Russia as a Country of Origin
About This Report

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Country Intelligence Reports (CIR) provide up-to-date information and intelligence on asylum-related migration to Europe from the perspective of the countries of origin or transit, in order for the EUAA to enhance its understanding on flows towards and the situation of asylum in Europe, to develop its early warning capabilities and to enrich the quality and relevance of its analysis products. CIRs differ from Country of Origin Information (COI) reports regarding methodology, aim, scope and intended audience. CIRs contain both information and intelligence, and provide analysis of implications (of push, pull and enabling factors on trends) and an outlook (identification of upcoming events that may impact on migration, and a forward-looking analysis of trends).

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The reference period for this report includes the months February 2022 to May 2022. Reference may however also be made to developments in earlier periods to shed light on current trends. Some referenced articles may be behind a paywall. All sources are referenced and where possible primary references are used. All information presented, except for undisputed/obvious facts, has been cross-checked, unless stated otherwise. The information provided has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited time frame. However, this document does not pretend to be exhaustive. If a certain event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

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Three interviews were conducted in the research for this report. These interviews are referenced as Interview 1, Interview 2, and Interview 3.

Interviewee 1 is a legal scholar at a migration research institute with knowledge of the Russian context.

Interviewee 2 is a regional director at a humanitarian displacement organisation that supports refugees and internally displaced persons.

Interviewee 3 is a research fellow at a European university with expertise in migration and trafficking in the post-Soviet space.
Key Developments

Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, prompting Western countries to adopt a wide range of sanctions on Russia. In Russia, citizens have experienced significant restrictions on their freedom of speech and assembly. There were 15,440 detentions in Russia in connection with anti-war protests between 24 February and 10 May 2022, and fear of reprisal, prosecution for anti-war protests, and censorship laws are believed to be a significant push factor for migrants who have recently left Russia.

The economic impact of the invasion and the associated sanctions include rising prices, which have increased the cost of living for Russian citizens. The Russian rouble depreciated significantly following the invasion of Ukraine but has since recovered, reaching a 5-year maximum in May. As of 10 May 2022, almost 1,000 international companies had curtailed operations in Russia, thus limiting the economic prospects of many Russian citizens. A significant proportion of those who have left Russia since the invasion of Ukraine are young IT professionals who work for foreign-based and internationally focused companies.

Data indicate that most Russians fleeing the country since the invasion of Ukraine have chosen to travel to South Caucasus and Central Asian countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as to Turkey. Destination choices are influenced by visa requirements and travel costs.

The vast majority of Russians travelling to EU+ countries are using regular means. Visas remain available for Russians to travel to many EU+ countries, although transportation options are limited due to border closures and bans enacted on Russian and EU airspace.

Migration Trends

Nature and Scale of Migration

In March 2022, OK Russians, a non-profit organization set up to help Russians who oppose the war in Ukraine, estimated that over 300,000 Russian nationals had left Russia since the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.1 One interviewee with knowledge of the situation estimates that approximately 260,000 – 340,000 Russians have left the country, with the majority understood to have travelled to Kazakhstan and to Armenia, with additional smaller flows to Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Israel and Uzbekistan.2 Russian nationals have additionally been noted to have travelled to Azerbaijan, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Turkey,3 although data on the scale of these migration flows are not currently available as of May 2022.

OK Russians conducted a survey in late March and early April of 1,500 Russian citizens who left Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.4 Of the respondents, 18% stated that they planned to move on to another country, most of whom listed Western countries as their preferred destination.5 Some 58% of

2 Interview 1, 28 April 2022.
3 Siberia Realities, The Russian authorities counted the number of people who left the country in the first quarter of 2022, 2 May 2022, accessed 25 May 2022; Associated Press, As Russia sees tech brain drain, other nations hope to gain, 31 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022; Reuters, Russians crowd trains to Helsinki as passage to EU narrows, 8 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022; Schengen Visa Info, Russians use border crossing point in Norway to reach Europe, 12 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022; RFI, The escaping Russians finding a better life in Turkey, 7 May 2022, accessed 25 May 2022; Al Jazeera, Ukrainian refugees, Russian exile seek shelter in Turkey, 21 March 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
4 OK Russians, Anti-War Wave, March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022. As noted by Ok Russians, survey participants were generally young people who are active on social media and messenger apps, and may not be representative of all Russians who have left Russia.
5 Ibid.

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respondents stated that they did not have a connection with their current host country, but had chosen to travel there due to factors such as lack of visa requirements and lower travel costs.\footnote{Ibid.}

In the first quarter of 2022, the Russian Federation issued 2.8 million passports to Russian citizens, including 1.2 million external (international travel) passports.\footnote{Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Сводка основных показателей деятельности по миграционной ситуации в Российской Федерации за январь - март 2022 года [Summary of key performance indicators on the migration situation in the Russian Federation for January-March 2022], 19 April 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.} This represents an 87% annual increase on the volume of external passports issued in the first quarter of 2021.\footnote{Ibid.} Russia has previously been noted to distribute passports to people outside of Russia, for example in eastern Ukraine,\footnote{Atlantic Council, Russian passports: Putin’s secret weapon in the war against Ukraine, 23 April 2021, accessed 25 May 2022; Euro News, Russia has issued 720,000 fast-track passports in separatist-held areas of eastern Ukraine, 17 February 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.} and the proportion of external passports issued to Russian citizens residing within Russia is unclear. According to the website Pasportist, around 30% of people in Russia currently have an external passport.\footnote{Ibid.}

According to data collected by the Russian Federation Border Guard Service, there was a 46% increase in the number of Russian citizens travelling abroad in the first quarter of 2022 compared to the same period in 2021, including a 114% increase in the number of Russian citizens travelling to EU+ countries.\footnote{Ibid.} It is unclear to what extent these numbers reflect the onset of war in Ukraine or the relaxation of previous restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic in other countries. Overall, 709,158 Russian nationals were listed as travelling to EU+ countries in the first quarter of 2022, accounting for 18% of total overseas Russian travellers during this period.\footnote{Ibid.} This is a slight increase compared to the first quarter of 2021 (12%), as well as to the annual average for 2021 (15%).\footnote{Ibid.} Among the approximately 3.9 million Russians who travelled abroad in the first quarter of 2022, the Border Guard Service data state that none were travelling for the purposes of moving to a permanent address.\footnote{Ibid.} Among those for whom the purpose of travelling abroad was listed as ‘private,’ the most common destinations were the Republic of Abkhazia (738,056) – part of Georgia but recognised by Russia as an independent country –, Ukraine (316,755), Kazakhstan (120,872), Finland (96,270), Turkey (95,916) and Estonia (93,729).\footnote{Ibid.}

Russian citizens lodged about 700 asylum applications in EU+ countries in February 2022, increasing to 1,400 in March.\footnote{Ibid.} While Russian applications were not yet unusually high in February, the level in March was the highest since 2018.\footnote{Ibid.} Previous Eurostat data indicate that the most common EU+ destination countries for Russian asylum seekers were Germany, France and Poland, jointly accounting for 68% of EU+ asylum applications by Russian citizens in 2021.\footnote{Ibid.}

In Norway, asylum applications from Russian citizens have increased since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022: Russian citizens lodged six asylum applications in January, four in February,
48 in March, and 44 in April 2022.\(^{19}\) Russia was the third most common country of origin for asylum applicants in Norway in March 2022, and the second in April.\(^{20}\) While a rising trend can be observed, Russians still accounted for only 1% of asylum applicants in Norway between January and April 2022.\(^{21}\) Ukrainian citizens accounted for 94% of asylum applications in Norway during this period.\(^{22}\)

Media reports from independent Russian news agencies, The Moscow Times and The Village, suggest that some individuals who left Russia immediately following the invasion of Ukraine have since returned.\(^{23}\) Individual returnees interviewed by the media had travelled to Armenia, Estonia, Georgia or Uzbekistan before returning to Russia.\(^{24}\) Aside from individual accounts, there is a lack of data on the flows of returnees to Russia. In the media reports, some individuals stated that they had chosen to return as they missed the culture and their lives in Russia, while others reported returning after failing to find work, facing difficulties accessing their Russian bank accounts, or seeing that the threats of mobilisation that had pushed them to leave did not materialise.\(^{25}\) Other individuals reported their return to be temporary while they planned for a more permanent departure.\(^{26}\)

![Figure 1: Routes taken by Russian migrants as per sources cited in this report.](image)

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 The Moscow Times, *‘Unprepared’ emigres trickle back to Russia as war drags on*, 19 April 2022, accessed 9 May 2022; The Village, *‘I tried – I didn’t succeed’: Stories of people who returned to Russia*, 11 April 2022, accessed 9 May 2022.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 The Moscow Times, *‘Unprepared’ emigres trickle back to Russia as war drags on*, 19 April 2022, accessed 9 May 2022.
Routes and Modes of Transport

Regular Migration

Routes through which Russian citizens can legally travel to EU+ countries have been restricted since the invasion of Ukraine, limiting the ability of residents to travel by air, sea and land.

According to the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (FAVT), international flights are permitted from 60 cities in Russia as of April 2022.27 Of these 60 cities, international flights departing from Chita, Magadan, Murmansk and Pskov are restricted only to destinations in Egypt and Turkey.28 As of April 2022, the FAVT reported that international air traffic had been re-established after the ease of anti-COVID-19 measures to 24 of the 29 EU+ countries, excluding Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.29 On 27 February, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission announced that all Russian-owned, Russian-registered, and Russian-controlled aircrafts were prohibited from entering EU airspace.30 Russia has banned airlines from all EU+ countries from entering Russian airspace.31

The closest open gateways for air travel between Russia and the EU+ are Belgrade and Istanbul.32 The FAVT reported that there were 1.6 million international passengers travelling from Russia abroad in February 2022, 611,347 of whom travelled between Russia and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).33

On 8 April, the EU announced that all EU ports would henceforth be closed to Russian-flagged vessels.34 Norway announced similar restrictions on 29 April 2022, keeping, however, fishing vessels outside of the scope of the ban.35

The Allegro train connection between Helsinki and St. Petersburg, which was the last functioning passenger rail service between EU+ countries and Russia, was discontinued by Finland on 28 March.36 Prior to its closure, demand for the service was reported to have surged following the invasion of Ukraine, with reports from early March stating that the two daily trains running from St. Petersburg were consistently sold out, with 700 passengers travelling from Russia to Finland each day.37 Train services

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27 Federal Air Transport Agency, Иностранные государства, с которыми возобновлено международное воздушное сообщение [Foreign countries for which international air traffic has been resumed], 21 April 2022, accessed 3 May 2022.
28 Federal Air Transport Agency, Иностранные государства, с которыми возобновлено международное воздушное сообщение [Foreign countries for which international air traffic has been resumed], 21 April 2022, accessed 3 May 2022.
30 Reuters, Russia closes its airspace to Switzerland in retaliatory move, 1 March 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
32 European Commission, Ukraine: EU agrees fifth package of restrictive measures against Russia, 8 April 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
33 Government of Norway, New sanctions against Russia incorporated into Norwegian law, 29 April 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
34 VR Group, VR will discontinue the Allegro-train service, starting from March 28th, 2022, 25 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022; The Barents Observer, End comes to last Russia-Europe rail link, 25 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022; Reuters, Finland suspends its rail link between Russia and the EU, 27 March 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
35 Reuters, Russians crowd trains to Helsinki as passage to EU narrows, 8 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
from Helsinki to St. Petersburg were reportedly running at approximately 25 % capacity. Only Finnish and Russian citizens were permitted to travel on these services due to COVID-19 restrictions.

The Russian Federation has border crossing points with Norway, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, as well as with Poland and Lithuania, which border the Kaliningrad region, most of which remain open. As reported by Dovidka Info, as of May 2022 buses are running from Russia to Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. The Barents Observer reported in March 2022 that Russian checkpoints at land borders were practically closed for normal citizens to leave the country. In a statement by the Border Guard Service of the FSB of Russia, restrictions on the ability of Russian citizens to leave Russia via land border crossings do not apply to those travelling for reasons connected to illness, death of a close relative, medical treatment, visiting family members, or for work or education purposes. Exemptions also apply for Russians who have valid residence documents or citizenship for foreign countries, as well as those who own real estate abroad.

Irregular Migration

The number of Russian nationals travelling irregularly to EU+ countries appears to remain low. Frontex reported that, in March 2022, there were 13 detections of illegal border-crossings by Russian nationals, 11 of which occurred along the Eastern land borders. The Eastern land borders route accounted for 76 % of the 21 detections of Russian nationals identified by Frontex in the first quarter of 2022, as well as 87 % of 217 detections for the year 2021. In the first quarter of 2022, Russian nationals accounted for only 1 % of individuals detected travelling irregularly along this route.

Profile of Migrants Targeting the EU+

There is limited data available on the profile of Russian citizens who choose to travel to the EU+, although general data on the profile of Russian migrants provide insight on potential migrants to EU+ countries.

In the OK Russians survey of 1,500 Russian migrants who had left the country following the invasion of Ukraine, the average age of respondents was 32 years. Survey respondents had higher levels of education than the general population of Russia, with 80 % holding higher education qualifications.

Russian migrants who responded to the OK Russians survey from 27 March to 4 April 2022 were less likely than those in the general population of Russia to report having experienced financial problems such as insufficient money for food or clothes in Russia. Some 93 % of survey respondents reported that they could speak English, while 21 % could speak other languages and 5 % could speak the language of the host country where they were staying at the time of the survey. The majority (63 %) of respondents were travelling with a partner, while 27 % were travelling alone, and 19 % were travelling with children.

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Embassy of Malta Moscow, Land exit points from Russian Federation Territory, 3 March 2022, accessed 13 May 2022. See Situation at Borders and in Transit Countries section for further information on border closures.
41 Dovidka Info, What to do if you were taken out of Ukraine by force, n.d., accessed 25 May 2022.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
As noted by one interviewee, those fleeing the country are likely to originate from large cities in Russia.\textsuperscript{53} Google Trends data on the prevalence of use of the search term ‘эмиграция’[‘emigration’] within Russia shows that, since mid-February 2022, the term was most highly searched in St. Petersburg and Moscow, followed by the Murmansk Oblast, a border region in north-west Russia, and the Tomsk Oblast in Western Siberia.\textsuperscript{54}

The Associated Press reported on 31 March that up to 70,000 IT professionals were estimated to have left Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, with one industry expert predicting that up to 100,000 more could leave in the following month.\textsuperscript{55} As noted by one interviewee, IT professionals have skills that can allow them to earn money in many different countries.\textsuperscript{56} Additionally, IT professionals can typically work remotely and so can continue to work after leaving Russia, and many already work for foreign-based and internationally-focused companies.\textsuperscript{57} In the OK Russians survey conducted in late March, 50% of survey respondents stated that they would continue to work in their current organisation.\textsuperscript{58}

**Push Factors**

**Security Situation**

Since the invasion of Ukraine, incidents of shelling of Russian territory have been reported.\textsuperscript{59} As of 19 April, the Belgorod region, which borders Ukraine, reported 12 incidents, including shelling, allegedly from Ukraine, oil terminal explosions and accidents involving military vehicles.\textsuperscript{60} One resident was reportedly injured by shelling in early April.\textsuperscript{61} Independent Russian online media outlet The Insider reported that the Russian military has placed multiple launch rocket systems inside residential areas in Belgorod.\textsuperscript{62} The Insider noted that many residents of Belgorod have left the border area.\textsuperscript{63}

As of the end of March 2022, the terrorist threat level was raised to ‘yellow’, the second of three potential threat levels, in five out of the six Russian border regions with Ukraine, as well as the Russia-occupied Crimea.\textsuperscript{64} The only border region not to have raised terrorist threat levels as of May 2022 was Rostov, which borders Donetsk and Luhansk.\textsuperscript{65} Kursk region’s governor announced through Telegram that due to the increased threat level military and police checkpoints would be set up and increased security patrols would be established.\textsuperscript{66}

Russian men between the age of 18 and 27 are subject to a conscription of one year of active military duty.\textsuperscript{67} Exceptions to conscription rules exist, for example men have the right to undertake a non-military form of national service if their religious beliefs or convictions contradict military service.\textsuperscript{68} While the Russian Minister of Defence has emphasised that conscripts will not be sent to Ukraine, some conscripts

\textsuperscript{53} Interview 3, 11 May 2022.


\textsuperscript{55} Associated Press, \textit{As Russia sees tech brain drain, other nations hope to gain}, 31 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{56} Interview 3, 11 May 2022.


\textsuperscript{58} OK Russians, \textit{Anti-War Wave}, March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{59} The Moscow Times, \textit{Fresh attacks reported on Russia’s Ukraine border}, 19 April 2022, accessed 11 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} The Insider, \textit{«Грады» во дворах и окопы в городе. Как война пришла в Белгородскую область}, [“Grady” in the yards and trenches in the city. How the war came to the Belgorod region], 18 April 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{67} Al Jazeera, \textit{Explainer: How does conscription work in Russia}, 5 May 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
are known to have been deployed to the conflict.\textsuperscript{69} Instances of young men choosing or planning to leave the country to avoid potential conscription or mobilisation have been reported by a number of news outlets.\textsuperscript{70}

### Human Rights

Independent war reporting and protests against the war have been criminalised in Russia. Since the invasion of Ukraine, almost all independent media in Russia have been banned or blocked, with remaining media subject to military censorship.\textsuperscript{71} As per the Criminal Code, spreading ‘false information’ about the Russian military or any other Russian state body operating abroad is punishable by up to 15 years in prison.\textsuperscript{72} As of 22 April, independent human rights media project OVD-Info had recorded approximately 1000 documented offences of ‘discrediting the military’ under the newly-amended Code of Administrative Offences.\textsuperscript{73} Online reports suggest a number of employees have been fired for expressing objections to the war in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{74} Amnesty International noted in May 2022 that this includes dozens of school teachers and university lecturers.\textsuperscript{75}

As of 10 May 2022, OVD-Info recorded 15,440 detentions in Russia in connection with anti-war actions since 24 February 2022.\textsuperscript{76} Some individuals detained for anti-war actions reported experiencing violence from the police.\textsuperscript{77} Videos of arrests in St. Petersburg and Moscow, verified by Human Rights Watch, show police officers beating, pushing, grabbing and choking peaceful protestors.\textsuperscript{78}

Detained individuals have reported that they were denied access to lawyers, with police stations initiating ‘fortress protocol’, designed for situations in which police stations are under attack, in order to prevent outside visitors from entering the premises.\textsuperscript{79}

On 8 April, Russia’s Ministry of Justice cancelled the registration of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as 13 other foreign non-governmental organisations and foundations working in Russia.\textsuperscript{80}

One interviewee stated that fear of reprisal, prosecution for anti-war protests, and censorship laws have been a push factor for migrants who have recently left Russia.\textsuperscript{81} In OK Russians’ survey of 1500 Russian emigrants in late March 2022, 55% stated that they had faced some form of political pressure prior to leaving Russia.\textsuperscript{82}

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\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} The Village, \textit{"I tried – I didn’t succeed": Stories of people who returned to Russia}, 11 April 2022, accessed 9 May 2022; Al Jazeera, \textit{Fearing front-line deployment, some Russians resist conscription}, 18 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022; Al Jazeera, \textit{Fearing conscription, anti-war Russians flock to Uzbekistan}, 16 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022; Reuters, \textit{Fearing martial law or conscription, some Russians try to flee abroad}, 3 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} OVD, \textit{Russian protests against the war with Ukraine. A chronicle of events}, 23 April 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
\textsuperscript{74} Open Democracy, \textit{‘You betrayed the Motherland’: Russians are being fired for speaking out}, 22 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
\textsuperscript{75} Amnesty International, \textit{Russia: Educators fired, students indoctrinated – academia is the latest victim of the ongoing crackdown}, 12 May 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview 1, 28 April 2022.
\textsuperscript{82} Ok Russians, \textit{Anti-War Wave}, March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
Economic Situation

Since February 2022, the EU and various countries including Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States have imposed financial sanctions on the Russian Federation, including financial sanctions on specific banks, defence companies and oligarchs. Seven Russian banks were excluded from the SWIFT messaging service from 12 March; this exclusion effectively prevents the banned banks from obtaining foreign currency and transferring assets abroad. The EU has further prohibited all transactions related to the management of the National Central Bank of Russia’s reserves and assets.

The Yale School of Management estimated on 10 May that almost 1,000 companies have curtailed operations in Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Mastercard and Visa, who make up approximately 70% of the debit card market in the country, suspended their services in Russia from early March. Mastercard and Visa cards can, however, still be used to process domestic transactions. Other financial services to have suspended their services in Russia include American Express, Apple Pay, Google Pay, PayPal and Western Union. Following the invasion of Ukraine there were reports of citizens in Russia withdrawing cash, with the Financial Times reporting on 27 February that people in Moscow and other Russian cities were queuing in order to withdraw foreign currencies.

Consumer Price Index data published by Russia’s statistics service, Rosstat, show the price of foodstuffs, medicines, hygiene items and other consumer goods and services to have risen significantly since prior to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, between 1 January and 6 May 2022 the prices of several foods had risen, including: sugar by 50%, beetroots, carrots, cabbages and onions by over 60% each, tomatoes by 35%, and potatoes by 30%, among others. Over the same period, the prices of hygiene items such as washing powder, soap and toothpaste had risen by 25% to 31%. In April 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted a 21% increase in average consumer prices in Russia in 2022. Russian newspaper Kommersant reported in late March 2022 on panic buying of sugar despite the ‘skyrocketing prices’. Retail chains in Russia introduced restrictions in March on the amount of sugar, cereals, pasta, canned food and hygiene products that customers could purchase. Poll data published by state-run pollsters VTsIOM suggest that Russian poll participants are concerned about the cost of living. In the March 2022 Index of Fears produced by VTsIOM, participants reportedly ranked

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85 Ibid.
86 Yale School of Management, *Almost 1,000 companies have curtailed operations in Russia – But some remain*, 10 May 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
95 Kommersant, Невыносимая сладость бытия [The unbearable sweetness of life], 21 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
96 Kommersant, Магазины придерживают продукты [Stores hold products], 11 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
‘familiar goods becoming too expensive’ as the top fear, followed by ‘decrease in income’. VTsIOM reported in April 2022 that 85% of Russians have stockpiles of food.

The rouble hit a record low on 10 March 2022, but has since recovered. On 23 March President Putin announced that ‘unfriendly’ countries would be required to pay Russia in roubles for the sale of natural gas, and the currency strengthened in late March. The Russian rouble then reached a five-year high in May 2022, with a conversion rate of 61.02 roubles per euro on 20 May. Reuters noted on 8 April that there are risks associated with the appreciation of the currency, since appreciation results in less profit from the sale of commodities abroad.

Official data from Rosstat state that there were 3.1 million unemployed persons over the age of 15 in Russia as of March 2022, with 0.7 million officially registered as unemployed according to the Federal Service for Labour and Employment, RosTrud. Media communications from the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection on 24 March stated that 59 000 Russian employees were due to be laid off from work. In a survey conducted by Bloomberg in March, analysts predicted that joblessness in Russia will exceed 9% in 2022. Among respondents to Russian Field’s 26-28 February survey, 42% stated that they believed their income would sharply fall following the ‘special military operation’.

Enabling Factors

Ease of Travel

Official Consumer Price Index data from Rosstat indicate that the ticket price for economy class air travel increased by 15% between 1 January and 6 May 2022. There are indications that the prices for some routes have increased significantly, however, with one individual who had left the country following the invasion of Ukraine stating that purchasing two one-way plane tickets to Istanbul had cost them more than a month’s salary.

Russian citizens can travel visa-free to many South Caucasus and Central Asian states such as Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Russian citizens can also travel to Turkey visa-free for up to 60 days. There

97 VTsIOM, Индекс страхов [Index of Fears], 1 March 2022, accessed 9 May 2022.
98 Hindustan News Hub, VTsIOM: more than 85% of Russians have stocked up on groceries just in case, 13 April 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
99 Reuters, Analysis: Russia’s rouble rebound not quite what it seems, 8 April 2022, accessed 12 May 2022; Financial Times, Russia steadies rouble with harsh capital controls and investment curbs, 1 April 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
100 Rosstat, Стоимость проживания в России, January-March 2022, 27 April 2022, accessed 4 May 2022, p.6.
101 Bloomberg, Ruble hits 5-year high as gas buyers bend to Putin’s will, 20 May 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
102 Rosstat, Стоимость проживания в России, January-March 2022, 27 April 2022, accessed 4 May 2022, p.6.
103 Interfax, Russian employers warned about 59 000 redundances, 24 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
104 Bloomberg, Russia piles pressure on companies as unemployment crisis looms, 7 April 2022. Accessed 4 May 2022.
105 Rosstat, Об оценке индекса потребительских цен с 30 апреля по 6 мая 2022 года [On the assessment of the Consumer Price Index 30 April to 6 May 2022], 6 May 2022, accessed 13 May 2022. Source does not specify whether it refers to domestic or international flights.
108 Turkey iResidence, Russia-Ukraine war ‘many flee to Turkey’, May 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
are suggestions that some individuals who have travelled to Turkey plan to stay there temporarily while they wait for the approval of EU visas, although the prevalence of such plans is not known.

Russians living within 30 km of the Russia-Norway border can obtain local border permits which allow them to travel visa-free to Norway for up to 15 days under a 2010 agreement between the two countries. An immigration police officer at Storskog informed the Norwegian online newspaper The Barents Observer, that there were three border crossings from Russia to Norway by local border permit holders in March 2022.

On 25 February, the European Council announced a partial suspension on the privileged access to EU short-stay visas afforded to certain categories of citizens of Russia, including: members of official delegations, members of national and regional Governments and Parliaments, members of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, citizens holding valid diplomatic passports, and business people and representatives of business organisations. Similar changes to privileged visa access for some Russian citizens were enacted by Norway from 19 March. A Decree of the Russian President from 4 April announced a reciprocal suspension on privileged access to Russian visas previously afforded to groups mentioned above as well as to journalists of EU Member States and of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

Czechia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have suspended visa applications for Russian citizens since the invasion of Ukraine. Some exemptions apply, including for humanitarian reasons and for Russian citizens with close relatives residing in EU+ countries.

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs stopped issuing regular Schengen visas in Moscow on 27 April due to staffing shortages following the expulsion of embassy staff. Dutch authorities reportedly would still issue temporary residence permits and humanitarian visas. The extent to which such documents are

115 Open Democracy, ‘War gave us the final push’: Why one gay couple fled Russia for Turkey, 28 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
117 The Barents Observer, Tensions are high, but no plans to terminate visa-free travel, 7 April 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
118 The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, Temporary changes in Norway’s visa facilitation agreement with Russia, 18 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
123 VFS Global, Suspension of a short-term visa application acceptance, 27 April 2022, accessed 11 May 2022; NL Times, Russians can’t apply for Dutch visas after diplomats’ expulsion, 26 April 2022, accessed 25 May 2022.
124 RIA Novosti, Нидерланды прекращают выдачу виз россиянам [The Netherlands stops issuing visas to Russians], 26 April 2022, accessed 11 May 2022.
issued is unknown. According to a spokesperson for the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russians were previously submitting approximately 150 applications for short-stay visas each week.\textsuperscript{120}

The Norwegian visa application centres in eight Russian cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, were reopened with limited capacities on 4 April.\textsuperscript{121} Other EU+ visa application centres, such as those for Italy and France, remain open in Russia as of May.\textsuperscript{122} Reuters reported in early March that ‘a modest queue’ had formed at the Italian visa application centre in Moscow as Russian nationals attempted to apply for visas.\textsuperscript{123}

One interviewee stated that, even in 2021, some Russian citizens were making preparations to potentially leave the country, for example by renewing international passports, after rising tensions and temporary border closures between Russia and Turkey raised fears of travel restrictions among Russian citizens.\textsuperscript{124}

### Situation at Borders and in Transit Countries

Reuters reported on 8 March that hundreds of vehicles were queuing to cross land borders to Estonia, Finland and Latvia.\textsuperscript{125}

There is one official border-crossing point between Norway and Russia, located in Storskog and also known as the Kirkenes-Murmansk crossing. This crossing has been closed for freight transport since 29 April but otherwise remains open.\textsuperscript{126} According to reports by Norwegian newspaper VG, high numbers of Russians who wish to reach Europe have been crossing the Russia-Norway border at the Kirkenes-Murmansk crossing point, with entries mainly by persons doing business or visiting relatives.\textsuperscript{127} The Barents Observer reported on 29 April that many of those crossing the border at Kirkenes-Murmansk were sailors from Russian trawlers.\textsuperscript{128}

As of 12 May, the Imatra-Svetogorsk border-crossing point between Finland and Russia, located north of St. Petersburg, is closed to passengers according to the Finnish Border Guard. Finland’s seven remaining land border crossings with Russia remained open as of 13 May, according to information active on the Finnish Border Guard’s website.\textsuperscript{129}

There are four official border crossings between Poland and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, two of which were closed to border traffic as of 12 May 2022.\textsuperscript{130}

### Smuggling Networks

No information was found on Russian nationals using smuggling networks during the reporting period.

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\textsuperscript{120} NL Times, *Russians can’t apply for Dutch visas after diplomat’s expulsion*, 26 April 2022, accessed 11 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{121} Embassy of the Kingdom of Norway in Moscow, *Important information to applicants in the Russian Federation VFS in Russia will open for visa and residence applications for Norway from 4th April 2022*, 31 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.


\textsuperscript{123} Reuters, *Fearing martial law or conscription, some Russians try to flee abroad*, 3 March 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{124} Interview 2, 10 May 2022; Reuters, *Russia restricts flights to Turkey as political tensions rise*, 12 April 2021, accessed 12 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{125} Reuters, *Russians crowd trains to Helsinki as passage to EU narrows*, 8 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{126} NRK, *Stenger grensa og hamnene for russisk transport*, 29 April 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{127} Schengen Visa Info, *Russians use border crossing point in Norway to reach Europe*, 12 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.

\textsuperscript{128} The Barents Observer, *Norway closes seaports and border to Russian traffic*, 29 April 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.


Pull Factors

Local Perceptions on What is Happening in Destination Countries

According to one expert interviewed for this report, Russian citizens’ perceptions of EU+ countries, as well as on the current situation in Ukraine, depend heavily on the information that they consume, the individual’s age, and whether they have close relatives in Ukraine.\(^{131}\) Around two thirds of Russians get their news predominantly from state-controlled television and from Russian social media like VKontakte.\(^{132}\) One interviewee noted that much of the public discussion on Western states in Russia emphasises the so-called ‘double standards’ and the ‘hypocrisy’ of the West.\(^{133}\)

Discouraging Factors

Local Prevention Initiatives

The threat of reprisal in Russia may act as a discouraging factor for some potential migrants. The Moscow Times quoted State Duma Speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, on 19 April as stating that ‘people acting like traitors’ by leaving the country should be deprived of their citizenship.\(^{134}\) Russian citizens who have left the country have reported that they were interrogated by border guards, had their phones and laptops searched, and had their political views questioned.\(^{135}\) Via Telegram, human rights organization Pervý Otdel reported on 3 May that they are aware of at least five cases in which relatives of individuals who have left Russia have been invited for interviews with the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).\(^{136}\) These cases relate to individuals who were under suspicion from the FSB prior to leaving the country.\(^{137}\)

Discouraging Factors in the EU+

Media outlets such as the Washington Post, the Straits Times and Al Jazeera have reported that there has been a rise in anti-Russian sentiment in Europe due to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.\(^{138}\) The Straits Times reported in March 2022 that in Germany, a restaurant has refused to serve customers with Russian passports, and a doctor refused to treat Russian patients.\(^{139}\) The ‘growing atmosphere of hatred against Russians in several Western countries’ was noted by a Kremlin spokesperson on 11 March, who further stated that ‘it’s very dangerous. Our fellow citizens have to be on alert and vigilant’.\(^{140}\)

Those who leave Russia are likely to face difficulties accessing money in Russian bank accounts due to Russian currency controls and sanctions imposed by Western financial institutions.\(^{141}\)

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\(^{131}\) Interview 3, 11 May 2022.
\(^{133}\) Interview 2, 10 May 2022.
\(^{134}\) The Moscow Times, ‘Unprepared’ emigres trickle back to Russia as war drags on, 19 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
\(^{135}\) Medizona, “Are you running? Russians who decided to leave the country are subjected to biased interrogation at the border”, 2 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
\(^{136}\) Pervý Otdel, ФСБ уговаривает уехавших из страны вернуться в Россию [The FSB persuades those who left the country to return to Russia], 3 May 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
\(^{137}\) Ibid.
\(^{138}\) The Straits Times, ‘Get the hell out’: Wave of anti-Russian sentiment in Europe, 12 March 2022, accessed 13 May 2022; Al Jazeera, Beware of the resurgent Russophobia, 1 April 2022, accessed 13 May 2022; Washington Post, Anti-Russian hate in Europe is making chefs and school children out to be enemies, 7 March 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
\(^{139}\) The Straits Times, ‘Get the hell out’: Wave of anti-Russian sentiment in Europe, 12 March 2022, accessed 13 May 2022.
\(^{140}\) Ibid.
\(^{141}\) The Moscow Times, ‘Unprepared’ emigres trickle back to Russia as war drags on, 19 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.
Outlook and Implications

Evidence collected for this report suggests that the overall number of Russians emigrating has likely peaked and therefore can be expected to decrease in the mid-term. One interviewee for this report stated that they believe the majority of Russians who wish to leave the country due to the invasion of Ukraine have already done so, although they acknowledged that significant developments in the war in Ukraine could convince a new wave of potential migrants.\(^{142}\) Google Trends data show that searches within Russia for the term ‘эмиграция’["emigration"] peaked at a 10-year high on 2 March 2022 and have since somewhat reduced.\(^{143}\)

Among the individual accounts published in the media and examined in this report, many who have left Russia have expressed their opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The events in Ukraine and the implications this has had on the security and human rights situation within Russia can be considered to be a key push factor for Russian nationals migrating to the EU+. As noted in this report, many individuals who have chosen to emigrate had previously faced political pressure in Russia.\(^{144}\)

With the introduction of new international sanctions and a reported increase in the cost of living, economic factors appear to also impact the decision of Russian nationals to migrate. Many recent Russian emigrants are young professionals, notably educated IT professionals working for international companies,\(^{145}\) and a loss of economic prospects within Russia is likely to have influenced the migration decision-making of many of these individuals. Migration decision-making is typically influenced by the interaction of a variety of factors, however, and the degree to which individual factors influence decision-making is difficult to determine. Results from a survey conducted on 26-28 February 2022 by private survey agency Russian Field found that younger and more highly educated Russians were more likely to have a negative assessment of the invasion of Ukraine,\(^{146}\) and so it should be noted that many young professionals who have recently left Russia were likely driven to do so by a combination of economic, security and human rights push factors.

The majority of Russians who have chosen to leave Russia following the invasion of Ukraine have travelled to South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. As noted by one interviewee in Georgia, there is a significant amount of anti-Russian sentiment in many of these countries and the situation could become volatile if the economy in these host countries deteriorates.\(^{147}\) The impact that such volatility could potentially have on the migration decisions of Russian nationals is difficult to predict.

So far, all indications suggest that the vast majority of Russians who wish to travel to the EU+ are doing so through regular means. While some countries have chosen to close visa application centres and stop issuing visas to Russian citizens, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia announced on 10 May that Russia had no intention of closing the embassies of European countries in Russia.\(^{148}\) Based on this assessment that the majority of Russian nationals travelling to the EU+ are doing so through regular means, the continued availability of visas and travel documents will be a decisive factor when considering the scale of future migration flows from Russia to the EU+.

There are no indications to suggest that changes will occur in the short term regarding the bans imposed on Russian and EU airspace, and so individuals wishing to travel to the EU by air will likely continue to
transfer through Turkey and other countries. Many land border crossings between EU+ countries and Russia remain open.

As noted in this report, individuals who have left Russia since the invasion of Ukraine have reported that they were subject to interrogations and searches at the Russian border. While representatives of the Russian government have publicly expressed a desire for those who are leaving Russia to be punished, this report did not uncover any large-scale government initiatives to limit migration. Any future measures introduced by the Russian government could have a significant impact on Russian citizens desire and ability to migrate to EU+ countries.

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149 Mediazona, “Are you running? Russians who decided to leave the country are subjected to biased interrogation at the border,” 2 March 2022, accessed 12 May 2022.
150 The Moscow Times, ‘Unprepared’ emigres trickle back to Russia as war drags on, 19 April 2022, accessed 10 May 2022.