

A young man with dark, wavy hair is smiling broadly. He is wearing a light-colored polo shirt. He is holding a dark banner that features the yellow stars of the European Union flag. The background is a blurred crowd of people, also holding similar banners. The entire image has a blue color overlay.

External evaluation of the implementation of Operating Plan 2019 (OP 2019) of EASO intervention in Cyprus

Summary report

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Executive summary

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) started providing support to Cyprus in July 2014, with the signature of the Special Support Plan (SSP). In December 2018, an Operating Plan (OP) was signed between EASO and Cyprus for the 2019 intervention. In December 2019, EASO launched the second external evaluation of its operations in Cyprus, which covered the implementation of OP2019. This evaluation sought to assess the achievement of intended results, determine the relevance, assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities performed, highlight good practices and lessons learned, and provide appropriate recommendations. The OP2019 was assessed against the following evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and added value. This document represents the summary report of that external evaluation.

OP2019 offered a clearer view of EASO's role and intervention, partly due to its multiannual results framework (with outcome and output indicators and targets) and the Fidelity Monitoring Plan. The intervention in 2019 focused on four measures, with the overall objective of providing persons in need of international protection with access to the asylum procedure and reception facilities, fully in line with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). **Measure 1** focused on improving the registration system and access to the asylum procedure by providing registration support to the Aliens and Immigration Unit (AIU) of the Cypriot police. **Measure 2** aimed to enhance the implementation of reception conditions in the Kofinou reception centre and support the establishment of a first reception centre in Pournara by establishing a 'safe zone'. **Measure 3** supported the capacity of the Cyprus Asylum Service (CAS) to manage and reduce backlog in the number of pending asylum applications. It also aimed to prepare the ground to support the second instance to process a potential backlog at that level. **Measure 4** aimed to enhance database and case management in order to improve asylum processing.

EASO's support on some measures was very **effective**, such as registrations (Measure 1). More than half of its efforts focused on backlog management of first instance asylum applications. The intervention scaled-up during the year, following the increase in the number of asylum applicants (+70% in 2019 compared to 2018). 43 EASO temporary workers and experts were deployed, who conducted a total of 764 interviews and drafted 515 opinions. Introducing shifts to cater for the lack of office space disrupted productivity, however, and created practical issues for asylum applicants to present themselves for interview. The content of interview templates could be further harmonised to avoid parallel quality systems with different metrics. EASO supported the accelerated procedures for applications lodged by nationals of safe third countries (Georgian nationals) initiated by CAS. It also effectively implemented steps to support the improvement of reception conditions in Kofinou. The deployment of MS experts provided effective support to the development of the centre's operational manual. Despite a delay, the deployment of a full-time reception field coordinator improved the coordination of stakeholders' activities within the centre.

Assessment of the **efficiency** of EASO's support depended on the measure (ranging from fair to very good). No data are available on resources spent per output. Notwithstanding some efficiency gains, examples of inefficiencies were also found – for example, cooperation between EASO social workers and other social service providers, with no common database to follow-up cases and supports received by residents. EASO support for Measure 2 was affected by challenges in recruiting and retaining social workers due to the legal restrictions in Cyprus and poorer employment conditions (e.g. salary offered).

2019 saw an increasing number of arrivals in Cyprus, which resulted in a greater number of applications for international protection (13,101 applications in 2019, compared to 7,745 in 2018), putting tremendous pressure on national authorities' capacity to register and process asylum applications. EASO's intervention was thus highly **relevant** in almost all measures. A needs-mapping exercise, coupled with good cooperation with national authorities, meant that OP2019 outputs corresponded to the needs of the authorities. EASO's support

to a case management system in the asylum procedure became less relevant in the light of central authorities' efforts to develop a digitalised solution in-house.

EASO's support to registration indirectly improved the **coherence** of national procedures by enabling exchange of information and communication between CAS and the police. Regular training activities for EASO experts facilitated the application of harmonised practices and quality standards across the asylum procedure. However, recruitment of several waves of new caseworkers throughout 2019 showed the need for increased consistency in the communication of information (e.g. interview templates). Interview transcripts and opinions drafted by EASO caseworkers were subject to the quality assessment tool by the former EASO Department for Asylum Support and may need to be assessed for potential overlaps with CAS' in-house system, once in place. The design of Measure 4 lacked coherence, as it included several interventions from other measures (notably, Measure 3), resulting in inconsistencies between inputs, outputs and planned outcomes.

Added value was evident where EASO support brought specific know-how or closed national capacity gaps. This ranged from additional administrative tasks performed by EASO registration assistants and interpreters, to the attribution of more complex cases to EASO caseworkers, to supporting the operationalisation of accelerated procedures for applications from nationals of safe third countries. EASO's intervention brought added value where activities supported a strategic (e.g. coordinating activities of relevant stakeholders) and/or capacity-building purpose.

At a horizontal level, external factors - such as increases in the number of asylum applicants and EASO's legal and procurement framework - affected its flexibility to respond to the needs of the operation in Cyprus. Unlike EASO operations in Italy and Greece, Cyprus did not have a resident statutory staff, which affected the overall implementation of the OP2019 in terms of recruitment, deployment of EASO temporary workers, management of various administrative tasks (e.g. office space) and ensuring continuity of interactions with national authorities and other stakeholders. Contractual arrangements to recruit EASO temporary workers under a local contract had mixed results due to the legal limitations (four months renewable within maximum a year) and high turnover of personnel.

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS AT STRATEGIC LEVEL

SR1: Define a concrete working plan to translate the high-level OP into actual implementation actions.

SR2: Advance the level of maturity of results-based planning, implementation and monitoring of EASO's intervention in Cyprus.

SR3: Frame EASO's intervention in a multiannual plan instead of one-year planning.

SR4: Develop a clearer intervention logic to frame EASO's intervention on reception.

SR5: Harmonise the implementation of the quality system and practices with those of CAS.

SR6: Enhance EASO's expert deployment and working conditions.

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL

OR1: Embed vulnerability assessments in workflows on registration via additional capacity building

OR2: Explore synergies across registration templates and asylum interviews.

OR3: Enhance coordination mechanisms in Pournara.

OR4: Organise further capacity-building targeting non-permanent staff contracted by CAS in reception and vulnerability assessments.

OR5: Enhance the practical part of content of EASO's module on vulnerability

OR6: Assess the types of concrete support EASO could provide to the implementation of electronic systems and databases.

1 Introduction and methodology

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) started providing support to Cyprus in July 2014, with the signature of the Special Support Plan (SSP). The Plan was amended several times (2015, 2016, 2017), with the latest amendment signed in December 2017, extending the SSP until January 2019. In September 2018, the Cypriot Asylum Service (CAS) submitted a formal request to EASO for support in the area of backlog and case management (first and second instance), first and second-line reception, registration and capacity-building. As a result, a 2019 Operating Plan (OP2019) was signed on December 2018 between EASO and Cyprus.

The intervention in 2019 focused particularly on four measures, with the overall objective of providing persons in need of international protection with access to the asylum procedure and reception facilities, in line with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). **Measure 1** of OP2019 focused on improving the registration system and access to the asylum procedure by providing registration support to the Aliens and Immigration Unit (AIU) of the Cypriot Police, improving Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and registration procedures across the various districts, and producing tools on early identification and referral of vulnerable applicants. **Measure 2** worked to improve conditions in the Kofinou reception centre and supported the establishment of a First Reception Centre in Pournara, through a 'safe-zone'. **Measure 3** supported the Cyprus Asylum Service (CAS) to manage and reduce backlog in the number of pending asylum applications, and prepared the ground to support the second instance to process a potential backlog. **Measure 4** sought to improve database and case management in order to enhance the quality of the asylum processing.

In December 2019, EASO launched the second external evaluation of its operations in Cyprus, which covered the implementation of OP2019. This evaluation sought to assess OP2019 against the following evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and added value. The evaluation provides recommendations to support EASO internal decision-making and to improve operations and future interventions.

The *ex post* evaluation of OP2019 had three phases:

- Inception phase: clarified the evaluation methodology and described the intervention logic and the analytical framework of the evaluation.
- Implementation phase: covered data collection and reporting activities. Data collection was triangulated, covering desk research on quantitative and qualitative data, a sample review of nine training evaluation feedback forms, four Member State (MS) activity feedback reports, seven assessments of interviews and recommendation reports, 10 in-depth interviews with EASO staff, CAS, international and civil society organisations (International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), CODECA (Centre for Social Cohesion, Development and Care), European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME)), eight focus group meetings with EASO contact points in Nicosia, EASO registration assistants and caseworkers, reception field coordinators, security assistants and interpreters, vulnerability and information provision experts.
- Final phase: validated the main findings and final report. An Overview Analytical Report has also been established, capturing the commonalities and differences in findings between the three Member States (Cyprus, Greece and Italy) that underwent this evaluation.

2 Findings

2.1. Key highlights

Asylum procedures:

- ✓ Registered over 66% (8,959) of all applications for international protection.
- ✓ Five-fold reduction of the (median) duration between registration request and registration of applicants who entered irregularly (11 days in 2019 compared to 55 days in 2018).
- ✓ A total of 43 EASO experts and caseworkers conducted a total of 764 interviews and drafted 515 recommendations (or opinions).
- ✓ Supported the implementation of accelerated procedures for applications from nationals from safe third countries (Georgian nationals).
- ✓ Took steps to embed the assessment of vulnerable cases throughout the asylum procedure: more systematic identification at registration stage (13% of all cases registered by EASO), actively involved in the coordination for a common vulnerability assessment form initiated by CAS (Pournara) and deploying vulnerability experts (expert supporting EASO caseworkers at Pournara).

Reception:

- ✓ Expertise and longer deployments of MS experts contributed to the development of operational documents for the management of reception (i.e. SOPs) in Kofinou.
- ✓ Effective coordination of events delivered by other stakeholders in the centre (e.g. coordination of volunteer organisations).
- ✓ Individual case follow-up by social workers for nearly half of the residents in the centre.

2.2. Measure-specific findings

Measure 1: Improved registration system and access to asylum procedure in Cyprus

EASO's intervention focused on supporting the registration system for asylum applications of the Aliens and Immigration Unit (AIU) of the Cyprus police. The support to registration was very **effective**, accounting for some 66% of all registrations in 2019. The evaluation found some evidence of harmonisation of the referral system and prioritisation of vulnerable applicants (13% of EASO registrations). Divergent registration practices between district police offices affected the identification of vulnerable cases, ranging from visual screening of vulnerabilities in busy district offices (e.g. Nicosia) to more in-depth interviews with applicants in others (Larnaca, Paphos). Towards the end of the year, progress was made in Pournara by embedding vulnerability assessments in workflows (e.g. between CAS and medical departments or social welfare services), with EASO involved in coordinating the process. The deployment of EASO registration assistants – and the outputs achieved – were not intended to be sustainable. Rather, the deployment of EASO registration assistants was agreed in 2018 as a contingency measure, in the context of a lack of capacity of Cypriot authorities to deal with the additional number of registrations.

Efficiency of the intervention is assessed as very good. Given the outputs produced and the budget spent, actual efficiency was higher than expected. OP2019 planned for four interpreters for the registration process, but only two were ultimately deployed (in Nicosia and Paphos). Interpreter costs were lower than planned, following a change in the service provider contract. The deployment of EASO registration assistants was agreed in 2018 as a contingency measure and in the context of a lack of capacity of Cypriot authorities to deal with the additional number of registrations. The **relevance** of the intervention was

underlined by the national authorities, who recognised that the registration process would have faced serious challenges without EASO intervention. The deployment of EASO registration assistants to the police in Nicosia (which faced the highest numbers of arrivals) and in other districts (e.g. Paphos) was particularly important, as was EASO support to the accelerated procedure.

EASO’s support to registration contributed – indirectly – to the **coherence** of national procedures by enabling exchange of information and communication between CAS and the Cyprus police (identification of vulnerabilities). Regular training activities and guidance (SOPs) for EASO registration assistants facilitated harmonised practices across the district offices where EASO registration assistants operated. Achieving complementarity between registration workflows and vulnerability assessments and referrals was hindered by delays in setting-up Pournara as a first reception centre. EASO’s intervention in registration **added value** by shortening the time taken to access the asylum procedure and ensuring that a large proportion of asylum seekers were registered. The national authorities pointed to EASO added value in the additional tasks performed by EASO registration assistants and interpreters, as well as the steps implemented by EASO to improve vulnerability identification and assessment.

Operational recommendations	
OR1	Further embed vulnerability assessments in registration workflows via capacity-building on registration and vulnerabilities (for AIU officers).
OR2	Explore synergies across Measures 1 and 3: registration templates could be improved to capture more information on the applicant at registration stage. While variations in registration procedures are noted between police district offices, consistency could improve time efficiencies for EASO caseworkers when checking basic information on the applicant during an interview.

Measure 2: Cyprus enhances implementation of reception conditions in line with CEAS

EASO’s support saw the deployment of social workers and security assistants, as well as physical and human resources allocated to create a ‘safe zone’ with a capacity of 25-30 places in Pournara (*Kokkinotrimithia*) arrival centre. After a nine-month suspension, EASO resumed its support to the Kofinou reception centre in November 2018, following the implementation of five pre-conditions (improved security, regular coordination meetings, appointment of a permanent camp manager, permanent police presence and effective inter-agency response).

Effectiveness is rated as good overall, but was impacted by a number of factors. The set-up of the safe zone was delayed by lengthy tendering procedures and coordination issues among the different national authorities (CAS, civil defence, service provider, other NGOs in Pournara) and, consequently, SOPs for the safe zone were not developed. Likewise, steps to establish an early identification system for vulnerable groups materialised quite late in the year. EASO supported the CAS initiative to coordinate the work of relevant stakeholders (CAS, EASO, UNHCR) on a common vulnerability template. More progress was noted in Kofinou, where MS experts helped to develop almost 70% of the ‘operational manual’ (SOPs) on the running of the centre. These were not finalised in 2019, however. Various initiatives were undertaken to improve reception conditions, including coordinating events delivered by other centre stakeholders. EASO continued to support the implementation of an electronic system to monitor entry/exit of residents in the open reception centre. However, information technology (IT) and CAS capacity issues saw this initiative put on hold. EASO support to improving reception conditions was highly dependent on the actions of other national authorities. There was some evidence of sustainability in EASO efforts to enhance reception conditions, in particular where longer deployments of MS experts allowed the transfer of expertise (development of SOPs, update of information leaflets, plans for Pournara’s safe zone) and material support (e.g. containers for safe zone).

Measure 2 represented around 20% of the total planned budget, with actual spending of 22.5%, the highest of actual vs. planned among the measures. Poor cooperation between EASO and other social service providers affected **efficiency** in the first half of 2019 (e.g. lack of a common database for follow-up of case files), which improved towards the end of the year with the appointment of a EASO reception coordinator to Kofinou. Legal restrictions, as well as employment conditions, created issues in recruiting and retaining social workers (e.g. salary). In Kofinou, EASO support to the management of the centre was **relevant** and appreciated by CAS staff, being seen as more stable than that of other organisations and NGOs present. The development of SOPs by MS experts responded to the need for CAS to establish clearer workflows and develop supporting documents.

In terms of **coherence**, EASO efforts to improve reception conditions took place alongside other national authorities, service providers and NGOs. This risked providing similar support as other, more specialised organisations (e.g. information provision, social workflows and integration), and created coordination challenges (e.g. database to follow-up on residents' case files). Coordinating working groups on strategic points such as SOPs and (vulnerability assessment) templates **added value** and appeared to yield more significant results than the deployment of experts for social services work. The deployment of MS experts generated added value (in Kofinou) as they brought specific expertise to the management of reception facilities, either by developing comprehensive sections of centre SOPs or technical expertise on establishing a safe zone. EASO experts also added value in key areas where CAS did not have adequate capacity, e.g. information provision, coordination and facilitation of meetings and activities.

Operational recommendations	
OR3	Enhance support to coordination mechanisms in Pournara by advocating for a permanent CAS manager, dedicate EASO resources to ensure follow-up and coordination of activities, and develop SOPs with other stakeholders to ensure effectiveness of referrals.
OR4	Organise capacity-building activities for non-permanent personnel contracted by CAS in reception and vulnerability assessments to enhance implementation of CEAS standards in Cyprus.

Measure 3: Cyprus has increased capacity to manage and reduce first instance backlog

This measure supported CAS to manage and reduce the backlog in pending asylum applications by providing resources for interviews and drafting recommendations. This included both quality monitoring and training activities (for CAS, EASO caseworkers and judges).

Effectiveness is assessed as fair. The intervention scaled-up following a 70% increase in the number of asylum applicants. EASO caseworkers conducted a total of 764 interviews and drafted 515 opinions, below the initial target. The introduction of shifts to compensate for the lack of office space led to changes in work organisation that disrupted caseworkers' productivity. A total of 43 EASO experts were deployed in several waves throughout the year, with 80% of the team being new by the end of the year. Significant time and resources were devoted to training and coaching, partly explaining the lower-than-expected productivity. Despite the significant number of MS experts, their impact was reduced by the short duration of their deployment. EASO caseworkers identified vulnerable cases, but the referral system at national level was not fully operational, resulting in some 400 vulnerable persons pending at CAS in 2019, under a single CAS caseworker. EASO assigned a Vulnerability Focal Point to support and liaise with CAS on such cases. The combined outputs of EASO experts and CAS did not reverse the backlog. EASO provided direct support to CAS to reduce backlog, through a mix of seconded temporary workers (60%) and directly managed MS expert caseworkers (40%). However, while MS experts brought valuable experience and know-how, short contracts saw the backlog persist. CAS maintained a balance between the number of deployed EASO experts and in-house CAS caseworkers in order to avoid future dependency.

In terms of **efficiency**, Measure 3 was the most resource intensive in OP2019. 35% of the planned resources were not spent, indicating possible inefficiencies, such as slow recruitment of experts and an inadequate EASO procurement framework. Stakeholders acknowledged that EASO’s support was highly **relevant**, as CAS lacks resources to adequately respond to this emergency. They suggested EASO could show a more flexible approach to interview templates to increase productivity without sacrificing quality. Interviews with caseworkers highlighted the need for further training, e.g. more practical case study-based sessions on vulnerability.

Recruitment of several waves of new caseworkers showed the need for consistent communication of information (interview templates, SOPs) in order to maintain **coherence**. Given their complementary work, joint training initiatives were foreseen with UNHCR (e.g. sex and gender-based violence) but did not materialise. However, EASO cooperated with UNHCR on other operational and training activities (e.g. training for CAS officers on accelerated procedures). The division of cases between EASO and CAS brought **added value**, particularly for complex cases. EASO also supported operationalisation of accelerated procedures for applications from nationals of safe third countries (Georgia), a pilot process initiated by CAS.

Operational recommendations

OR5	Enhance the practical element of EASO’s module on vulnerability (e.g. case studies).
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Measure 4: Cyprus databases for backlog management systems are improved (efficient data management)

This measure aimed to support an improved/new database for asylum procedures, together with a consistently applied quality assurance mechanism. **Effectiveness** of this measure is assessed as low, with little concrete improvement in case management. EASO collected information on data systems during the first trimester of 2019 and recommended supporting CAS with two temporary workers (business analyst and Oracle developer). Initial steps were taken towards a quality assurance mechanism of first instance asylum processing, with the deployment of a quality insurance expert and the application of the DAS (Department of Asylum Support) quality tool to interviews and opinions drafted by EASO caseworkers. CAS included a full quality assurance mechanism in its organigram, which awaits additional capacity. Measure 4 represented less than 5% of the total planned budget, and 1.2% of the actual budget.

Efficiency is assessed as unsatisfactory. Resource consumption was low and limited, as was the amount of outputs produced. Measure 4 was **relevant** in that it is necessary to ensure that the case files exchanged between national authorities move from paper format to digital files. It also sought to respond to the lack of interconnection of different authorities’ databases. The implementation of an in-house project on digitalisation by the Ministry of the Interior saw EASO step back to avoid duplication of effort. EASO’s support here – although beneficial in the long-term – could be reassessed in light of the emergency context and high backlog of cases.

The lack of **coherence** in Measure 4 – which drew on interventions in several other measures (e.g. quality assurance mechanism and Measure 3) – was evident in the inconsistencies between inputs, outputs and planned outcomes. A functioning data management system would be of substantial **added value** for vulnerable persons and the authorities, as it would facilitate tracking progress on their files throughout the different national administrations. Without it, a referral system would not be entirely functional and the impact of EASO’s support on referrals and vulnerability assessments would be limited.

Operational recommendations

OR6	Assess the types of concrete support EASO could provide in the implementation of databases and increased ownership of the process by national authorities. The type of support could be tailored to the needs of national authorities, depending on the emergency context and capacity constraints (e.g. capacity-building activities).
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3 Conclusions

3.1. General

EASO's support was particularly effective in registration, where it contributed to 66% of all applications. Its intervention also helped to shorten the duration between registration request and registration of applicants who entered irregularly (Nicosia). EASO's support to the improvement of reception conditions in Kofinou yielded positive results, such as MS experts developing nearly 70% of SOPs for the management of the reception centre. EASO was particularly effective in coordinating events delivered by other centre stakeholders, as well as coordination of volunteer organisations. By the end of 2019, EASO social workers had implemented individual case follow-up for nearly half of the residents in the centre. The biggest share of OP2019 resources focused on backlog management of first instance asylum applicants. EASO's intervention scaled-up during the year, following the increase in the number of asylum applicants, with an increasing number of MS experts deployed and EASO caseworkers recruited (43 in total). EASO experts and contracted temporary caseworkers conducted a total of 764 interviews and drafted 515 recommendations (or opinions).

3.2. Conclusions per evaluation criterion

Effectiveness

EASO's support on some measures was very effective, such as registrations (Measure 1). OP2019 set an outcome target to stabilise or reduce the backlog of asylum applications by 30% in 2019 (Measure 3), an impossible target, given the significant increase in the number of applications (13,1010 applications in 2019, compared to 7,791 applications in 2018) and the number of pending cases (17,192 in December 2019, twice as many as at the end of 2018). The combined efforts of EASO and CAS were not enough to reverse this trend. More than 40 temporary workers and experts were deployed (nearly a threefold increase compared to 2018), but their productivity was affected by several internal and external factors (shift work, timely recruitment). EASO implemented steps to improve reception conditions in Kofinou. The deployment of MS experts provided effective support to the development of the centre's operational manual. The eventual deployment of a full-time reception field coordinator enabled increased coordination of stakeholders' activities in the centre. At a horizontal level, EASO's intervention was affected by several structural issues and external factors, which affected its flexibility to respond to the needs of the operation (presence of resident statutory staff, contractual arrangements, high staff turnover and low retention).

Efficiency

Assessments of the efficiency of EASO's support was affected by the lower level of budget consumption throughout all measures, as well as a lack of data (no information on spend per output). This could point to inefficiencies, such as slow recruitment of EASO experts and rigid EASO procurement frameworks. Inefficient cooperation was evident between EASO social workers and other social service providers, for example the lack of a common database to follow-up cases and the types of support received by residents. EASO support for Measure 2 was affected by challenges in recruiting and retaining social workers due to legal restrictions in Cyprus and the (low) salary offered.

Relevance

2019 saw an unprecedented increase in arrivals, putting tremendous pressure on national authorities to register and process asylum applications. EASO's intervention was thus highly relevant in almost all measures. A needs-mapping exercise, coupled with good cooperation with national authorities, meant that OP2019 outputs corresponded to the needs of the authorities. EASO's support to a case management system in the asylum procedure became less relevant in the light of central authorities' efforts to develop a digitalised solution in-house. Likewise, greater involvement of the European Commission in Cyprus in the second half of 2019 impacted the relevance of EASO's support to operations in Pournara through the development of SOPs for the safe zone.

Coherence
EASO's support to registration indirectly improved the coherence of national procedures by enabling communication and the exchange of information between CAS and the police. Regular training activities for EASO experts facilitated the application of harmonised practices and quality standards across the asylum procedure. Recruitment of several waves of new caseworkers throughout 2019, however, showed the need for increased consistency in the communication of information (e.g. interview templates). Interview transcripts and opinions drafted by EASO caseworkers were subject to the quality assessment tool by the DAS unit and may need to be assessed for potential overlaps with the CAS in-house system, once in place. The design of Measure 4 lacked coherence, as it included several interventions from other measures (notably Measure 3), resulting in inconsistencies between inputs, outputs and planned outcomes.
Added value
Added value was apparent where EASO support brought specific know-how or closed national capacity gaps. This ranged from additional administrative tasks performed by EASO registration assistants and interpreters, to the attribution of more complex cases to EASO caseworkers, to supporting accelerated procedures for applications from nationals of safe third countries. EASO's intervention brought added value where activities supported a strategic (e.g. coordinating activities of relevant stakeholders) and/or capacity-building purpose.

The following table summarises the scores of the evaluation for each evaluation criterion per measure. The Final Evaluation Report contains further details for each of these scores.

	M1	M2	M3	M4
Effectiveness	Very good	Fair	Fair	Unsatisfactory
Efficiency	Good	Very good	Fair	Unsatisfactory
Relevance	Very good	Good	Good	Fair
Coherence	Good	Good	Good	Unsatisfactory
Added value	Very good	Good	Good	Good

4 Strategic level recommendations

SR 1: Define a tangible working plan to translate the high-level OP into actual implementation actions

There is a gap between the OP as a strategic document and the very operational performance management framework. A document outlining the details of how the OP would be implemented at a lower level is needed.

SR 2: Advance the level of maturity of results-based planning, implementation and monitoring of EASO intervention in Cyprus

Ensure consistency in the setting and use of targets and indicators throughout all monitoring tools, improve the monitoring mechanism, and develop more concrete management tools to monitor and measure the quality of outputs.

SR 3. Frame EASO's intervention in a multiannual plan instead of one-year planning.

This would contribute to a more sustainable and flexible intervention in response to developments in Cyprus (continuous increase of asylum applications and arrivals, increasing backlog at first and second instance) and provide visibility on the required level of resources (facilitating procurement, contracting, etc.).

SR 4. Develop a clearer intervention logic to frame EASO's intervention on reception

This could include defining outcomes, outputs and indicators to allow capture of more tangible results of the intervention. Areas where EASO's intervention was found to have particular added value on reception (thus possibly recommended for consideration when defining the intervention logic) are: vulnerability assessments, supporting the coordination of activities involving multiple stakeholders, bringing in specific expertise and know-how on reception conditions.

SR 5. Harmonise quality standards and practices with those of CAS

Length of interviews, transcripts, etc. could be harmonised without losing quality. Time efficiency should form an integral part of the quality insurance mechanism.

SR 6. Enhancing EASO's experts' deployment and working conditions

Consider different modalities of engaging temporary workers. While maintaining the temporary nature of the contracts, improvements in the conditions of current temporary workers in terms of contract duration (moving away from the four months renewable within a year) would limit loss of know-how and turnover. With the scaling-up of the operation in 2019, a stable team of EASO resident and statutory staff in the country office is needed to ensure continuity in administrative tasks (e.g. recruitment of EASO experts and interpreters), to follow-up implementation of different activities, and to ensure efficient communication and coordination with various stakeholders (at national, EU and EASO headquarters (HQ) level).