political, security, and humanitarian developments




Somalia: Country Focus



Somalia: Security Situation



Geographical differentiation of Refugee profiles



Given the high fragmentation of Somalia, a geographical differentiation may be necessary when considering if and what type of protection to grant to Somali applicants.

Refugee profiles at risk throughout the whole territory of Somalia

Profiles considered equally at risk in all regions of Somalia.

Refugee profiles at risk in South-central Somalia only

In **Puntland**, risk-impacting circumstances must be considered for these profiles. In **Somaliland**, they would not qualify as refugees.

Main actors of persecution


In Somalia, a wide range of groups and individuals can be considered as actors of persecution or serious harm.

State actors

- Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) forces;
- Federal Member States (FMS) forces and Somaliland forces.

Non-state actors

- Al-Shabaab;
- Clans and clan militias;
- Other non-state actors.



Refugee profiles




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Federal and state officials

This sub-profile refers to staff of the FGS and FMS and Somaliland administrations and focuses on their risk of persecution by Al-Shabaab.



Risk

South-Central Somalia: for **high-ranking federal and state officials** well-founded fear of persecution in general but for **low-level federal and state officials:** risk-impacting circumstances (nature of duties/visibility, frequented locations, home area/Al-Shabaab's operational capacity).

Puntland: for both high-and low-ranking federal and state officials, risk-impacting circumstances (nature of duties and visibility, home area/Al-Shabaab's operational capacity).

Somaliland, a well-founded fear of persecution in general **not substantiated.**

Nexus: highly likely to be for reasons of **religion and/or political opinion.**

Persons fearing forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab

Risk

Risk-impacting circumstances:

- **Age** (younger ages usually recruited, elders if profession relevant and useful for Al-Shabaab)
- **Home area/Al-Shabaab control or influence** (areas where the group has established control, for areas outside of direct control personal circumstances and presence of Al-Shabaab to be considered)
- **Profession, socio-economic status** (medical professions or with social influence, family pressure for poorer individuals)

Nexus

The consequences of refusal to be recruited could lead to persecution which is highly likely to be for reasons of **religion** and/or **political opinion**.



Individuals involved in clan disputes

Clan conflicts can be triggered by various reasons, including access to resources, competition over land, access to jobs and markets, political competition, insults and breach of women's or other vulnerable persons' protection status.



Risk

In the whole of Somalia risk-impacting circumstances, such as:

- **Gender and age** (men at higher risk, ages 15 and 40 years mostly directly involved, women, children and elderly as 'sacrosanct')
- **Being considered a priority target** (perceived perpetrator of humiliation, the role of patrilineal kin)
- **Clan affiliation** (status and power of the clan determine the 'blood compensation')

Nexus: may be **race/nationality** or **membership to a particular social group.**

Low-status occupational minorities



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Risk

In the whole of Somalia, risk-impacting circumstances, such as:

- **Gender** (women and girls from minority clans at higher risk for sexual abuse and violence, access to education influenced by group belonging);
- **Home area – local clan dynamics** (in rural areas Gabooye face problems to access health-care and education/Yibir exposed to abuse and extreme poverty, whereas in Puntland Gabooye and Tumul are in better position).

Nexus: highly likely for **race/nationality**, and/or **membership to a particular social group**.

For occupational groups engaged in spiritual services, the nexus may also be **religion**.



Women and girls

5 Sub-profiles..



3.11.1. Gender-based violence (GBV)



3.11.2. Female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C)



3.11.3. Women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab



3.11.4. Child marriage and forced marriage



3.11.5. Single women and female heads of households

Female Genital Mutilation or Cutting (FGM/C)

Two sub- profiles:

3.11.2.a. Women and girls who have not undergone FGM/C.

3.11.2.b. Women and girls who have undergone FGM/C.

Risk

Girls who have not undergone FGM/C: well-founded fear of persecution in general

Exceptional case: a woman has not undergone FGM/C → risk-impacting circumstances, such as: age, marital status, tradition and the views of family, home area.

For women and girls who have undergone FGM/C: risk-impacting circumstances, such as: age and marital status, family perceptions/traditions, type of FGM/C.



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Nexus

For women and girls who have not undergone FGM/C, the nexus is highly likely to be for reasons of **membership to a particular social group** and may be for reasons of **religion**.

For women and girls who have undergone FGM/C, the nexus may be for reasons of **membership to a particular social group** or **religion**.

Somalis who have resided for a long time in neighbouring countries or other countries in the region



In general, the treatment faced by individuals under this profile **would not amount to persecution.**


However, belonging to this profile might be a **risk-enhancing factor** for other profiles, e.g. women and girls

Subsidiary protection »



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Subsidiary Protection under art. 15 (c) QD/QR: Assessment of indiscriminate violence





Individual elements

Age

Health
conditions/
Disabilities

Profession /
Place of
residence



Economic
situation

Knowledge
of the area

Family
members/
Support
network



Article 15(c) QD/QR: Assessment per region



Internal Protection Alternative »»



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Part of the country



Mogadishu
(Benadir)



Garowe
(Puntland)




Hargeisa
(Somaliland)

This is without prejudice to the possibility to apply IPA to other places in Somalia



The clan family the applicant belongs to should be considered when assessing a specific part of the country for IPA.



Safety



Security situation

Mogadishu: high level of indiscriminate violence

Garowe/Hareisha: no real risk



Actor of persecution

- **State actor** (except in areas with limited presence);
- **ISS or clans** (specific profiles)
- **Al-Shabaab** (South-Central Somalia);
- **Somali society at large** (in case of persecution for reasons of social norms);
- **Extended family or community at large** (specific profiles)



Individual elements

Whether the applicant is considered a priority target.

The requirement of safety may be satisfied **only in exceptional cases** in **Mogadishu**.

In **Garowe** and **Hargeisa**, it may be satisfied depending on the profile and the individual circumstances of the applicant.

Legally and safely travel



Safe travel

Mogadishu: some security concerns.

Garowe/Hargeisa: in general, a person can access these cities without serious risks.



Legal travel

- Identification and/or travel documents is required to access Somalia and Somaliland.
- The lack of identification documents may render the applicant vulnerable to ill-treatment at checkpoints.



Gain admittance

Clan affiliation does not constitute a legal requirement to travel and gain admittance, however it would be a crucial factor.

Reasonableness to settle

General circumstances in the three cities entail significant hardship. However, they do not preclude the reasonableness, more careful examination for Mogadishu. Individual elements to consider, such as gender, age, clan, etc.

In **Mogadishu: IPA might be reasonable only in exceptional cases**, e.g. single able-bodied men and married couples without children and/or no additional vulnerabilities, from majority or dominant clan and with educational/professional background facilitating access to employment or with support network.

In **Garowe** and **Hargeisa**, IPA **may be reasonable** for single, able-bodied men and married couples without children and/or no additional vulnerabilities from locally dominant clan. Not generally reasonable for families with children and unaccompanied children or applicants from minority groups. For other profiles individual circumstances to be considered.

General conclusion for Internal Protection Alternative

IPA in Mogadishu might be applicable only in exceptional cases.

IPA in Garowe and Hargeisa may be applicable depending on the profile and individual circumstances of the applicant.

Clan affiliation is a crucial element to consider for IPA in all three cities.

Please provide your feedback on CG Somalia 2025!



Feedback Form




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