Peru

Country Focus

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This report was drafted by COI experts from the EUAA, Country of Origin Information Sector.

COI experts from the following national asylum and migration departments reviewed this report:

- Sweden, Unit for Migration Analysis, Swedish Migration Agency

Furthermore, this report was reviewed by an external expert, Tamara Taraciuk Broner. Ms. Taraciuk Broner is director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. Before joining the Dialogue, she was the acting Americas director at Human Rights Watch for 15 years. Ms. Broner has carried out extensive field research throughout Latin America, documenting human rights violations and has an extensive research and publication record on issues such as judicial independence, freedom of speech, discrimination, and harassment of civil society organisations in the region.

The review carried out by the mentioned departments and expert contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EUAA.
Contents

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................3
Contents .........................................................................................................................4
Disclaimer......................................................................................................................6
Glossary and abbreviations..............................................................................................7
Introduction...................................................................................................................10
  Methodology................................................................................................................12
    Defining the terms of reference..................................................................................12
    Collecting information...............................................................................................12
    Quality control..........................................................................................................13
  Structure and use of the report.....................................................................................13
Map ...............................................................................................................................14
1. Overview ..................................................................................................................15
  1.1. Economy ...............................................................................................................15
  1.2. Government..........................................................................................................16
  1.3. Judicial system......................................................................................................18
    1.3.1. Structure.........................................................................................................18
    1.3.2. Effectiveness....................................................................................................19
    1.3.3. Witness protection program..........................................................................20
  1.4. State security forces.............................................................................................22
    1.4.1. Effectiveness....................................................................................................25
  1.5. Political developments.........................................................................................26
2. Demonstrations.........................................................................................................29
  2.1. Treatment by authorities .....................................................................................31
  2.2. Investigations into abuses....................................................................................34
3. Criminality.................................................................................................................36
  3.1. Homicides.............................................................................................................37
  3.2. Human trafficking..................................................................................................38
  3.3. Kidnapping............................................................................................................39
  3.4. Extortion................................................................................................................40
  3.5. Armed and criminal groups..................................................................................43
3.5.1. Criminal groups .................................................................................................................. 43
3.5.2. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP, Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú) .......................................................... 47
3.6. State response .......................................................................................................................... 48

4. Domestic violence and gender-based violence ................................................................. 50
4.1. Prevalence and social attitudes .......................................................................................... 50
4.2. Legislation and state protection ......................................................................................... 50
  4.2.1. Reporting and seeking assistance .................................................................................. 51
  4.2.2. State protection .............................................................................................................. 51
  4.2.3. Hotlines and shelters ..................................................................................................... 53

5. Situation of LGBTI people ...................................................................................................... 54

Annex 1: Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 57
Annex 2: Terms of Reference ....................................................................................................... 78
Disclaimer

This report was written according to the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Any event taking place after the finalisation of this report is not included. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the introduction.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 19 September 2023. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the Methodology section of the Introduction.
## Glossary and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Comités de Autodefensa (Self-defence Committees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJNG</td>
<td>Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación (Jalisco Cartel New Generation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDDHH</td>
<td>Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Coordinator for Human Rights)</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Country of origin information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVR</td>
<td>Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU+ countries</td>
<td>Member States of the European Union and associated countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUAA</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Asylum</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Fuerza Aérea del Peru (Air Force of Perú)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC dissidents</td>
<td>Disidencias de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FF. AA.</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas del Perú (Armed Forces of Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISTRAP</td>
<td>Fiscalía Especializada en Trata de Personas (Special Prosecutor for Human Trafficking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACHR</td>
<td>Inter-American Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>INEI</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Institute for Statistics and Informatics)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>Instituto Peruano de Economía (Peruvian Institute of Economy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNE</td>
<td>Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (National Elections Committee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNJ</td>
<td>Junta Nacional de Justicia (Justice National Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTI</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCP</td>
<td>Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Militarized Communist Party of Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGP</td>
<td>Marina de Guerra del Perú (Peruvian Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOVADeF</td>
<td>Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales (Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Policía Nacional del Perú (National Police of Peru)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Péstamos gota a gota</td>
<td>Loan shark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNAT</td>
<td>Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria (National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secuestros al paso</td>
<td>Express kidnappings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>VRAEM</td>
<td>Valles de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDOS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WJP</td>
<td>World Justice Project</td>
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</table>
Introduction

Peru has been experiencing successive political crises, culminating in the December 2022 removal of President Pedro Castillo and his replacement by interim President Dina Boluarte, which triggered nationwide large-scale protests. Clashes between security forces and protesters caused more than 60 deaths and over a thousand injuries, and human right organisations reported the use of excessive force by security forces. The country is characterised by lack of trust in the government, a ‘highly fragmented’ political class, and weak political parties. Corruption in Peru is pervasive at all levels of government, including at the highest levels and in the justice system. The justice system has serious limitations due to inefficiencies, corruption, and staff shortages. Security forces are hampered by resource challenges. A number of criminal organisations operate in Peru, including transnational crime syndicates that engage mostly in extortion, sex trafficking, kidnapping, and contract killings. Indigenous leaders, environmental activists, and human rights defenders have also been killed by criminals linked to drug trafficking and illegal resource extraction. The highest number of recorded attacks against journalists ever was in 2022. Peru’s national economy has experienced consistent growth since 1993. However, the recent crisis is threatening its performance and stability. Although Peru has a low unemployment rate, the majority of employment remains informal. Poverty rates increased during 2021-2022, with rural areas having almost double the poverty rate of urban areas, and extreme poverty being even more stratified.

In relation to Peruvian claims for international protection in the EU+, between January and June 2023, Peruvians lodged 12,000 applications for asylum in the EU+ making them the twelfth largest group of applicants for international protection. The level of Peruvian applications doubled compared to the first half of 2022. Indeed, during this period, Peruvian applications increased from 1,400 in January to 2,300 applications in June, which forms part of a longer-term trend of increased applications going back five years only interrupted by COVID-19. During the first half of 2023, the majority of applications were lodged in Spain (65%) and consisted of first-time applications 99%.

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1 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
2 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url
3 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url
5 Peru, Bases para el fortalecimiento y la modernización de la Policía Nacional del Perú, 2021, url
6 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror en el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, url
8 Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe defensorial No. 0001-2023-DP/APCSG, 21 July 2023, url
9 Castillo, Luis Miguel, in The Dialogue, HYBRID EVENT – Peru at the Crossroads: Political Crisis, Human Rights Abuses, and What’s Next?, 24 May 2023, url
10 Peru, Nota de prensa: Pobreza monetaria afectó al 27,5% de la población del país en el año 2022, 11 May 2023, url
11 Analysis by European Union Agency for Asylum
The EU+ recognition rate for international protection was around 4 % during the first half of 2023, and 5 % in 2022. At the end of June 2023, there were 20 000 Peruvian cases awaiting first instance decisions which represents a significant 170 % increase compared to the end of June 2022.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} Analysis by European Union Agency for Asylum.
Methodology

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference for this report were developed in response to a survey of information needs gathered from the EUAA-IGC (Intergovernmental-Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees)13 Country of Origin Information (COI) Specialist Network on Latin America, which is comprised of COI experts from across IGC participating States and EU+ countries14 national asylum authorities. EUAA then analysed the results and created the terms of reference.

The reference period for the report is from January 2021 to 19 September 2023 but includes background information on trends and context where needed. The terms of reference can be found in Annex 2: Terms of Reference.

Collecting information

Public sources

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources, as well as oral source interviews from 15 July to 6 September 2023. Some additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 19 September 2023.

This report has relied upon mainly Spanish-language sources in order to provide added value to the available COI. The expert drafter who wrote this report did so in English using Spanish sources. Legislation only available in Spanish was informally translated from Spanish into English by the expert drafter. Due to the volume of Spanish sources used, for the citation of all these non-English sources, this report does not follow the EUAA Writing and Referencing Guide signalling in the citation each time a source is translated. This is for maximal readability and efficiency. In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include:

- COI reports by governments;
- Information from civil society, advocacy groups, and NGOs;
- Human rights reports by governments and NGOs;
- Reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations;
- Peruvian government publications, including public statements, laws, policies, media outlets, and reports to the UN;
- Peru-based media and social media;
- Academic publications and think tank reports; and

13 IGC participating States are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States
14 EU+ includes EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland
• Reports of organisations specialised in specific topics, such as armed and criminal
groups.

All sources are referenced in the Annex 1: Bibliography.

**Oral sources**

In addition to using publicly available documentary sources, five oral sources were
interviewed for this report; however, two agreed to be cited. The types of oral sources
contacted include: scholars, journalists, civil society organisations, and political analysts. All
sources were assessed for their background, publication history, reputability, seriousness of
their research, and recognition of their credentials by peers, the media, and international
bodies. Oral sources who were interviewed and agreed to be cited in this report are described
in the Annex 1: Bibliography. All interviews were conducted in Spanish.

**Quality control**

This report was produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023) and the
EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Guide (2023). To ensure that this report is aligned with the
EUAA COI Report Methodology, this report was peer-reviewed by COI specialists from
Sweden. Additionally, external expert Tamara Taraciuk Broner was also a reviewer. All the
comments from reviewers were duly considered and were implemented to the extent
possible, under time constraints. The peer reviewers read both Spanish and English and were
able to assess the quality of sources used.

**Structure and use of the report**

This report is intended to capture a general overview of the main issues relevant to
international protection in the assessment of claims from Peru. The report is structured to
facilitate the consideration and logical assessment of claims for international protection:

Chapter 1: Provides an overview of the economy, government, judicial structures, state
security forces, and recent political developments in the country.

Chapter 2: Covers the situation of demonstrations, especially related to the recent political
crisis in Peru, including treatment of protesters by authorities and investigations into abuses.

Chapter 3: Provides an overview of the situation of criminality, including main types, key
criminal group, and state response.

Chapter 4: Covers the situation of domestic violence, including state protection.

Chapter 5: Provides information on the situation of LGBTIQ people.
Map 1. Peru

Map 1: UN, Peru Profile Map No. 3838 Rev.4, May 2011, [url](#)
1. Overview

Peru (República del Peru) is a presidential republic16 divided into 24 departments (departamentos), 196 provinces (provincias), and 1,874 districts (distritos).17 The population estimate for 2023 is 32,440,172, with around one third of the population residing alongside the Pacific coast, particularly in Lima (11.2 million), Arequipa (959,000), and Trujillo (904,000).18 In 2017, the major ethnic groups included ‘Mestizo (mixed Amerindian and White) 60.2 percent, Amerindian 25.8 percent, White 5.9 percent, African descent 3.6 percent, [and] other (including Chinese and Japanese descent) 1.2 percent.’19 The official languages are Spanish (spoken by 82.9 percent of the population), Quechua (13.6 percent), and Aymara (1.6 percent), in addition to other native languages, including a “large number of minor Amazonian languages.”20

1.1. Economy

Economic policy and the growth of the economy have been consistent since 1993 despite political upheavals.21 However, recent political crises are impacting economic performance and stability.22 The Peruvian economy experienced a rapid recovery after the pandemic, growing 2.2 percent in 2022 and an estimated 1.1 percent in 2023.23 Small businesses make up 98 percent of the total number of businesses, and 89 percent of large firms are in major urban centers in the Pacific coast.24 The National Institute for Statistics and Informatics (INEI, Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática) indicated that the unemployment rate for the first trimester of 2023 was 5.9 percent,25 while the World Bank reported rates of 3.7 percent for 2022, 5.1 percent for 2021, and 7.2 percent for 2020.26 INEI also reported that the percentage of informal employment for the first trimester of 2023 was 76.8 percent.27 The overall poverty rate for 2022, according to INEI, was 27.5 percent, an increase of 1.6 percent from 2021.28 For 2022, rural areas registered poverty rates of 41.1 percent and urban areas,

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16 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, 23 August 2023, url
17 Peru, INEI, División política y administrativa al 31 de diciembre del 2019, n.d., url, p. 1
18 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, 23 August 2023, url
19 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, 23 August 2023, url
20 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, 23 August 2023, url
21 Castilla, Luis Miguel, in The Dialogue, HYBRID EVENT – Peru at the Crossroads: Political Crisis, Human Rights Abuses, and What’s Next?, 24 May 2023, url; DW, Crisis política en Perú: ¿crecimiento económico amenazado?, 14 December 2022, url
22 Castilla, Luis Miguel, in The Dialogue, HYBRID EVENT – Peru at the Crossroads: Political Crisis, Human Rights Abuses, and What’s Next?, 24 May 2023, url; DW, Crisis política en Perú: ¿crecimiento económico amenazado?, 14 December 2022, url
23 Bloomberg, Peru Struggles to Revive Its Days as Latin America’s Top Economy, 29 August 2023, url; Reuters, Peru slashes growth outlook amid falling copper investment, 29 August 2023, url
24 The World Bank, Peru: Systematic Country Diagnostic Update, 2022, url
25 Swissinfo.ch, El desempleo disminuyó hasta el 5,9 % en Perú en el primer trimestre de 2023, 15 August 2023, url
26 The World Bank, Desempleo, total (% de la población activa total) (estimación modelado OIT) – Peru, n.d., url
27 Swissinfo.ch, El desempleo disminuyó hasta el 5,9 % en Perú en el primer trimestre de 2023, 15 August 2023, url
28 Peru, Nota de prensa: Pobreza monetaria afectó al 27,5% de la población del país en el año 2022, 11 May 2023, url, p. 1
24.1 percent.\textsuperscript{29} The overall extreme poverty rate for 2022 was 5 percent, an increase of 0.9 percent from 2021.\textsuperscript{30} For 2022, extreme poverty rates for rural areas and urban areas were 14.6 and 2.6 percent, respectively.\textsuperscript{31}

1.2. Government

The branches of government are the executive, which consists of the President, as the Head of the State, and its ministers;\textsuperscript{32} legislative, consisting of an unicameral Congress that adopts laws and legislative resolutions;\textsuperscript{33} and the judiciary, responsible for the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{34} Peru is a decentralised country with three levels of government: national, governed by the three branches of the government; regional, governed by departmental governments; and local, governed by districts.\textsuperscript{35} The President is elected by absolute majority for a five-year term, and the 130 members of Congress are elected by open list proportional representation for a five-year term.\textsuperscript{36} Re-election, either for President or the Congress, is not permitted.\textsuperscript{37}

In July 2021, Pedro Castillo, from the left-wing party Free Peru (\textit{Perú Libre}), was declared President for the period 2021-2026.\textsuperscript{38} Despite fraud allegations and legal challenges launched by Popular Force (\textit{Fuerza Popular})\textsuperscript{39}, the presidential elections were regarded as free and fair by observers.\textsuperscript{40} Castillo was removed from office in December 2022 and replaced by Dina Boluarte, then Vice-President, who was appointed President by Congress.\textsuperscript{41} See \textbf{1.5 Political developments}. Peru’s political class is considered by sources as ‘highly fragmented’ which, in addition to high-profile corruption scandals, has led to lack of trust in the government and repeated political turmoil.\textsuperscript{42} Political parties are generally ‘weak’ with members of Congress appearing more guided by personal agendas and interests rather than the country’s needs.\textsuperscript{43}

In an interview with EUAA, the Executive Director of Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), a
regional organisation that promotes the rule of law in Latin America, indicated that, ‘in recent years, traditional political parties almost disappeared in Peru, and others emerged, generally led by provincial leaders (from the interior of the country) with certain economic resources or political strength in their regions, different ideologies, and an interest in participating in national policy for interests that are not always clear or with dubious ends (e.g., low quality education, informal transportation, illegal mining, etc.).’

According to the same source, these new parties entered into alliances with traditional forces like Keiko Fujimori’s to coopt institutions and obtain benefits.

Corruption in Peru is pervasive at all levels of government, including at the highest levels and in the justice system. A number of senior political figures have been involved in corruption scandals and illicit deals with Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction firm involved in corruption scandals in Latin American countries, including Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Argentina, consisting of paying bribes to politicians and political parties to secure lucrative contracts. All Peruvian presidents, since 1990, have been investigated on corruption charges. At least three ex-presidents of Peru are being investigated for receiving bribes from Odebrecht. Castillo, his wife, and several of his ministers are also being investigated for corruption crimes including influence peddling, collusion, and the fraudulent award of public contracts. An investigation by Ojo Público, a Peruvian news source, indicated that all governors elected in 2018 faced investigations by the Public Ministry for different crimes, and that 21 of them faced investigations for corruption and embezzlement.

The government respected the rights of freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. However, as of 2023 reporting, restrictions to the freedom of movement are in place in the VRAEM (Valley of the Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro rivers) area due to the presence of irregular actors.

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44 DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
45 DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
47 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
48 Euronews, What is the Odebrecht corruption scandal in Latin America, and who is implicated?, 18 April 2019, url; AP, Colombian prosecutors accuse former presidential candidate of taking money from Odebrecht, 10 July 2023, url
49 Clarín, De la corrupción a los golpes de Estado: uno a uno, todos los presidentes de Perú desde los ‘90 y qué pasó con ellos, 7 December 2022, url; Público, Perú, el país de los presidentes encarcelados y procesados, 23 April 2023, url; Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2023, url, p. 9
50 Reuters, Factbox: Peru’s presidents and years of political turmoil, 7 December 2022, url; Expansión, 9 expresidentes de Perú que han sido destituidos o acusados de corrupción, 8 December 2022, url
51 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url; Infobae, Pedro Castillo: las ocho investigaciones en su contra que le valieron a la Fiscalía para lograr su prisión preventiva, 16 December 2022, url
52 Ojo Público, Corrupción descentralizada: 84% de gobernadores regionales son investigados, 20 September 2022, url
1.3. Judicial system

1.3.1. Structure

The Peruvian judiciary is structured as follows:

1. Unlicenced Justices of Peace (*Juzgados de Paz No Letrados*) and Licenced Justices of Peace (*Juzgados de Paz Letrados*): Investigate cases involving minor offenses.\(^{56}\)
   1.1. Unlicenced Justices of Peace: Located in rural towns, hamlets, and small districts with low judicial backlog. They are elected by the inhabitants of the locality and ratified by Superior Courts of Justice.\(^{57}\)
   1.2. Licenced Justices of Peace: Hear cases involving one or more localities in certain rural and urban areas and hear appeals on rulings made by Unlicenced Justices of Peace. They are subordinated to Superior Courts of Justice.\(^{58}\)

2. Specialised Courts (*Juzgados Especializados*) and Mixed Courts (*Juzgados Mixtos*): They have provincial jurisdiction and are responsible for investigating cases in ordinary proceedings related to penal, administrative, labour, family, customs, and tax law.\(^{59}\) These courts also investigate and rule on cases in summary or specialised proceedings and hear appeals on rulings made by Licensed Justices of Peace.\(^{60}\) They are subordinated to Superior Courts of Justice.\(^{61}\)
   2.1. Specialised Courts: They hear cases involving only one of the following areas of law: penal, administrative, labour, family, customs, or tax.\(^{62}\)
   2.2. Mixed Courts: They are in places where there are no Specialised Courts and investigate cases involving two or more of these areas of law.\(^{63}\)

3. Superior Courts of Justice (*Cortes Superiores de Justicia*): They carry out trials and issue rulings and sentences on cases deemed by Specialised and Mixed Courts as having merit. These courts also hear appeals on cases ruled by Specialised and Mixed Courts.\(^{64}\)

4. Supreme Court of Justice (*Corte Suprema de Justicia*): It is the highest court in the judicial system and hears appeals on cases ruled by Superior Courts of Justice.\(^{65}\)

The Constitutional Court (*Tribunal Constitucional*) is the highest court on constitutional issues and rules on issues regarding unconstitutionality, habeas corpus, habeas data, and writ of amparo [protection].\(^{66}\) The Public Ministry (*Ministerio Público*), also known as the General Attorney Office (*Fiscalía de la Nación*), is an autonomous entity responsible for investigating

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\(^{56}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{57}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{58}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{59}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{60}\) Peru, Conócenos / Definiciones, n.d., url

\(^{61}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{62}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{63}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url

\(^{64}\) Peru, Conócenos / Definiciones, n.d., url

\(^{65}\) Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Conócenos / Historia, n.d., url; Peru, Conócenos / Definiciones, n.d., url

\(^{66}\) Peru, Tribunal Constitucional: Información institucional, n.d., url
criminal offenses and providing protection to victims of crime. The Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) is an autonomous entity that defends and promotes the rights of citizens and communities, and oversees the fulfilment of obligations by the state.

1.3.2. Effectiveness

The judiciary is considered one of the most corrupt institutions in Peru. Constitutional guarantees of due process are not consistent across the judicial system. Pretrial detention is common, with judges ordering it as a rule rather than the exception. In some instances, the length of pretrial detention reached the length of the sentence that the person would have obtained for the alleged crime, although time spent under pretrial detention was factored into the final sentence.

According to DPLF’s Executive Director, the judicial system in Peru is not collapsed, but it is a system with serious limitations to effectively respond to current challenges, including crime and corruption. Delays in the judicial system are usually due to inefficiency, corruption, staff shortages, and backlogs. Judges are also frequently influenced or corrupted by persons outside the judiciary system. Public defenders are ‘poorly trained’, and translation services are rarely provided to defendants who do not speak Spanish. According to the 2022 Bertelsmann Stiftung annual report on Peru, ‘most people are not able to access the judicial system, which is seen as expensive, unreliable and corrupt, and try to resolve their disputes informally. Arbitration outside the judicial system has emerged as a substitute mechanism for resolving contractual disputes, especially in the private sector and in cases involving chambers of commerce, although often with limited success.’ The World Justice Project’s (WJP) Rule of Law Index ranked Peru 0.38 for the impartiality of its justice system, below the regional and global averages of 0.41 and 0.47, respectively. Regarding the timeliness and effectiveness of the justice system, the same index ranks Peru 0.26, below the regional and global averages of 0.37 and 0.47, respectively. Between January and June 2022, the judicial system opened 766,507 cases and resolved 804,742.

67 Peru, ¿Qué es el Ministerio Público - Fiscalía de la Nación?, 30 July 2023, url
68 Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Nuestra institución, n.d., url
70 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
72 La República, Poder Judicial: expertos advierten abuso de la prisión preventive, 6 August 2023, url; TVPE Noticias, Jefe del INPE: “Existe un abuso de la prisión preventiva”, 5 August 2023, url
75 DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
80 WJP, Rule of Law Index: Peru, n.d., url
81 WJP, Rule of Law Index: Peru, n.d., url
82 Peru, Poder Judicial del Perú, Boletín estadístico institucional, No. 02-2022, June 2022, url, p. 8
judicial system opened 702,527 and resolved 700,163 cases. Most cases opened between January and June 2022 were related to family (254,259), labour (177,322), penal (166,123), and civil (104,655) laws. By June 2022, the backlog of cases was over 1,044,000, including 334,000 related to penal law, 248,000 to civil law, 228,000 to family law, and 205,000 to labour law. Most of the backlog is concentrated in Specialised and Mixed Courts (668,430) and Licensed Justices of Peace (291,461).

Sources indicated that the Constitutional Court was considered independent from the other branches of government and has facilitated the resolution of conflicts among the executive and legislative. However, sources also point to recent irregularities in the appointment of Constitutional Court justices, including the selection of persons with ‘inadequate academic and legal qualifications.’

Sources also point to the high levels of impunity for crimes committed in the country. Sources report, for example, on the impunity for the investigation of crimes against human rights defenders, including environmental activists, due to slow and ineffective investigations. Radio Programas del Perú (RPP), a Peruvian news source, quoted the former director of the National Police as indicating that killing-for-hire was only incorporated as a criminal offence in the Penal Code in 2015 and, in seven years, 10 cases have been fully investigated.

1.3.3. Witness protection program

The Procedural Penal Code indicates the following regarding protection measures for witnesses and victims of crime:

Article 247.- Persons eligible for protection measures

1. The protection measures provided for in this Title are applicable to those who, as witnesses, experts, victims, special agents or collaborators, intervene in criminal proceedings.

2. For the protection measures to be applicable, it will be necessary for the Prosecutor, during the preparatory investigation, or the Judge, to determine the existence of a
serious danger to the person, freedom or property of the person, his or her spouse or cohabitant, or their ascendants, descendants or siblings.

Article 248.- Protection measures

1. The Prosecutor or the Judge, as the case may be, having assessed the circumstances provided for in the previous article, ex officio or at the request of the parties, will adopt, depending on the degree of risk or danger, the necessary measures to preserve the identity of the protected person, his or her domicile, profession and place of work, without prejudice to the adversarial action that assists the accused.

2. The protection measures that can be adopted are the following:

a) Police protection.

b) Change of residence.

c) Concealment of the person’s whereabouts.

d) Protection of the identity and other personal data during the procedures, and any other data that may reveal the identity, with a number or any other code used as a replacement for this purpose. When it concerns an inmate in a penitentiary establishment, it is communicated to the Penitentiary Registry Directorate of the National Penitentiary Institute or the one that takes its place.

e) The use of any procedure to make visual identification impossible during the procedures.

f) Setting as address, for the purposes of summonses and notifications, the headquarters of the Prosecutor’s Office, which, in turn, will send confidentially to the recipient.

g) Use of technological tools, such as videoconferences or other appropriate procedures, provided that the necessary resources are available for their implementation. This measure will be adopted to prevent the safety of the protected person from being put at risk once his or her identity is revealed and whenever the preservation of the parties' right to defence requires it.

h) Whenever there is a serious and imminent risk to the life, physical integrity or freedom of the protected person or that of their family members and these legal rights cannot be safeguarded in any other way, their departure from the country may be facilitated with an immigration status that allows them to reside temporarily or carry out work activities abroad.93

According to the DPLF’s Executive Director, protection programs are available for persons participating in high-profile cases but not for regular citizens who are witnesses or victims of

93 Peru, Código de Procedimiento Penal, 2004, url
Additional information on witness protection programs could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

1.4. State security forces

The Armed Forces of Peru (FF. AA., Fuerzas Armadas del Perú) are composed of the Peruvian Army (Ejército del Perú), Peruvian Navy (MGP, Marina de Guerra del Perú), and Air Force of Perú (FAP, Fuerza Aérea del Perú). In 2022, the FF. AA. had about 95,000 active-duty personnel, distributed in 60,000 Army, 25,000 Navy, and 10,000 Air Force.

According to a Ministry of the Interior report on police modernisation, Peru had over 140,000 police officers in 2021. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) website indicated that in 2017, Peru had 120,306 police officers, a rate of 382.6 officers per 100,000 inhabitants. According to a national census on police stations carried out between 2012 and 2017, the National Police of Peru (PNP, Policía Nacional del Perú) had 47,265 officers stationed at police stations in 2017, about one police officer per 673 inhabitants, which represents a decrease in the number of inhabitants per police officer from 755 in 2016 and 856 in 2015. The following map indicates the number of police officers stationed at police stations, by department, as of 2017:

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94 DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
95 Peru, Ministerio de Defensa, Información institucional, n.d., url
96 US, CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, 1 August 2023, url
97 Peru, Bases para el fortalecimiento y la modernización de la Policía Nacional del Perú, 2021, url, p. 11
98 As a comparison, the EU had, in average, a rate of 335 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants between 2019 and 2020. EU, Eurostat, Police, court and prison personnel statistics, April 2023, url. The UNODC website indicated that, based on countries that reported data for 2018, Chile had a rate of 314.48 and Colombia a rate of 367.77.
99 UNODC, Police personnel, n.d., url
100 Peru, INEI, VI Censo Nacional de Comisarías 2012-2017: Principales resultados, February 2018, url, pp. 33-34
Map 2. Number of police officers stationed at police stations, by department, in 2017.¹⁰¹

Peru had 1,470 police stations in 2015, 1,474 in 2016, and 1,495 in 2017.¹⁰² For 2017, police stations included 1,310 regular police stations and 185 specialised police stations, which includes those at airports, highways, for border security, and family stations.¹⁰³ The following map indicates the number of police stations by department, as of 2017:

¹⁰³ Peru, INEI, VI Censo Nacional de Comisarías 2012-2017: Principales resultados, February 2018, url, p. 5. For a detailed map indicating the municipalities that have a police station, see: Peru, INEI, VI Censo Nacional de Comisarías 2012-2017: Mapas temáticos, February 2018, url, p. 8
Additionally, most municipalities have peace officers (Oficiales de Serenazgo) who are responsible for, among others, to alert the National Police of suspicious activity in neighbourhoods, undertake outreach initiatives in communities to prevent crime, assist the National Police and citizens when a crime is committed, and participate in community patrols with the National Police.\textsuperscript{105} By March 2020, the country had 31,715 peace officers.\textsuperscript{106} The following table indicates the number of peace officers by March 2020, by department:

\textsuperscript{104} Peru, INEI, Censo Nacional de Comisarías 2012-2017: Principales resultados, February 2018, \url{url}, p. 33
\textsuperscript{105} Peru, Manual del Sereno Municipal, 2019, \url{url}, Ch. 4
\textsuperscript{106} Peru, Perú: Indicadores de Gestión Municipal 2020, February 2021, \url{url}, p. 136
1.4.1. Effectiveness

Much of the information related to defence and security policies is classified under a 2012 law. A 2021 Ministry of the Interior report on police modernisation identified, among others, the following institutional challenges to police effectiveness: lack of adequate filters in the process of selection of new police officers that results in the recruitment of people with criminal background, ‘arbitrary’ rules and practices around promotions, lack of access to mental health care for police officers, some police stations having obsolete infrastructure and not located in areas in need, obsolete weaponry, lack of specialised equipment for criminal investigations, lack of land and fluvial vehicles, and outdated communication equipment.

In March 2020, Congress approved the Police Protection Law which granted additional judicial protections to state security forces and eliminated the explicit requisite that the use of

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107 Peru, Perú: Indicadores de Gestión Municipal 2020, February 2021, url, p. 136
108 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
109 Peru, Bases para el fortalecimiento y la modernización de la Policía Nacional del Perú, 2021, url, pp. 25-33
force must be proportional to the threat.110 The Law was still in effect in 2023.111 On 29 October 2021, the government passed a resolution authorising the armed forces to support the National Police in ‘securing and maintaining internal order.’112 The resolution, which was issued with a 30-day validity, has been extended since then, according to January 2023 reporting.113 The government has investigated and prosecuted public officials accused of corruption.114

1.5. Political developments

In July 2021, Pedro Castillo was declared President of Peru for the period 2021-2026 in the second round of the presidential elections that took place in the previous month.116 Castillo, from left-wing party Free Peru (Perú Libre), defeated right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori from the Popular Force (Fuerza Popular) political party.117 Despite fraud allegations and legal challenges launched by Popular Force, both presidential and legislative elections were regarded as free and fair by observers.118 Castillo survived two attempts by Congress to remove him from office, in 2021 and May 2022.119

On 7 December 2022, hours before Congress was scheduled to vote whether to impeach Castillo for “moral incapacity”, President Castillo addressed the country announcing the immediate dissolution of Congress and that he would rule by decree until new legislative elections were called.120 The same measures had been successfully adopted by President Alberto Fujimori in 1992 when he dissolved Congress and gained complete control of the government.121 President Castillo’s move was considered an attempted ‘self-coup’ and condemned across the political spectrum.122 As a result, Castillo was detained, impeached,
removed from office, and imprisoned.\textsuperscript{123} Dina Boluarte, then Vice-President, was appointed President by Congress.\textsuperscript{124} Boluarte initially indicated that presidential elections would be called in 2024, requesting Congress to pass legislation to that effect.\textsuperscript{125} Congress, however, rejected these requests.\textsuperscript{126} In June 2023, president Boluarte indicated that she would stay in power until the end of Castillo’s mandate, or July 2026,\textsuperscript{127} although public opinion favoured early elections.\textsuperscript{128}

The DPLF Executive Director observed that, ‘currently, there is a process of coopting of democratic institutions. In the past, there was a widespread consensus that democratic institutions were solid and autonomous despite political crises. But it is no longer the same, especially for the Supreme Court of Justice, the Public Ministry, the Office of the Ombudsperson, and the Justice National Commission (JNJ, Junta Nacional de Justicia),\textsuperscript{129} the constitutional body responsible for appointing and investigating judges and prosecutors.\textsuperscript{130} Human Rights Watch (HRW) similarly indicated that ‘[s]ectors of Congress seem to be moving rapidly to weaken democratic institutions that could serve as checks on their power.’\textsuperscript{131} The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) indicated, for example, that constitutional concepts such as ‘constitutional impeachment’, ‘presidential vacancy due to permanent moral incapacity’, and ‘dissolution of Congress due to non-confidence votes by two councils of ministers,’ lack of objective definition and have the ‘potential to weaken the separation and balance of powers and paralyze the governability of the country.’\textsuperscript{132} The ‘presidential vacancy due to permanent moral incapacity’ concept, for example, was used

\textsuperscript{123} International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
\textsuperscript{124} International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
\textsuperscript{125} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 3; El País, Dina Boluarte sepulta su promesa de adelanto electoral: “El tema está cerrado. Seguiremos hasta julio de 2026”, 16 June 2023, url; AFP, Boluarte descarta elecciones anticipadas en Perú ante nuevos llamados a protestas, 16 June 2023, url
\textsuperscript{126} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 3; El País, Dina Boluarte sepulta su promesa de adelanto electoral: “El tema está cerrado. Seguiremos hasta julio de 2026”, 16 June 2023, url; AFP, Boluarte descarta elecciones anticipadas en Perú ante nuevos llamados a protestas, 16 June 2023, url
\textsuperscript{127} El País, Dina Boluarte sepulta su promesa de adelanto electoral: “El tema está cerrado. Seguiremos hasta julio de 2026”, 16 June 2023, url; AFP, Boluarte descarta elecciones anticipadas en Perú ante nuevos llamados a protestas, 16 June 2023, url
\textsuperscript{128} El País, Dina Boluarte sepulta su promesa de adelanto electoral: “El tema está cerrado. Seguiremos hasta julio de 2026”, 16 June 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 22
\textsuperscript{129} DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
\textsuperscript{130} DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023; La República, Congreso aprueba golpe contra el sistema de justicia, 8 September 2023, url; CEJIL et al., Organizaciones internacionales condenamos ataque parlamentario contra Junta Nacional de Justicia en el Perú, 8 September 2023, url
\textsuperscript{131} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 12
\textsuperscript{132} OAS, IACHR, Situación de Derechos Humanos en Perú en el contexto de las protestas sociales, 23 April 2023, url, pp. 34-35
against several presidents, including Alberto Fujimori in 2000, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2017, Martín Vizcarra in 2020, and Pedro Castillo.

On 7 September 2023, the Justice Commission of the Congress approved a motion to investigate, within seven days, and summarily dismiss the seven members of the JNJ. Sources indicated that the JNJ is currently investigating the General Attorney for irregularities including influence peddling and accepting an award from the mayor of Lima who is being investigated for money laundering. Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

133 AFP, En 2000, Alberto Fujimori dimitió y el Congreso luego lo destituyó, 22 March 2018, [url]
134 BBC, El Congreso de Perú debate la aceptación de la renuncia del presidente Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, 23 March 2018, [url]
135 BBC, Pedro Castillo | 6 presidentes en 4 años: por qué Perú es tan difícil de gobernar, 8 December 2022, [url]; Caretas, Cuatro presidentes fueron vacados por “incapacidad moral permanente” en la historia del Perú, 14 March 2022, [url]
136 La República, Congreso aprueba golpe contra el sistema de justicia, 8 September 2023, [url]; CEJIL et al., Organizaciones internacionales condenamos ataque parlamentario contra Junta Nacional de Justicia en el Perú, 8 September 2023, [url]
137 CEJIL et al., Organizaciones internacionales condenamos ataque parlamentario contra Junta Nacional de Justicia en el Perú, 8 September 2023, [url]
138 La República, Patricia Chirinos denuncia constitucionalmente a miembros de la JNJ y pide que sean inhabilitados, 9 July 2023, [url]; Infobae, Patricia Benavides se refirió a la investigación contra la JNJ: “No me involucren en las decisiones del Congreso”, 9 September 2023, [url]
2. Demonstrations

In April and May 2022, large demonstrations, some violent, took place against then President Castillo, protesting the administration’s economic policies in the context of rising inflation and the increase in the prices of fuel, fertilisers, and food. The government decreed a 30-day state of emergency to deal with the protests, but abolished the decree later that day. The protests left 5 deaths and 59 persons injured among citizens and police officers.

On 7 December 2022, after Castillo was removed from office and imprisoned, nationwide protests emerged to demand Castillo’s release. This demand ‘quickly’ disappeared and protests evolved and broadened, with demonstrators calling for Boluarte’s removal from office, the holding of early general elections before 2026, the drafting of a new Constitution, and demands for better living standards and access to health care and education. Initially, protesters were predominantly from rural areas, some of whom identified with Castillo’s background as a rural school teacher, and travelled to the capital cities of the departments to demonstrate. Protests grew in size with the outcry over the government’s repressive response to demonstrations and the participation residents of these cities, many of them of indigenous background. Sources indicated that protesters’ grievances had deeper roots arising from Peru’s profound inequality where power and financial resources are concentrated in urban elites, while the Indigenous population has been plagued by racism and lack of economic opportunity. According to International Crisis Group, many demonstrators identified with Castillo and saw his impeachment as a ‘direct attack on their community.”

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139 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
140 BBC, Perú: el gobierno de Pedro Castillo decreta el estado de emergencia en Lima para contrarrestar las protestas que dejaron 4 muertos, 5 April 2022, url; The New York Times, Protestas en Perú: el gobierno eliminó el estado de emergencia pero las manifestaciones continúan, 5 April 2022, url
141 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
142 Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Resumen ejecutivo del vigésimo sexto informe anual 2022, 19 May 2023, url, p. 16
143 Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Resumen ejecutivo del vigésimo sexto informe anual 2022, 19 May 2023, url, p. 16
144 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Resumen ejecutivo del vigésimo sexto informe anual 2022, 19 May 2023, url, p. 16
146 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 23
147 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, pp. 4, 23
148 HRW, interview with EUAA, 22 August 2023. See also: International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url
149 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 4
150 HRW, interview with EUAA, 22 August 2023
151 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 24
152 International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url
As a response to the protests, the Boluarte government deployed the military and declared a state of emergency in affected areas. \(^{153}\) The state of emergency granted ‘special powers’ to security forces and limited freedom of assembly. \(^{154}\)

Between 7 December 2022 and mid-February 2023, the Office of the Ombudsperson reported 1,327 protests with ‘thousands’ of people participating. \(^{155}\) Protests were organised through social media without an apparent leadership and were supported by different sectors of society, including students, teachers, farmers, trade unions, indigenous peoples, defence fronts (grupos de defensa), and rural patrols (rondas campesinas). \(^{156}\) The largest demonstrations took place in southern Peru, characterised for a large presence of indigenous peoples and high levels of poverty, as well as in coastal cities such as Callao and Lima. \(^{158}\) Some demonstrations led to the burning of buildings and blockades of highways and roads across the country, affecting the supply of food and fuel. \(^{159}\) By 15 February 2023, around 60 people had died in the protests, including 48 in clashes with security forces, and a police officer. \(^{160}\)

Between March and July 2023, the number of protests declined progressively to virtually none. \(^{162}\) However, on 19 July 2023, further demonstrations were held in the country calling for President Boluarte’s resignation and new presidential elections. \(^{163}\) According to the Office of the Ombudsperson, demonstrations took place in 64 provinces and included rallies, blockades, and confrontations between demonstrators and state security forces. \(^{164}\) Among the demonstrators were union organisations, feminist organisations, students, and reservists, and citizens unaffiliated with any social or political organisations. \(^{165}\) The Office of the Ombudsperson reported 14 persons injured during the protests, including 6 civilians and 8 police officers, 16 cases of aggression against journalists, and the detention of 6 demonstrators. \(^{166}\)

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\(^{153}\) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, [url]

\(^{154}\) Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, [url]

\(^{155}\) HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, [url], p. 4

\(^{156}\) Community self-defence groups that emerged during the armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s. International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, [url];

\(^{157}\) International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, [url];  HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, [url], p. 23

\(^{158}\) International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, [url];  HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, [url], pp. i, 24

\(^{159}\) HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in April 2023, [url], p. 4

\(^{160}\) HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, [url], p. 4

\(^{161}\) International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, [url];  AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, [url], p. 11

\(^{162}\) Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe defensorial No. 0001-2023-DP/APCSG, 21 July 2023, [url], p. 2;  DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023

\(^{163}\) El País, Las protestas se reactivan en Perú para exigir la renuncia de Dina Boluarte y un adelanto electoral, 20 July 2023, [url];  DW, Reinician protestas en Perú pidiendo adelanto de elecciones, 20 July 2023, [url]

\(^{164}\) Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe defensorial No. 0001-2023-DP/APCSG, 21 July 2023, [url], pp. 2-3

\(^{165}\) Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe defensorial No. 0001-2023-DP/APCSG, 21 July 2023, [url], p. 3;  El Mundo, Nueva ‘Toma de Lima’ para resucitar las protestas en Perú, 20 July 2023, [url]

\(^{166}\) Peru, Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe defensorial No. 0001-2023-DP/APCSG, 21 July 2023, [url], pp. 4-6
2.1. Treatment by authorities

Authorities reportedly used excessive and indiscriminate force, including lethal force, during the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{167} According to a January 2023 report by the National Coordinator for Human Rights (CNDDHH, Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos), an NGO that promotes and advocates for the defence of human rights in the country, authorities used assault rifles and, as ammunition, buckshot calibre pellets, glass marbles, and bullets,\textsuperscript{168} which are prohibited by internal rules of the National Police.\textsuperscript{169} Authorities also used tear gas during demonstrations as well as during funeral processions for those killed during the demonstrations, despite the presence of children.\textsuperscript{170} The CNDDHH report further indicated that police officers infiltrated the demonstrations and instigated demonstrators to engage in disturbances to justify eventual detentions.\textsuperscript{171} Sources also indicated that authorities planted evidence such as illicit drugs and machetes to incriminate protesters.\textsuperscript{172}

The Boluarte government also engaged in a stigmatising discourse against those who participated in the protests by linking them to terrorists, drug traffickers, and illegal miners.\textsuperscript{173} Amnesty International indicated that the portrayal of protesters as ‘violent and radical’ was intentional and government officials ‘did not publicly demand accountability from the police or the army.’\textsuperscript{174} For example, the chief of the criminal investigations division of the National Police indicated that members of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) infiltrated the protests.\textsuperscript{175} Government officials also accused the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADDEF, Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales), a political organisation

\textsuperscript{167} International Crisis Group, Is There a Way Out of Peru’s Strife?, 15 February 2023, url; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 2
\textsuperscript{168} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, url, pp. 18-19. See also: HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 2
\textsuperscript{169} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 2
\textsuperscript{170} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, url, p. 19
\textsuperscript{171} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, url, p. 28
\textsuperscript{172} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, url, p. 28
\textsuperscript{173} RPP, Dina Boluarte llama a la paz y unidad ante reinicio de protestas en el sur del país, 4 January 2023, url; El Popular, Alberto Otárola sobre protestas en Puno: “Están siendo financiados por dinero oscuro del narcotráfico”, 9 January 2023, url; HRW, interview with EUAA, 22 August 2023; AI, Peru: Senior officials should face investigation over widespread lethal attacks by security forces, 25 May 2023, url
\textsuperscript{174} AI (Amnesty International), Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 3
\textsuperscript{175} Agencia EFE, Policía de Perú afirma que Sendero Luminoso se ha infiltrado en protestas, 13 January 2023, url; CNN, Familias de Perú piden reparaciones por la muerte de manifestantes durante las protestas, mientras Boluarte promete investigar abusos de las autoridades, 25 January 2023, url
with alleged links to Shining Path,\textsuperscript{176} of being behind the protests.\textsuperscript{177} For more information on Shining Path, see Section 3.5 Armed and criminal groups. In addition, pro-government media outlets publicly denounced demonstrators and labelled them as ‘terrorists,’ and NGOs that advocated for the rights of demonstrators were portrayed as ‘defenders of terrorists.’\textsuperscript{178} The government also indicated that the protests were financed by foreign actors\textsuperscript{179} and illegal organisations such as drug traffickers and illegal miners,\textsuperscript{180} and that money collections made by demonstrators to travel to the cities to protest were deemed as illegal financing by authorities.\textsuperscript{181} Despite these allegations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged in an interview with The New York Times that the government did not have ‘any evidence that weeks of protests were being driven by criminal groups’, adding, however, that the government ‘will have that evidence very soon.’\textsuperscript{182} Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

According to the Director of the National Police, in interview with Human Rights Watch, the ‘police had not confiscated any firearms from protesters anywhere in the country as of February 7, 2023.’\textsuperscript{183} According to the IACHR, there was also a ‘strong stigmatization on the basis of ethnic, racial and regional factors’ in the discourse of some authorities, which used terms such as ‘terrorists,’ ‘senderistas,’ ‘Indians,’ and ‘other disrespectful expressions’ to refer to indigenous peoples and peasants.\textsuperscript{184} Similarly, Human Rights Watch indicated that, according to its field research, even though ‘some people involved in crime may be taking advantage of the crisis to pursue their interests in certain locations, [it] found no evidence that criminal organizations had orchestrated the protests.’\textsuperscript{185} According to Human Rights Watch, as of August 2023, the stigmatising discourse continued.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{176} MOVADEN organises and participates in anti-government demonstrations and rallies calling for the release of Shining Path members. MOVADEN applied to become a political party, but the JNE rejected the application in 2016 indicating that MOVADEN does not meet the requirements to be a political party. BBC, Qué es el Movadef, la polémica organización que vinculan con Sendero Luminoso en Perú y a la que acusan de apología al terrorismo, 9 August 2017, \url{...}; Infobae, Movadef, Sendero Luminoso y MRTA están detrás de la violencia en las protestas, advirtió el jefe de la Dircote, 13 December 2022, \url{...}; Canal N, JNE rechazó inscripción de frente impulsado por el Movadef, 28 September 2016, \url{...}

\textsuperscript{177} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, \url{...}, p. 29

\textsuperscript{178} CNDDHH, Informe Alternativo al Comité de Derechos Humanos: Presentado en el marco del sexto informe periódico del Perú, 30 January 2023, \url{...}, p. 29

\textsuperscript{179} El Popular, Alberto Otárola sobre protestas en Puno: "Están siendo financiados por dinero oscuro del narcotráfico", 9 January 2023, \url{...}; 24 Horas, Ministro del Interior: “No se descarta que haya financiamiento extranjero para las protestas”, 15 December 2022, \url{...}

\textsuperscript{180} El Popular, Alberto Otárola sobre protestas en Puno: "Están siendo financiados por dinero oscuro del narcotráfico", 9 January 2023, \url{...}; La República, Manifestantes: “Acusación de tener financiamiento ilegal nos ofende”, 12 February 2023, \url{...}

\textsuperscript{181} HRW, interview with EUAA. 22 August 2023

\textsuperscript{182} The New York Times, Peru’s Foreign Minister Concedes There’s No Evidence Criminals Are Behind Protests, 7 February 2023, \url{...}

\textsuperscript{183} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, \url{...}, p. 6

\textsuperscript{184} Ojo Público, CIDH denuncia terruqueo y estigmatización por factores raciales de parte de autoridades durante la crisis social, 13 January 2023, \url{...}

\textsuperscript{185} HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, \url{...}, p. 37

\textsuperscript{186} HRW, interview with EUAA, 22 August 2023
The Office of the Ombudsperson indicated that between 7 December 2022 and 23 January 2023, 639 persons were detained in the context of the protests.187 The same source indicated that 578 of the detainees were set free and that the Public Ministry opened 105 criminal investigations.188 Sources indicated that between 7 December 2022 and 10 February 2023, 743 people were detained in the context of the protests.189 Ojo Público reported that, according to information provided by the Public Ministry, 27 persons were sentenced for ‘vandalism’ and other 30 persons are under ‘pretrial detention.’190 Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

Sources indicate that violation of due process and abuses against detainees took place during the protests, including mass detentions, physical and psychological abuse during detention, and deprivation of food, medicines, menstruating products, water, and sleep.191 Authorities also dissuaded protesters through the arbitrary use of ‘identity checks’ to intimidate protesters or persons wanting to protest.192 In an interview with EUAA for this report, César Muñoz, Americas Associate Director of Human Rights Watch indicated that the General Attorney Office opened investigations against protesters and assigned these cases to prosecutors specialised in organised crime due to the allegations of terrorism and financing by criminal organisations. However, in the cases analysed by Human Rights Watch, after the preliminary investigations, prosecutors found that these cases were not organised crime-related and referred them to common crime prosecutors.193 The same source indicated that for some people who were injured in the demonstrations, authorities reportedly use these injuries as evidence of their participation in the attacks against the police during the protests.194

Journalists were also attacked during the protests by both demonstrators and state security forces, with the Peruvian National Association of journalists documenting, between December 2022 and January 2023, 155 instances of harassment, threats, beatings, and arbitrary detentions.195

According to Ministry of Health data consulted by Human Rights Watch, about 1,300 people, including 39 children and 380 police officers, were treated in public and private health facilities for injuries sustained during the demonstrations.196 Some of the injured were
passersby or bystanders. According to Amnesty International, the use of force differed between regions, with localities with greater indigenous representation having a disproportionate higher number of deaths.

Most of the victims who died were killed by gunshot wounds caused by assault rifles and handguns consistent with security forces’ equipment, and at least one victim died from a direct shot with a gas canister. Sources also pointed to the alleged commission of ‘extrajudicial executions’ by state agents. Amnesty International documented the death of 25 people and, according to its research, 20 of these deaths are consistent with extrajudicial execution due to the type of ammunition used, the location of the fatal wounds in the body of the victims, the state of defenselessness of the victim at the time of death, the way incidents occurred as recorded on images or reported by witnesses, among others. Human Rights Watch documented several cases of demonstrators and bystanders who were injured or killed by state security forces. Amnesty International also documented the killings of demonstrators by police.

Violence against police officers by some demonstrators was also documented. Some demonstrators threw stones and homemade devices that included fireworks, and used explosives and craft made weapons. The Office of the Ombudsperson documented 153 incidents of violence by protesters against police officers, leaving ‘hundreds’ of them injured.

2.2. Investigations into abuses

Sources indicate that state security forces have been involved in the commission of arbitrary detentions and unlawful killings and that abuses committed by security forces are rarely punished. In July 2022, the General Attorney Office suspended the investigation into the killings of Inti Sotelo and Brian Pintado allegedly by security forces during a 2020 anti-

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198 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 64; AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 44
199 AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 48
200 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, pp. 2, 5, 6; AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, pp. 11-12
201 OAS, IACHR, Situación de Derechos Humanos en Perú en el contexto de las protestas sociales, 23 April 2023, url, paras. 158, 290; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 108; AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 2; DPLF, interview with EUAA, 6 September 2023
202 AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 12
203 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, pp. 63-67
204 AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 16
205 AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 11; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 4
206 AI, Lethal racism: Extrajudicial executions and unlawful use of forces by Peru’s security forces, 2023, url, p. 11; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 4
207 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 4
209 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url; HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 60
government demonstration, after a court ruled that the killings did not amount to human rights violations and that they should be investigated as a regular crime. In February 2023, the Inspector General of the National Police found that the 11 officers who were accused of the killings were not responsible and absolved them of all charges.

The IACHR report on Peru indicates that, in the context of the December 2022 protests, the Public Ministry opened six investigations on the 27 deaths reported, all in the stage of 'preliminary investigation.' It also opened 16 investigations on the 344 cases of persons injured. As of February 2023, the General Attorney Office had opened 189 investigations into the deaths and injuries of protesters and bystanders; however, no police officer has been disciplined or removed from duty. Specialised human rights prosecutors lead some of these investigations; however, there are 47 nationwide with 4 of them stationed in southern Peru, where most of the incidents occurred. Additionally, ‘serious’ flaws have occurred during the investigations, including failure to collect evidence, secure crime scenes, order gunshot residue tests on military and police officers, arrange autopsies before burials, seizing guns for ballistic analysis, obtain CCTV footage of crime scenes, and lack of forensic experts assigned to the cases. Additional information on the status of these investigations could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

The General Attorney Office opened an investigation against Boluarte, three ministers and two ex-ministers for the crimes of murder and genocide. Additional information could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report.

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211 Infobae, "Impunidad criminal": Absuelven a 11 policías investigados por muertes de Inti y Bryan, 21 February 2023, url; La República, Inti y Bryan: Inspectoría PNP absolvió a 11 oficiales investigados por muerte de jóvenes, 23 February 2023, url
212 OAS, IACHR, Situación de Derechos Humanos en Perú en el contexto de las protestas sociales, 23 April 2023, url, para. 181
213 OAS, IACHR, Situación de Derechos Humanos en Perú en el contexto de las protestas sociales, 23 April 2023, url, para. 181
214 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 8
215 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 83
216 HRW, Deadly Decline: Security Force Abuses and Democratic Crisis in Peru, April 2023, url, p. 9
217 DW, Fiscalía de Perú abre investigación a Boluarte por genocidio, 11 January 2023, url; BBC, La Fiscalía de Perú abre investigación preliminar contra la presidenta Dina Boluarte por "genocidio" tras las muertes en las protestas, 11 January 2023, url
3. Criminality

According to the Public Ministry, the most prevalent crimes in Peru are aggravated theft, extortion, kidnapping, and cybercrime. A statistics report produced by INEI on criminality, based on information provided by the National Police and the Ministry of the Interior, indicated that, in 2022, the National Police registered a total of 497,581 complaints, an increase of 23.4 percent from 2021. Of these complaints, 316,728 were related to crimes such as theft, robbery, and extortion. Between October and December 2020, the departments with the highest number of criminal complaints were Lima Metropolitan Area, Lambayeque, Arequipa, and La Libertad. A survey by INEI on public safety, indicated that between November 2022 and April 2023, 25 percent of respondents nationwide, 27.3 percent in major urban centres, and 19 percent in rural towns, declared as having been the victim of a crime. A 2022 report by Ricardo Valdés, former Minister of the Interior of Peru; Carlos Basombrío, journalist and former Minister of the Interior; and Dante Vera, sociologist, indicated that, according to INEI, between 80 and 85 percent of crimes are not reported to authorities. According to security experts consulted by Argentinian news source Infobae, criminal organisations have been incorporating different methods and techniques throughout the years, and they have infiltrated large sectors of Peruvian society, taking advantage of the ‘fear and vulnerability’ of the population.

Sources indicated that a number of local criminal organisations and gangs operate in the country, particularly in Lima. Peruvian newspaper La República reported that the National Police and prosecutors identified 11 criminal organisations that control around 33 public park areas in Lima. Some of the activities carried out by criminal organisations include kidnapping, extortion, contract killings, drug trafficking, and trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation. According to a spokesperson from the National Police, criminal organisations

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226 Peru, Ministerio Público Fiscalía de la Nación, ¿Cuáles son los delitos más comunes en el Perú?, 6 August 2023, url
227 Peru, INEI, Estadísticas de la criminalidad, seguridad ciudadana y violencia: Una visión desde los registros administrativos, Enero – Marzo 2023, Informe Técnico No. 2 – Junio 2023, June 2023, url
228 Peru, INEI, Estadísticas de la criminalidad, seguridad ciudadana y violencia: Una visión desde los registros administrativos, Enero – Marzo 2023, Informe Técnico No. 2 – Junio 2023, June 2023, url
229 A survey had a sample of 28,624 households throughout the country with a margin of error of 5 %. Peru, INEI, Estadísticas de seguridad ciudadana, Noviembre 2022-April 2023, Informe Técnico No. 4 – Julio 2023, July 2023, url
230 Peru, INEI, Estadísticas de seguridad ciudadana, Noviembre 2022-April 2023, Informe Técnico No. 4 – Julio 2023, July 2023, url
231 Valdés, Ricardo et al., Las economías criminales y su impacto en el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, url
232 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, url
233 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; La República, PNP: bandas extranjeras tienen el control de 33 plazas en 14 distritos de Lima, 26 June 2023, url
234 La República, PNP: bandas extranjeras tienen el control de 33 plazas en 14 distritos de Lima, 26 June 2023, url; Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, url
commit these and other ‘cruel’ acts as an ‘exemplary tactic to create fear among inhabitants’ and control territory. According to sources, criminal organisations from Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador have made inroads in Peru, particularly in Lima, and are displacing Peruvian gangs due to their economic and military power. For additional information on criminal groups, see Section 3.5 Armed and criminal groups.

Peru is the second largest cocaine producer in the world after Colombia. Local traffickers have ties with international drug trafficking organisations from countries such as Colombia and Mexico, as well as with transnational criminal organisations in countries such as Brazil and Italy. According to the Director of the General Directorate Against Organised Crime, international drug trafficking organisations act as financiers of criminal organisations in Peru.

3.1. Homicides

Peru’s homicide rate is lower than some countries in the region; however, street crime is rampant and violent organised criminal groups are prevalent in the country. Information on recent homicide rates could not be found among the sources consulted within the time constraints of this report. The homicide rate for 2020 was 5.8 per 100 000 inhabitants. In Lima, 700 homicides were committed in 2022, including 367 contracted killings. Between January and April 2023, 220 homicides took place in Lima, including 118 contracted killings. The districts with the highest number of homicides in 2022 were San Juan Lurigancho (138 homicides), San Martín de Porres (80), Ate (59), Comas (54), Cercado de Lima (36), Los Olivos (34), and El Agustino (31). Between January and April 2023, the districts with the highest number of homicides were Ate (20 homicides), San Juan de Lurigancho (19), Villa María del Triunfo (12), Puente Piedra (9), and San martín de Porres and San Juan de Miraflores (8 each).

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229 La República, PNP: bandas extranjeras tienen el control de 33 plazas en 14 distritos de Lima, 26 June 2023, url
230 Trome, Tren de Aragua y otras bandas criminales extranjeras toman el control de Lima: ¿quién son y en qué distritos operan?, 5 June 2023, url; Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; La República, Guerra entre bandas extranjeras ya ha dejado 41 muertos en Lima, según PNP, 19 June 2023, url
231 InSight Crime, Peru, n.d, url; Swissinfo.ch, La mutación del mapa del narcotráfico en Perú, 26 June 2023, url
232 InSight Crime, Peru, n.d, url; Ojo Público, Sonia Medina: “En Perú las organizaciones criminales nos están llevando la avanzada”, 9 July 2023, url
233 Ojo Público, Sonia Medina: “En Perú las organizaciones criminales nos están llevando la avanzada”, 9 July 2023, url
234 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2023: Peru, 2023, url
235 Peru, INEI, Nota de prensa No. 198, 14 December 2022, url
236 Infobae, Sicariato en Lima va en aumento: 367 de los 700 crímenes del 2022 fueron por encargo o ajustes de cuenta, 6 May 2023, url; La República, Pelea territorial de bandas aumentan muertes por sicariato, 6 May 2023, url
237 Infobae, Sicariato en Lima va en aumento: 367 de los 700 crímenes del 2022 fueron por encargo o ajustes de cuenta, 6 May 2023, url; La República, Pelea territorial de bandas aumentan muertes por sicariato, 6 May 2023, url
238 Infobae, Sicariato en Lima va en aumento: 367 de los 700 crímenes del 2022 fueron por encargo o ajustes de cuenta, 6 May 2023, url; La República, Pelea territorial de bandas aumentan muertes por sicariato, 6 May 2023, url
239 Infobae, Sicariato en Lima va en aumento: 367 de los 700 crímenes del 2022 fueron por encargo o ajustes de cuenta, 6 May 2023, url; La República, Pelea territorial de bandas aumentan muertes por sicariato, 6 May 2023, url
3.2. Human trafficking

Human trafficking for the purposes of sexual and labour exploitation has also been increasing in Peru.\textsuperscript{240} Statistics vary according to the source. According to Public Ministry statistics, 6 107 cases were reported by authorities in 2022, 5 626 in 2021, 3 915 in 2020, and 6 056 in 2019.\textsuperscript{241} Between January and May 2023, authorities reported 2 222 cases.\textsuperscript{242} According to statistics by the Ministry of the Interior, 631 complaints were filed in 2022 and 106 between January and March 2023.\textsuperscript{243} The same source indicated that in the complaints filed between January and March 2023, 90.6 percent of victims were women and 48.1 percent were minors between the ages of 12 and 17.\textsuperscript{244} Victims, however, prefer not filing police complaints out of fear of retribution, including killing.\textsuperscript{245} The Special Prosecutor for Human Trafficking (FISTRAP, \textit{Fiscalía Especializada en Trata de Personas}) have 688 files opened, including 115 in Arequipa, 70 in northern Lima, 65 in Tumbes, 62 in Loreto, and 61 in central Lima.\textsuperscript{246} Sources indicated that human trafficking for the purposes of sexual and labour exploitation is closely related to the trafficking of migrants who are usually forced, often under threats, into sexual or labour exploitation.\textsuperscript{247} According to the Public Ministry, Venezuelans represented 85 percent of victims of sexual exploitation in 2022, followed by Colombians (6.27 percent), Ecuadorians (4.43), and Bolivians (2.21).\textsuperscript{248} According to the Coordinator of Specialised Courts for human trafficking, criminal organisations are parcelling out red light districts to, among others, extort sex workers and sexually exploit them.\textsuperscript{249} The justice system sentenced 170 persons in 2022 and, between January and May 2023, 44 persons.\textsuperscript{250}

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\textsuperscript{240} Infobae, Trata de personas: uno de los delitos que mueve más millones en el Perú por la explotación sexual y laboral, 28 March 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{241} La República, Redes de trata aumentan en todo el país: hay 2.222 denuncias en lo que va del 2023, 23 May 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{242} La República, Redes de trata aumentan en todo el país: hay 2.222 denuncias en lo que va del 2023, 23 May 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{243} Perú, Ministerio del Interior, Denuncias de trata de personas, March 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{244} Perú, Ministerio del Interior, Denuncias de trata de personas, March 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{245} La República, Redes de trata aumentan en todo el país: hay 2.222 denuncias en lo que va del 2023, 23 May 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{246} Valdés, Ricardo et al., Las economías criminales y su impacto en el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, \url{url}, pp. 110-111.
\textsuperscript{247} CHS Alternativo, En el Perú, el 85% de víctimas extranjeras de trata de personas son venezolanas, 5 September 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{248} CHS Alternativo, En el Perú, el 85% de víctimas extranjeras de trata de personas son venezolanas, 5 September 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{249} La República, Redes de trata aumentan en todo el país: hay 2.222 denuncias en lo que va del 2023, 23 May 2023, \url{url}.
\textsuperscript{250} La República, Redes de trata aumentan en todo el país: hay 2.222 denuncias en lo que va del 2023, 23 May 2023, \url{url}.
\end{flushright}
3.3. Kidnapping

Sources indicated that kidnappings are increasing in the country. The Director of the National Police indicated that, between January and June 2013, 99 kidnappings were reported in Lima, 25 in Arequipa, 24 in Lambayeque, 9 in Ica, 9 in Piura, 9 in Cusco, 9 in Cajamarca, and 5 in Ayacucho. According to data provided by Willax TV, a Peruvian news source, the following are among the places where most kidnappings have taken place in Lima: Javier Prado Avenue, Bolognesi Plaza, Óvalo Grau, Puente Primavera, Puente Atocongo, and the area around Carlos Izaguirre Avenue and Panamericana Norte. According to the National Police, 3 398 kidnapping complaints were filed with authorities in 2022, about nine kidnappings per day. The Director of the National Police indicated that the increasing number of kidnappings is associated with the crime of extortion in the sense that criminal groups are engaging in the kidnapping of victims that they used to extort to obtain higher ransoms. Kidnappers usually start profiling victims according to their wealth and monitor them through social media. Profiles of victims reported by sources include business owners, restaurant owners, mayors, public servants, professionals, street vendors, warehouse owners, moto taxi drivers, and minors.

Sources reported that ‘express kidnappings’ (‘secuestros al paso’) also occur. They consist in kidnapping the victim for a few hours to empty the bank accounts of the victim. Express kidnappings usually occur when the victim boards an illegal taxi and, once abroad, criminals get into the taxi to force the victim to empty bank accounts. Sources reported on the case of a National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT, Superintendencia...

251 Expreso, PNP da a conocer cifras de secuestros: estos son los lugares con mayor incidencia, 18 July 2023, url: El Comercio, Alerta por incremento de secuestros y casos que terminan en asesinato: ¿cuál es el perfil de los criminales?, 28 May 2023, url
252 Willax TV, Estos son los lugares donde se reportan más secuestros en Lima, 18 July 2023, url: Expreso, PNP da a conocer cifras de secuestros: estos son los lugares con mayor incidencia, 18 July 2023, url
253 Willax TV, Estos son los lugares donde se reportan más secuestros en Lima, 18 July 2023, url
254 PanamericanaTelevisión, Alerta por incremento de secuestros en Perú: Solo en 2022 se registraron 3 398 denuncias, 10 May 2023, url: El Comercio, Alerta por incremento de secuestros y casos que terminan en asesinato: ¿cuál es el perfil de los criminales?, 28 May 2023, url
255 Infobae, Ola de secuestros en Perú: ¿Cuáles son los distritos más afectados por este delito en ascenso, 23 June 2023, url
256 Infobae, Ola de secuestros en Perú: Dueños de restaurantes, empresarios y hasta autoridades en la mira de los delincuentes, 11 May 2023, url
257 Infobae, Secuestros en el Perú: la lucha contra la impunidad y la inseguridad ciudadana continúa, 24 June 2023, url
258 El Comercio, Alerta por incremento de secuestros y casos que terminan en asesinato: ¿cuál es el perfil de los criminales?, 28 May 2023, url
259 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión amenazan Lima y Callao: cuáles son los distritos más afectados por este delito en ascenso, 23 June 2023, url
260 Expreso, PNP da a conocer cifras de secuestros: estos son los lugares con mayor incidencia, 18 July 2023, url: La República, ¡Niños en mira de los secuestradores! Un total de 70 casos se han reportado en el país, 26 June 2022, url
261 Ojo, Secuestros tradicionales y exprés en el Perú aumentan: conoce los puntos, 2 April 2022, url: La República, Volvieron los secuestros clásicos en Lima: ya van cinco casos, 28 April 2023, url
262 LIMAY.PE, Ola de secuestros crece en Lima: Estas son las modalidades, 19 March 2022, url: Ojo, Secuestros tradicionales y exprés en el Perú aumentan: conoce los puntos, 2 April 2022, url
263 El Comercio, Aumentan secuestros de menores de edad en el país, 22 February 2022, url
Nacional de Administración Tributaria) employee who boarded an illegal taxi on 20 April 2023 in Lima and was kidnapped by members of Chinos de Agucho, a local Lima gang, who forced her to reveal the passwords of her bank cards. She was killed the next day and her body found in the locality of Ate. Authorities detained two suspects for the crime.

3.4. Extortion

Extortion is a problem in Peru. Infobae reported that, according to statistics by the National Police, over 8,000 complaints for extortion were filed in 2022, an increase of 62 percent from 2021. The Public Ministry reported 1,398 complaints in January 2023, or 45 cases per day. In many cases, victims of extortion do not file a complaint out of fear of retribution.

The following are, among others, the extortion methods used by criminal gangs in Peru, as reported by sources:

- **Cobro de cupos**: Criminal organisations charge workers with a ‘fee’, which usually consists of a percentage of their salary.

- **Cobro de cuotas**: Extortion payment imposed on business owners and public transportation companies and drivers for allowing them to operate in the criminal organisation’s area of operation.

- **Chalequeo**: An extortion payment masked as a ‘protection fee’.

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264 Infobae, ‘Loco David’, el cabecilla de la banda que mató a funcionaria de la SUNAT fue capturado, 20 May 2023, [url]; Perú21, Detienen a sospechosos del secuestro y asesinato de trabajadora de la Sunat en Ate, 2 May 2023, [url]

265 Infobae, ‘Loco David’, el cabecilla de la banda que mató a funcionaria de la SUNAT fue capturado, 20 May 2023, [url]; Perú21, Detienen a sospechosos del secuestro y asesinato de trabajadora de la Sunat en Ate, 2 May 2023, [url]

266 Infobae, ‘Loco David’, el cabecilla de la banda que mató a funcionaria de la SUNAT fue capturado, 20 May 2023, [url]; Perú21, Detienen a sospechosos del secuestro y asesinato de trabajadora de la Sunat en Ate, 2 May 2023, [url]

267 Infobae, Extorsión y sicariato sin control en Lima y regiones: por qué los delincuentes ganan cada vez más terreno y qué medidas tomar, 18 June 2023, [url]

268 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url]

269 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url]

270 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url]

271 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, [url], p. 239

272 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, [url], p. 239

273 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, [url], p. 239
• Telephone extortion: The most common type, is carried out through WhatsApp/telephone calls or messages, demanding the deposit of the ‘fee’ in bank accounts. Criminal organisations often use minors to carry out this type of extortion.274

• Extortive stickers: Mostly common in northern Peru, this type of extortion consists in charging an extortion payment to freightliners, transportation drivers, and drivers in general, in exchange of an ‘sticker’ that must be placed in the vehicle to avoid further problems.275

• Hijacking of vehicles: Criminals demand a payment for returning the vehicle to the owner; however, after the payment is done and the owner has the vehicle, the criminal organisation starts to extort him or her with weekly payments. A sticker on the vehicle is used to signal the payment of the extortion ‘fee’.276

• Fake kidnappings or accidents: Criminal organisations simulate the kidnapping or the accident of a person and request the person’s family a payment for the person’s release or assistance in the accident.277

• Loan sharking is one of the drivers of extortion,278 through ‘drop-by-drop’ loans (Péstamos gota a gota) which are illegal loans made by criminal organisations with interest rates of up to 500 percent.279 Criminal organisations have created mobile applications to receive loan applications, and make loans often with the only requirement of providing the national identification document.280 Payments are made daily and non-payment results in threats, harassment, and violence.281 Sources reported that such loans are also made without the person’s consent and loan sharks start to threaten the person with violence, damages to property, sabotaging his or her source of income if no payment is made,282 and extorting the victim’s family members or friends.283 According to a study by the Peruvian Institute of Economy (IPE, Instituto Peruano de Economía), a think tank based in Peru, around 22 percent of informal

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274 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, url; El Peruano, PNP intensifica operativos en todo el país para desarticular mafias de extorsionadores, 30 June 2023, url; Valdés, Ricardo et al., Las economías criminales y su impacto en el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, url, p. 239

275 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, url; UNDiario, Hombre de 19 Años fue Detenido con Stickers, Municiones y Celulares Usados para Extorsión, 28 June 2023, url

276 Valdés, Ricardo et al., Las economías criminales y su impacto en el Perú: ¿Cuáles? ¿Cuánto? ¿Dónde? ¿Cómo?, 2022, url, p. 239

277 El Peruano, PNP intensifica operativos en todo el país para desarticular mafias de extorsionadores, 30 June 2023, url

278 La República, Llamadas de extorsión: ¿cómo denunciar este delito ante la PNP?, 30 June 2023, url; Infobae, Préstamos ‘gota a gota’ en Perú: conoce las aplicaciones que ofrecen estos créditos peligrosos, 2 June 2023, url

279 Infobae, Préstamos ‘gota a gota’ en Perú: conoce las aplicaciones que ofrecen estos créditos peligrosos, 2 June 2023, url; IPE, El mercado de créditos informales en el Perú, 5 June 2023, url

280 For a list of some of the applications, see: Infobae, Préstamos ‘gota a gota’ en Perú: conoce las aplicaciones que ofrecen estos créditos peligrosos, 2 June 2023, url

281 Peru, Ministerio del Interior, “El préstamo gota a gota es un delito”, 16 August 2023, url; Infobae, Préstamos ‘gota a gota’ en Perú: conoce las aplicaciones que ofrecen estos créditos peligrosos, 2 June 2023, url

282 Infobae, Préstamos ‘gota a gota’ en Perú: conoce las aplicaciones que ofrecen estos créditos peligrosos, 2 June 2023, url; La República, Préstamos gota a gota: delincuentes obligan a víctimas y sus contactos a pagar dinero no solicitado, 16 April 2023, url

283 La República, Préstamos gota a gota: delincuentes obligan a víctimas y sus contactos a pagar dinero no solicitado, 16 April 2023, url
loans in Peru are via loan sharks and 49 percent of people who received such a loan pay upwards 500 percent of interests.  

Extortion is also carried out through posted letters, and later evolve into threats of death against victims or their family members. Contract killings, the burning of property, and the throwing of explosives at the victim’s property are carried out when extortion payments are not made. Latina Noticias reported an example on 22 April 2023 where a gang made up of Peruvian nationals and foreigners torched two moto taxis in Comas after the owners refused to pay over 150 soles (37 EUR) per week.

 Victims of extortion, as reported by sources, included affluent persons, blue-collar workers, street vendors, public transit drivers, public servants, members of security forces, artists, owners of small businesses and pharmacies, former football players, fashion models, and warehouse owners. According to a security expert consulted by Infobae, criminal organisations are currently targeting any person they can get their contact information from.

Extortion amounts vary according to the situation: small business owners and public transit drivers in some areas, for example, can be extorted with a ‘protection’ payment of 50 soles (13 EUR) per week. Public transit companies are extorted with payments ranging from 5 (1.24 EUR) soles for drivers and upwards 15 000 soles (3 700 EUR) for companies. An Infobae article reported that a fashion model was extorted with 50 000 soles (12 334 EUR) and threatened the victim with killing her son if she refused to pay. An Infobae news article provided the example of a councillor of the Comas district, Lima, who was extorted with 500 soles (123 EUR) per week by a local gang in exchange for ‘protection’ and received a threatening phone call for skipping a payment. According to a small business owner who filed a complaint for extortion with the National Police, at least 1 000 local small businesses in Chiclayo, Lima, were being victims of extortion.

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284 IPE, El mercado de créditos informales en el Perú, 5 June 2023, [url](#)
285 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
286 Infobae, Extorsión y sicariato sin control en Lima y regiones: por qué los delincuentes ganan cada vez más terreno y qué medidas tomar, 18 June 2023, [url](#); Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
287 Latina Noticias, Comas: extorsionadores queman mototaxis de víctimas, 22 April 2023, [url](#)
288 Infobae, Extorsión y sicariato sin control en Lima y regiones: por qué los delincuentes ganan cada vez más terreno y qué medidas tomar, 18 June 2023, [url](#)
289 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión amenazan Lima y Callao: cuáles son los distritos más afectados por este delito en ascenso, 22 June 2023, [url](#)
290 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
291 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
292 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
293 Infobae, Mafias sangrientas de la extorsión siembran el terror el Perú: amenazan, asesinan y cobran millones a empresarios en Lima y regiones, 10 June 2023, [url](#)
294 Infobae, Extorsión y sicariato sin control en Lima y regiones: por qué los delincuentes ganan cada vez más terreno y qué medidas tomar, 18 June 2023, [url](#)
295 Infobae, Extorsión y sicariato sin control en Lima y regiones: por qué los delincuentes ganan cada vez más terreno y qué medidas tomar, 18 June 2023, [url](#)
The report produced by Valdés et al provided an estimate of the intensity of extortion by province, based on information from a variety of sources consulted by the authors:

Map 4. Intensity of extortion, by department.

3.5. Armed and criminal groups

3.5.1. Criminal groups

Tren de Aragua

*Tren de Aragua* is Venezuela’s most powerful and largest criminal organisation.²⁹⁷ It has between 4 000 and 5 000 members, under a solid hierarchy,²⁹⁸ and has branches in several countries in the Americas, including Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Brazil,²⁹⁹ and

²⁹⁷ InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, [url]; Transparencia Venezuela, *Economías ilícitas: Al amparo de la corrupción*, June 2022, [url], p. 104; Infobae, Extorsión, prostitución, asesinatos, robos y narcotráfico: la banda venezolana “Tren de Aragua” se convirtió en una multinacional del crimen, 1 April 2023, [url].
²⁹⁸ Transparencia Venezuela, *Economías ilícitas: Al amparo de la corrupción*, June 2022, [url], p. 104; Infobae, Extorsión, prostitución, asesinatos, robos y narcotráfico: la banda venezolana “Tren de Aragua” se convirtió en una multinacional del crimen, 1 April 2023, [url].
²⁹⁹ InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, [url]; Transparencia Venezuela, *Economías ilícitas: Al amparo de la corrupción*, June 2022, [url], p. 104; Infobae, Extorsión, prostitución, asesinatos, robos y narcotráfico: la banda venezolana “Tren de Aragua” se convirtió en una multinacional del crimen, 1 April 2023, [url].
Costa Rica. The main leader is Héctor Guerrero, also known as ‘Niño Guerrero’, imprisoned in Aragua state, Venezuela, and he has lieutenants also in jail who control criminal activities carried out by the organisation within Venezuela and abroad. Tren de Aragua’s main criminal activities in Peru include kidnapping, extortion, sexual exploitation, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, contraband, and arms trafficking. Despite efforts by authorities to combat this criminal organisation, Tren de Aragua’s adaptability and economic power have contributed to its strengthening. In Lima, Tren de Aragua operates in districts including Comas, San Martín de Porres, Los Olivos, Independencia, San Juan de Miraflores, Chorrillos, Ate, and Villa El Salvador.

Sources indicated that several factions of Tren de Aragua operate in Peru, including Los Gallegos, La Cota 95, Puros Hermanos Sicarios, Los Palmitos, Los Hijos de Dios, and Guerrilla Pobre. According to Infobae, each faction possesses its own structure and criminal objectives. According to the National Police, these factions are subordinated to Tren de Aragua but can engage in direct confrontations among each other to gain access to areas with profitable illegal activities. For example, which originated in Venezuela, operates in the San Martín de Porres district and is fighting against another faction of Tren de Aragua in Lima to exert control over the illegal economies dedicated to sexual exploitation and extortion. La Cota 95 is engaged in extortion, sexual exploitation, contract killings,

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300 Transparencia Venezuela, Economías ilícitas: Al amparo de la corrupción, June 2022, url, p. 104; Infobae, Extorsión, prostitución, asesinatos, robos y narcotráfico: la banda venezolana “Tren de Aragua” se convirtió en una multinacional del crimen, 1 April 2023, url
301 InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, url; Transparencia Venezuela, Economías ilícitas: Al amparo de la corrupción, June 2022, url, pp. 106-107; Infobae, Extorsión, prostitución, asesinatos, robos y narcotráfico: la banda venezolana “Tren de Aragua” se convirtió en una multinacional del crimen, 1 April 2023, url
302 InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, url; Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url
303 InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, url
304 InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua, 14 February 2023, url; Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; La República, Ronna Rísquez: “El tren de Aragua se expande por el ampio portafolio de delitos que tienen”, 13 August 2023, url
305 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; For additional information on the Tren de Aragua, see the book by Venezuelan journalist Ronna Rísquez, El Tren de Aragua: la banda que revoluciona el crimen organizado en América Latina, 2023.
306 Infobae, Tren de Aragua en Perú: se identificó a los líderes que operan en la explotación sexual en nuestro país, 29 May 2023, url; El Comercio, Red criminal ‘Tren de Aragua’ se extiende de forma imparable en Perú: ya están en 10 regiones, 26 July 2023, url
307 Infobae, Tren de Aragua en Perú: se identificó a los líderes que operan con la explotación sexual en nuestro país, 29 May 2023, url
308 El Comercio, Red criminal ‘Tren de Aragua’ se extiende de forma imparable en Perú: ya están en 10 regiones, 26 July 2023, url
309 Infobae, Tren de Aragua en Perú: se identificó a los líderes que operan con la explotación sexual en nuestro país, 29 May 2023, url
310 Infobae, Tren de Aragua en Perú: se identificó a los líderes que operan con la explotación sexual en nuestro país, 29 May 2023, url
311 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; La República, ¿Quiénes lideran la organización criminal ‘Tren de Aragua’ en el Perú?, 28 May 2023, url
312 Trome, La Cota 95: Cae venezolano por asesinato de compatriota en hotel de Breña, 10 June 2023, url; Infobae, La guerra de bandas del ‘Tren de Aragua’ en Perú: muertes y extorsión por las ‘zona rosas’ de Lima, 3 June 2023, url
among other crimes. For additional information on Tren de Aragua, see EUAA COI report Venezuela: Country Focus (2023).

**Los Tiguerones**

Originating in Ecuador, *Los Tiguerones* is expanding its criminal activities in Peru from Guayaquil, Ecuador, where it has ties with the Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG, *Cartel Jalisco Nuevo Generación*) and FARC dissident groups from Colombia. It operates in San martin de Porres and Comas and its engaged in street-level drug trafficking, robberies, sexual and labour exploitation, contract killing, extortion, smuggling, and trafficking of weapons. Many members in Lima are Ecuadorian citizens residing in the country without immigration status and all members are required to have a tiger tattoo, which is used as an identity marker. *Los Tiguerones* is reportedly engaged in armed confrontations with *Tren de Aragua* for the control of illicit economies in northern Lima.

**Los Malditos del Cono**

Originating in Venezuela as a splinter of *Tren de Aragua*, this criminal organisation operates in northern Lima and is dedicated to sexual exploitation of Venezuelan, Colombian and Ecuadorian women. It also engages in contract killing, kidnapping, extortion, and street-

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313 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url; América Noticias, Banda criminal La Cota 905 es sindicada como responsable del doble crimen en Pasamayo, 4 June 2023, url
314 VICE News, Mexican Cartels Are Turning Once-Peaceful Ecuador Into a Narco War Zone, 17 April 2023, url; Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url. See also: InSight Crime, Guerra de pandillas rompe récord de asesinatos al norte de Ecuador, 28 October 2022, url
315 El Universo, Los Tiguerones llegaron a Perú y mantienen disputas con el Tren de Aragua, alvertan autoridades de ese país, 13 March 2023, url; Swissinfo.ch, En libertad líder criminal de Ecuador que relacionan con disidencias de FARC, 18 April 2023, url
316 Panorama, ¡Exclusivo! Regreso de “Los Tiguerones”: Sanguinario asesino ecuatoriano tenía DNI original peruano, 9 July 2023, url; Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url
317 Panorama, ¡Exclusivo! Regreso de “Los Tiguerones”: Sanguinario asesino ecuatoriano tenía DNI original peruano, 9 July 2023, url; Infobae, ‘Los Tiguerones’: así opera la banda criminal que ya se encuentra en Perú, 11 July 2023, url
318 El Universo, Los Tiguerones llegaron a Perú y mantienen disputas con el Tren de Aragua, alertan autoridades de ese país, 13 March 2023, url
319 La República, Los Tiguerones: ¿cómo opera la banda ecuatoriana qué rivaliza con el Tren de Aragua en Perú?, 17 July 2023, url
320 Panorama, ¡Exclusivo! Regreso de “Los Tiguerones”: Sanguinario asesino ecuatoriano tenía DNI original peruano, 9 July 2023, url; Infobae, ‘Los Tiguerones’: así opera la banda criminal que ya se encuentra en Perú, 11 July 2023, url
321 Panorama, ¡Exclusivo! Regreso de “Los Tiguerones”: Sanguinario asesino ecuatoriano tenía DNI original peruano, 9 July 2023, url; Infobae, ‘Los Tiguerones’: así opera la banda criminal que ya se encuentra en Perú, 11 July 2023, url
322 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, url. See also: La República, PNP: bandas extranjeras tienen el control de 33 plazas en 14 distritos de Lima, 26 June 2023, url
level drug trafficking. In January 2023, its leader was captured by the National Police in Lince, Lima.

**La Dinastía Alayón**

Venezuelan gang operating in the districts of San Juan de Lurigancho and Lince, Lima, and dedicated to sexual exploitation. This gang, alongside other gangs operating in Lima, divided the streets of several districts into ‘plots’ (lotes) to control sexual workers and victims of sexual exploitation. The gangs charge 900 soles [222 EUR] for letting them work in the ‘plots’ and extort them with payments that range from 200 soles [50 EUR] to 300 soles [74 EUR] per week.

**Gangs involved in loan sharks**

*Los Bravos del Gota a Gota* is dedicated to extortion derived from loan sharks. Based in Chorrillos, this group threatens victims and their family members if extortion payments are not made. This band was reportedly dismantled by authorities in April 2023. Other gangs engaged in extortions from loan sharks include *Los Parceros del Gota a Gota* and *Los Malandros del Cono Norte*.

**Los Cagaleches de Virú**

Criminal gang operating in the province of Virú dedicated to the extorsion of farmers and transportation and construction companies. This gang reportedly engaged in the nationwide protests by installing barricades, charging extortion fees to transportation companies, looting

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321 La República, Caen 8 integrantes de la banda criminal Los Malditos del Cono, 24 January 2023, [url]; América Noticias, Desarticulan banda criminal dedicada a la trata de personas, 25 January 2023, [url]
322 La República, PNP captura a ‘Mamut’, líder de una banda de extorsión y trata de personas en Lima Norte, 30 January 2023, [url]; Infobae, Lo que está detrás de la mafia que extorsionaba a trabajadoras sexuales venezolanas en los distritos de Lima Norte, 2 February 2023, [url]
323 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, [url]; Perú21, Mafia venezolana controlaría la prostitución en Lince y otros distritos de Lima, 20 February 2022, [url]
324 Panamericana Televisión, Identifican a las cinco mafias extranjeras que se disputan el control de la prostitución en Lima, 27 February 2022, [url]; Perú21, Mafia venezolana controlaría la prostitución en Lince y otros distritos de Lima, 20 February 2022, [url]
325 Infobae, No es solo el Tren de Aragua: quiénes son esas otras bandas extranjeras y en qué zonas de Lima operan, 5 June 2023, [url]; Andina, “Gota a Gota”: Policía Nacional intensifica operativos contra extorsionadores en el país, 1 May 2023, [url]
326 Andina, “Gota a Gota”: Policía Nacional intensifica operativos contra extorsionadores en el país, 1 May 2023, [url]; Infobae, La guerra del ‘gota a gota’: mafias colombianas y venezolanas desatan el terror por el control del negocio de préstamos extorsivos, 2 May 2023, [url]
327 Infobae, La guerra del ‘gota a gota’: mafias colombianas y venezolanas desatan el terror por el control del negocio de préstamos extorsivos, 2 May 2023, [url]; Andina, “Gota a Gota”: Policía Nacional intensifica operativos contra extorsionadores en el país, 1 May 2023, [url]
328 El Comercio, Extorsión y cobro de cupos en piquetes de carreteras: la historia de los ‘peajes’ paralelos, 28 January 2023, [url]
3.5.2. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP, Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú)

Shining Path was created in 1970 as a Maoist guerrilla and, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, was responsible for 54 percent of the 61,007 to 77,552 deaths that occurred during the internal conflict between May 1980 and November 2000. Shining Path is the last remaining guerrilla group in the country and has been declining over the years.

The Militarized Communist Party of Peru (MPCP, Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú) is the leading faction of the Shining Path after its disintegration in 1992. It has presence in the VRAEM region, particularly the departments of Junín, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica. The VRAEM region is a strategic area for the harvesting of coca and the production of cocaine. Several of its leaders have been killed by authorities since 2011, and it is estimated that the group has between 250 and upwards of 1,200 members. Among the activities carried out by MPCP include the charging of protection ‘fees’ to drug traffickers; ‘social cleansing’ activities to kill drug addicts, thieves, kidnappers, corrupt officials, and LGBT persons; and armed confrontations with state authorities. In May 2021, MPCP killed 16 people in the department of Junín, leaving pamphlets indicating that the killing was part of a ‘social cleansing’ campaign aimed at ‘cleansing the VRAEM from dens, parasites, and corrupt persons,’ and demanded residents of the area to abstain from voting in the second round of the presidential elections.

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334 El Comercio, Extorsión y cobro de cupos en piquetes de carreteras: la historia de los ‘peajes’ paralelos, 28 January 2023, [url]
335 La República, PNP: bandas extranjeras tienen el control de 33 plazas en 14 distritos de Lima, 26 June 2023, [url]
336 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) was established in 2001 to investigate ‘assassinations, torture, disappearances, displacement, employment of terrorist methods and other violations attributable to the State, the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement between May 1980 and November 2000.’ USIP, Truth Commission: Peru 01, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, 13 July 2001, [url]
338 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
339 BBC, ‘Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista de Perú (MPCP) al que le atribuyen la matanza de 16 personas en Vraem (y qué relación tiene con Sendero Luminoso), 26 May 2021, [url]; InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
340 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]; La República, ¿Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú, presunto responsable de la matanza de 16 personas en el Vraem?, 23 November 2021, [url]
341 BBC, ‘Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista de Perú (MPCP) al que le atribuyen la matanza de 16 personas en Vraem (y qué relación tiene con Sendero Luminoso), 26 May 2021, [url]
342 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
343 BBC, ‘Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista de Perú (MPCP) al que le atribuyen la matanza de 16 personas en Vraem (y qué relación tiene con Sendero Luminoso), 26 May 2021, [url]
344 Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, ‘sending death squads to commit human rights violations, particularly the departments of Junín, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica. It has presence in the VRAEM region, particularly the departments of Junín, Ayacucho, and Huancavelica. The VRAEM region is a strategic area for the harvesting of coca and the production of cocaine. Several of its leaders have been killed by authorities since 2011, and it is estimated that the group has between 250 and upwards of 1,200 members. Among the activities carried out by MPCP include the charging of protection ‘fees’ to drug traffickers; ‘social cleansing’ activities to kill drug addicts, thieves, kidnappers, corrupt officials, and LGBT persons; and armed confrontations with state authorities. In May 2021, MPCP killed 16 people in the department of Junín, leaving pamphlets indicating that the killing was part of a ‘social cleansing’ campaign aimed at ‘cleansing the VRAEM from dens, parasites, and corrupt persons,’ and demanded residents of the area to abstain from voting in the second round of the presidential elections.

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334 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
335 BBC, ‘Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista de Perú (MPCP) al que le atribuyen la matanza de 16 personas en Vraem (y qué relación tiene con Sendero Luminoso), 26 May 2021, [url]
336 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) was established in 2001 to investigate ‘assassinations, torture, disappearances, displacement, employment of terrorist methods and other violations attributable to the State, the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement between May 1980 and November 2000.’ USIP, Truth Commission: Peru 01, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, 13 July 2001, [url]
338 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
339 BBC, ‘Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista de Perú (MPCP) al que le atribuyen la matanza de 16 personas en Vraem (y qué relación tiene con Sendero Luminoso), 26 May 2021, [url]; InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]
340 InSight Crime, Shining Path on the Offensive in Peru, Again, 21 March 2023, [url]; La República, ¿Qué es el Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú, presunto responsable de la matanza de 16 personas en el Vraem?, 23 November 2021, [url]
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In February 2023, the MPCP ambushed a military vehicle killing six officers and injuring one.\(^{346}\) In February 2023, the MPCP ambushed a military vehicle killing six officers and injuring one.\(^{347}\)

### 3.6. State response

In May 2023, the National Police executed 26,188 police operations and dismantled 241 gangs dedicated to crimes such as extortion, shark-loaning, and drug trafficking, and detained 1,428 persons, many of them with pending arrest warrants.\(^{348}\) In June 2023, the National police dismantled 117 criminal groups dedicated to extortion and theft in La Libertad, arresting 363 persons.\(^{349}\) According to the INEI report on criminality statistics, authorities dismantled 4,966 criminal groups in 2022, 4,158 in 2021, and 3,365 in 2020.\(^{350}\)

Some of the operations made by authorities against criminal groups, as reported by sources, include:

- On 13 August 2023, the Ministry of the Interior reported that a gang called Los Llaneros de la Extorsión, dedicated to loan sharking and extortion in Chorrillos, Lima, was dismantled by the National Police. Five persons among Colombian and Venezuelan nationals were detained.\(^{351}\)

- On 24 May 2023, W Radio, a Colombian news source, reported that Colombian and Peruvian authorities dismantled the gang Los Gallegos, which is allied to Tren de Aragua, and captured five persons. The gang was dedicated to the trafficking in women to Peru to subject them to sexual exploitation.\(^{352}\)

- On 11 May 2023, El Peruano, the official newspaper of the Peruvian government, reported that the gang Los Sicarios de la Red, dedicated to cybercrime, including internet fraud, was dismantled by authorities. The 11 persons detained operated in Lima, Callao, Áncash, and Arequipa.\(^{353}\)

- On 18 April 2023, La República reported the detention of 61 alleged members of Tren de Aragua in the district of Chosica, Lima.\(^{354}\)

- On 2 December 2022, Peruvian news source Diario Correo reported that the Public Ministry and the National Police detained five members of the gang Los Sanguinarios, La Nueva Sangre dedicated to extortion in Chimbote.\(^{355}\)

\(^{346}\) Infobae, Camarada ‘Carlos’ sería el autor de la matanza de siete policías en el VRAEM, 13 February 2023, [url](https://www.infobae.com/2023/02/13/camarada-carlos-seria-el-autor-de-la-matanza-de-siete-policias-en-el-vraem/).

\(^{347}\) Página 12, Matan a siete policías en una emboscada en Perú, 13 February 2023, [url](https://www.infobae.com/2023/02/13/camarada-carlos-seria-el-autor-de-la-matanza-de-siete-policias-en-el-vraem/).


\(^{349}\) El Peruano, Policía desarticula 240 bandas criminales, 9 May 2023, [url](https://www.infobae.com/2023/05/09/el-peruano-policia-desarticula-240-bandas-criminales/).

\(^{350}\) TVPE Noticias, PNP desarticula más de 240 bandas organizadas a nivel nacional, 8 May 2023, [url](https://www.tvpe.com.pe/noticias/policia-desarticula-mas-de-240-bandas-organizadas-a-nivel-nacional/).

\(^{351}\) Diario Correo, Desarticulan banda “Los Llaneros de la Extorsión” en Chorrillos, 13 August 2023, [url](https://diariocorreo.com.pe/criminologia/2023/08/13/desarticulan-banda-los-llaneros-de-la-extorsion-en-chorrillos/).

\(^{352}\) W Radio, Desarticulan banda de trata de personas vinculada con el Tren de Aragua, 24 May 2023, [url](https://www.wradio.com.pe/noticias/desarticulan-banda-de-trata-de-personas-vinculada-con-el-tren-de-aragua/).


\(^{354}\) La República, Caen 61 presuntos miembros del ‘Tren de Aragua’ en casa de Chosica, 18 April 2023, [url](https://www.larepublica.pe/criminologia/2023/04/18/caen-61-presuntos-miembros-del-tren-de-aragua-en-casa-de-chosica/).

\(^{355}\) Diario Correo, Chimbote: Desarticulan banda dedicada a la extorsión, 2 December 2022, [url](https://diariocorreo.com.pe/criminologia/2022/12/02/desarticulan-banda- dedicada-a-la-extorsion-en-chimbote/).
• On 5 August 2022, TVPE Noticias reported that the Public Ministry and the National Police dismantled a criminal organisation in Lima dedicated to sexual exploitation and trafficking in women. Eight people were detained.\textsuperscript{356}

Ojo Público cited the General Director of the General Directorate Against Organised Crime as indicating that despite the dismantling of a number of criminal organisations, criminal activities are increasing in the country.\textsuperscript{357} Police officers also lack resources and equipment to combat criminal organisations, are slow to respond, and do not conduct efficient investigations.\textsuperscript{358} Government presence in remote areas of the Andes and Amazon is scant\textsuperscript{359} and inhabitants have organised around peasant armed groups called rondas campesinas and Self-defence Committees (CAD, Comités de Autodefensa).\textsuperscript{360} Some indigenous communities have also organised around the CADs to defend their communities from drug traffickers, illegal miners, and illegal deforestation.\textsuperscript{361} Several NGOs have raised objections to the 2022 law that created the CADs as it puts these communities at risk from further violence when it is the responsibility of the National Police and other authorities to provide them with protection.\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{356} TVPE Noticias, Autoridades desarticulan banda dedicada a la trata de personas y explotación sexual de mujeres, 5 August 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{357} Ojo Público, Sonia Medina: “En Perú las organizaciones criminales nos están llevando la avanzada”, 9 July 2023, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{358} US DOS, Peru Country Security Report, 30 September 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{359} US DOS, Peru Country Security Report, 30 September 2022, \url{url}
\textsuperscript{360} BBC, Qué son los Comités de Autodefensa, la “policía paralela” que recupera poder en Perú, 8 July 2022, \url{url}; Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, Rechazamos la “Ley de comités de autodefensa” que vulnera la autonomía comunal y promueve la violencia y el uso de armas, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{361} BBC, Qué son los Comités de Autodefensa, la “policía paralela” que recupera poder en Perú, 8 July 2022, \url{url}; Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, Rechazamos la “Ley de comités de autodefensa” que vulnera la autonomía comunal y promueve la violencia y el uso de armas, n.d., \url{url}
\textsuperscript{362} Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, Rechazamos la “Ley de comités de autodefensa” que vulnera la autonomía comunal y promueve la violencia y el uso de armas, n.d., \url{url}
4. **Domestic violence and gender-based violence**

4.1. **Prevalence and social attitudes**

Violence against women remained ‘widespread’ in the country, including issues of domestic violence, femicide, ‘obstetric violence’, sexual violence, and disappearances of women. About half of women have reported instances of physical, sexual, or emotional violence. Due to prevailing attitudes about women, victims and families of disappeared women complained of humiliation in their search for missing female relatives, ‘especially in police stations.’

High rates of rape and sexual violence, especially against teen girls, led to higher rates of forced pregnancy and maternal mortality rates in rural areas, due to the criminalisation of abortion, except in cases where the woman’s life or health is in danger.

There were 240 875 complaints of domestic violence made in 2021. Disappearances of women was a ‘serious problem’ in Peru, with the Office of the Ombudsperson reporting that in the first 9 months of 2021, 4 463 female adults and children went missing. There were 166 femicides in 2019, 141 in 2021, and 135 femicides were reported in 2022. Femicides were primarily related to domestic violence.

4.2. **Legislation and state protection**

Domestic violence is prohibited under the law with criminal penalties from one month to six months in prison. Rape of women and men is against the law, including spousal rape, and is penalised by 14 years to life in prison. Femicide is defined under the law as the killing of a woman or girl due to her gender, and is punished by a minimum sentence of usually 20 years.
or 30 years with aggravating circumstances, including when the victim is a child, elder, or pregnant.\textsuperscript{376}

Abortion is illegal under the Penal Code.\textsuperscript{377} The only abortion that is permitted is called ‘therapeutic abortion’ and only applies when the life of ‘the pregnant woman [is at risk] or to avoid serious and permanent damage to her health.’\textsuperscript{378} Abortion for pregnancies from rape is penalised by law.\textsuperscript{379}

### 4.2.1. Reporting and seeking assistance

Violence against women and girls of a sexual, physical, and psychological nature was a ‘serious, underreported national problem.’\textsuperscript{380} Statistically, 71 percent of female victims of violence against women do not file charges.\textsuperscript{381} Reasons for not seeking state assistance included shame, not knowing where to go, fear, negative experiences of reporting, and lack of action by available entities.\textsuperscript{382}

Victims of violence may approach the following entities for assistance: National Police of Peru, mixed family courts or local justices of peace, Public Ministry, Office of the Ombudsperson, Women’s Emergency Centres (CEM, Centro de Emergencia Mujer), Hotline 100, Chat 100, Urgent Care Services, or the General Attorney Office’s Hotline.\textsuperscript{383} The National Police run a complaints office and 1818 helpline for victims.\textsuperscript{384}

### 4.2.2. State protection

Peru has an extensive legislative framework, regulations and national plans on issues of violence against women.\textsuperscript{385} Legislative Decree No. 1323 (2017) is aimed at strengthening measures to tackle femicide, domestic violence and gender-based violence and establishing new offences and aggravating circumstances;\textsuperscript{386} The National Gender Equality Policy was adopted by Supreme Decree No. 008-2019-MIMP of 4 April 2019.\textsuperscript{387} The policy aims to reduce violence against women, institutional barriers, and discrimination against women.\textsuperscript{388}

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\textsuperscript{377} Peru, Código Penal, Decreto Legislativo No. 635, 1991 (amended 2018), url, Arts. 114-120

\textsuperscript{378} Peru, Código Penal, Decreto Legislativo No. 635, 1991 (amended 2018), url, Art. 119

\textsuperscript{379} France 24, Acceso al aborto en Perú: sigue la lucha por los derechos de las menores víctimas de violación, 13 August 2023, url; HRW, Peru Should Provide Comprehensive Reproductive Care for Girls, 20 June 2023, url


\textsuperscript{381} USDOS, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru, 20 March 2023, url, pp. 13-16

\textsuperscript{382} Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, p. 7

\textsuperscript{383} Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, pp. 6-7

\textsuperscript{384} USDOS, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru, 20 March 2023, url, pp. 13-16

\textsuperscript{385} For a full list, see: Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, pp. 1-5

\textsuperscript{386} UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Peru (CCPR/C/PER/CO/6), 5 April 2023, url, Pp. 1-2

\textsuperscript{387} UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Peru (CCPR/C/PER/CO/6), 5 April 2023, url, Pp. 1-2

\textsuperscript{388} Peru, National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 (A/HRC/WG.6/42/PER/1), 1 November 2022, url, Para. 93
The Law 30364 on the Prevention, sanction, and eradication of violence against women and family members is charged with coordinating and organising the actions of the state to prevent violence against women and protect victims. Victims are also entitled to a number of civil and criminal remedies for domestic violence under the legal framework of Law 30364. The law provides for a special judicial process for reporting, applying for protection, investigating, prosecuting and sentencing perpetrators. The process involves a guardianship stage (where timely action is guaranteed by the state through protective measures imposed in the event of a threat or act of violence), and a criminal stage, conducted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office and criminal judge.

Under the law against domestic violence, judges and prosecutors may prevent a convicted person returning to the family home, as well as authorise complaints of domestic violence by relatives of the victim or unrelated persons living in the home. The law also obliges authorities to ‘extend protection to female victims of domestic violence.’ The government of Peru indicated that ‘under the specialized national system of justice for the protection of women and family members from violence and the punishment of perpetrators, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights has 133 public defenders specialising in victim defence who assist women and their family members, and 86 public defenders specialised in legal assistance in matters relating to acts of violence against them, for example alimony, tenure and filiation.’

Where there is the presence of a Specialised Police Commission on Protection against Family Violence, they are the primary policing body dealing with domestic violence; where they are not present, the local police station is involved in primary policing responsibility. This includes registering the complaint, assessing the situation, making arrests, arranging for CEM involvement, and escorting parties to the police station.

However, enforcement of legislation against domestic violence was described as ‘lax’ according to civil society groups. ‘Enforcement of sexual and domestic violence laws was inadequate, often at the discretion of the relevant authorities, according to gender-based violence experts. Undue dismissals of charges were allegedly common,’ according to USDOS. Mechanisms of the state to assist victims did not work effectively in some cases. Legal sanctions are ‘not usually proportional to the severity of the harm caused’ and ‘reparations are also not comprehensive or effective’ in cases of domestic violence. Women victims who did turn to police and make complaints were reported to ‘suffer significant levels

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389 Peru, MIMP, Sistema Nacional, n.d.  
390 For a full list of these measures, see: Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url  
391 Peru, MIMP, Esquema Procesal de la Ley No 30364 ‘Ley para Prevenir, Sanctionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra las Mujeres y los integrantes del Grupo Familiar, 2016, url  
392 Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, p. 6; for information on the substance of protection orders, see pp. 18-21 of the same source.  
394 Peru, National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 (A/HRC/WG.6/42/PER/1), 1 November 2022, url, para. 105  
395 Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, p. 23  
of victimisation due to the abandonment of the government, police attitudes, and corruption, which hampered police action.\textsuperscript{399}

Police action to enforce the laws on femicide were also described as ‘weak and slow’ with prosecution being described as ‘often lengthy and ineffective.’\textsuperscript{400}

On witness protection in cases of sexual violence, USDOS reported that ‘Provincial prosecutorial offices are required by law to incorporate survivors into the national Victims and Witness Assistance Program or to request required protection measures from the court; however, an NGO reported 15 percent of criminal prosecutors did not make these requests.’\textsuperscript{401}

### 4.2.3. Hotlines and shelters

In 2019, the government adopted a protocol on ‘joint action by women’s emergency centres, police stations and police stations specializing in protection against domestic violence’, and as of December 2021, there were 46 police stations specialising in family issues across 23 police regions. These centres provide ‘specialised services’ to women and family victims of violence.\textsuperscript{402}

There were 430 service centres for victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse, and other crimes such as sex trafficking which were run by the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, and nearly half of them were embedded within police stations. Some of the services available in some centres included short-term shelter, legal, psychological, and social services. The General Attorney Office also had emergency shelters for short-term accommodation of women victims of domestic violence.\textsuperscript{403}

NGOs reportedly expressed concern at the quality of the shelter and services programs embedded in police stations, especially in rural areas. Governmental measures to provide additional shelters were insufficient, according to NGOs.\textsuperscript{404}

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\textsuperscript{399} Baker Mckenzie, Fighting Domestic Violence – Latin America and the Caribbean: Peru, 2021, url, p. 23
\textsuperscript{400} USDOS, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru, 20 March 2023, url, pp. 13-16
\textsuperscript{401} USDOS, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru, 20 March 2023, url, pp. 13-16
\textsuperscript{402} Peru, National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 (A/HRC/WG.6/42/PER/1), 1 November 2022, url, paras. 102, 104
\textsuperscript{403} USDOS, 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Peru, 20 March 2023, url, p. 15
\end{flushright}
5. Situation of LGBTI people

BBC reported that there has been ‘growing acceptance’ of LGBTI people in Peru; however, ‘many still face legal challenges and widespread prejudice.’ Human Rights Watch indicates that politicians also continued to make public comments disparaging LGBTI people. Peru has an openly lesbian congresswoman, who was elected in 2021.

Consensual same-sex activity is not illegal or criminalised. However, there were reports of official and society discrimination against LGBTI persons in areas of employment, housing, education, healthcare, and law enforcement. For example, according to LGBTI advocacy NGO, Promsex, LGBTI persons were prevented from pursuing education for economic reasons (69.3 percent), discrimination/violence (15.4), fear of discrimination (7.7), or for personal reasons (7.57). The same source reported that 63.3 percent of LGBTI persons surveyed had access to health services, while 36.7 percent indicated that they did not.

Same-sex couples are not permitted to marry or enter a civil union in Peru. According to Human Rights Watch, ‘in 2021, certain courts recognized same-sex marriages contracted by Peruvians abroad. But in April 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled against recognizing any same-sex marriage abroad, by either Peruvians or foreigners.’

Promsex reported that in the cases of violence and discrimination against LGBTI persons that it was aware of, 43.2 percent was psychological, 34.8 was physical, and 22 was sexual; the majority of cases being linked to family (55.3 percent) or unknown persons (38.6).

The Public Prosecution Service published a report on the killings of 84 LGBTI people between 2012-2021; noting most killings occurred in La Libertad, Lima, and Lima-Norte and most being homosexual males (59.2 percent) or transgender women (37.5). Most crimes did not have an identified perpetrator, leading to high likelihood of impunity. However, in 2022, Peru also opened a preliminary investigation into the 2022 suspicious death of a Peruvian transgender man who was killed while on holiday in Bali with his spouse. Abuse and harassment of transgender people by police and other authorities was a ‘serious problem’ according to Partners in Health, an international NGO that promotes the right to

405 BBC, Azul Rojas Marín: Peru found responsible for torture of LGBT person, 7 April 2020, url
406 HRW, World Report: Peru – Events of 2022, 12 January 2023, url
407 Reuters, Peru's first lesbian lawmaker vows 'strong battle' to boost LGBT+ rights, 15 April 2021, url
408 HRW, World Report: Peru – Events of 2022, 12 January 2023, url
409 HRW, World Report: Peru – Events of 2022, 12 January 2023, url
410 Promsex, Informe Annual Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos de las Personas LGBTI en el Perú 2021, May 2022, url, pp. 37-38
411 Promsex, Informe Annual Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos de las Personas LGBTI en el Perú 2021, May 2022, url, pp. 41-42
412 HRW, World Report: Peru – Events of 2022, 12 January 2023, url
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414 Promsex, Informe Annual Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos de las Personas LGBTI en el Perú 2021, May 2022, url, p. 47
415 Peru, Características criminológicas de las muertes dolosas de las personas LGBT en el Perú 2012-2021, url, pp. 12-13, 20, 25
416 Le Monde, Peru opens ‘torture’ investigation over transgender man’s death in Indonesia, 8 September 2022, url
health care access, ‘[m]any transgender women don’t feel safe seeking care at clinics and hospitals where discrimination runs rampant ... Peru’s health system lacks comprehensive training and protocols for clinicians around sexual and gender diversity, making health centers potential sites of abuse and prejudice.’

In 2020, a court ordered the civil registry to permit transgender Peruvians to change their name and gender on identity documents. In January 2022, the appeal court overturned the decision and a further appeal has been filed with the Constitutional Court, which was pending as of September 2022. Legal proceedings for transgender people to change one’s name and gender on the national identity card were often costly, with cumbersome procedures and ‘unpredictable results.’

The Constitution provides broad provisions against discrimination and permits the launching of complaints due to reasons of sexual orientation and gender; there were few national laws providing protections however, specific to this group. According to USDOS, ‘some regions and municipalities, including La Libertad, Loreto, Piura, and San Martín, had regulations that explicitly prohibit discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons and provide administrative relief but not criminal charges.’ Peru published a National Gender Equality Policy in 2019, including with a focus on LGBTI women.

Sources indicated a general lack of official statistics on the situation of violence and discrimination against LGBTI people. The Public Prosecution Service reported in 2022 that it has incorporated data on violence and discrimination against LGBTI into its statistical database.

The Inter-American Court on Human Rights ruled against Peru, including in two separate cases of transgender victims who were discriminated against (2023) and tortured by police (2020) in 2004 and 2008 respectively. The rulings also included orders for reparations and orders to implement guides for LGBTI people on services and training for judicial and
administrative officials.\textsuperscript{433} Other measures have yet to be implemented.\textsuperscript{434} Peru reported offering such training sessions and several guides in 2022.\textsuperscript{435}

In 2022, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights announced the formation of a technical team to support the development of a protocol on investigation and administration of justice in criminal proceedings related to LGBTI victims of violence.\textsuperscript{436}

Promsex’s 2021 annual report on the situation of LGBTI persons reported that in 94.9 percent of the cases it was aware of, the victims did not report incidents of violence, nor did they access the services of the state. Furthermore, 17.5 percent of those surveyed who did report it experienced discrimination while accessing the services of the state in cases of violence.\textsuperscript{437}

\textsuperscript{433} HRW, Peru Ruling a Victory for LGBT Equality, 20 April 2023, url
\textsuperscript{434} Blade, Peru officially apologizes to Transgender woman for police abuse, 11 November 2022, url
\textsuperscript{435} Peru, National report submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 (A/HRC/WG.6/42/PER/1), 1 November 2022, url, paras. 69-77
\textsuperscript{436} Peru, Hoy se marca un hito para los derechos humanos en el país, dice ministro de Justicia en acto de disculpas públicas a Azul Rojas, 3 November 2022, url
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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

**Reference period**: (January 2021 - 19 September 2023)

This report is meant to provide an overview of a selection of specific topics relevant for international protection considerations in Peru, specifically in relation to needs identified by the COI Specialist Network on the Americas for the recent months. The report will provide an overview of the reference period’s developments, with a particular focus on 2023.

Overview

- Government/state structure
- Economy/humanitarian situation
- Freedom of movement
- Judicial structure/security and police
  - State presence in rural/urban areas
  - Corruption in the security forces and justice system

Political opponents and activists

- Political developments
- Demonstrations and treatment of anti-government protesters and persons who do not support protests, including sympathizers of Peru Libre and Fuerza Popular
- State pressure to participate in protests in rural areas
- Involvement of criminal groups in protests (e.g. extortion to avoid road blocks)
- Protection mechanisms and measures by police, judiciary, other bodies, including effectiveness

Organised crime

- Main actors/gangs/groups/cartels, nationally and especially in Lima
- Presence/Areas of operation
- Activities/methods: Violence, threats, extortion, human trafficking, forced recruitment, illegal mining/economies, racketeering, property / land disputes, petty crime
- Links/alliances to other groups and state actors, especially in rural areas
- Ability to track and trace, including access to the residence registration system
- Protection mechanisms and measures by police, judiciary, other bodies, including effectiveness

Domestic violence and gender-based violence

- Prevalence
• Protection mechanisms and measures by police, judiciary, other bodies, including effectiveness

LGBTI

• Treatment by society, the state
• Protection mechanisms and measures by police, judiciary, other bodies, including effectiveness