



Sudan - Security Situation

Sudan: Security Situation

Country of Origin Information Report

February 2025



Manuscript completed in January 2025

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within this publication.

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025

PDF ISBN 978-92-9410-551-6 doi: 10.2847/6774685 BZ-01-25-009-EN-N

© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2025

Cover photo: Sudan conflict – Stockfoto, Abd Almohimen Sayed, ©gettyimages, 2023,
<https://www.gettyimages.be/detail/foto/sudan-conflict-royalty-free-beeld/1496786713>

Please cite as: EUAA, COI Report – Sudan: Security Situation, February 2025,
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2025_02_EUAA_COI_Report_Sudan_Security_Situation.pdf

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.



Acknowledgements

The EUAA acknowledges as the drafter of this report:

- Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)

The following national COI departments reviewed this report:

- Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, CEDOCA – Documentation and Research Centre
- Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Country of Origin Information, Section for Information Analysis.

All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer.

The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.





Contents

Acknowledgements	3
Contents	4
Disclaimer	7
Glossary and abbreviations	8
Introduction	11
Methodology.....	11
Defining the terms of reference.....	11
Collecting information.....	11
Research challenges.....	11
Quality control.....	12
Sources.....	12
Structure and use of the report.....	12
Maps	14
1. General description of the security situation	15
1.1. Overview of the conflict.....	15
1.1.1. Political developments	15
1.1.2. Main conflict dynamics	18
1.1.3. Territorial control.....	22
1.1.4. Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates.....	24
1.2. Actors in the conflict.....	30
1.2.1. Major state and non-state armed groups.....	30
1.2.2. International actors.....	39
1.3. Impact of the security situation on the civilian population.....	41
1.3.1. Humanitarian situation.....	41
1.3.2. Communication and media presence	62
2. Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by region	66
2.1. Khartoum	66
2.1.1. Actors involved and territorial control.....	66
2.1.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	69
2.1.3. Security incidents.....	70



2.1.4. Civilian casualties.....	71
2.1.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts	74
2.1.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	75
2.2. Darfur	77
2.2.1. Actors involved and territorial control	77
2.2.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	79
2.2.3. Security incidents.....	80
2.2.4. Civilian casualties.....	81
2.2.5. Conflict related infrastructure damage and other war impacts.....	84
2.2.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	85
2.3. The Kordofans	86
2.3.1. Actors involved and territorial control	86
2.3.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	88
2.3.3. Security incidents.....	89
2.3.4. Civilian casualties.....	90
2.3.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts	93
2.3.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	94
2.4. Central	94
2.4.1. Actors involved and territorial control	95
2.4.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	96
2.4.3. Security incidents.....	98
2.4.4. Civilian casualties.....	100
2.4.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts	102
2.4.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	103
2.5. North	103
2.5.1. Actors involved and territorial control	104
2.5.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	105
2.5.3. Security incidents.....	106
2.5.4. Civilian casualties.....	107
2.5.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts	108
2.5.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	109
2.6. East.....	110
2.6.1. Actors involved and territorial control	110



2.6.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics	111
2.6.3. Security incidents.....	114
2.6.4. Civilian casualties.....	115
2.6.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts	116
2.6.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return.....	117
Annex 1: Bibliography	119
Oral sources	119
Public sources.....	119
Annex 2: Terms of Reference	168





Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 21 January 2025. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the [Methodology](#) section of the Introduction.





Glossary and abbreviations

Term	Definition
ACJPS	African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies
ACLEDD	The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AOAV	Action on Armed Violence
AWSD	Aid Workers Security Database
CIR	Centre for Information Resilience (UK)
COI	Country of Origin Information
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
Darfur	Historically refers to the entire Darfur region, which was divided into three states in 1994 and then subsequently into five states in 2011. Sometimes it is also known as Greater Darfur.
DNHR	Darfur Network for Human Rights
EU+ countries	Member States of the European Union and associated countries
EUAA	European Union Agency for Asylum
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GPC	Global Protection Cluster
GSLF	Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces
HRW	Human Rights Watch





Term	Definition
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JFASM	Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
Kordofans, The	Referring to all Kordofan States or regions, also known as Greater Kordofan
LNA	Libyan National Army (self-styled)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
<i>Mustanfareen</i>	The mobilised, referring to armed popular resistance
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SIHA Network	Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa
SLM-AW	Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur
SLM-MM	Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi
SLM-Tambour	Sudan Liberation Movement – Mustafa Tambour





Term	Definition
SLM-TC	Sudan Liberation Movement the-Transitional Council of Al-Hadi Idris
SPLM-N-Agar	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North-Malik Agar
SPLM-N-al-Hilu	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North-al-Hilu
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WHO	World Health Organisation





Introduction

The purpose of this security situation report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of international protection status determination, including refugee status and subsidiary protection, and in particular for use in the upcoming EUAA's country guidance development on Sudan.

The report covers the period of February 2024 – November 2024, and it provides an update of the [EUAA COI report: Sudan: Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). For topics not covered in the previous report such as the security situation in North, East and part of Central regions, the reference period is 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024.

Methodology

This report is produced in line with the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#)¹ and the [EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide \(2023\)](#).²

Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA COI specialist network on Sudan and from policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Sudan. The ToR also builds on previous EUAA COI reports on Sudan covering the same topics. The Terms of Reference for this report can be found in [Annex 2: Terms of Reference](#) of this report.

Collecting information

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources, as well as interviews with experts until 31 December 2024. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 31 January 2025.

All sources used are referenced in the [Annex 1: Bibliography](#). Wherever information could not be found within the timeframes for drafting this report after carefully consulting a range of sources, this is stated in the report.

Research challenges

The present report has encountered a number of research challenges, including: lack of or limited reporting on some issues covered by the ToR due to the communication outage affecting media coverage and communication opportunities in wide parts of the country for

¹ EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, [url](#)

² EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, [url](#)





extended periods of time during the reference period; targeting of media personnel normally reporting on the issues addressed by the report and that often resulted in self-censorship and relocation; limited or scarce international and national media and other organisations' presence in most of Sudan, as a consequence of the on-going hostilities; the sensitivity of the issues at stake, and the documented reluctance of affected survivors to report about incidents or events on safety and security grounds.

Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Terms of Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 31 January 2025. EUAA also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and local human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Sudanese and regionally-based media; academic publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Sudan. All information from these sources was consulted within time constraints and within the research constraints posed by Sudan's challenging information-gathering environment.

In addition to using publicly available sources, oral sources were contacted and interviewed for this report. Sources were assessed for their background, publication history and current knowledge of the situation on the ground. A source who was interviewed chose to remain anonymous for security reasons. Yousra Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, Africa Correspondent for Sky News, was interviewed on 10 December 2024. Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah has reported extensively on Sudan, including from the ground.

Regarding the maps used in the report, the administrative and humanitarian access map were borrowed from MSF and UNOCHA respectively. The map on the security situation and territorial control was developed and tailored to the needs of the report by PolGeoNow, in coordination with the EUAA.

All public and oral sources are described in [Annex 1: Bibliography](#).

Structure and use of the report

The report is divided into two parts. The first part comprises an overview of the conflict, the major actors as well as the impact of the security situation on the civilian population across the






country. It furthermore focuses on the general political and security situation of Sudan as of November 2024, and then addresses the communication and the humanitarian situation at country level, including their implications in terms of quality and quantity of information available to shed light on the issues addressed in the remainder of the report.

The second part of the report maps actors, conflict dynamics as well as security trends, events and major impacts on the civilian population in the different regions of the country. For the purposes of this report, the region denoted as Central comprises Al Jazirah, Sennar, Blue Nile and White Nile states; the region denoted as North comprises Northern and River Nile states; the region denoted as East comprises Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states.



Maps



Map 1. Sudan – General Reference Map³

³ MSF, Sudan – General Reference Map, 3 July 2024, [url](#)



1. General description of the security situation

1.1. Overview of the conflict

1.1.1. Political developments

In mid-April 2023, hostilities erupted in Khartoum between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as their respective allied militia groups, and soon spread to other parts of the country.⁴ The conflict broke out amid a standoff between the army leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF head Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ‘Hemedti’, who had governed together since taking power in 2019 on the back of a protest movement against the country’s long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir.⁵ For further information on political developments prior to February 2024, see section 1.1.1. of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Since its inception in April 2023, the conflict has spread to 13⁶ or 14 of Sudan’s 18 states.⁷ The conflict has been fuelled by an inflow of large quantities of weapons and military equipment into the country, and weaponry was further transferred into Darfur despite an existing UN arms embargo prohibiting weapons supplies to Darfur.⁸ The conflict has been described as the world’s largest current humanitarian crisis⁹ and the most severe humanitarian crisis overall since the beginning of records.¹⁰ It has resulted in the most significant¹¹ and fastest-growing levels of displacement in the world,¹² widespread¹³ and deteriorating food insecurity¹⁴ (including famine¹⁵ and malnutrition), lack of access to safe water,¹⁶ and a collapse of the

⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 53

⁵ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁶ AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷ OHCHR, Sudan: UN Fact-Finding Mission outlines extensive human rights violations, international crimes, urges protection of civilians, 6 September 2024, [url](#)

⁸ Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁹ Hudson, C. and Strucke, M., Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis: What Was Old Is New Again, CSIS, 17 December 2024, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁰ IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#)

¹¹ CFR, Civil War in Sudan, 3 October 2024, [url](#); IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#)

¹² IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#)

¹³ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 30 December 2024, [url](#), section 1.1.; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Largest Displacement Crisis in the World: The Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation in Sudan, 12 June 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴ ICRC, Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure, 8 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵ UNICEF, Food and nutrition crisis deepens across Sudan as famine identified in additional areas, 24 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 30 December 2024, <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1220/document/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025>, sections 1.1., 3.8.





healthcare system¹⁷ with much of the population lacking access to essential medical care¹⁸ and reports of disease outbreaks.¹⁹

As of December 2024, some 8.8 million people have been internally displaced as a result of the current conflict, while an additional 3.2 million have fled to neighbouring countries.²⁰ The destruction of homes and key infrastructure such as schools and hospitals has exacerbated an existing humanitarian crisis. According to the UN's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, as of August 2024, more than half of the population (26.5 million people) were facing acute hunger, of which some 8.5 million people were affected by emergency levels of hunger, while another 755 000 were affected by catastrophic levels of hunger.²¹

Multiple initiatives have been launched to end the conflict, including by the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Negotiations between the SAF and RSF that were co-facilitated by the USA and Saudi Arabia in Jeddah in May 2023, led to the signing of the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan. Under this deal, the parties committed to safeguard civilians and respect human rights and international humanitarian law. However, these commitments remained mostly unimplemented.²² While the SAF and RSF agreed to resume negotiations in late October 2023, neither party was willing to stop fighting.²³

In February 2024, SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan declared that there would be no political process until the military conflict ended with the SAF regaining control of all territories held by the RSF, including Darfur and Al Jazirah.²⁴ Al-Burhan later reiterated his conditions for peace negotiations.²⁵ In early March 2024, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling for an immediate end of hostilities.²⁶

Ensuing talks facilitated by Libya and Türkiye in March 2024 broke down after the SAF, which had made substantial military advances in the Khartoum area, refused to accept a proposal for a ceasefire for the duration of the month of Ramadan unless the RSF vacated the civilian sites it controlled.²⁷ Further ceasefire talks – co-hosted by Switzerland, the USA and Saudi Arabia – were held in Switzerland in August 2024. These were attended by the RSF but not the SAF,

¹⁷ Hudson, C. and Strucke, M., Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis: What Was Old Is New Again, CSIS, 17 December 2024, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁸ ICRC, Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure, 8 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 30 December 2024, [url](#), section 1.1.

²⁰ UNHCR, Sudan Emergency: Population movements from Sudan, 15 December 2024, [url](#); IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

²¹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 277

²² UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan – Advance unedited version, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024, [url](#), para. 20-21

²³ CFR, Civil War in Sudan, 3 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁴ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 3

²⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 6; Sudan War Monitor, Al-Burhan rejects talks with RSF in blow to peace efforts, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁶ UN Security Council, Resolution 2724 (2024) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 9568th meeting, on 8 March 2024, S/RES/2724 (2024), 8 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2

²⁷ CFR, Civil War in Sudan, 3 October 2024, [url](#)





which cited concerns about the inclusion of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as an observer to the negotiations.²⁸ These talks resulted in an agreement to temporarily²⁹ reopen the border at Adré (Chad) to allow the entry of humanitarian aid.³⁰ As of late October 2024, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted that there was no tangible progress in ceasefire negotiations³¹ as both the SAF and RSF were still pursuing their own military victory.³²

Meanwhile, fighting continued across the country.³³ On 31 July 2024, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan's military leader, survived a drone attack blamed on the RSF, which did not claim responsibility for the incident.³⁴ An October 2024 report of the UN's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan found that the SAF and RSF, along with their allied militias, had committed 'large-scale human rights and international humanitarian law violations, many of which may amount to war crimes and/or crimes against humanity'.³⁵ The parties to the conflict, especially the RSF, were reported to have committed widespread acts of sexual violence.³⁶ The chair of the UN fact finding mission recommended the deployment of an international force mandated to protect civilians.³⁷ However, this recommendation was entirely rejected by the country's military-led government, while the RSF did not respond to the proposal.³⁸ In January 2025, the United States determined that the RSF has committed genocide.³⁹

²⁸ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 4

²⁹ Marsden, R., The war in Sudan is intensifying. Coordinated pressure is needed to prevent the country's fragmentation, Chatham House, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁰ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 70

³¹ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 13 – 19 October 2024, 25 October 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³² Marsden, R., The war in Sudan is intensifying. Coordinated pressure is needed to prevent the country's fragmentation, Chatham House, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

³³ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 24 – 30 November 2024, 6 December 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 27 October – 2 November 2024, 8 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 4

³⁴ BBC News, Sudan's military leader survives drone strikes – army, 31 July 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁶ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 167-168; HRW, Sudan: Widespread Sexual Violence in the Capital, 28 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁷ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 342 (b)

³⁸ BBC News, Sudan rejects UN call for peace force to protect civilians, 8 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁹ USUN, Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Determination of Genocide in Sudan, 7 January 2025, [url](#)



1.1.2. Main conflict dynamics

The conflict in Sudan has been characterised as complex,⁴⁰ ‘devastating’⁴¹ and highly volatile, with clashes reported in multiple regions throughout the reference period.⁴² For information on the main dynamics of this conflict prior to February 2024, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

Compared to the first twelve months of the war, the conflict was growing more complicated and involved a larger share of the population as both the SAF and RSF resorted to recruiting civilians into their ranks – frequently along ethnic lines. Moreover, both sides now employed armed drones⁴³ whose long reach has ‘shattered the sense of security in regions far from conflict zones’, rendering previously safe areas vulnerable to devastating attacks.⁴⁴

Since the RSF captured Wad Madani, the capital of Al Jazirah state, in December 2023, the momentum of its military successes stalled, with their resources and supply lines strained from fighting multiple fronts⁴⁵ and their forces stretched thin after expanding into Al Jazirah state.⁴⁶ However, the group continued to maintain substantial combat capabilities, as the International Crisis Group reported.⁴⁷

The SAF, which had hitherto been adopting a strategy of retreating from territories and focusing on bolstering its numbers, switched to an offensive strategy⁴⁸ with the tri-city area of Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman as its primary military objective.⁴⁹ The SAF launched its first large-scale counteroffensives in January 2024⁵⁰ and has retaken large portions of Omdurman.⁵¹ Following these victories, the SAF attracted support from a variety of rebel militias and ethnic armed groups, with groups like the Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi faction (SLM-MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement – Jibril Ibrahim faction (JEM, also JEM-Jibril) deploying their fighters against the RSF.⁵² For more information on these groups, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

⁴⁰ SWP, How (Not) to Talk About the War in Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#); UNHCR, Sudan Situation 1 May 2024, 3 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴¹ De Waal, A., Sudan is collapsing – here’s how to stop it, Chatham House, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

⁴² UNHCR, Sudan Situation 24 – 30 November 2024, 6 December 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 23 – 29 August 2024, 2 September 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation, 9 – 15 August 2024, 19 August 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 20 – 27 June 2024, 28 June 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 1 May 2024, 3 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 17 April 2024, 18 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 7 – 13 March 2024, 15 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴³ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴⁴ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴⁶ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴⁸ ACLED, Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, [url](#); AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵¹ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵² ACLED, One Year of War in Sudan, 14 April 2024, [url](#)



While its operations slowed down, the RSF nevertheless launched an offensive against the oil-rich town of Babanusa (West Kordofan state)⁵³ in early 2024, with the city becoming a hotspot of clashes in that state.⁵⁴ In a series of further offensives following the killing of its Central Darfur Area commander in June 2024, the RSF took over the West Kordofan capital of Al-Fula⁵⁵ and the strategic town of Al-Meiram (also in West Kordofan) and captured most major cities in Sennar state,⁵⁶ including its capital Sinja⁵⁷ and the town of Dindar but not Sennar city.⁵⁸ However, later advances by the SAF resulted in the RSF-held cities of Sinja and Karkoj being cut off from its supply lines.⁵⁹

An ongoing armed conflict around El Fasher (North Darfur),⁶⁰ the only state capital in Darfur still under SAF control,⁶¹ intensified⁶² following the takeover of the North Darfuri town of Mellit by the RSF in April 2024.⁶³ The RSF and allied militias started a siege of El Fasher in May⁶⁴ and had made several advances towards the city by September 2024.⁶⁵ These hostilities took a heavy toll on civilians⁶⁶ and gave rise to concerns about an ethnic conflict between Arabs and Zaghawa⁶⁷ as the RSF targeted Zaghawa communities⁶⁸ and SAF-backed Zaghawa armed groups pursued their fight against the RSF.⁶⁹ At the same time, the Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements (JFASM), a group of SAF-backed former rebels and militias, opened new fronts against the RSF in Mellit, Kutum and Kulbus.⁷⁰ As of December 2024, the SAF was carrying out widespread and frequently indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas of El Fasher, while the RSF conducted indiscriminate artillery strikes on Zamzam IDP camp and attacks on individual civilian sites in El Fasher, which appeared to be ethnically motivated.⁷¹

Some fighting also continued in southern and eastern parts of the country, including around Gedaref, Sennar, Blue Nile, and parts of White Nile states, although the RSF's ambitions to expand its territorial gains appeared to have diminished.⁷² In South Kordofan, hostilities between the SAF and RFS were tied to 'complex networks of alliances between the Sudanese

⁵³ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁵⁴ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), pp. 2, 4-5

⁵⁶ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), pp. 5-6

⁵⁸ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰ GPC, At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 25, 15 March 2024, 18 March 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁶¹ HRW, Civilians at Risk as Large-Scale Fighting Looms in Darfur, 18 April 2024, [url](#); BBC News, Key Sudanese city could fall to rebels imminently – US, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶² UNHCR, Sudan Situation 9 – 15 May 2024, 17 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2; OHCHR, Sudan: Türk expresses grave concern at escalating violence in El-Fasher, 26 April 2024, [url](#)

⁶³ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴ OHCHR, Sudan: Türk sounds alarm over hostilities in El Fasher, warns of serious human rights violations, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3; ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸ OHCHR, Sudan: Türk expresses grave concern at escalating violence in El-Fasher, 26 April 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁷⁰ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹ Howarth, C.N. et al., Update: RSF Attacks on Zamzam IDP Camp, Widespread SAF Bombardment and RSF Targeted Razing in El-Fasher, Yale HRL, 19 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3



militaries, rebel groups, and local clans'.⁷³ Clashes were reported between the RSF and the militant Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North-al-Hilu (SPLM-N-al-Hilu), with some speculation about the existence of an alliance between the SPLM-N and the SAF, claimed by the latter but denied by the former.⁷⁴ For more information on the SPLM-N-al-Hilu, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the previous [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

In late September 2024, the SAF launched a large-scale offensive to reconquer areas of Greater Khartoum controlled by the RSF,⁷⁵ reportedly seizing roads and bridges linking Omdurman with Khartoum city⁷⁶ and retaking areas in the capital⁷⁷ and in Khartoum Bahri.⁷⁸ Late October 2024 saw an intensification of fighting between SAF and RSF across multiple locations,⁷⁹ including in the states of Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Blue Nile, West and North Darfur, and Gedaref.⁸⁰ The SAF advanced from Omdurman into central sections of Khartoum state.⁸¹ Multiple Civilians continued to be killed in heavy artillery shelling in the tri-city area of Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman. SAF fighter planes and drones routinely targeted buildings in residential zones where RSF fighters were hiding, while some bombardments of RSF-controlled towns were of an indiscriminate nature.⁸²

Meanwhile, the SAF and the JFASM were making inroads into Al Jazirah state with the aim of recapturing Wad Madani and the rest of the region but were progressing at a slower pace there.⁸³ Armed hostilities resulted in significant civilian casualties and displacement.⁸⁴ Following the defection of Abu Agla Keikel, commander of an RSF ally force in Al Jazirah, in October 2024,⁸⁵ the state witnessed heavy fighting between RSF and SAF.⁸⁶ It was alleged that the SAF had orchestrated the defection of Keikel and his forces to weaken the RSF's grip on Al Jazirah state while launching its coordinated military offensives from Sennar and Gedaref states into Al Jazirah state, resulting in setbacks for the RSF. It was noted that Keikel's defection allowed the SAF to temporarily advance into Tamboul town before being forced to retreat.⁸⁷ These military clashes were followed by RSF attacks on multiple towns and villages, including Tamboul, Al-Sireha, Rufaa, Azrag,⁸⁸ and Al-Hilaliya.⁸⁹ The attackers targeted

⁷³ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁷⁵ OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, [url](#); BBC News, Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷ Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's army regaining ground lost in the civil war?, 19 October 2024, [url](#); AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁸⁰ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 27 October – 2 November 2024, 8 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁸¹ AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁸³ AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 27 October – 2 November 2024, 8 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2; UNHCR, Sudan Situation, 5 – 11 July 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#), pp. 2-3; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 13 – 19 June 2024, 22 June 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁸⁵ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁸⁷ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)



members of Keikel’s Shukria tribe in retaliation for the defection, as well as other communities suspected of having welcomed the SAF’s advances in the region.⁹⁰ The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that these attacks by RSF ground forces left hundreds of people dead and pointed to multiple cases of sexual violence, abductions of women and girls, and the reported displacement of thousands of families into neighbouring states.⁹¹ Local villagers faced plundering RSF fighters⁹² who were robbing and killing civilians.⁹³ According to ACLED, at least 500 people may have died during a siege imposed by the RSF on the town of Al-Hilaliya, including dozens from an outbreak of diarrhea that was attributed to the RSF poisoning food supplies.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁹¹ OHCHR, Sudan: Escalating violence in Al-Jazirah, 29 October 2024, [url](#)


⁹² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁹³ Amnesty International, Sudan: Urgent need for civilian protection in wake of escalating violence, 30 October 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁹⁴ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan’s al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)



1.1.3. Territorial control



Map 2. Sudan Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 November 2024, Political Geography Now.⁹⁵

Note: the depictions on this map do not express any stance from the EUAA concerning legal status or effective control over any country, territory, city, or area. Efforts were made to maintain accuracy; however, there is no assurance that its features are spatially or temporally precise or fit for a particular purpose. This map is provided without any form of warranty, whether expressed or implied.

⁹⁵ PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control as of 30 November 2024, n.a., non-public source.



During the reference period, the country remained fragmented into different areas of control. Most territories were either being held by the SAF or the RSF, who were the primary factions in the conflict, alongside local armed groups controlling regional territories.⁹⁶

The SAF retained control over the country's north, east and southeast, including Port Sudan on the Red Sea Coast.⁹⁷ Most areas of Khartoum's sister city Omdurman were under SAF control as of May 2024⁹⁸ and the SAF recaptured several more suburbs in August 2024.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the RSF has been controlling most of the city of Khartoum since April 2023,¹⁰⁰ although the SAF continued to hold its General Command Headquarters. During its September 2024 offensive, the SAF recaptured at least one of Khartoum city's neighbourhoods and retook control of several neighbourhoods in the adjacent city of Khartoum Bahri.¹⁰¹

The RSF controlled large swaths of West and North Kordofan in the country's south¹⁰² and bolstered its hold of West Kordofan as it captured the cities of Al-Fula (June 2024),¹⁰³ Al-Meiram (July 2024)¹⁰⁴ and Wad Banda (October 2024).¹⁰⁵ Similarly, it seized most key cities in Sennar state (late June/early July 2024)¹⁰⁶ and consolidated its control there, while the SAF managed to hold on to Sennar city.¹⁰⁷ In the central Sudanese state of Al Jazirah,¹⁰⁸ the RSF extended its control across most of the state's territory after seizing the city of Wad Madani in December 2023.¹⁰⁹ In January 2025, the SAF reported that it had retaken Wad Madani from the RSF.¹¹⁰

In Darfur, El Fasher was the only state capital not fully controlled by the RSF.¹¹¹ A 'patchwork' of different armed actors including the SAF and the RSF were holding different parts of the El Fasher area.¹¹² The SAF's control of the city was exercised by its allies from the JFASM.¹¹³

⁹⁶ Al Jazeera, Visualising the war in Sudan: Conflict, control and displacement, 14 November 2024, [url](#); PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023 [Map], 11 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷ Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁸ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

⁹⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army advances in Omdurman, regaining control of key areas, 4 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰ Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's army on the verge of recapturing Khartoum?, 27 September 2024, [url](#); SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

¹⁰¹ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰² SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

¹⁰³ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 4; ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁴ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁵ Sudan Times (The), Rapid Support Forces capture key town in West Kordofan, 9 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁷ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁸ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

¹⁰⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan army retakes village near Wad Madani, RSF counterattack repelled, 20 September 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁰ Al Jazeera, Sudan army says its forces enter Wad Madani in push to retake city from RSF, 11 January 2025, [url](#)

¹¹¹ HRW, Civilians at Risk as Large-Scale Fighting Looms in Darfur, 18 April 2024, [url](#); TNH, Inside the battle for El Fasher: "Innocent lives are lost every day", 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹¹² HRW, Civilians at Risk as Large-Scale Fighting Looms in Darfur, 18 April 2024, [url](#)

¹¹³ AA, Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, [url](#)



However, by November 2024, the RSF was controlling most of the city's neighbourhoods.¹¹⁴ The same month, it was reported that the RSF was closing in on the city's SAF military headquarters, with the New Arab news website suggesting that the paramilitaries were on the verge of seizing full control of the city.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile, the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW), which declared itself neutral in the current conflict, has continuously controlled parts of the Jebel Marra in Darfur.¹¹⁶ For more information on the SLM-AW, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the previous [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#). In the south of the country, the SPLM-N-al-Hilu, another neutral group, controlled parts of Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.¹¹⁷

1.1.4. Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates

Due to the ongoing conflict, the task of collecting data was difficult¹¹⁸ and many deaths have gone unreported.¹¹⁹ Several sources explained how the insecurity caused by the conflict generally affected the reporting across the country: journalists being intimidated, harassed, arrested,¹²⁰ killed or driven into exile, as well as interruptions of internet and mobile services affected journalistic reporting in the conflict zones.¹²¹ Internet blackouts rendered the task of monitoring violations on the ground difficult.¹²² The dangerous environment for journalists has led to self-censorship,¹²³ lack of reporting on the ground¹²⁴ and underreporting of events.¹²⁵ International media coverage of the conflict was limited.¹²⁶ Foreign journalists faced difficulties accessing Sudan¹²⁷ and few managed to enter the country,¹²⁸ let alone spend significant amounts of time observing the conflict there.¹²⁹ Moreover, it was noted that there was a general lack of global media and geopolitical attention to the conflict.¹³⁰

¹¹⁴ TNH, Inside the battle for El Fasher: "Innocent lives are lost every day", 27 November 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁵ New Arab (The), RSF 'closing in' on Sudanese army HQ in North Darfur's El Fasher, 16 November 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁶ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁷ Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁸ Dahab, M. et al., War-Time Mortality in Sudan: A Capture-Recapture Analysis, 12 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 2, 4;

Guardian (The), Monday briefing: Charting the forgotten crisis in Sudan, 26 February 2024, [url](#)

¹¹⁹ Asharq Al-Awsat, Sudan Doctors' Union: War Death Toll Tops 40,000, 26 June 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁰ Sudan Tribune, Journalists under attack, media devastated amidst Sudanese conflict, 4 May 2024, [url](#)

¹²¹ Free Press Unlimited, Support for Sudan Media Forum's Silence Kills' campaign, 6 November 2024, [url](#)

¹²² HRW, World Should Rally to Halt Unfolding Atrocities in Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

¹²³ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#); UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 271

¹²⁴ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁵ Free Press Unlimited, Support needed for Sudanese media to keep All Eyes On Sudan, 8 July 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁶ International Crisis Group, Inside Sudan's Catastrophic Civil War, 7 November 2024, [url](#); Middle East Council on Global Affairs, The War in Sudan: Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis and Diplomatic Impasse, 4 November 2024, [url](#) DW, Sudanese refugees in Germany decry forgotten war, 21 April 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁷ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁸ World (The), Journalist says parts of Sudan's capital are now 'almost unrecognizable', 7 June 2024, [url](#)

¹²⁹ World (The), Journalist says parts of Sudan's capital are now 'almost unrecognizable', 7 June 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁰ Scales, S.E. et al., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, [url](#)



Estimates of the death toll for the conflict vary widely.¹³¹ Several sources have stated that the death counts for the conflict were significantly underestimated.¹³² Besides telecommunication blackouts and insecurity reportedly hampering the recording of fatalities,¹³³ many indirect cases of death resulting from war-exacerbated factors – such as lack of emergency care, essential food, medicine and vaccination programs – were not recorded.¹³⁴

While no data apart from those collected by ACLED (detailed further below) could be found on conflict-related incidents and fatalities during the reference period, several sources provided estimates on fatality figures for the entire period since the outbreak of the conflict on 15 April 2023. The UN's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan reported in October 2024 that over 18 800 persons had been killed across the country since that date,¹³⁵ while ACLED recorded 28 608 fatalities resulting from battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians as of November 2024.¹³⁶

Other sources gave significantly higher fatalities estimates, including by also taking into account deaths arising from conflict-exacerbated factors. As early as May 2024, the US government's special envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, pointed to some estimates suggesting that up to 150 000 people had been killed in the conflict.¹³⁷ An October 2024 report by a group of academic researchers from the USA and Belgium estimated that the conflict had caused more than 62 000 fatalities when taking into account such indirect fatalities resulting from factors exacerbated by the conflict such as lack of emergency care, vaccinations, essential food and medicine, in addition to the direct conflict-related fatalities recorded by ACLED.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, the Sudan Research Group of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), focusing exclusively on Khartoum state, estimated that, between 15 April 2023 and 4 June 2024, there had been 61 202 all-cause wartime deaths (which also included deaths from accidents, disease and starvation) and 26 024 deaths from intentionally inflicted injury in that state. These deaths from intentionally inflicted injuries surpassed those documented by ACLED for the entire country during the same period.¹³⁹ Given that more than 90 % of both all-cause and intentional-injury deaths in Khartoum state had gone unrecorded

¹³¹ New York Times (The), Disaster by the Numbers: The Crisis in Sudan, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

¹³² Khair, K., [@KholoodKhair, X], posted 21 December 2024, [url](#); LSHTM, 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, [url](#); Blanchard, L., [@LaurenBinDC, X], posted 13 December 2024, [url](#); Scales, S.E. et al., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, [url](#); Guardian (The), Monday briefing: Charting the forgotten crisis in Sudan, 26 February 2024, [url](#)

¹³³ Dahab, M. et al., War-Time Mortality in Sudan: A Capture-Recapture Analysis, 12 November 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Protection Cluster Sudan, Protection of Civilians' Note: Conflict in Darfur: Key Protection Impacts in September-October 2024, 28 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

¹³⁴ Scales, S.E. et al., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 124

¹³⁶ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁷ BBC News, Sudan death toll far higher than previously reported – study, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁸ Scales, S.E. et al., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

¹³⁹ Dahab, M. et al., War-Time Mortality in Sudan: A Capture-Recapture Analysis, 12 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 2, 7-8





according to this estimate, the LSHTM suggested that the death toll in other parts of the country must have also been considerably higher than the respective recorded figures.¹⁴⁰

From 1 February 2024 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 4 230 security incidents (battles, explosions/remote violence, and violence against civilians) at national level for a total estimate of 12 144 fatalities, both combatants and civilians.¹⁴¹ However, such figures are likely to be underestimates, ACLED¹⁴² and other sources explained.¹⁴³ Among the 4 230 security events recorded by ACLED, 1 464 (35 %) were coded as battles, 1 446 (34 %) as explosions/remote violence and 1 320 (31 %) as incidents of violence against civilians. In 1 688 instances (40 %), civilians were the primary or only target.¹⁴⁴ While ACLED recorded 458 security incidents in February 2024, the number dropped to between 316 and 418 from March to August but then increased to 502 in September and 616 in October before dropping to 398 in November.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ LSHTM, 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴² ACLED, Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War, 17 January 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴³ Asharq Al-Awsat, Sudan Doctors' Union: War Death Toll Tops 40,000, 26 June 2024, [url](#); Guardian (The), Monday briefing: Charting the forgotten crisis in Sudan, 26 February 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁵ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)






Figure 1: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Sudan, 1 February 2024 - 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data¹⁴⁶

Security incidents were recorded in all regions, with Khartoum, Darfur, and Al Jazirah registering the highest numbers during the reference period. Khartoum reported the highest overall number of incidents (1 610, accounting for 38 % of all incidents). The Darfur region reported 1 024 (24 %) incidents, the vast majority of which occurred in North Darfur (770). This was followed by Al Jazirah (821 incidents, 19 %) and Sennar (208 incidents, 5 %).¹⁴⁷ The Darfur region accounted for 37 % of the overall fatalities (with 89 % of the fatalities in the region registered in North Darfur), followed by Khartoum (18 %).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁷ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁴⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)




Figure 2: Security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians by region in Sudan, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



Estimated number of fatalities: 1 February 2024 - 30 November 2024




Figure 3: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Sudan, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data¹⁵⁰

With regards to casualties solely attributable to explosions/remote violence, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 148 incidents and 3 078 civilian casualties (including 1 307 fatalities) in Sudan between February and October 2024. Of 3 001 civilian casualties recorded between March¹⁵¹ and October 2024, 925 (31 %) were recorded in urban residential areas, 663 (22 %) across multiple urban areas, 689 (23 %) in markets and 205 (7 %) in villages. Ground-launched weapons have caused most cases of civilian harm, accounting for 1 635 civilian casualties (54 %). Meanwhile, air-launched weapons including air strikes accounted for 1 261 civilian casualties (42 %).¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵¹ For February 2024, figures on types of areas where civilian casualties were recorded, as well as on types of weapons causing casualties were not available.

¹⁵² AOAV, Explosive Violence in October 2024, 10 November 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in September 2024, 10 October 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in August 2024, 10 September 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in July 2024, 10 August 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in June 2024, 10 July 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in May 2024, 10 June 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2024, 10 May 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2024, 10 April 2024, [url](#)



1.2. Actors in the conflict

1.2.1. Major state and non-state armed groups

(a) Brief description and capacity

During the reference period, the SAF and the RSF remained the primary opposing parties to the conflict.¹⁵³ Both sides relied on military and paramilitary forces, auxiliary and allied militias, as well as security and intelligence agencies.¹⁵⁴ See section [2. Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by region](#) for more information on the presence of armed groups at regional level.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are comprised of the Land Force, the Sudanese Navy, the Sudanese Air Force,¹⁵⁵ the SAF Military Intelligence¹⁵⁶ and the Border Guards¹⁵⁷. Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan remained Commander-in-Chief of the SAF.¹⁵⁸ While its corps of officers viewed the SAF as a pan-Sudanese institution, it was dominated by members of Arab tribes of central Sudan.¹⁵⁹ Estimates of the strength of the SAF, which included both conventional units and special forces,¹⁶⁰ ranged from 120 000¹⁶¹ up to 200 000 personnel around the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023.¹⁶²

¹⁵³ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 75; Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 75

¹⁵⁵ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#); UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 14

¹⁵⁶ UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 14

¹⁵⁷ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁵⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 76

¹⁵⁹ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 15

¹⁶⁰ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

¹⁶¹ Jamestown Foundation (The), Can the SAF Defeat the RSF in Sudan?, 9 June 2023, [url](#); Carlson, K., Sudan is awash with weapons: how the two forces compare and what that means for the war, The Conversation, 15 May 2023, [url](#)

¹⁶² US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#)



The SAF's arms inventory consisted of weapons systems of mostly Soviet/ Russian,¹⁶³ Chinese¹⁶⁴ and domestic origin¹⁶⁵ and included military aircraft,¹⁶⁶ heavy weaponry,¹⁶⁷ combat drones,¹⁶⁸ tanks¹⁶⁹ and other armoured fighting vehicles¹⁷⁰. Air superiority has been a key element of advantage for the SAF.¹⁷¹ Since the outbreak of the conflict, the SAF heavily relied on its air force while seeking to strengthen its ground forces, which before the conflict had also included the RSF.¹⁷² Since late 2023/early 2024, the capabilities of the air force improved after acquiring combat drones from Türkiye¹⁷³ (Bayraktar drones)¹⁷⁴ and Iran,¹⁷⁵ (Mohajer-6,¹⁷⁶ Shahid and Ababil drones),¹⁷⁷ The SAF reportedly also received arms shipments from Egypt.¹⁷⁸ During the reference period, the SAF consolidated its overall operational capabilities, including in terms of personnel numbers,¹⁷⁹ aviation systems and defence industries.¹⁸⁰ At the same time, the SAF was faced with an array of structural issues, including lack of discipline, political infighting and rivaling personal interests and loyalties. Moreover, it has been subject to sanctions under UN Security Council Resolution 1591 since 2005, which included an embargo on arms due to the SAF's involvement in the Darfur conflict.¹⁸¹

¹⁶³ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#); ADF, Sudanese Armed Forces Agrees to Russian Red Sea Base in Exchange for Weapons, 25 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Mercenary aviation: Russian cargo planes helped both sides in Sudan's war, 26 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁴ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network, More weapons embolden Sudan's army to reject critical peace talks, 26 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁵ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁶ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁷ Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 77; ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#);

Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁶⁹ London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

¹⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army receives armoured vehicles to counter RSF snipers, 13 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷¹ London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#); ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#); ACLED, One Year of War in Sudan, 14 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷² UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 77

¹⁷³ Ramzy, S., The Conflict in Sudan: Military Landscape Shifts and Settlement Prospects, EPC, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army deploys Turkish Bayraktar drones in Khartoum, 30 November 2024, [url](#); Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁵ ADF, Iran Seeks Influence In Sudan Through An Influx Of Weapons – Analysis, Eurasia Review, 20 October 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Iran's air bridge to the Sudanese military, 17 October 2024, [url](#); Ramzy, S., The Conflict in Sudan: Military Landscape Shifts and Settlement Prospects, EPC, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁶ Ayin Network, More weapons embolden Sudan's army to reject critical peace talks, 26 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2

¹⁷⁸ Ayin Network, Egypt's intervention in Sudan's war, 27 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷⁹ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's military announces progress in restoring defence capabilities, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸¹ Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#)



A number of Darfuri militias were backing the SAF, including the three Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signatories¹⁸² JEM, SPLM-N-Agar and SLM-MM, as well as the groups SLM-Tambour,¹⁸³ the predominantly Massalit¹⁸⁴ SLM-Sudanese Alliance and some eastern Sudanese factions¹⁸⁵ such as the Eastern Battalion (led by Mousa Mohamed).¹⁸⁶ Further forces supporting the SAF included the 80 000-strong¹⁸⁷ paramilitary Central Reserve Force,¹⁸⁸ the Popular Resistance battalions,¹⁸⁹ as well as the Popular Mobilization (*‘mustanfareen’*) battalions¹⁹⁰ (consisting of newly recruited former civilians) and militias like the Islamist Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade.¹⁹¹ There were signs that the Islamist fighters were playing a prominent role in the SAF's offensives launched in 2024.¹⁹² For further background information on the SAF, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a highly mobile ground-based combat force consisting of regular RSF units, an intelligence service of its own and allied militias.¹⁹³ The RSF is led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (*‘Hemedti’*).¹⁹⁴ The RSF has been less institutionalised than the SAF, with much of its commanders stemming from the Dagalo family.¹⁹⁵ Its traditional stronghold has been in the Darfur region.¹⁹⁶ The RSF has been aiming to gain control over the security sector and establish a new army replacing the traditional SAF structures.¹⁹⁷ The RSF's corps of officers has been historically dominated by ethnic Arabs from Darfur, especially the

¹⁸² Jamal, A., Key actors in the Juba peace agreement: Roles, impacts, and lessons, Rift Valley Institute, 14 September 2023, [url](#), p. 7

¹⁸³ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 87-88; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3

¹⁸⁴ ACLED, One Year of War in Sudan, 14 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 88

¹⁸⁶ Radio Dabanga, Growing armed presence in eastern Sudan fuels fears of escalation, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁷ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 81

¹⁸⁹ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 4

¹⁹⁰ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 4

¹⁹¹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

¹⁹² Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 8

¹⁹³ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 91

¹⁹⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 53, 91; Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁵ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 15

¹⁹⁶ Al Jazeera, After a year of war in Sudan, what is the situation now?, 11 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁷ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 15



Rizeigat¹⁹⁸ and Misseriya tribes.¹⁹⁹ But more recently, the RSF has sought to diversify its corps of officers and allied commanders by bringing in individuals from other peripheral regions of the country, including some who were ethnically non-Arab.²⁰⁰

Estimates of the RSF's size varied between 70 000 and up to 100 000 fighters around the onset of the current conflict.²⁰¹ Being a light infantry force, the RSF has lacked airpower.²⁰² It mainly relied on vehicles with mounted large-calibre weapons,²⁰³ UAE-manufactured²⁰⁴ armoured personnel carriers (APCs)²⁰⁵ and reportedly a very limited number of tanks.²⁰⁶ Moreover, RSF fighters were using portable anti-aircraft weapons²⁰⁷ and also had access to anti-tank guided missiles²⁰⁸ (including Russian-made Kornet missiles)²⁰⁹ and, likely, Turkish-made Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS).²¹⁰

Although denied by the UAE government,²¹¹ multiple sources noted that RSF has been benefitting from arms support from the UAE²¹² as the Gulf state pursued a 'militarized strategy

¹⁹⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 101

¹⁹⁹ Radio Dabanga, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁰⁰ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 101

²⁰¹ US, CIA, World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, [url](#); Jamestown Foundation (The), Can the SAF Defeat the RSF in Sudan?, 9 June 2023, [url](#); Carlson, K., Sudan is awash with weapons: how the two forces compare and what that means for the war, The Conversation, 15 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁰² London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁰³ Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, [url](#); London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁰⁴ Amnesty International, Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁰⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 95

²⁰⁶ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 95

²⁰⁷ London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#); Jamestown Foundation (The), Can the SAF Defeat the RSF in Sudan?, 9 June 2023, [url](#); Carlson, K., Sudan is awash with weapons: how the two forces compare and what that means for the war, The Conversation, 15 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁰⁸ HRW, Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment, September 2024, [url](#), pp. 9, 22; Jamestown Foundation (The), Can the SAF Defeat the RSF in Sudan?, 9 June 2023, [url](#)

²⁰⁹ HRW, Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment, September 2024, [url](#), p. 22

²¹⁰ Sudan War Monitor, RSF are likely using Turkish-made rocket launchers, 25 July 2024, [url](#)

²¹¹ Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#)

²¹² Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#); Zaldan, Y., To End Sudan's War, Pressure the UAE, FP, 29 August 2024, [url](#); Rinaldi, A.S., How Sudan's RSF became a key ally for the UAE's logistical and corporate interests, MEE, 1 September 2024, [url](#); London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2



for influence' in Sudan,²¹³ seeking to uphold the institutional presence of the RSF in Sudan as a means of protecting its investments and influence on politics in the country.²¹⁴ The RSF's arsenal of weapons reportedly obtained through the UAE included advanced long-range drones equipped with guided missiles,²¹⁵ attack drones (including one-way attack drones and drones using Serbian-made thermobaric munitions)²¹⁶ and a sophisticated French-manufactured defence system installed on UAE-made APCs to counter close-range threats.²¹⁷

The RSF has also received weapons supplies from Russia's former Wagner Group,²¹⁸ in addition to armaments provided by the Sudanese authorities prior to the outbreak of the conflict.²¹⁹ As the RSF captured SAF bases, it gained access to additional heavy weaponry²²⁰ and deployed artillery²²¹ and long-range missiles²²² in attacks on civilian areas.

During the reference period, the RSF was backed by ethnic Arab militia groups,²²³ popularly referred to '*Janjaweed*',²²⁴ who appeared to have provided most of the manpower within the RSF alliance. The RSF was also supported by fighters from other non-Masalit ethnicities such as Bargo, Borno and Fallata from Darfur,²²⁵ Hawazma and Misseriya from South Kordofan,²²⁶ fighters from the militia groups Sudan Shield Forces²²⁷ and Tamazuj, as well as foreign combatants from Chad²²⁸ (a country also accused by the SAF of 'supplying arms to rebel militias'),²²⁹ the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya,²³⁰ and Colombia.²³¹ While the group

²¹³ Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁴ Rinaldi, A.S., How Sudan's RSF became a key ally for the UAE's logistical and corporate interests, MEE, 1 September 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁵ Agenzia Nova, Sudan: Government accuses Emirates of supplying RSF with long-range drones launched from Chad, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁶ HRW, Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment, September 2024, [url](#), pp. 25-27, 32-33

²¹⁷ Amnesty International, Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁸ Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#)

²¹⁹ London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

²²⁰ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 95; SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 28

²²¹ AA, Shelling by RSF kills at least 21 civilians in central Sudan, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

²²² Sudan Tribune, RSF missile attack on Darfur's Zamzam IDP camp kills and injures civilians, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

²²³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 23; HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), pp. 39, 42-43

²²⁴ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 23

²²⁵ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 42

²²⁶ Horner, J., Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan, Small Arms Survey, March 2024, [url](#), pp. 3-4; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3

²²⁷ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

²²⁸ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), pp. 40-43

²²⁹ New Arab (The), Sudan files AU complaint against Chad over arms: minister, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

²³⁰ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 43

²³¹ Radio Dabanga, 'Colombian mercenaries fighting in Sudan with alleged UAE links', 28 November 2024, [url](#)



recently witnessed defections in Al Jazirah, Khartoum and West Kordofan, ACLED noted that the RSF's horizontal structure enabled it to 'absorb their impact', allowing troops to reorganise in accordance to needs on the ground, instead of being dependent on a hierarchical chain of command.²³² For further background information on the RSF, see section 1.1.3 Security situation of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North-al-Hilu (SPLM-N-al-Hilu) faction controlled parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.²³³ The SPLM-N-Hilu faction, a group which has rejected the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the JPA²³⁴ and expanded its areas of control in South Kordofan since April 2023, maintained a non-aligned position in the conflict,²³⁵ although there were reports of its involvement in clashes with both the SAF²³⁶ and the RSF.²³⁷ Other non-aligned armed groups included Darfur's SLM-Transitional Council (led by El Hadi Idriss) and SLM-AI-Nur (led by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur),²³⁸ a signatory and non-signatory of the JPA, respectively.²³⁹

(b) Nature of methods and tactics used

Since the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, the SAF has been responsible for carrying out all airstrikes as the RSF has been lacking fighter planes.²⁴⁰ The SAF deployed its air force, heavy artillery and tanks²⁴¹ to defend fixed locations.²⁴²

While trained in defending positions, holding territory and carrying out sustained attacks,²⁴³ the SAF troops lacked forces fighting on the ground,²⁴⁴ as well as mobility and the ability to

²³² ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

²³³ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 107; Reuters, Sudan's SPLM-N rebel group declares famine in its territory, 14 August 2024, [url](#)

²³⁴ Jamal, A., Key actors in the Juba peace agreement: Roles, impacts, and lessons, Rift Valley Institute, 14 September 2023, [url](#), p. 8

²³⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 107; Sudan War Monitor, Sudan's military strike deal with SPLM-North on humanitarian access, 6 May 2024, [url](#)

²³⁶ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan's military strike deal with SPLM-North on humanitarian access, 6 May 2024, [url](#); Horner, J., Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan, Small Arms Survey, March 2024, [url](#), pp. 3-4

²³⁷ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan's military strike deal with SPLM-North on humanitarian access, 6 May 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

²³⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 107

²³⁹ Jamal, A., Key actors in the Juba peace agreement: Roles, impacts, and lessons, Rift Valley Institute, 14 September 2023, [url](#), pp. 7-8

²⁴⁰ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁴¹ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

²⁴² SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27; Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁴³ Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁴⁴ BBC News, Evidence of Iran and UAE drones used in Sudan war, 13 June 2024, [url](#)



pursue RSF fighters in urban terrain.²⁴⁵ While in the initial stages of the conflict the SAF relied on its air force²⁴⁶ to break the RSF's sieges of its garrisons,²⁴⁷ it obtained and deployed new combat drones as the conflict progressed.²⁴⁸ As ACLED reported, the SAF had conducted hundreds of drone strikes as of August 2024, the vast majority in Khartoum state, using drones as a supplement to its ground-based offensives.²⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the RSF employed hit-and-run tactics targeting SAF positions with the aim of depleting their munitions and supplies, forcing them to retreat from their positions and taking over their territory, notably in Darfur and Al Jazirah state.²⁵⁰ Its lack of a hierarchical chain of command has allowed the RSF to regroup its forces based on the necessities on the ground, amassing fighters in significant locations while withdrawing them from less relevant ones.²⁵¹

Due to the nature of the RSF's combat experience in Yemen (supporting Saudi and Emirati troops against Houthi rebels) and Libya (supporting General Khalifa Haftar), the RSF was deemed to be mainly effective in rural combat.²⁵² While initially unaccustomed to Khartoum's urban operational environment,²⁵³ the RSF adopted street warfare tactics²⁵⁴ and techniques of evading SAF aerial strikes by swiftly dispersing in urban terrain and occupying residential buildings.²⁵⁵ Its fighters have also infiltrated urban neighbourhoods wearing civilian attire to set up sleeper cells there.²⁵⁶

At the same time, the RSF continued to employ tactics known from the *Janjaweed* era, including pillaging and marauding,²⁵⁷ as well as deliberate killings to intimidate residents. With logistical support from regional powers such as Russia's Wagner Group, the RSF notably acquired more sophisticated intelligence capabilities, including the use of satellite imagery and advanced technology allowing it to spy on movements of army units.²⁵⁸

As the conflict progressed, the RSF, which runs a Special Task Battalion capable of operating drones,²⁵⁹ also began to deploy combat drones. Unlike the SAF's mass drone attacks, the RSF's drone attacks followed a more strategic approach, targeting SAF-controlled areas far away from the frontlines that had previously been viewed as 'safe', including in River Nile,

²⁴⁵ Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁴⁶ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#); BBC News, Evidence of Iran and UAE drones used in Sudan war, 13 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁷ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁴⁹ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁰ Hamza, A., On The Offensive: Military Tactics and Peace Talks for Sudan's Takeover, African Arguments, 16 April 2024, [url](#)

²⁵¹ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁵² London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁵³ Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁵⁴ Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#); London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁵⁵ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 28

²⁵⁶ Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁷ Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁵⁸ Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI, 10 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁵⁹ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)



White Nile, Gedaref, Red Sea states.²⁶⁰ They aimed ‘to create a sense of constant threat, forcing the SAF to stretch its defenses, thereby weakening its overall capacity to sustain prolonged engagements’.²⁶¹ This use of drones has contributed to a marked expansion of the conflict’s geographic reach.²⁶²

Moreover, sources pointed to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war.²⁶³ Rape and gang-rape, overwhelmingly targeting women and girls, continued to occur ‘on a large scale’, especially during invasions of cities, attacks on IDPs and IDP sites, as well as during the occupation of urban residential areas by armed fighters.²⁶⁴ Mostly attributed to the RSF,²⁶⁵ these acts have been a ‘defining’ characteristic of the current conflict.²⁶⁶ Several UN special rapporteurs further noted in late June 2024 that ‘both the SAF and the RSF are using food as a weapon and starving civilians,’ as aid deliveries were being blocked and agricultural activities disrupted due to the ongoing armed conflict, heightening the risk of imminent widespread famine.²⁶⁷

(c) Recruitment

In June 2023, the Commander-in-Chief of the SAF, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, called on all ‘young and capable’ civilians to join the SAF in its fight against the RSF.²⁶⁸ The SAF set up a National Committee for Mobilization and Popular Resistance to coordinate the recruitment, arming and financing of newly formed units.²⁶⁹ The SAF used social media messaging to mobilise fighters and direct them to register at the nearest military command or unit.²⁷⁰ Recruitment centres were set up across the areas controlled by the SAF.²⁷¹ In October 2024, it was reported that the SAF had trained thousands of recruits during the previous months and opened new camps for the SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces.²⁷² Many of the SAF’s newly recruited fighters were from River Nile State,²⁷³ a region known for producing many of the

²⁶⁰ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁶¹ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

²⁶² ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Regional Overview Africa - August 2024, 6 September 2024, [url](#)

²⁶³ OHCHR, High Commissioner outlines ‘insidious disregard for human life’ in Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#); DW, Rape is being used as a weapon of war in Sudan, 2 July 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 166

²⁶⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 167; OHCHR, High Commissioner outlines ‘insidious disregard for human life’ in Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁶ OHCHR, High Commissioner outlines ‘insidious disregard for human life’ in Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁷ OHCHR, Using starvation as a weapon of war in Sudan must stop: UN experts, 26 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁶⁸ Radio Dabanga, El Burhan calls for Sudan’s ‘young and capable’ civilians to fight against RSF, 29 June 2023, [url](#)

²⁶⁹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 84

²⁷⁰ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁷¹ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 28

²⁷² ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁷³ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)



country's military leaders.²⁷⁴ Darfuri former rebel groups aligned with the SAF also engaged in training thousands of new recruits in Gedaref and Kassala states²⁷⁵ in eastern Sudan²⁷⁶.

The RSF has largely recruited from among Arab communities in Darfur.²⁷⁷ Some elements within the RSF continued to pursue an ideology of 'Arab supremacy' once upheld by the '*Janjaweed*' militias in the 2000s. A large number of men have joined the RSF ranks mainly for financial reasons, attracted by their comparatively higher pay.²⁷⁸ New recruitment by the RSF was notably reported in the Darfur²⁷⁹ and Kordofan regions²⁸⁰ as well as among armed militias in the Central African Republic (CAR).²⁸¹ In Darfur, the RSF recruited fighters using the tribal networks of its officers and by providing rewards, including money, cars and military ranks, to ethnic Arab tribal leaders who enlisted members of their own tribes.²⁸² As well as invoking the ancient pre-Islamic Sudanese tradition of Faza'a, which allows tribes to call upon their kinsmen and allies for support against attacks by other tribal groups or to avenge killings,²⁸³ the RSF coerced civilians into joining their ranks by withholding food.²⁸⁴ In autumn 2024, the RSF launched a large-scale recruitment campaign in the Darfur and Kordofan regions along tribal affiliations.²⁸⁵

Both the SAF and the RSF enlisted or employed child soldiers, including minors who had been forcibly recruited.²⁸⁶ The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) noted that the recruitment of children was a widespread phenomenon, especially in Darfur and eastern Sudan.²⁸⁷ However, recruitment of children was reportedly occurring across the country and was carried out by all belligerents, including those who had signed the JPA. Coercive methods of recruitment like intimidation, torture, summary execution and denial of food and medical care were reportedly being widely used.²⁸⁸ According to the UN Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, unaccompanied and separated street children were particularly at risk of being recruited by armed groups.²⁸⁹

²⁷⁴ Al Jazeera, Sudan's civilians pick up arms, as RSF gains and army stumbles, 24 December 2023, [url](#)

²⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan's El Fasher, 24 June 2024, [url](#), p. 9

²⁷⁶ UNHCR, Sudan: East Sudan (Kassala & Gedaref) & Blue Nile States - Ethiopian Emergency Situation Update (as of 29 February 24), 21 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁷⁷ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 38

²⁷⁸ SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 15

²⁷⁹ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 38

²⁸⁰ Radio Dabanga, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁸¹ VOA, UN experts say Sudan paramilitaries are recruiting in Central African Republic, 14 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁸² HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, [url](#), p. 38

²⁸³ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Are the RSF recruiting children to fight in Sudan's war?, 28 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁴ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁵ Radio Dabanga, Sudan's RSF 'stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment', 11 November 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁶ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁷ OHCHR, Sudan conflict: 24 million children exposed to a year of brutality and rights violations, UN committee says, 18 March 2024, [url](#)

²⁸⁸ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 12

²⁸⁹ UN News, Sudan: UN expert warns of child recruitment by armed forces, 16 October 2023, [url](#)



1.2.2. International actors

Since the eruption of the conflict, both the SAF and the RSF have sought support from external actors. The SAF maintained close ties with Egypt²⁹⁰ reflecting long-standing relations between the two countries' militaries.²⁹¹ It has been alleged, including by the experts and the RSF, that Egypt provided the SAF with aerial support, Chinese-made K-8 fighter jets, ammunitions and training, as well as weaponry and military intelligence to the SAF-allied SLA-MM forces.²⁹² While Egypt's minister of foreign affairs denied that his country was providing military support to the SAF,²⁹³ Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi pledged his 'continued support' to the SAF during a November 2024 meeting with al-Burhan.²⁹⁴

After re-establishing diplomatic ties with Sudan in October 2023 following an eight-year break,²⁹⁵ Iran began to provide material assistance to the SAF with drones²⁹⁶ such as Iran-made Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones that contributed to subsequent SAF victories over RSF fighters.²⁹⁷ Research published by the Conflict Observatory with funding from the US Department of State (USDOS) concluded that 'with near certainty', the transfer of weapons from Iran to the SAF via flights to Port Sudan airport continued during the reference period of this report.²⁹⁸

Meanwhile, the UAE, viewed as the RSF's most important ally in the past years,²⁹⁹ has repeatedly been accused of supporting the RSF in the current conflict.³⁰⁰ Research published by the Conflict Observatory with funding from the USDOS concluded that 'with near certainty', the transfer of weapons from the UAE to the RSF through Amdjarass airport in Chad,³⁰¹ already addressed in a January 2024 report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan,³⁰² continued into the reference period of this report.³⁰³ These findings have been corroborated by numerous other reports,³⁰⁴ including by research conducted by Amnesty International³⁰⁵ and Reuters.³⁰⁶ However, the UAE government denied providing military, logistical, political or

²⁹⁰ Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

²⁹¹ VOA, Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

²⁹² Ayin Network, Egypt's intervention in Sudan's war, 27 December 2024, [url](#)

²⁹³ Sudan Tribune, Egypt rejects RSF leader's accusations of support for Sudanese army, 18 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁴ AFP, Egypt's Sisi assures Sudan army chief of 'continued support', 5 November 2024

²⁹⁵ ADF, Iran Seeks Influence In Sudan Through An Influx Of Weapons – Analysis, Eurasia Review, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁶ Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁷ ADF, Iran Seeks Influence In Sudan Through An Influx Of Weapons – Analysis, Eurasia Review, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁸ Conflict Observatory, Foreign Facilitators of Weapons Fueling Sudan's Civil War, October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

²⁹⁹ Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan reiterates accusations of UAE support for RSF, urges UN action, 12 October 2024, [url](#);

VOA, Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁰¹ Conflict Observatory, Foreign Facilitators of Weapons Fueling Sudan's Civil War, October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁰² UN Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, S/2024/65, 15 January 2024, [url](#), para. 41-42

³⁰³ Conflict Observatory, Foreign Facilitators of Weapons Fueling Sudan's Civil War, October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁰⁴ See, for example, Reuters, Dozens of UAE flights head to airstrip UN says supplies arms to Sudan rebels, 12 December 2024, [url](#); Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024, [url](#); Howarth, C.N. et al., Special Report: Cargo Plane over RSF Territory & Continued Civilian Displacement from El-Fasher, Yale HRL, 12 June 2024, p. 4; MenchOsint, [@MenchOsint, X], posted on: 14 May 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁵ Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁶ Reuters, Dozens of UAE flights head to airstrip UN says supplies arms to Sudan rebels, 12 December 2024, [url](#)



financial support to any of the warring parties.³⁰⁷ For further information on the UAE's reported military support for the RSF, see section [1.2.1 Major state and non-state armed groups](#).

The RSF also maintained links to the Russian-supported Libyan National Army (LNA) of Libya's warlord Khalifa Haftar.³⁰⁸ Russia's mercenary army Wagner Group, now renamed 'Africa Corps',³⁰⁹ has also been accused of supplying weapons to the RSF,³¹⁰ including surface-to-air missiles.³¹¹ In response to the Wagner Group's alleged support for the RSF, Ukrainian special forces intervened on behalf of the SAF³¹² and were reported to have started training SAF personnel in March 2024.³¹³ During the reference period, the Russian government, which has been seeking to establish a Russian naval base in Port Sudan, gradually backed away from supporting the RSF and shifted towards supporting the SAF.³¹⁴ In November 2024, Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that called for an immediate halt of attacks against civilians and for all feasible precautions to be taken by the warring parties to avoid and minimise civilian harm.³¹⁵

Saudi Arabia, which had maintained close ties to both General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo prior to the current conflict, has claimed a mediating role over the conflict³¹⁶ (with no evidence of providing military support to the SAF),³¹⁷ while also seeking to safeguard its economic interests in the Red Sea region³¹⁸ and to counter-balance the UAE's military-focused efforts to exert influence in Sudan.³¹⁹

³⁰⁷ VOA, Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁸ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 25

³⁰⁹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 25, footnote 157

³¹⁰ VOA, Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, [url](#); ADF, Drones Supplied by Iran and UAE Threaten to Prolong the Conflict in Sudan, 9 July 2024, [url](#); Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 25

³¹¹ VOA, Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Will Russia's support for Sudan's army turn the tide in the war?, 3 June 2024, [url](#)

³¹² Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Ukraine Fights Russia in Sudan, 9 March 2024, [url](#)

³¹³ WSJ, Ukraine Is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan, 6 March 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁴ McGregor, A., Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War, The Jamestown Foundation, 8 July 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Will Russia's support for Sudan's army turn the tide in the war?, 3 June 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁵ UN Press, Russian Federation Vetoes Security Council Resolution Aimed at Strengthening Measures to Protect Civilians, Increase Humanitarian Aid Access in Sudan, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁶ Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁷ SWP, How (Not) to Talk About the War in Sudan, 22 April 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁸ Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁹ Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024, [url](#)



1.3. Impact of the security situation on the civilian population

1.3.1. Humanitarian situation

As of October 2024, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan remained ‘severe’ and malnutrition, displacement and outbreaks of diseases - such as cholera, malaria and dengue fever - were ‘pervasive’.³²⁰ In the same month, UNHCR and UNICEF noted in a joint statement that the country’s humanitarian crisis continued ‘to spiral’, with several million people in ‘desperate need of assistance’ in terms of access to water, healthcare, shelter and food.³²¹

In a report of December 2024, UNOCHA described the situation as ‘one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises’, due to the ongoing armed conflict, attacks against civilians, displacement, malnutrition and hunger, disease outbreaks (like cholera and measles), and climate shocks. Almost two thirds of the population were in ‘desperate need’ of humanitarian and protection assistance. Attacks on civilian areas and infrastructure, including healthcare facilities, school closures, collapsing water and sanitation systems and telecommunication blackouts contributed to the ‘staggering’ level of needs, according to UNOCHA.³²²

IOM pointed to a ‘polycrisis of catastrophic proportions’, with about 11.5 million people internally displaced, including more than 8.7 million who were displaced over the past 20 months alone. Moreover, the country was also facing an ‘unprecedented’ protection crisis, as the lack of food, income and other resources – aggravated by a lack of access to government or legal services – led IDPs to accept risky jobs to cover their needs. Some of the specific protection risks identified by IOM included trafficking of persons, exploitation of migrants, child marriage, forced recruitment, child labour and sexual violence.³²³

More than 25 million people – over half of the population – were reportedly suffering acute food insecurity,³²⁴ and famine was confirmed in at least five areas as of December 2024. The ongoing armed conflict has led to an economic collapse and disrupted supply chains for food, other basic commodities, and services, as well as agricultural activities, with crops being abandoned, looted and stock destroyed.³²⁵ For more information on food and water insecurity, please see below, section [1.3.1\(b\)](#).

³²⁰ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 29 September – 5 October 2024, 11 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³²¹ UNHCR and UNICEF, UN agencies warn of spiraling Sudan crisis as civilians face grave risks and famine threat grows amid access barriers, Joint UNHCR-UNICEF Statement, 25 October 2024, [url](#)

³²² UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, December 2024, [url](#), pp. 7-8

³²³ IOM, Sudan Crisis Regional Response Situation Update, 12 December 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³²⁴ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 4

³²⁵ IPC, Famine Review Committee: Sudan, December 2024, 24 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 1-2





(a) IDPs and refugees on the move

Internally Displaced Persons

As of the start of December 2024, there were about 11.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan,³²⁶ which represents an increase of about 1.5 million IDPs since the end of January 2024. At that time, Sudan hosted about 9 million IDPs across the country, while the total number of persons displaced by the conflict (including those who fled abroad) amounted to 10.7 million people.³²⁷ For more detailed information on the situation before February 2024, please see section 1.1.5 of the previous report [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

1.6 million Sudanese were forcibly displaced between January and June 2024 – the largest new displacement in that period worldwide, according to UNHCR.³²⁸

According to IOM, an estimated 30 % of the population (about 11.2 million people) has been displaced as of early November 2024, with more than half of them (53 %) being children under the age of 18 years and 55 % being female. Of these 11.2 million people, about 8.4 million have been displaced since the beginning of the armed conflict in April 2023. More than 1 million of the IDPs who had been displaced prior to April 2023 experienced secondary displacement after the outbreak of the current armed conflict. According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, IDPs had been displaced to 9 653 locations across all 18 states.³²⁹ States of origin were Khartoum, accounting for 32% of IDPs (3 719 212 persons), South Darfur, accounting for 18% (2 080 174 persons) and North Darfur, accounting for 14% (1 641 178 persons). The latter two were also among the top three hosting states (15 % or 1 831 920 persons and 13 % or 1 603 671 persons, respectively), together with Gedaref state (10 % of IDPs or 1 159 414 persons).³³⁰

According to a report by Refugees International of August 2024, about 700 000 IDPs were estimated to have arrived in the Nuba Mountains area in South Kordofan since April 2023, an area bordering South Sudan that has long been controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement North (SPLM-N), a non-state armed group.³³¹

³²⁶ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

³²⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update, 4 February 2024, [url](#), 4 February 2024, p. 1

³²⁸ UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends 2024, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³²⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 1-2

³³⁰ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

³³¹ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 4






Figure 4: Sudan, IDPs' States of Origin and Displacement, as of 3 December 2024. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data³³²

³³² IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)





According to UNICEF, the number of displaced children (internally and abroad) amounted to 5 million as of September 2024. More than 17 million children were not attending school, and more than 3 200 school buildings were being used as shelters for IDPs.³³³

IOM DTM for Sudan recorded 52 incidents that caused sudden displacement in the period from 1 October to 30 November 2024, leading to the displacement of an estimated 501 525 individuals. The main regions of origin of IDPs in this period were North Darfur, West Darfur, Al Jazirah and River Nile states.³³⁴ In another report covering the months of September and October 2024, IOM DTM noted that increased violence-induced displacement was recorded in the states of North Darfur, West Darfur, River Nile, Sennar and Karthoum.³³⁵

In terms of location, about 58 % of IDPs (6 722 137 people) stayed in urban areas and 42 % (4 797 461 people) in rural areas across Sudan, although this proportion varied from state to state. In urban areas, 83 % of IDPs lived in urban neighbourhoods and about 17 % in camps. In rural areas, the percentage of IDPs living in camps was similar with 18 %, while 82 % were living in rural villages.

In terms of type of shelter, about half of all IDP households were staying with host families and communities (50 % or 1 170 053 households). About 17 % (403 461 households) stayed in camps, 16 % (363 165 households) in informal settlements or open areas, 9 % (206 686 households) in schools or other public buildings, 6% (142 542 households) in private rented accommodation and 1 % (34 342) of households stayed in critical or improvised shelters as of December 2024. There were, however, major regional differences between the country's northern regions and the Darfur region: while most IPD households in Sennar and Al Jazirah states were reportedly sheltered by host families (88 % and 85 %, respectively), most of IDP households in South Darfur reportedly stayed in camps (47 %), with host families (24 %) or in open area gathering sites (20 %), according to IOM DTM data.³³⁶ Similarly, in Northern state, the majority of IDP households reportedly stayed with host families (79 %) or in rented accommodation (11 %). Only 4 % stayed in schools or other public buildings or improvised shelters, and 2 % stayed at gathering sites. On the other hand, in Central Darfur, most IPD households stayed either at gathering sites/open areas (39 %) or at formal camps (33 %), while 17 % were sheltered by host families, in schools/public buildings (9 %) or improvised/critical shelters (2 %).³³⁷

Asylum seekers, refugees and returnees

In December 2024, IOM DTM noted with reference to several sources that, since 15 April 2023, approximately 3.25 million individuals – an estimated 70 % of them Sudanese nationals – had crossed into neighbouring countries, in particular into Egypt (37%), Chad

³³³ UNICEF, Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 23, 11 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 4

³³⁴ IOM, DTM Sudan - Flash Alert Overview, Update 4, 1 October – 30 November 2024, 3 December 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³³⁵ IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7

³³⁶ IOM, DTM Sudan - Sudan Mobility Update (12), 10 December 2024, [url](#), p. 4

³³⁷ IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, [url](#), p. 17





(29 %) and South Sudan (27%).³³⁸ In figures, 1 200 000 Sudanese nationals crossed into Egypt, 719 482 into Chad, 211 555 into South Sudan, 83 554 into Ethiopia, 30 246 into the Central African Republic and 19 482 into Libya.³³⁹ This represents an increase of approximately 1.4 million individuals crossing from Sudan into neighbouring countries since the end of January 2024. Then, the cross-border movement of 1 780 295 individuals had been recorded, according to EUAA's previous report on Sudan of April 2024. The authors, however, had noted that these figures were drawn from a combination of different sources and referring to different timeframes.³⁴⁰ For more detailed information on the situation before February 2024, please see section 1.1.5 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

In the period from January to June 2024, 465 900 Sudanese sought refuge abroad, including in neighbouring states such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Sudan, but increasingly also in other countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Uganda, according to UNHCR.³⁴¹

³³⁸ IOM DTM explained that, while data on cross-border movement was in general valid as of 9 December 2024, data provided by some sources referred to a slightly different timeframe, including Egypt (26 September 2024) and Libya (3 November 2024). IOM, DTM Sudan - Sudan Mobility Update (12), 10 December 2024, [url](#)

³³⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Sudan Mobility Update (12), 10 December 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³⁴⁰ EUAA, Sudan – Country Focus, 26 April 2024, [url](#), p. 36

³⁴¹ UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends 2024, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 5






Figure 5: Sudanese nationals and non-nationals displaced into neighbouring countries since 15 April 2023, as of December 2024. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data³⁴²

Figures provided by UNHCR on Sudanese refugees who fled to neighbouring countries differ from IOM DTM figures with the most notable discrepancy observed in Libya (180 000), followed by Ethiopia (40 439 Sudanese refugees as of 1 December 2024) and the Central African Republic (30 246).³⁴³ In Libya, an estimated 128 000 Sudanese refugees have arrived through Kufra (a Libyan border district) alone in the period from January to October 2024, according to local authorities.³⁴⁴ The Sudan Tribune wrote in August 2024 on over 96 000 Sudanese refugees arriving in Libya since April 2023, with many of them reportedly arriving traumatised, malnourished and in need of medical care.³⁴⁵ According to a public official quoted by the Libya Observer, as of October 2024, the number of Sudanese refugees in Kufra city was equal to half the city’s population (reportedly not more than 50 000 people³⁴⁶), exhausting the city’s institutions’ capacities and resources.³⁴⁷

Incidents involving displacement, as reported by sources, include:

- On 20 October 2024, the RSF launched an assault on 30 villages in the state of Al Jazirah, leading to the displacement of over 119 400 people and the killing of 124

³⁴² IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Update (12), 10 December 2024, [url](#), p. 5; UNHCR, Sudan Emergency Population Movements from Sudan, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁴³ UNHCR, Sudan Emergency Population Movements from Sudan, 1 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁴ UNHCR, Sudan Situation, Sudanese Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Libya, 17 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁵ Sudan Tribune, Libya: IRC launches emergency response for nearly 100,000 Sudanese refugees, 11 August 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁶ Moatinoon, Sudanese Refugees Flow into Al-Kufra City, Municipality Unable to Assist, 7 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁴⁷ Libya Observer (The), UNHCR reports massive influx of Sudanese refugees into Kufra, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

civilians. According to the Al Jazirah Ministry of Health, more than 27 women and girls aged between 6 and 60 years old were subjected to rape and sexual assault. The displaced fled to localities in the states of Gedaref, Kassala, and River Nile.³⁴⁸

- On 16, 19 and 25 September 2024, artillery rounds on the Abu Shouk IDP Camp in El Fasher killed two children and wounded ten civilians.³⁴⁹
- On 16 September 2024, Radio Dabanga reported that the RSF besieged the area surrounding Shangil Tobay Refugee Camp, Shangil Tobay city, North Darfur state, which was going through a 'severe humanitarian crisis', and 'prevented the entry of food supplies such as sugar, flour, onions, fuel, and other essentials; they also confiscated any materials brought into the camp'.³⁵⁰
- On 11 September 2024, the RSF launched an artillery attack on Kafut, a residential area in El Fasher, striking homes and a shelter for IDPs located in a local school, where two women were killed and four civilians were injured.³⁵¹

(b) Food and water security

The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) noted in August 2024 that more than 20 million people were in need of humanitarian food assistance in order to avoid 'hunger, acute malnutrition, and mortality'.³⁵² In October 2024, a group of UN experts declared in a joint statement that 'never in modern history' had 'so many people faced starvation and famine as in Sudan today'.³⁵³ A UN aid official reportedly stated that 100 people were dying of hunger every day in Sudan.³⁵⁴

As of October 2024, Sudan was among the 'top four countries' with the highest rate of global acute malnutrition (GAM), according to UNOCHA.³⁵⁵ In the same month, UNHCR and UNICEF issued a joint statement noting that an estimated 13 million children were acutely food insecure. About 3.7 million children under the age of five years old were estimated to experience 'severe acute malnutrition' and were in 'urgent need' of treatment to save their lives.³⁵⁶ According to a Mercy Corps report of July 2024, four to five children are estimated to be dying from malnutrition-related causes every day in the Al Radoum area in South Darfur.³⁵⁷

³⁴⁸ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Impact of Armed Violence in Aj Jazirah, Flash Update No. 02, 30 October 2024, [url](#), pp. 1-2

³⁴⁹ Darfur24 and ACLED, in Insecurity Insight, Protection in Danger Monthly News Brief - September 2024, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, in Insecurity Insight, Protection in Danger Monthly News Brief - September 2024, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵¹ DNHR, Field Report: Escalating Crisis in North and Central Darfur, 12 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁵² FEWS NET, Famine (IPC Phase 5) confirmed in part of Al Fasher, North Darfur, 1 August 2024, [url](#)

³⁵³ OHCHR, Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades, warn UN experts, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁴ HRW, Sudan's Victims Survived Killings; Now They Face Starvation, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁵ UNOCHA, Sudan, Humanitarian Update, 1 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³⁵⁶ UNHCR and UNICEF, UN agencies warn of spiraling Sudan crisis as civilians face grave risks and famine threat grows amid access barriers, Joint UNHCR-UNICEF Statement, 25 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁷ Mercy Corps, Grave Malnutrition Emergency is Unfolding in Sudan's Conflict-Affected Central and South Darfur States, 18 July 2024, [url](#)



According to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)³⁵⁸ report of December 2024, the humanitarian situation was expected to continue to ‘significantly worsen’ in the coming months. The IPC’s Famine Review Committee (FRC) identified famine conditions in five areas across the country where reliable data was available, including the Zamzam, Abou Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps and the Western Nuba Mountains. Famine conditions were expected to expand to five additional locations in North Darfur by May 2025. Moreover, the FRC identified a risk of famine in 17 other areas across Sudan.³⁵⁹ In the Nuba Mountain area, about 20 % of families were facing a severe food shortage and about 30 % of children were suffering from malnutrition, according to local leaders of the SPLM-N, the armed group controlling the area. Several children and adults had reportedly died from malnutrition in the past few months, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that while no data on the total number of deaths by starvation were collected, that number was likely to rise if food aid was not provided ‘as a matter of urgency’.³⁶⁰ In the Darfur region, graveyards were reportedly ‘expanding fast’, due to the rising number of people dying from starvation and diseases.³⁶¹

Besides the increased risk of diseases and death, food insecurity also affected the population’s mental health. World Vision estimated that due to the linkage link between hunger and mental health, 15.7 million children and their families might be at risk to develop mental disorders such as depression or anxiety. Moreover, in the context of conflict and food insecurity, gender-based violence such as sexual exploitation and child marriage were increasing.³⁶² Other harmful coping mechanisms included prostitution for food, child labour or families eating whatever they could find.³⁶³ FEWS NET noted that in September 2024, food prices in the besieged city of Kadugli had increased by 500 % compared with September 2023, leaving IDP households dependent on support from their host communities and on wild foods.³⁶⁴ The Sudan Tribune quoted a resident from Dilling as similarly saying that many had resorted to eating leather or wild herbs.³⁶⁵ In other regions, people reportedly lived on only one meal per day.³⁶⁶

Food insecurity was caused by the disruption of trade routes – a consequence of conflict-induced displacement –, ensuing market food shortages and high prices unaffordable for most of the poor and IDP households,³⁶⁷ as well as by the disruption of agricultural

³⁵⁸ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a tool to classify the severity and extent of food insecurity and malnutrition, implemented by a partnership of 15 organisations at global, regional and country levels. See IPC, IPC Overview and Classification System, undated, [url](#)

³⁵⁹ IPC, Famine Review Committee: Sudan, December 2024, 24 December 2024, [url](#); p. 1

³⁶⁰ HRW, Sudan’s Victims Survived Killings; Now They Face Starvation, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁶¹ Reuters, Sudan’s cemeteries swell with fresh graves as hunger and disease spread, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁶² World Vision, Unprecedented hunger, mental health tragedy, and gender-based violence: The crisis for children and families in Sudan, 19 August 2024, [url](#), p. 11, 14

³⁶³ Ayin Network, Systematic starvation, a ceasefire is critical, 13 August 2024, [url](#)

³⁶⁴ FEWS NET, Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 9 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁶⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Dilling faces famine as war isolates South Kordofan, 25 July 2024, [url](#)

³⁶⁶ NRC, Sudan: World ignores countdown to famine, 22 November 2024, [url](#); DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 4

³⁶⁷ FEWS NET, Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 9 October 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 3





production.³⁶⁸ The latter included the deliberate destruction of crops,³⁶⁹ the disruption of the production or import of agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, and agrochemicals, and the shift from cultivating food crops to cash crops.³⁷⁰ Food insecurity was further aggravated by the parties to the conflict preventing the access and delivery of humanitarian aid.³⁷¹ A human rights analyst with deep knowledge of the country, who was interviewed by EUAA, stated that the RSF do not allow people to obtain goods from areas that they do not control and force people to buy expensive goods they have looted themselves.³⁷²

A group of UN experts noted in a joint statement in June 2024 that both the SAF and the RSF were ‘using food as a weapon and starving civilians’ and had to stop blocking, looting and exploiting humanitarian aid.³⁷³ The Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Mercy Corps stated in a joint report of September 2024 that the hunger crisis in Sudan was ‘human-made’, with the parties to the conflict deliberately hindering the delivery of humanitarian assistance and blocking the access to aid for people in need, thus turning hunger into ‘a weapon of war’.³⁷⁴ The SAF’s and RSF’s ‘starvation tactics’ reportedly included the use of bureaucratic and administrative impediments to obstruct the delivery of aid, attacks against local respondents,³⁷⁵ logistical constraints and the blocking or delaying of aid to access areas controlled by the respective other party.³⁷⁶

According to UNICEF, 17.3 million people in Sudan were lacking access to safe drinking water and about 24 million access to sanitation facilities.³⁷⁷ Africanews reported in October 2024 that tens of thousands of households had reportedly been left without access to safe drinking water in Khartoum city after parts of the city’s water infrastructure had been destroyed by fighting and could not be repaired due to a lack of personnel and spare parts. Instead, residents relied on water from the Nile River or untreated water that had to be bought at high prices, thus risking falling ill with water-borne diseases such as cholera.³⁷⁸

Moreover, water sources in several states across the country were destroyed and contaminated by heavy rainfall and flooding, leading to an increase in cholera cases in the weeks following the end of the rainy season. A new cholera outbreak had been officially declared in August 2024 by Sudan’s Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) starting from 22 July

³⁶⁸ IPC, SUDAN: Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot I April 2024 - February 2025, 27 June 2024, [url](#), p. 1; FAO, 5 things you should know about how conflict in Sudan is devastating agriculture and people’s food security, 15 April 2024, [url](#); Clingendael, From Catastrophe to Famine, February 2024, [url](#), pp. 3-4

³⁶⁹ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 2; FAO, Sudan: Cereal production down by over 40 percent, likely exacerbating hunger, 16 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁰ Clingendael, Sudan’s agricultural input supply in times of war, December 2024, [url](#), pp. 35, 44

³⁷¹ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁷² Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

³⁷³ OHCHR, Using starvation as a weapon of war in Sudan must stop: UN experts, 26 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁴ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁷⁵ UN, Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades, warn UN experts, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

³⁷⁶ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 13

³⁷⁷ UNICEF, Water, sanitation and hygiene, n.d., [url](#)

³⁷⁸ Africanews, Cholera fears as Sudan faces a worsening water crisis, 20 October 2024, [url](#)



2024.³⁷⁹ As of the end of November 2024, the number of cases had risen to 43 490, and 1 187 people across 11 states had died of the disease, according to the Ministry of Health.³⁸⁰

UNHCR pointed to the necessity of improving water and sanitation infrastructure in refugee camps to cope with the rising number of displaced persons, as poor conditions and unsafe hygiene practices had contributed to a cholera outbreak in these areas.³⁸¹ Measures included, for example, maintaining water distribution networks, water chlorination, the cleaning of latrines and hygiene promotion campaigns across refugee camps in Gedaref state.³⁸²

UNICEF similarly reported on the provision of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services to more than half a million people and 10 health care facilities in 41 localities across 17 states in September 2024, including the construction or repair of water sources, chlorination/flocculation³⁸³ of water and water trucking.³⁸⁴ 1.9 million people had reportedly been supported by UNICEF with water chlorination of water sources as of mid-September 2024.³⁸⁵

Zamzam camp

UNICEF and the WFP pointed to severely limited humanitarian access as one of the primary causes of famine in the Zamzam camp,³⁸⁶ the country's largest IDP camp located in El Fasher, North Darfur's capital city.³⁸⁷ With the RSF controlling most of the supply roads and making it 'all but impossible' to deliver humanitarian supplies for the camp's 300 000 to 500 000 residents, Doctors without Borders (MSF) stated in September that it had to cut down the services it was able to provide, while about 10 % of the more than 29 000 children under the age of five living in the camp were suffering from live-threatening levels of hunger and 34 % more from global³⁸⁸ acute malnutrition (GAM).³⁸⁹ According to aid groups cited by NPR, children were dying almost daily and many camp residents had been forced to eat peanut

³⁷⁹ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update, 1 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁸⁰ Sudan Tribune, Cholera outbreak surpasses 43,000 cases in Sudan, death toll tops 1,100, 28 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁸¹ UNHCR, Sudan, Global Appeal 2025 Situation Overview, November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁸² UNHCR, Sudan Situation 3 – 9 November 2024, 15 November 2024, [url](#), p. 4; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 10 – 16 November 2024, 22 November 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³⁸³ Flocculation means adding a chemical substance to the water that brings particles together into larger flocs, making it easier to filter them out of the water. UNICEF et al., Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector, Emergency Technical Guidelines for Sudan, November 2017, [url](#), p. 91

³⁸⁴ UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report No. 23, Reporting Period 1-30 September 2024, 11 November 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁸⁵ UNICEF, Over Three Million Children at Heightened Risk of Cholera and other Deadly Diseases in Sudan, 17 September 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁶ UNICEF, Famine confirmed in Sudan's North Darfur, confirming UN agencies worst fears, 1 August 2024, [url](#)

³⁸⁷ MSF, Sudan: Zamzam displacement camp under attack, 2 December 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Sudan's famine-hit Zamzam camp comes under fire, say residents and MSF, 3 December 2024, [url](#); Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Update: RSF Attacks on Zamzam IDP Camp, Widespread SAF Bombardment and RSF Targeted Razing in El-Fasher, 19 December 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁸⁸ Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is the proportion of children aged from 6 to 59 months in a given population who are considered severely or moderately malnourished (measured by weight to height ratio). FSC Cluster, Global Acute Malnutrition by WHZ (Weight-for-Height), 2020, [url](#)

³⁸⁹ MSF, Food must be delivered to people starved by blockade in Zamzam camp, 13 September 2024, [url](#)



shells and animal fodder.³⁹⁰ For additional information on the situation in Zamzam camp, please see below section [2.2.4 \(Darfur - Civilian casualties\)](#) of this report.

In North Darfur state, the ongoing blockade of deliveries by the RSF led to a scarcity of affordable fuel in El Fasher city and the Zamzam IDP camp, thus making it difficult to operate water pumps necessary to provide water to the local and IDP populations.³⁹¹ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one third of the Zamzam camp's water points were not working as of November 2024.³⁹² Previously, several water points had reportedly been contaminated by flood water following heavy rains. 'Multiple' latrines at school facilities had reportedly also been affected.³⁹³

In early December 2024, Zamzam camp was reportedly attacked by RSF forces, causing casualties and forcing people to flee.³⁹⁴ The RSF denied responsibility for the attack.³⁹⁵ NPR noted with reference to local media sources that more than 80 people were killed and almost 400 injured in the ongoing shelling. Patients in need of surgery had to be transferred to a hospital in nearby El Fasher city. Transport, however, was dangerous as warring parties were holding positions along the only exit road. One humanitarian driver was reportedly killed earlier in 2024 on the way to the hospital.³⁹⁶ For additional information regarding attacks on humanitarian staff, please see below section [1.3.1\(d\)](#) of this report.

(c) Access to healthcare and medical supplies

As of October 2024, UNOCHA referred to the country's health system in some states as 'barely functional and essentially defunct'.³⁹⁷ An Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis of September 2024 pointed to reports of 'highly dysfunctional health services' in several parts of the country.³⁹⁸ Other sources described Sudan's health system as 'collapsing',³⁹⁹ facing 'virtual collapse',⁴⁰⁰ or being 'in ruins',⁴⁰¹ with an acute shortage of

³⁹⁰ NPR, Sudan's biggest refugee camp was already struck with famine. Now it's being shelled, 21 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁹¹ MSF, Food must be delivered to people starved by blockade in Zamzam camp, 13 September 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Water crisis batters war-torn Sudan as temperatures soar, 23 June 2024, [url](#)

³⁹² ICRC, Sudan: Community kitchens bring vital food relief to thousands in North Darfur as humanitarian conditions worsen, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

³⁹³ Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Flood Zone: Impact of Heavy Rains on Humanitarian and Human Security Situation in El-Fasher and Zamzam IDP Camp, 2 August 2024, [url](#), p. 5

³⁹⁴ MSF, Sudan: Zamzam displacement camp under attack, 2 December 2024, [url](#); Reuters, Sudan's famine-hit Zamzam camp comes under fire, say residents and MSF, 3 December 2024, [url](#); Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Update: RSF Attacks on Zamzam IDP Camp, Widespread SAF Bombardment and RSF Targeted Razing in El-Fasher, 19 December 2024, [url](#), p. 3

³⁹⁵ Radio Dabanga, RSF denies accusations of bombing North Darfur displaced camp, 3 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁶ NPR, Sudan's biggest refugee camp was already struck with famine. Now it's being shelled, 21 December 2024, [url](#)

³⁹⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update, 1 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

³⁹⁸ IPC, SUDAN: Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot I April 2024 - February 2025, 27 June 2024, [url](#), p. 1

³⁹⁹ Save the Children, Sudan: Over 2 million babies born into 18 months of devastating conflict, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁰ IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰¹ WHO, High-level mission to Sudan reaffirms WHO commitment, calls for urgent action to address and end the extreme health and humanitarian crisis, 9 September 2024, [url](#)



personnel, funding and medical supplies,⁴⁰² attacks on medical facilities,⁴⁰³ as well as electricity blackouts and insufficient water supplies.⁴⁰⁴

In September 2024, the World Health Organization (WHO) stated that in the areas worst affected by the conflict such as Al Jazirah, Kordofan, Darfur and Khartoum, 70-80 % of health facilities were ‘barely operational or closed’. The same applied to about 45 % of health facilities in other parts of the country. More than 100 verified attacks on health care facilities had been recorded since the outbreak of the armed conflict in April 2023, although the actual number of attacks was likely ‘much higher’, according to the WHO. Attacks targeted not only health facilities but also healthcare workers, ambulances and other means of transport, medical supplies and equipment and warehouses, and in 29 cases, directly impacted patients.⁴⁰⁵ Several sources pointed to the deliberate nature of attacks on health care by the warring parties,⁴⁰⁶ notably the RSF.⁴⁰⁷

In July 2024, MSF suspended all activities at the Turkish hospital in Khartoum, located in an area under RSF control. The announcement was made following a year of ‘multiple violent incidents [...] inside and outside the premises’, including death threats against MSF staff.⁴⁰⁸ According to a joint study by the Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale School of Public Health and the Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA), nearly half of hospitals in Khartoum state were damaged in attacks between 15 April 2023 and 26 August 2024. The study pointed to the ‘widespread, indiscriminate, and persistent nature of attacks on this critical infrastructure’ and noted these attacks affected not only the local patient population but the entire country, as also tier-1 referral facilities and teaching hospitals had been targeted.⁴⁰⁹ The Saudi Maternity Hospital, the last – partially – functional in El Fasher in Northern Darfur was repeatedly attacked, including in August⁴¹⁰ and October 2024, injuring medical staff and damaging several departments and infrastructure.⁴¹¹ It was destroyed by repeated RSF artillery and drone attacks in December 2024, which damaged several sections of the hospital, rendering it unusable.⁴¹²

The ICRC observed in August 2024 that two thirds of the population were no longer able to access essential health services, as many of them had to close due to the ongoing violence. Violent incidents reportedly included an increasing number of attacks on and threats against personnel and patients, as well as the looting and vandalising of health facilities,⁴¹³ such as a

⁴⁰² IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰³ IRC, Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, [url](#); MSF, Sudan: Last hospital in El Fasher under threat from intense bombardment of the city, 14 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁴ UNFPA, Sudan Emergency Situation Report #13, 27 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴⁰⁵ WHO, Sudan surpasses 100 attacks on healthcare since 2023 armed conflict began, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁶ HRW, Sudan: One Year of Atrocities Requires New Global Approach, 12 April 2024, [url](#) ; MSF, Sudan: Last hospital in El Fasher under threat from intense bombardment of the city, 14 August 2024, [url](#) ;

⁴⁰⁷ MSF, A war on people: The human cost of conflict and violence in Sudan, July 2024, [url](#), pp. 12-14; ADF, Attacks on Sudan’s Hospitals Are Crippling Health Care System, 20 August 2024, [url](#); Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care in Sudan 16-19 October 2024, 4 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁰⁸ MSF, MSF suspends delivery of care in Khartoum’s Turkish hospital, 10 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁹ Ahmed, Z. et al., Widespread damage to healthcare facilities in Khartoum State, Sudan, Yale HRL and SAPA, [url](#), pp. 3, 5

⁴¹⁰ MSF, Sudan: Last hospital in El Fasher risks closure amid intense bombardment, 14 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹¹ UNFPA, In Sudan, city’s last remaining hospital shelled: “We need support now”, 28 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹² Sudan Tribune, Only functioning hospital in El Fasher destroyed by RSF shelling, 25 December 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹³ ICRC, Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure, 8 August 2024, [url](#)



dialysis centre in Al Hilaliya in Al Jazirah state.⁴¹⁴ Many health workers fled from the ongoing violence, thus increasing the shortage of medical staff.⁴¹⁵ According to UNHCR, there is currently one doctor available for 24 000 patients, in comparison to the emergency standard of 10 000 patients per one doctor.⁴¹⁶

Moreover, the ICRC pointed to reports that civilians were increasingly being denied healthcare services.⁴¹⁷ Given the lack and inaccessibility of healthcare facilities, it reportedly became increasingly difficult for women to access maternal health services.⁴¹⁸ According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), an estimated 1.6 million women and girls of reproductive age were in need of reproductive health care as of May 2024.⁴¹⁹ UNFPA reported that '[a]ccess to essential sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services is dwindling, placing pregnant and lactating women at heightened risk of complications due to malnutrition and lack of healthcare'.⁴²⁰

Pregnant women gave birth without medical assistance or with unsterilised instruments, according to the New Humanitarian (TNH). Moreover, while sexual violence was reportedly widely used as a tool of war, rape victims were unable to access medical services, or to get abortion medication and post-exposure prophylaxis to prevent an HIV infection.⁴²¹

In addition, the lack of functioning medical infrastructure exacerbated outbreaks of cholera, malaria and dengue fever.⁴²² In the context of a 'mysterious' eye disease that appeared in early August 2024, doctors were reportedly lacking the resources and tools to properly diagnose and treat the disease, which was suggested to be linked to environmental damage caused by toxic remnants of war.⁴²³ MSF reported that Sudanese staff severely ill with malaria could not be treated due to a lack of essential medicines.⁴²⁴

UNICEF noted that the outbreak of several infectious diseases occurred in the context of a 'significant' decline in vaccination rates and the conflict-related destruction of health and WASH infrastructure. A cholera vaccination campaign was reportedly conducted in September 2024 in Kassala state.⁴²⁵

Health centres in Sennar, South Darfur and North Kordofan states reportedly pointed to a severe shortage of medicines. Moreover, a dialysis centre in North Kordofan had to stop working due to a lack of dialysis materials. Dialysis centres in South Darfur and in some SFA-controlled states were reportedly also facing shortages of medical supplies and functional

⁴¹⁴ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴¹⁵ WHO, High-level mission to Sudan reaffirms WHO commitment, calls for urgent action to address and end the extreme health and humanitarian crisis, 9 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁶ UNHCR, Unrelenting violence in Sudan drives continued refugee exodus, 8 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁷ ICRC, Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure, 8 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁸ WRC et al., Sudan: Different Needs, Ignored Priorities, October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴¹⁹ UNFPA, Sudan Emergency Situation Report #13, 27 May 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴²⁰ UNFPA, One year of war in Sudan, April 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴²¹ TNH, Health services non-functional as women bear the brunt of Sudan's war, 9 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴²² UNHCR, Sudan Situation 29 September – 5 October 2024, 11 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴²³ Radio Dabanga, Sudan doctors alarmed at 'mysterious' eye disease outbreak, 12 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴²⁴ IPS, Sudan Ravaged By Disease, Famine, and War, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴²⁵ UNICEF, Over Three Million Children at Heightened Risk of Cholera and other Deadly Diseases in Sudan, 17 September 2024, [url](#)





equipment and either had to close or were at risk of closure.⁴²⁶ For additional information on the lack of medical supplies and on access to healthcare until February 2024, please see section 1.1.5 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

(d) Aid delivery and humanitarian access

In the period from January to October 2024, 12.4 million people received ‘some form’ of humanitarian assistance, according to UNOCHA.⁴²⁷

Nevertheless, humanitarian organisations continued to experience ‘a range of restrictions and challenges’, such as bureaucratic obstacles, attacks on humanitarian personnel and facilities, and interference in humanitarian operations. From January to September 2024, humanitarian organisations reportedly recorded 73 incidents of humanitarian access impediments in 16 states and 30 localities.⁴²⁸

In April 2024, MSF noted that the country’s government continued to obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid, in particular to areas outside their control, by denying travel permits for humanitarian workers and supplies to cross front lines, restricting the use of border crossings and the issuing of humanitarian visas. On the other hand, in areas under RSF control, MSF pointed to frequent incidents of looting warehouses and health facilities, harassment and arrests of medical personnel - especially those working for the Ministry of Health - as well as carjacking.⁴²⁹

Delivery of aid continued to be blocked or delayed by the parties to the conflict.⁴³⁰ UNICEF mentioned ‘access constraints’ that impeded the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to areas such as Kordofan, Darfur and Khartoum, due to bureaucratic obstacles, ongoing fighting and ‘lack of commitment’ from the warring parties to give security guarantees for humanitarian operations.⁴³¹ The UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan noted in a report of October 2024 that humanitarian organisations continued to face ‘multiple challenges’, such as the denial of or delays in processing visa applications or granting travel permits for humanitarian workers as well as restrictions on cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid and on humanitarian movement within the country. The Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), established by the RSF in August 2023,⁴³² reportedly introduced administrative impediments such as registration requirements of humanitarian organisations or mandatory travel permits for aid workers and supplies entering RSF-controlled areas. Moreover, according to humanitarian organisations, RSF

⁴²⁶ Radio Dabanga, Medicines hard to find in war-torn Sudan, kidney patients desperate, 5 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴²⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Response Dashboard October 2024, 19 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴²⁸ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot September 2024, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴²⁹ MSF, After a year of war in Sudan, a rapid scale up of response is needed to avoid catastrophe, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

⁴³⁰ UN Press, Warning 26 Million People Facing Acute Hunger in Sudan, Senior World Food Programme Official Tells Security Council Political Will, Leadership Key to Stopping Famine, SC/15784, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴³¹ UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation Report No. 20, 1 January to 30 June 2024, 30 July 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 3

⁴³² SARHO was reportedly established as an equivalent to the government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) to oversee humanitarian operations in areas under RSF control. See Abdel Aziz, A., Leveraging Humanitarian Aid in Wartime Sudan, Spring 2024, [url](#)





compiled a list of vendors from whom they must purchase local goods and services in the future, which would undermine the neutrality of their organisations and activities.⁴³³

On the other hand, FEWS NET pointed to disruptions in cross-line aid deliveries to Darfur and Kordofan districts following a ‘proliferation of checkpoints’ by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and delays in granting approvals for the passing of aid convoys.⁴³⁴ Moreover, Sudanese authorities restricted cross-border aid deliveries from Chad into Darfur in February 2024, claiming that the border with Chad was being used for the transfer of arms and equipment into Darfur, as a leaked UN experts’ report of January 2024 suggested.⁴³⁵ While alternative routes were allowed, they were repeatedly facing blockades and bureaucratic obstacles, according to a joint report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and other organisations.⁴³⁶ The Ayin Network reported on allegations of irregularities with regard to the distribution of aid supplies by the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the official body under the ‘de facto army government’ tasked with overseeing humanitarian operations.⁴³⁷

The UN’s International Independent Fact-Finding Mission eventually concluded based on its findings that both the RSF and the SAF and their respective allied militias prevented access of humanitarian aid to areas controlled by the respective other party;⁴³⁸ the International Crisis Group made a similar observation.⁴³⁹

The Assessment Capacities Projects (ACAPS) noted in a report of June 2024 and with reference to several sources that cross-border deliveries of humanitarian aid remained challenging, with the El Tina border crossing from Chad being the only exception. At other crossing points, including Wadi Halfa and Argin (from Egypt), Gallabat (from Ethiopia) and Renk-Kosti (from South Sudan), aid organisations continued to face legal obstacles and blockages from both the Sudanese and the respective other authorities. Humanitarian personnel continued to be allowed to enter Sudan only through Port Sudan.⁴⁴⁰ In November 2024, the country’s military leader, General Al-Burhan, granted permission to the United Nations to use three airports – Kadugli (South Kordofan), El Obeid (North Kordofan) and Damazin (Blue Nile) – as ‘humanitarian hubs’ for storing aid supplies.⁴⁴¹

⁴³³ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 282-283

⁴³⁴ FEWS NET, Clashes in Sudan’s breadbasket threaten national food availability, 1 February 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁴³⁵ AFP, Sudan authorities block cross-border aid to stricken Darfur, 25 February 2024. For the UN report see Sudan War Monitor, Full Text: UN Panel of Experts Report on Sudan, 23 January 2024, [url](#)

⁴³⁶ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won’t. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 13

⁴³⁷ Ayin Network, Port Sudan: Humanitarian Aid Commission accused of aid graft, 21 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴³⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 284-285

⁴³⁹ International Crisis Group, Sudan: A year of War, 11 April 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁴⁰ ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁴¹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s Burhan allows UN to use three airports for aid delivery, 25 November 2024, [url](#)



In mid-August, the Adre border crossing between Chad and Sudan was re-opened for a period of three months for the delivery of humanitarian aid.⁴⁴² In mid-November 2024, Sudan's government decided to extend the opening for another three months. During that period, at least 377 trucks have reportedly delivered aid supplies for about 1.4 million people in need through the Adre border crossing into Sudan.⁴⁴³

In mid-November 2024, the first aid convoy in several months reached Zamzam, a camp in North Darfur hosting about half a million IDPs where famine has been confirmed since August 2024.⁴⁴⁴ MSF had previously announced that it had to stop outpatient treatment for more than 5 000 children with acute malnutrition living in the camp as the warring parties had blocked the delivery of aid supplies for several months.⁴⁴⁵ For additional information, please see also the sub-section on Zamzam camp in section [1.3.1\(b\)](#) above.

Government officials rejected claims of famine in Zamzam and other camps, claiming that conditions for the declaration of famine did not exist,⁴⁴⁶ and that MSF's findings were exaggerated. The rejection was reportedly linked to military concerns that an official declaration of famine would increase pressure on the government to allow easier access of humanitarian supplies, thus increasing the risk of allowing in supplies for the RSF and areas under its control.⁴⁴⁷

In a statement of June 2024, a group of UN experts pointed to the 'deliberate targeting' of humanitarian personnel and local volunteers, noting that many of them had been arrested, threatened and prosecuted during the previous weeks.⁴⁴⁸ [...] A UNOCHA representative similarly stressed in the context of a Security Council meeting in August 2024 that humanitarian workers continued to face harassment and – in some cases even deadly – attacks. Other sources pointed to attacks on local volunteers and activists of emergency response rooms who were operating in conflict zones.⁴⁴⁹ Humanitarian Outcomes noted that in the period from January to October 2024, 25 aid workers had been killed in Sudan.⁴⁵⁰ For additional information regarding attacks on humanitarian or aid personnel, please see sections 1.1.5 (Humanitarian situation) and 2.2.1 (Aid workers) of the of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

⁴⁴² UNOCHA, Sudan: Adre border crossing situation update, Flash Update No. 01, 27 August 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁴³ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan welcomes the decision to keep Adre border crossing point open for aid supplies for another three months, 14 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁴ BBC News, Famine-hit Sudan camp gets first aid convoy in months, 22 November 2024, [url](#); WFP, WFP announces major surge in food aid into Sudan's hard-to-reach areas, 22 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁵ MSF, Supply blockade forces MSF to stop care for 5,000 malnourished children in Sudan, 10 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁶ UN Press, Warning 26 Million People Facing Acute Hunger in Sudan, Senior World Food Programme Official Tells Security Council Political Will, Leadership Key to Stopping Famine, SC/15784, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁷ Reuters, The world's hunger watchdog warned of catastrophe in Sudan. Famine struck anyway., 5 December 2024, [url](#); Reuters, An elaborate global system exists to prevent famine. It's failing., 4 December 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁸ OHCHR, Using starvation as a weapon of war in Sudan must stop: UN experts, 26 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁹ TNH, Warring parties target local aid volunteers as fighting escalates in Sudan, 13 November 2024, [url](#); DW, Sudan's escalating conflict worsens humanitarian situation, 16 October 2024, [url](#); STPT, Humanitarianism under siege. Millions at risk as belligerents abuse humanitarian aid, August 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁴⁵⁰ Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security Database Signal Alert, National aid workers facing increased fatal attacks in Sudan, 29 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1



Map 3. Humanitarian access constraints map, September 2024.^{451 452}

(e) Road security

Border areas

The Gallabat-Metema crossing between Sudan and Ethiopia re-opened on 21 October 2024.⁴⁵³ It had been closed in early September after the Fano militia took control of Metema town in the Ethiopian Amhara region bordering Sudan’s Gedaref district.⁴⁵⁴ Thousands of Sudanese reportedly have crossed into Ethiopia through this border point since the beginning

⁴⁵¹ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (Map), September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵² As indicated by the source ‘Accessible: Movement from location A to location B is fully within the control of one of the parties to the conflict. Partially accessible: Part of the route is controlled by SAF, the other part is controlled by RSF or another party to the conflict. With partially accessible, these are high risk so always we need to notify both parties to the conflict. Inaccessible: Cross line movements where there is active fighting and/or criminality. A second criteria for an inaccessibility classification is adverse climatic conditions, notably the rainy season.’ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot, September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵³ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 20 – 26 October 2024, 1 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁵⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudan closes Ethiopia border after Fano militia seizes town, 2 September 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Sudan closes El Gedaref border crossing with Ethiopia, 5 September 2024, [url](#)



of the armed conflict in April 2023.⁴⁵⁵ The border crossing had been closed several times in the past,⁴⁵⁶ and reopening reportedly included the establishment of a temporary Sudanese-Ethiopian security force.⁴⁵⁷

Border issues with South Sudan over the disputed region of Abyei remained unresolved and the security situation in the region continued to be affected by the armed conflict in Sudan, in particular in terms of an ongoing influx of arms into the region and the arrival of people displaced by the fighting. According to a report by the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Abyei, 691 displaced persons arrived in Abyei in the period 16 April - 1 October 2024, the majority of whom were women and children.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, there were reports of RSF fighters crossing into Abyei and being involved in incidents of looting in October 2024.⁴⁵⁹

For additional information on the main border crossing and internal routes, please see section 1.1.5 (e) of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#)).

Internal routes

In Khartoum city, both, RSF and SAF reportedly set up checkpoints in their respective areas of control. MSF noted, in March 2024, that there had been reports of civilians being mistreated by staff at SAF checkpoints when going back to government-controlled areas.⁴⁶⁰ RSF checkpoints were also reported in Sinjah, the capital city of Sennar state, along the national highway leading south to Abu Hugar, on the road north to Senna and on the road to Al-Rusayris in Blue Nile state as of June 2024.⁴⁶¹ In November, the SAF reportedly regained control over Sinjah,⁴⁶² as well as over the road linking Sinjah to Damazin, the capital city of Blue Nile state.⁴⁶³ Previously, the SFA had retaken control over Jabal Moya, a mountain overlooking key roads linking Sennar to neighbouring states and claimed to have set up 'huge checkpoints' in the area.⁴⁶⁴

In North Darfur, the road running from the city of El Fasher's western gate (reportedly the only one not controlled by the RSF) around the Zamzam camp and then to Tawila and other towns further west was reportedly 'dotted with checkpoints' staffed with armed men who charged fees for letting vehicles pass. The Guardian quoted a driver saying that he was charged with at least 5 000 Sudanese pounds at every of the more than 15 checkpoints along the way, which increased the price for a place on the lorry and made it unaffordable for many families wishing to leave El Fasher.⁴⁶⁵ In November 2024, the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health noted that the B-26 road linking El Fasher with the Zamzam camp was under

⁴⁵⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudan closes Ethiopia border after Fano militia seizes town, 2 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁶ Chatham House, Securitizing the Ethiopia–Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁷ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 20 – 26 October 2024, 1 November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁴⁵⁸ UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2024/740, 14 October 2024, [url](#), pp. 1, 3

⁴⁵⁹ UN, Sudan war keeps reaching across borders, Security Council hears, 5 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁰ MSF, Sudan: "The situation remains extremely difficult", 12 March 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army denies RSF control of Sinjah, fighting continues amidst displacement, 30 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶² Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army regains control of Sinja, 23 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶³ Sudan Tribune, Sudan army says broke Damazin siege, recaptures towns, 26 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudan army, RSF clash over strategic mountain in Sennar, [url](#), 3 October 2024

⁴⁶⁵ The Guardian, In El Fasher you face only death': Sudan city empties as paramilitaries close in, 2 October 2024, [url](#)





threat from RSF lines of attack.⁴⁶⁶ UNOCHA's Humanitarian Access Constraints map of December 2024 marked all main roads linking Al Fasher with surrounding towns and cities as either only partially accessible or inaccessible.⁴⁶⁷

Circulation on main routes

Cross-line aid deliveries inside the country remained challenging. For example, of two proposed routes to deliver aid from Port Sudan to El Fasher in North Darfur, the RSF rejected the northern route via Ad Dabbah,⁴⁶⁸ Atbara and Mellit,⁴⁶⁹ while the southern route via Kosti and El Obeid had been out of use since the end of 2023 due to increased fighting and the lack of delivery permits by the warring parties.⁴⁷⁰ Similarly, UNOCHA pointed to insecurity, bureaucratic obstacles and poor road conditions as the main reasons for the routes to Blue Nile, Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan remaining inaccessible through the Gedaref-Sennar route.⁴⁷¹ Moreover, the RSF and several local militias were reportedly setting up checkpoints and charging 'protection fees' from aid convoys crossing through territory under their control.⁴⁷² For information on cross-border and cross-line aid deliveries, please also see above section 1.3.1(d) of this report.

The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) quoted traders from West Darfur and South Kordofan equally saying that they were forced to pay fees at checkpoints set up along trading routes.⁴⁷³ The UN Fact-Finding Mission pointed to reports of civilians being physically attacked at RSF checkpoints on the way between El Geneina and Adre, Western Darfur.⁴⁷⁴

In August 2024, seasonal rainfall and flooding led to the disruption of roads in several areas in Central Darfur, including around Mornei and Krinding bridges and between Nertiti and Golo, delaying the delivery of aid supplies.⁴⁷⁵ Radio Dabanga reported on the collapse of four important bridges in the Darfur region, among them the Azum Valley Bridge in West Darfur, a 'critical logistic link' between the West, Central and South Darfur states.⁴⁷⁶

In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country indicated that the SAF usually places checkpoints in the main highways, while the RSF has many checkpoints within cities and neighbourhoods.⁴⁷⁷ The Dutch COI report indicated that, according to Sudanese human rights organisation Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker,

⁴⁶⁶ Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, El-Fasher Situation Report: RSF Advances on 6th Division as Zamzam Prepares for Attack, 11 November 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁷ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot December 2024, 12 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁸ Africanews, Sudan war: RSF rejects proposed humanitarian aid route to Darfur, 22 March 2024, [url](#); ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁶⁹ ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁰ ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁷¹ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot September 2024, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷² ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁷³ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won't. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 11

⁴⁷⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), p. 61

⁴⁷⁵ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 23 – 29 August 2024, 2 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴⁷⁶ Radio Dabanga, Darfur and Sudan aid distribution hampered as bridges succumb to floods, 26 August 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁷ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024



between Nyala and El Fasher, for example, the RSF can have as many as 70 checkpoints.⁴⁷⁸ A confidential source also indicated that between Central and South Darfur, the RSF can have as many as 45 checkpoints.⁴⁷⁹ Around Port Sudan there are also many checkpoints.⁴⁸⁰ Checkpoints are also usually located next to markets, so people are obliged to pay a fee when they go to get food.⁴⁸¹

Sources indicated that people transiting through checkpoints are requested to pay.⁴⁸² The Dutch COI report indicated that, according to confidential sources, the fee to transit a checkpoint can reach 'thousands' of Sudanese pounds at each checkpoint.⁴⁸³ A human rights analyst with years of experience in the country interviewed by the EUAA indicated that fees range from \$10 to \$100 USD.⁴⁸⁴

Combatants from both the SAF and the RSF often harassed women, detained men,⁴⁸⁵ and steal valuables at checkpoints.⁴⁸⁶ The human rights analyst interviewed indicated that people from Darfur are ethnically targeted at checkpoints by both the RSF and the SAF, and that younger people are more likely to be targeted.⁴⁸⁷ In an interview with EUAA, Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah also indicated that particular profiles, including members of Resistance Committees, Emergency Response Rooms, and political activists, face 'lots of difficulties', with some of them detained and interrogated about their political affiliations.⁴⁸⁸ The same source indicated that women and children are particularly vulnerable at checkpoints, and provided the example of a woman who was subjected to sexual violence at a checkpoint in Gedaref and sustained bleeding from the injuries, according to medical volunteers at an IDP camp in Gedaref.⁴⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch mentioned the case of a family (husband, wife and three daughters) that was stopped at a RSF checkpoint when they were trying to flee Al-Sireha on 22 October 2024, and was pressured to hand over the youngest daughter of 15 years of age; the family managed to escape.⁴⁹⁰ The Dutch COI report indicated that

'[i]n some cases, the unfair treatment at a checkpoint seemed arbitrary in nature. For example, one source was aware of a group of people travelling from Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, to Port Sudan in the north of the

⁴⁷⁸ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁴⁷⁹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁴⁸⁰ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸¹ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸² Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57; Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁴⁸⁴ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸⁵ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11; Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁴⁸⁶ Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, [url](#), p. 11; Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57; Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸⁷ Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸⁸ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁸⁹ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁹⁰ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#)



country. This group passed many checkpoints held alternately by the SAF and the RSF. The travelling group was threatened by both sides. In other cases, negative treatment at a checkpoint targeted individuals. For example, a source was aware of human rights defenders who were blacklisted and detained at SAF checkpoints in eastern Sudan. According to the source, some were released, but many remained in detention'.⁴⁹¹

In an interview with EUAA, a human rights analyst with deep knowledge of the country provided the following information about checkpoints:

'There is no significant commander control over checkpoints by both the RSF and the SAF. ... It is like a feudal system with the RSF. For example, a Lieutenant picks a junior officer with 20 soldiers under his command and tells him to run a checkpoint. The junior officer would need to pay the Lieutenant certain amount of money every month, but he would be free to do anything with the checkpoint. The more money the junior officer pays back, the more benefits he gets. With SAF is more opportunistic, you can negotiate, they may let you pass'.⁴⁹²

In an interview with EUAA, Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah indicated that 'buses transiting through a checkpoint are searched thoroughly. Journalists are at the mercy of soldiers manning checkpoints, they can be said to be luckier compared to other travellers; however, soldiers are very volatile, and the situation can change unexpectedly'.⁴⁹³

According to a report by Human Rights Watch, between February and April 2024, 'UN convoys stopped entering Sudan from Eastern Chad along the route toward El Geneina following a Sudanese Armed Forces declaration that it would no longer allow such cross-border movement'.⁴⁹⁴

According to OCHA, '[r]outes to Blue Nile, Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan via Gedaref-Sennar remain inaccessible since mid-June due to insecurity, bureaucratic impediments, and poor roads'.⁴⁹⁵ Sudan Protection Cluster reported that civilians attempting to flee violence in Al Jazirah state have faced difficulty due to the presence of armed actors and the use of heavy weaponry, including bombardments on RSF positions in Azraq.⁴⁹⁶

A report by the Sudan Protection Cluster indicated that, in conflict areas such as Tamboul, Al Jazirah state, civilians have faced obstacles when trying to flee, with some of them getting trapped in areas where bodies of the deceased remained uncollected in the streets, and that there are reports of wounded persons who are unable to access medical care due to violence

⁴⁹¹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 57

⁴⁹² Human rights analyst, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁹³ Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024

⁴⁹⁴ HRW, "The Massalit Will Not Come Home": Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 195

⁴⁹⁵ UNOCHA, Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot, September 2024, [url](#)

⁴⁹⁶ Sudan Protection Cluster, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update: Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, [url](#), p.1



from armed groups and bombardments.⁴⁹⁷ The Protection Cluster indicated that those who managed to leave Tamboul faced a journey of over 100 kilometres on foot toward New Halfa, Al Fao, and Geradef, which takes about three days to complete and with limited access to water, food, and exposed to violence.⁴⁹⁸

1.3.2. Communication and media presence

This section should be read in conjunction with section 1.1.4 Communication blackout and media coverage of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(26 April 2024\)](#) as the main issues addressed there remain relevant and valid during the reference period of this report.

(a) Crackdown on media outlets and conflict media coverage

According to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, an estimated 90 % of the country's media infrastructure has been destroyed since the outbreak of the conflict, with around 1 000 journalists losing their jobs,⁴⁹⁹ hundreds driven into exile⁵⁰⁰ and some disappeared or killed.⁵⁰¹ Women journalists have been targeted with sexual violence.⁵⁰² In many cases, attacks against reporters also extended to their family members.⁵⁰³ The conflict has left electricity supply lines and communication networks destroyed in Khartoum, Darfur and elsewhere in the country.⁵⁰⁴ Several sources explained how the insecurity caused by the conflict generally affected the reporting across the country: journalists being intimidated, harassed, arrested,⁵⁰⁵ killed or driven into exile, as well as interruption of internet and mobile services affected journalistic reporting in the conflict zones.⁵⁰⁶ The dangerous working environment for journalists has led to self-censorship,⁵⁰⁷ lack of reporting on the ground⁵⁰⁸ and underreporting of events.⁵⁰⁹

⁴⁹⁷ Sudan Protection Cluster, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update: Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, [url](#), p.1

⁴⁹⁸ Sudan Protection Cluster, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update: Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, [url](#), p.1

⁴⁹⁹ Free Press Unlimited, Support for Sudan Media Forum's Silence Kills' campaign, 6 November 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Journalists under attack, media devastated amidst Sudanese conflict, 4 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁰ Sudan Tribune, Journalists under attack, media devastated amidst Sudanese conflict, 4 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰¹ Free Press Unlimited, Support for Sudan Media Forum's Silence Kills' campaign, 6 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰² UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 196

⁵⁰³ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 139

⁵⁰⁵ Sudan Tribune, Journalists under attack, media devastated amidst Sudanese conflict, 4 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁶ Free Press Unlimited, Support for Sudan Media Forum's Silence Kills' campaign, 6 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁷ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#); UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 271

⁵⁰⁸ Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁹ Free Press Unlimited, Support needed for Sudanese media to keep All Eyes On Sudan, 8 July 2024, [url](#)



International media coverage of the conflict was limited⁵¹⁰ as few foreign journalists managed to enter Sudan, let alone spend significant periods of time observing the conflict.⁵¹¹ Moreover, the reference period saw the Sudanese government suspending the work of several international news outlets in the country.⁵¹² For further information on the situation of media workers, see section 2.1 Journalists and treatment of media personnel of the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

(b) Propaganda war

Both the SAF and the RSF disseminated disinformation, propaganda and hate speech through their social media channels⁵¹³ and sought to shape content in ways that advanced their preferred narratives of the conflict.⁵¹⁴ Traditional media such as Sudanese National Television have supported the SAF through coordinated war propaganda, broadcasting numerous reports of alleged SAF victories over the RSF and misleading video material on the army's control of territory.⁵¹⁵

One confidential source consulted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands was quoted as saying that the parties to the conflict had infiltrated online chat groups used by journalists and human rights activists. Moreover, both conflict parties operated hundreds of accounts on social media through which they monitored posts they deemed undesirable.⁵¹⁶ Social media platforms also became an arena where AI-generated 'deepfakes' were frequently used to disseminate fake news about the respective opposing warring party, including images of alleged atrocities/attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.⁵¹⁷

War propaganda also framed narratives about certain tribes supporting either the RSF or the SAF, heightening the spread of hate speech towards some tribes.⁵¹⁸ Ethnic hate speech in social media amid ongoing tensions between Arabs and Zaghawa in Darfur was exploited by the warring parties as a driver of recruitment of new fighters.⁵¹⁹

(c) Mobile networks, internet access, and blackouts

The conflict has witnessed frequent deliberate disruptions of the internet,⁵²⁰ with both the SAF and the RSF shutting down the internet to obstruct information flows in areas controlled by the opposing party. A near-total communication blackout occurred in February 2024 following a

⁵¹⁰ International Crisis Group, Inside Sudan's Catastrophic Civil War, 7 November 2024, [url](#); Middle East Council on Global Affairs, The War in Sudan: Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis and Diplomatic Impasse, 4 November 2024, [url](#) DW, Sudanese refugees in Germany decry forgotten war, 21 April 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹¹ World (The), Journalist says parts of Sudan's capital are now 'almost unrecognizable', 7 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹² CPJ, CPJ urges Sudan authorities to end suspensions of 3 news outlets, 3 April 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹³ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 56

⁵¹⁴ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁵ ADDO, War propaganda.. concept and application in the Sudan war, Medium, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁶ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 56

⁵¹⁷ Suliman, M., The Deepfake is a powerful weapon in the war in Sudan, African Arguments, 23 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁸ ADDO, War propaganda.. concept and application in the Sudan war, Medium, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵¹⁹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵²⁰ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)



disruption of all networks and internet services,⁵²¹ affecting the entire country.⁵²² The shutdown was attributed to the RSF,⁵²³ who had reportedly seized facilities of the country's main internet service providers (ISPs)⁵²⁴ (those of MTN, Zain Sudan, and Sudani)⁵²⁵ in retaliation for a similar blackout imposed by the SAF in the largely RSF-controlled Darfur region in 2023.⁵²⁶ It was noted that the blackout followed the lapse of an ultimatum that the RSF had issued to Zain Sudan (Sudan's largest mobile carrier and internet provider), to restore services in Darfur, as well as similar orders and threats to the other two networks.⁵²⁷ As the shutdown continued, it restricted the ability of millions of people to communicate with their families, access essential necessities for survival,⁵²⁸ and receive mobile money services, and seek safety from fighting.⁵²⁹ While very limited levels of connectivity were re-established during the following weeks⁵³⁰ as two of the three major ISPs (Zain Sudan and Sudani) set up new data centres in Port Sudan,⁵³¹ full service on all ISPs was not restored until May 2024.⁵³²

According to Freedom House, more localised disruptions of the internet were reported in areas with ongoing hostilities throughout the period from June 2023 to May 2024, including in Khartoum, Omdurman and in towns in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.⁵³³ Disruptions like these have severely hampered the work of journalists⁵³⁴ and exacerbated the humanitarian situation by impeding aid deliveries⁵³⁵ and preventing residents from documenting acts of violence committed by the warring parties.⁵³⁶ Repeated internet and communication outages resulted in healthcare providers losing contact with survivors, or survivors unable to call for

⁵²¹ Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵²² Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵²³ CPJ, 'Back to the dark ages': Editor Ataf Mohamed on Sudan's wartime communications blackout, 21 March 2024, [url](#); Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#); Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁴ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268; Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁶ Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁵²⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268; Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁹ Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁰ Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#); Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵³¹ Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵³² Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵³³ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁴ CPJ, One year into Sudan's civil war, its media faces grave threats, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁵ Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#); Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁶ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)



medical support.⁵³⁷ Humanitarian organisations had difficulty keeping their co-workers and communities briefed as information could not be shared effectively during connectivity shutdowns.⁵³⁸

Due to frequent internet disruptions and damage or instability of existing communications infrastructure, there was increased reliance on Starlink's satellite-based service,⁵³⁹ despite the fact that its cost was prohibitive to many civilians⁵⁴⁰ and organisations⁵⁴¹ and its use remained unauthorised,⁵⁴² with the SAF-led government seeking to restrict the use of Starlink devices as they were being used extensively by the RSF.⁵⁴³ A chief editor of a local independent newspaper who was interviewed by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) pointed out that while many journalists on the ground were accessing the internet through Starlink, this was a dangerous endeavour as the RSF was able to locate journalists using the service and retaliate against them for covering atrocities committed by the RSF.⁵⁴⁴

The RSF seized critical communication infrastructure in April 2023, including Sudan TV and Sudatel Data Centre, and in April 2024, the RSF shut down telecommunication services offered by MTN Sudan and Sudani, the two major telecommunication companies, and forced Zain Sudan, the third largest, to suspend services to River Nile State and Port Sudan.⁵⁴⁵ Radio Dabanga reported that the RSF has carried out sabotage operations against telecommunications infrastructure in Al Jazirah state, and that the SAF has deprived Al Jazirah and other states of the Sudani network.⁵⁴⁶ In April 2024, Sudan suspended the operating licences of Saudi owned broadcasters Al Arabiya and Al Hadat, as well as United Arab Emirates (UAE)-owned Sky News Arabia for their 'lack of commitment to the required professionalism and transparency and failure to renew its licenses'.⁵⁴⁷ On 2 October 2024, Radio Dabanga reported that, according to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS), the current conflict has decimated 90 % of the country's media infrastructure and that 80 % of Sudan's states are cut off from access to internet and telecommunications, which makes it 'difficult to report on the war's developments'.⁵⁴⁸

⁵³⁷ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 214

⁵³⁸ Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵³⁹ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁰ NRC et al., Joint statement: Telecommunications blackout in Sudan, 13 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴¹ Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴² Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, TIMEP, 19 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴³ Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁴ CPJ, 'Back to the dark ages': Editor Ataf Mohamed on Sudan's wartime communications blackout, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁵ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268; Radio Dabanga, Communications blackout continues in large parts of Sudan, 19 February 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁶ Radio Dabanga, Communications blackout continues in large parts of Sudan, 19 February 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁷ Reuters, Sudan suspends work of Al Arabiya, Al Hadath and Sky News Arabia channels, state news agency says, 3 April 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁸ Radio Dabanga, Sudan journalists: '90% of media infrastructure wiped out by war', 2 October 2024, [url](#)



2. Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by region

2.1. Khartoum

For information on the conflict background in Khartoum, as well as developments before February 2024, see section 1.2.2 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

2.1.1. Actors involved and territorial control

As of early June 2024, without taking into account the situation in the three cities of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman, Khartoum state was divided into territories in the east controlled by the SAF, central areas where control was contested between the SAF and the RSF and their respective allies, and areas in the west largely under the control of the RSF.⁵⁴⁹ The SAF coalition groups operating in the Khartoum area included the SAF's conventional units and special forces, newly recruited *mustanfareen* battalions, Darfuri armed groups⁵⁵⁰ including SLM-MM and JEM,⁵⁵¹ and other militias such as the Islamist Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade.⁵⁵²

The SAF made territorial gains in the city of Omdurman during an offensive in the first quarter of 2024.⁵⁵³ By mid-February 2024, the SAF had broken the RSF's siege of its Engineers Corps base⁵⁵⁴ and residential quarters of Old Omdurman.⁵⁵⁵ Further SAF advances were reported in eastern and southern Omdurman, as well as around Bahri.⁵⁵⁶ As of autumn 2024, much of Omdurman was reported to be under the army's control.⁵⁵⁷ The SAF had troops stationed at its Engineers Corps base⁵⁵⁸ in the city's south⁵⁵⁹ and, in northern Omdurman,⁵⁶⁰ it retained control of the Karari locality, which now serves as its military operations headquarters.⁵⁶¹ As a result of the military campaign, the SAF was able to link its forces in the city's north with those stationed in the south.⁵⁶² Despite the SAF's territorial gains, the RSF remained in control of

⁵⁴⁹ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁰ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁵¹ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2; ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵³ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#); International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵⁴ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁵⁶ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁵⁵⁷ Guardian (The), Airstrike on North Darfur market kills more than 100, says Sudan lawyers' group, 10 December 2024, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Clashes Renew Between Sudanese Army, RSF in Khartoum, 3 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁸ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁹ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁰ Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶² ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)



large areas in the western and southern parts of Omdurman,⁵⁶³ although it was affected by infighting over leadership issues and supply shortages in western Omdurman⁵⁶⁴ and faced some defections towards the end of the reference period.⁵⁶⁵ During the following months, the conflict in the Khartoum area continued⁵⁶⁶ but remained largely frozen⁵⁶⁷ with both sides firmly entrenched in their positions,⁵⁶⁸ although the SAF made continuous ‘incremental’ territorial gains in Omdurman.⁵⁶⁹

In Khartoum city, most of which has been under RSF control since April 2023,⁵⁷⁰ the SAF remained unable to dislodge the effective RSF ground units positioned in the city.⁵⁷¹ RSF fighters were entrenched in residential areas, occupying homes, businesses, and key infrastructure installations such as healthcare facilities.⁵⁷² Meanwhile, the SAF held on to a few strategic positions, including the General Command Headquarters in the city centre and the Armoured Corps base in the south,⁵⁷³ both of which were under RSF siege. Meanwhile, the Strategic Corps base remained under RSF control.⁵⁷⁴

Following multi-pronged attacks launched by the RSF in Bahri in early September 2024, including in the surroundings of the Weapons Corps and Reconnaissance bases in Kadaro and Hattab,⁵⁷⁵ the SAF launched a major offensive in late September 2024 against RSF positions in Khartoum and Bahri,⁵⁷⁶ conducting waves of infantry assaults supported by airstrikes and heavy artillery fire.⁵⁷⁷ During its offensive launched in late September 2024, the SAF gained control of arterial bridges and roads linking Omdurman with Khartoum city and gained a foothold on the eastern bank of the Nile⁵⁷⁸ in the al-Muqrān district.⁵⁷⁹ After achieving rapid initial territorial gains between late September and mid-October 2024,⁵⁸⁰ the SAF’s advances slowed down.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁶³ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁴ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁵⁶⁵ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan’s al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁶ GPC, At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 29, 15 July 2024, [url](#), p. 1; UNHCR, Sudan Situation 9 – 15 May 2024, 17 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2; GPC, At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 26, 15 April 2024, 18 April 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁵⁶⁷ New Arab (The), Will the army’s push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan’s war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁶⁸ New Arab (The), Will the army’s push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan’s war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁵⁷⁰ New Arab (The), Will the army’s push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan’s war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷¹ Al Jazeera, Sudan’s army launches major offensive on Khartoum, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷² HRW, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women”: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan’s Capital, 28 July 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁵⁷³ New Arab (The), Will the army’s push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan’s war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁴ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁷⁶ BBC News, Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁷ Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁸ Jones, M., Has Sudan’s Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁹ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army seizes Khartoum bridgehead in surprise attack, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁰ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸¹ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Will the army’s push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan’s war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)



As of November 2024, control was fiercely contested in Khartoum's al-Muqran district,⁵⁸² although the SAF established a perimeter⁵⁸³ and held its ground in this strategically important area.⁵⁸⁴ Little change of control of territory was reported in the area as of late October 2024.⁵⁸⁵ Another embattled area was the surroundings of the Armoured Corps base further south.⁵⁸⁶ The SAF also took control of the Lamab neighbourhood, located north of the Armoured Corps base.⁵⁸⁷ In Khartoum, armed confrontations remained largely limited to areas within al-Muqran district.⁵⁸⁸

Most of the city of Bahri has been under RSF control,⁵⁸⁹ while the SAF held on to several strategic bases in the area.⁵⁹⁰ SAF troops were stationed at the besieged Signal Corps base in the city's south, at the Weapons Corps base further north in the Kadaro area,⁵⁹¹ and at the Reconnaissance Corps base in the Hattab area.⁵⁹²

During the offensive that began in late September 2024, SAF units captured a bridge connecting Omdurman to Bahri,⁵⁹³ infiltrated Bahri⁵⁹⁴ and ended the RSF's sieges of the Reconnaissance Corps and Weapons Corps bases while capturing the neighbourhoods around the Weapons Corps base as well. The SAF also captured the city's al-Izrigab⁵⁹⁵ and al-Halfaya neighbourhoods⁵⁹⁶ and later also retook some areas in the Al-Samrab neighbourhood east of al-Halfaya. Meanwhile, the RSF maintained its stronghold in the Shambat district⁵⁹⁷ on the route towards the still besieged General Command and Signal Corps bases.⁵⁹⁸ In November 2024, SAF units managed to seize some further ground in Bahri, although the momentum of the SAF's ground offensive was waning. Well-trained RSF special units at Bahri's Paratroopers Corps base were reported to have repeatedly obstructed the SAF's advances.⁵⁹⁹ The RSF launched counterattacks in Bahri's al-Halfaya district in an attempt to reverse the SAF's territorial gains, pushing back the SAF and reportedly inflicting several casualties.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁸² Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸³ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁵ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁶ New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁷ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁸ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan army repels RSF attack on strategic base in Khartoum Bahri, 3 September 2024, [url](#);

Guardian (The), Airstrike on North Darfur market kills more than 100, says Sudan lawyers' group, 10 December 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan army repels RSF attack on strategic base in Khartoum Bahri, 3 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹¹ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹² ACLED, Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan, 16 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹³ New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁴ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁵ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁶ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#);

ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁷ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁸ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army captures Halfaya Bridge, breaks Kadroo siege, 29 September 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁰ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)



According to a mid-November 2024 field report cited by the Sudan Tribune, the RSF only maintained a weak presence in several Bahri neighbourhoods, including Shambat, al-Sababi, al-Safiya and al-Shaabiya.⁶⁰¹ In early December 2024, following SAF drone attacks, it was reportedly forced to retreat from some positions within Shambat as well as from the al-Safiya neighbourhood.⁶⁰²

At the same time, the RSF had highly trained special units positioned at the Paratroopers Corps base in Khartoum Bahri⁶⁰³ and remained in control of the Al-Jaili oil refinery, a key source of fuel for RSF troops⁶⁰⁴ situated north of Bahri.⁶⁰⁵ However, the refinery was being surrounded by SAF troops as of October 2024.⁶⁰⁶

Moreover, the reference period witnessed a series of SAF attacks on the heavily defended RSF-controlled Al-Jaili oil refinery in late April/early May⁶⁰⁷ and August 2024,⁶⁰⁸ an area that has witnessed persistent armed confrontations during the current conflict.⁶⁰⁹

2.1.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

During the reference period, the parties to the conflict continued to engage in intense clashes around the cities of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman,⁶¹⁰ which remained the SAF's primary military objective.⁶¹¹ Shifting from a tactical defensive posture to an offensive one,⁶¹² the SAF launched a major military campaign in the Khartoum area in January 2024, focusing on retaking areas in Omdurman,⁶¹³ but also attacking RSF units in Bahri.⁶¹⁴ Civilians continued to be killed in heavy artillery crossfire in Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri.⁶¹⁵

During the major offensive launched by the SAF against RSF positions in Khartoum and Bahri in late September 2024,⁶¹⁶ the armed forces conducted waves of infantry assaults accompanied by airstrikes and heavy artillery fire.⁶¹⁷ The SAF's attacks were supported by the Egyptian Air Force which helped the army to retake key strategic locations and disrupt RSF supply routes.⁶¹⁸ In late November 2024, the SAF began to deploy – for the first time during

⁶⁰¹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰² Sudan Tribune, Army retreats from north Khartoum Bahri under army drone attacks, 7 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰³ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁴ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#); Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁰⁶ New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁰⁸ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁶⁰⁹ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#); International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁶¹⁰ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 8

⁶¹¹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁶¹² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2; ACLED, Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹³ New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹⁴ ACLED, Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁶¹⁶ BBC News, Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹⁷ Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point? [Commentary], RUSI, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶¹⁸ Ayin Network, Egypt's intervention in Sudan's war, 27 December 2024, [url](#)



this conflict – Turkish-manufactured Bayraktar drones to target RSF artillery positions within Khartoum state.⁶¹⁹

Although armed confrontations largely centred around strategically important installations, there were numerous reports of impacts on civilians, as pointed out by the UN Secretary-General.⁶²⁰ The deployment of explosive weapons with large area effects in the densely inhabited areas of Khartoum state has led to significant numbers of conflict-related deaths and injuries.⁶²¹ These attacks included the use of drone-dropped munitions against persons wearing civilian clothes.⁶²² An increase in civilian casualties at the hands of the warring parties was reported in autumn 2024⁶²³ when dozens of civilians were killed or injured by airstrikes and shelling during the early days of the SAF's offensive.⁶²⁴ A late December 2024 SAF airstrike on a fuel station in Khartoum left at least 28 people dead and dozens injured.⁶²⁵ Moreover, according to the UN, dozens of young men from Bahri's al-Halfaya neighbourhood were reportedly executed, allegedly at the hands of the SAF and its allied Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade.⁶²⁶

The RSF carried out repeated heavy artillery attacks⁶²⁷ on Omdurman's old neighbourhoods and drone and artillery strikes on civilian areas (markets, medical facilities and other service areas) in northern Omdurman's SAF-controlled Karari locality,⁶²⁸ killing and injuring dozens of people,⁶²⁹ including in December 2024, when what was reported as the RSF's 'heaviest artillery shelling yet' left at least 65 people dead.⁶³⁰ The RSF has also been accused of planting mines in northern Bahri, where it maintained control over some areas.⁶³¹ In the outskirts of Khartoum, unaccompanied and poor children were being targeted for recruitment by the RSF.⁶³²

2.1.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be

⁶¹⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army deploys Turkish Bayraktar drones in Khartoum, 30 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁰ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 8

⁶²¹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 124

⁶²² HRW, Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties' Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment, September 2024, [url](#), pp. 16-17

⁶²³ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 8

⁶²⁴ OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁵ Al Jazeera, Fierce fighting in Khartoum endangers Sudanese civilians, 31 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁶ OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁷ Sudan Tribune, Khartoum reports 9 dead, 121 injured from RSF shelling, 30 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁸ Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶²⁹ AA, Sudan says 1 killed, 17 injured in RSF shelling in Omdurman, 19 January 2025, [url](#)

Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, 15 civilians killed in Omdurman market by RSF shells, 23 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁰ Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶³¹ Radio Tamazuj, Heavy rains expose landmines north of Bahri in Khartoum, 5 August 2024, [url](#)

⁶³² UN News, Sudan: UN expert warns of child recruitment by armed forces, 16 October 2023, [url](#)

read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Among 1 610 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) recorded by ACLED in Khartoum state between 1 February and 30 November 2024, 627 were coded as battles, 846 as explosions/remote violence and 137 as violence against civilians. In 303 instances, civilians were the primary or only target. The city of Khartoum accounted for 34 % of the recorded security incidents, followed by Bahri (22 %), Omdurman (13 %) and Karari (12 %).⁶³³




Figure 6: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Khartoum, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁶³⁴

ACLED reported that nearly all (98 %) of the over 280 drone strikes conducted by the SAF across Sudan between April 2023 and late August 2024 occurred within Khartoum state.⁶³⁵

2.1.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict

⁶³³ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁵ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

A study the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)'s Sudan Research Group estimated that between 15 April 2023 and 4 June 2024, there had been 61 202 all-cause wartime deaths (which also included deaths from accidents, disease and starvation) and 26 024 deaths from intentionally inflicted injury in Khartoum state.⁶³⁶ This figure by far surpassed the number of fatalities from intentional injury (battles, explosions/remote violence/violence against civilians) recorded by ACLED for the entire country during the same period (20 104 fatalities).⁶³⁷ The LSHTM estimated that more than 90 % of both all-cause and intentional-injury deaths in Khartoum state had gone unrecorded.⁶³⁸

Between March⁶³⁹ and October 2024, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 604 civilian casualties resulting from incidents of explosive weapons use in Khartoum state, with peaks recorded in September (178 casualties) and October (158 casualties).⁶⁴⁰

Many indirect cases of death resulting from war-exacerbated factors – such as lack of emergency care, essential food, medicine and vaccination programs – have not been recorded.⁶⁴¹ Khartoum's healthcare system has been 'decimated' due to the conflict,⁶⁴² with MSF warning in January 2025 that healthcare in the state was 'on the verge of collapse'.⁶⁴³ An analysis of satellite imagery by the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health (Yale HRL) revealed that 41 out of a total 87 hospitals sustained damages in 55 incidents documented through satellite imagery during this period (eight hospitals were assessed as 'minimally damaged' and 33 as 'partially damaged').⁶⁴⁴ Residents of Khartoum state were increasingly being cut off from healthcare as only a limited number of hospitals were still operational⁶⁴⁵ (in Bahri, only one hospital was functional as of October 2024)⁶⁴⁶ and prices of essential medicines have risen exponentially. Movement restrictions imposed on medical and humanitarian workers have prevented residents from being able to access lifesaving treatments for injuries and preventable diseases.⁶⁴⁷

⁶³⁶ Dahab, M. et al., War-Time Mortality in Sudan: A Capture-Recapture Analysis, 12 November 2024, [url](#), pp. 2, 7

⁶³⁷ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁸ LSHTM, 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶³⁹ The AOAV's monthly report for February 2024 does not cover Sudan. AOAV, Explosive Violence in February 2024, 10 March 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁰ AOAV, Explosive Violence in October 2024, 10 November 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in September 2024, 10 October 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in August 2024, 10 September 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in July 2024, 10 August 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in June 2024, 10 July 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in May 2024, 10 June 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2024, 10 May 2024, [url](#); AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2024, 10 April 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴¹ Scales, S.E. et al., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴² UN News, 'Unimaginable trauma' haunts Sudan's displaced while violence, famine threaten millions, 7 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴³ MSF, Sudan: Health system on the verge of collapse in Khartoum, 18 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁴ Ahmed, Z. et al., Widespread damage to healthcare facilities in Khartoum State, Sudan, Yale HRL and SAPA, 10 December 2024, [url](#), p. 15

⁶⁴⁵ MSF, Sudan: Health system on the verge of collapse in Khartoum, 18 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁶ Al Jazeera, Inside the last functioning hospital in Sudan's Khartoum North, 10 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁷ MSF, Sudan: Health system on the verge of collapse in Khartoum, 18 January 2025, [url](#)



Khartoum has been affected by severe food insecurity as a result of the ongoing conflict,⁶⁴⁸ with reports of deaths from starvation,⁶⁴⁹ including among children.⁶⁵⁰ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) assessed in December 2024 that the risk of famine was ‘extremely high’ in Khartoum state.⁶⁵¹ As of July 2024, over 90 000 residents of Khartoum city were facing ‘catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC5)’ – indicating they were unable to access sufficient food to survive and were at risk of starvation.⁶⁵²

ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in Khartoum state between 1 February 2024 and 30 November 2024 caused an estimated 2 127 fatalities.⁶⁵³ Among main security events affecting civilians were air and drone strikes, clashes between the parties to the conflict, and instances of artillery shelling.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁴⁸ NRC, Sudan: World ignores countdown to famine, 22 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁹ Sudan Tribune, Malnutrition kills 12 children in Khartoum as aid groups struggle, 25 December 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Malnutrition and extrajudicial killing reported by Khartoum residents, 22 October 2024, [url](#); NRC, Sudan crisis: People are dying of hunger, 5 August 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁰ Sudan Tribune, Malnutrition kills 12 children in Khartoum as aid groups struggle, 25 December 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Malnutrition and extrajudicial killing reported by Khartoum residents, 22 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵¹ IPC, Famine Review Committee Sudan, December 2024 - Conclusions and Recommendations, 24 December 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁵² WFP, Sudan updates: WFP supports Khartoum's grassroots kitchens as famine threatens capital, 24 July 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵³ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



Estimated number of fatalities: 1 February 2024 - 30 November 2024




Figure 7: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Khartoum, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁶⁵⁵

2.1.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

The use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in densely populated Khartoum has resulted in large-scale destruction of homes, schools, hospitals, and other vital infrastructure.⁶⁵⁶ Indeed, Khartoum has been one of the states most affected by attacks on healthcare facilities since the outbreak of the conflict, according to the World Health Organization (WHO).⁶⁵⁷ The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan found that both the SAF and the RSF attacked, damaged or destroyed civilian infrastructure and objects, including objects crucial for the survival of civilians.⁶⁵⁸

According to a report by the Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health (Yale HRL) and the Sudanese American Physicians Association (SAPA), open-source data revealed that 112 attacks were conducted on hospitals in Khartoum state between 15 April 2023 and 26

⁶⁵⁵ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁶ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 124

⁶⁵⁷ WHO, Sudan surpasses 100 attacks on healthcare since 2023 armed conflict began, 24 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 139



August 2024 (including bombing, shelling, forced entry, looting, and shooting into, encircling, or other forceful incidents). An analysis of satellite imagery by Yale HRL revealed that 41 out of a total of 87 hospitals sustained damages in 55 incidents documented through satellite imagery during this period (eight hospitals were assessed as ‘minimally damaged’ and 33 as ‘partially damaged’). Nearly half of these damage incidents were recorded between September and December 2023.⁶⁵⁹

Ongoing clashes inflicted severe damage to Khartoum city’s water infrastructure.⁶⁶⁰ Aerial strikes and explosives affected water treatment plants and water pipes, causing severe water shortages in a number of neighbourhoods. Civilians in the Greater Khartoum region were also left with lack of electricity.⁶⁶¹ Notably, airstrikes and artillery attacks⁶⁶² during the SAF’s offensive launched in September 2024 resulted in extensive damage to civilian infrastructure.⁶⁶³

While 2.6 million square metres in Omdurman had been cleared of explosive remnants of war as of early September 2024, Sudan’s National Mine Action Centre indicated that 470 627 square metres remained yet to be cleared.⁶⁶⁴ Explosive remnants were also reported to be scattered in rural areas north of Bahri.⁶⁶⁵

2.1.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

As IOM reported, most IDPs fled Khartoum thereby making Khartoum the most common area of origin for IDPs in Sudan⁶⁶⁶ (accounting for 32 % of all IDPs in the country), with IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data showing that a total of 3 719 212 IDPs from Khartoum were found across all the country’s 18 states.⁶⁶⁷ 788 247 (21 %) of these IDPs were living in neighbouring River Nile state, 559 431 (15 %) in Gedaref state, 500 744 (13 %) in White Nile state, 465 339 (13 %) in Northern state, and 360 240 (10 %) in East Darfur state.⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁵⁹ Ahmed, Z. et al., Widespread damage to healthcare facilities in Khartoum State, Sudan, Yale HRL and SAPA, 10 December 202, [url](#), pp. 14-15

⁶⁶⁰ Africanews, Cholera fears as Sudan faces a worsening water crisis, 20 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶¹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 140-141

⁶⁶² OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶³ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 8; OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁴ Sudan Tribune, Khartoum clears over 30,000 explosive remnants from Omdurman, 11 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁵ CIEDR, Sudan: Heavy rains expose landmines north of Bahri in Khartoum, 5 August 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁶ IOM, DTM Sudan, Focused Flash Alert: Conflict In Al Fasher, North Darfur State, Update 004, 17 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1; IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Update (7), 17 September 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁶⁶⁷ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁸ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)



State of displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
East Darfur	Khartoum	360 240 (10%)
Gedaref	Khartoum	559 431 (15%)
Northern	Khartoum	465 339 (13%)
River Nile	Khartoum	788 247 (21%)
White Nile	Khartoum	500 744 (13%)

Table 1. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement.⁶⁶⁹

Significant numbers of people have already been displaced from Khartoum prior to the beginning of the reference period.⁶⁷⁰ MSF noted that despite the ‘mass exodus’ triggered by the conflict, there was still a large number of people in the state ‘who either could not afford to flee or were unable to do so due to vulnerabilities or insecurity’.⁶⁷¹

There have been several reports of civilians being displaced by fighting in the Greater Khartoum area during the reference period.⁶⁷² September and October 2024 saw increased displacement⁶⁷³ resulting from fighting during the offensive launched by the SAF in September 2024.⁶⁷⁴ Information on returns of IDPs and refugees to Khartoum state could not be found within the time constraints of this report.

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of the start of December 2024, there were 100 026 IDPs documented in Khartoum state (the lowest number across all states). Most IDPs living in Khartoum state (90 %) had been displaced within the state, while 8 % were from Al Jazirah state.⁶⁷⁵ Families were reported to be sheltering in public buildings (e.g. schools) after losing their homes in Khartoum.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁶⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁰ ACLED, Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan, 12 January 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷¹ MSF, Sudan: Health system on the verge of collapse in Khartoum, 18 January 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁷² IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7; MEE, Sudan: Hundreds of families flee intense fighting near Khartoum, 7 September 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Fighting forces families to flee Khartoum neighbourhoods, 4 March 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷³ IOM, DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, [url](#), p. 7

⁶⁷⁴ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 8

⁶⁷⁵ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁶ NRC, Sudan crisis: People are dying of hunger, 5 August 2024, [url](#)



2.2. Darfur

For information on the conflict background in Darfur, as well as developments before February 2024, see section 1.2.1 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

2.2.1. Actors involved and territorial control

Darfur is the home region of the RSF, who were originally formed by Darfuri Arabs, particularly the Rizeigat.⁶⁷⁷ The RSF controlled four of the five Darfur state capitals,⁶⁷⁸ having seized Nyala in South Darfur, El Geneina in West Darfur, El Daein in East Darfur, and Zalingei in Central Darfur between October and November 2023.⁶⁷⁹ North Darfur's capital El Fasher as of November 2024 was referred to as 'the last major urban centre in the western Darfur region where the RSF hasn't managed to fully oust the army'.⁶⁸⁰

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), also called Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), a Darfur-based armed group with members largely hailing from the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit,⁶⁸¹ were present in Darfur in the form of several splinter groups (for further information, see section 1.2.1 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#)).

SLM-AW, named after its leader Abdel Wahid El Nur, reportedly controlled parts of Jebel Marra,⁶⁸² and had troops present in El Fasher, claiming to protect displacement camps in the area.⁶⁸³

- SLM-MM, under its leader and governor of Darfur region,⁶⁸⁴ Minni Minnawi, was estimated to control the Umbro area in North Darfur and the El Tina border crossing to Chad as well as forming a large portion of the pro-SAF forces in El Fasher together with the JEM.⁶⁸⁵
- SLM-Transitional Council (TC) led by Hadi Idris.⁶⁸⁶

⁶⁷⁷ Sudan War Monitor, Understanding the fighting in El Fasher, 25 May 2024, [url](#); UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 92, 100-101

⁶⁷⁸ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, RSF suffers losses in El Fasher offensive, 14 September 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Eight Darfur groups unveil plan to reclaim cities from Rapid Support Forces, 28 April 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁹ Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces seize Sudanese army base in Central Darfur, 31 October 2023, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF seize control of Sudanese army base in East Darfur, 21 November 2023, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁰ TNH, Inside the battle for El Fasher: "Innocent lives are lost every day", 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸¹ ACAPS, Sudan - West Darfur pre-crisis profile, 18 July 2023, [url](#), p. 5

⁶⁸² PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸³ Sudan Tribune, Darfur holdout group denounces RSF attack on its supply convoy in El Fasher, 29 March 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁴ Radio Tamazuj, RSF legal advisor: We no longer consider Minni Minnawi governor of Darfur, 2 April 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁵ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁶ Sudan War Monitor, Hadi Idriss blames Minnawi and Jibril for security deterioration in North Darfur, 23 April 2024, [url](#)





- SLM-Tambour, led by Mustafa Tambour, separated from the SLM-AW in 2018⁶⁸⁷ and was reportedly based in Central Darfur.⁶⁸⁸

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Gibril Ibrahim, a Zaghawa allied with the SAF, was involved in active fighting against the RSF in El Fasher during the reference period.⁶⁸⁹

SLM-AW, even though it officially declared neutrality in the SAF-RSF war⁶⁹⁰ through one of its commanders was reportedly reinforcing the anti-RSF coalition in El Fasher.⁶⁹¹ At the beginning of October 2024, SLM-AW and the Sudan Liberation Forces (SLF), an alliance led by El Tahir Hajar,⁶⁹² officially agreed to form a neutral military alliance with the aim to protect civilians as well as commercial and humanitarian convoys in Darfur.⁶⁹³

In April 2024, the coalition of armed groups named Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements (JFASM), also known as the Darfur Joint Force or Sudanese Joint Force⁶⁹⁴ or Darfur Joint Protection Force,⁶⁹⁵ announced that it was abandoning its former neutrality and declared war on the RSF. The JFASM is largely comprised of the SLM-MM and the JEM along with smaller armed groups and its forces are mainly present in North Darfur.⁶⁹⁶ SLM-MM and JEM had already announced their intention to abandon their neutrality in November 2023, accusing the RSF of systematic killings in captured towns.⁶⁹⁷

While the SLM-TC as of October 2024 was described as taking a neutral stance in the conflict,⁶⁹⁸ leader Hadi Idris admitted that some members in El Fasher had broken away to align with the SAF.⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁸⁷ Radio Dabanga, Darfur rebel faction denies attacking village in eastern Sudan, 5 July 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁸ UNHCR, Protection Brief Darfur Region, October 2023, [url](#), p. 6

⁶⁸⁹ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁰ UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 15

⁶⁹¹ PoIGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹² Also known as Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces, see International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan's El Fasher, 24 June 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁶⁹³ Radio Dabanga, Two Darfur movements form 'neutral military alliance' to protect civilians, 2 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁴ Radio Dabanga, North Darfur: Joint Force seizes 'strategic areas', Zaghawa and Arab leaders sign accord, 3 October 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 86

⁶⁹⁶ Sudan War Monitor, Darfur Joint Force declares war on Rapid Support Forces, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁷ Radio Dabanga, Darfur armed movements renounce neutrality in Sudan war, 17 November 2023, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 107

⁶⁹⁹ Sudan War Monitor, Hadi Idriss blames Minnawi and Jibril for security deterioration in North Darfur, 23 April 2024, [url](#)





SLM-Tambour, who had strongly aligned with the SAF early in the conflict,⁷⁰⁰ in June 2024 reportedly faced defections by a group of fighters in Zalingei, Central Darfur, to the RSF.⁷⁰¹

2.2.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In May 2024, the RSF supported by allied tribal militia started laying siege on El Fasher in North Darfur,⁷⁰² described as the ‘last stronghold’ of the SAF in Darfur.⁷⁰³ The siege of the town and surrounding areas was still in place as of October 2024, with over 900 000 people trapped in the city under dire conditions.⁷⁰⁴ As of November 2024, the city remained under siege being subjected to daily artillery shelling targeting markets, the southern neighbourhoods, the military base and Abou Shouk IDP camp.⁷⁰⁵

As of June 2024, thousands of RSF fighters reportedly controlled the northern and eastern districts of the city while encircling the rest.⁷⁰⁶ The October 2024 report by the UN Secretary-General noted a number of major assaults carried out by the RSF in the El Fasher area from August 2024⁷⁰⁷, with an intensification of fighting in September.⁷⁰⁸ In October 2024, heavy fighting occurred in areas north of El Fasher, upon which military reinforcements were sent to the joint forces fighting the RSF in that area.⁷⁰⁹ OHCHR based on its monitoring noted attacks by the RSF on the city from May to November 2024, employing heavy artillery shelling and suicide drones, while SAF forces countered the RSF advances with airstrikes and shelling leading to civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure.⁷¹⁰ It further documented 15 artillery attacks on Abou Shouk IDP camp, amounting to a direct attack on civilians, while Zamzam IDP camp south of El Fasher was hit by shelling at the beginning of December 2024.⁷¹¹ Sources further reported that the RSF targeted healthcare infrastructure in El Fasher, shelling two hospitals on several occasions as well as a medical centre,⁷¹² leading to the loss of civilian life and damage to health infrastructure.⁷¹³

⁷⁰⁰ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰¹ Radio Tamazuj, Group of SLM-Tambour forces defect to the RSF in Zalingei, 10 June 2024, [url](#); Al-Rakoba, فصيلة من قوات تمبور تعلن انضمامها للدعم السريع بزالنجي [Faction of Tambour forces announces that it is joining RSF in Zalingei], 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰² OHCHR, Sudan: Türk sounds alarm over hostilities in El Fasher, warns of serious human rights violations, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰³ International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan’s El Fasher, 24 June 2024, [url](#), p. 1; BBC News, Sudan’s El Fasher battle: Satellite images of Darfur show RSF destruction, 23 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁴ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 9

⁷⁰⁵ ACJPS, Sudan War Update: Security And Humanitarian Situation In North Darfur, 11 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan’s El Fasher, 24 June 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁰⁷ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 9;

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁷⁰⁸ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 9;

MEE, Sudan: Fighting breaks out in el-Fasher following RSF attack, 14 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁹ Sudan Tribune, El Fasher receives major reinforcements as fighting with RSF intensifies, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁰ OHCHR, Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur since May 2024, 20 December 2024, [url](#), para. 3

⁷¹¹ OHCHR, Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur since May 2024, 20 December 2024, [url](#), para. 27-28

⁷¹² OHCHR, Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur since May 2024, 20 December 2024, [url](#), para. 23-25

⁷¹³ Al Jazeera, At least nine killed in drone attack on hospital in Sudan’s Darfur, 14 December 2024; [url](#); MSF, Last hospital in El Fasher risks closure during intensive bombardment on the city, 14 August 2024, [url](#); BBC News, Last civilian hospital in besieged Sudan city closed, 10 June 2024, [url](#)



In July 2024, the JFASM managed to take control of the border area between Sudan, Libya and Chad, cutting off potential arms supply lines to the RSF from Libya.⁷¹⁴ At the beginning of October 2024, the JFASM reported to have seized a strategically important area from the RSF north of Kutum, among them an RSF base in Bir Mazza.⁷¹⁵ The SAF and allied militia that same month made gains in West Darfur on the border with Chad,⁷¹⁶ claiming to have retaken Kulbus and Jebel Awum from the RSF.⁷¹⁷

The October 2024 report by the UN Secretary-General noted that in different parts of Darfur, especially West Darfur, violence including summary executions, sexual violence and forced displacement mainly carried out by the RSF and allied militia was characterised by ethnic motivations.⁷¹⁸ For example, arson attacks at the beginning of October 2024 affected fourteen villages predominantly inhabited by Zaghawa near Kutum, North Darfur.⁷¹⁹ In April 2024, during the RSF military campaign to seize Mellit, a town 60 km northeast of El Fasher, 20 attacks on civilians were recorded by ACLED. Reportedly these attacks disproportionately targeted Zaghawa and included extrajudicial killings, torture, widespread property destruction, and looting.⁷²⁰ That same month, 15 villages west of El Fasher predominantly inhabited by Zaghawa were reportedly attacked by RSF troops that committed mass killings and enforced disappearances.⁷²¹ For more information on ethnically motivated killings, see section of 2.4, notably 2.4.2 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

The SAF carried out indiscriminate airstrikes in Darfur, including in Nyala in South Darfur, El Geneina in West Darfur, and El Daein in East Darfur, resulting in civilian casualties and displacement.⁷²² Throughout the reference period, media sources and rights groups reported SAF airstrikes, some of which hit civilian infrastructure or killed civilians.⁷²³ The RSF employed indiscriminate artillery shelling resulting in civilian deaths and significant damage in affected areas.⁷²⁴

2.2.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be

⁷¹⁴ ADF, Darfur's Joint Force Helps Sudan's Army Retake Key Areas, 22 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁵ Radio Dabanga, North Darfur: Joint Force seizes 'strategic areas', Zaghawa and Arab leaders sign accord, 3 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁶ Ayin Network, New Battlefronts in Darfur, recapture of Jebel Moya, 19 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁷ ADF, Darfur's Joint Force Helps Sudan's Army Retake Key Areas, 22 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷¹⁸ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 10

⁷¹⁹ Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁷²⁰ ACLED, Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷²¹ ACJPS, Ethnic Cleansing in the Volatile Darfur, 4 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷²² UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 9

⁷²³ Amnesty International, Sudan: SAF airstrike on crowded market a flagrant war crime, 12 December 2024, [url](#);

Erem News, عشرات القتلى في غارات جوية للجيش السوداني على دارفور [Dozens killed in SAF air raids in Darfur], 21

November 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Wave of SAF airstrikes in North Darfur kills dozens of civilians, 6 October

2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Newborn among five killed in SAF airstrike in Central Darfur, 2 September 2024, [url](#);

Radio Dabanga, Battles continue in Sudan, air raids on East Darfur hospital kill four, 21 August 2024, [url](#); DNHR,

Update from Zamzam IDP Camp, El Fasher, North Darfur State, Sudan, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁴ DNHR, Still, in Abu Shouk Camp, El Fasher lives with worries about the artillery she is shelling by RSF, 24

November 2024, [url](#); DNHR, Continued Airstrikes and Bombings Devastate Darfur: Civilians Bear the Brunt, 27

August 2024, [url](#)

read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Among the 1 024 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) reported by ACLED, 406 were coded as battles, 371 as violence against civilians and 247 as explosions/remote violence. In 464 instances, civilians were the primary or only target. Security incidents were recorded across all Darfur states, with 75 % in North Darfur and about 10 % in South Darfur.⁷²⁵




Figure 8: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Darfur region, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁷²⁶

2.2.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2. Communication and media presence](#).

A November 2024 report by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) found that in Khartoum State alone, 90 % of fatalities went unrecorded, mainly attributing this

⁷²⁵ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁶ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



to the lack in infrastructure needed to document the data.⁷²⁷ Based on this report, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) argued that taking Khartoum's estimated 90 % as an indication, the death toll especially in Darfur was probably far higher than recorded.⁷²⁸ According to AOAV, violence accounted for 69% of deaths in Darfur.⁷²⁹

Among the most significant security incidents affecting civilians were airstrikes and clashes by conflict parties.⁷³⁰ Sources reported on SAF bombardment of civilian areas causing civilian casualties across Darfur, such as the bombardment of a school,⁷³¹ and areas near an IDP camp and a hospital⁷³² as well as state buildings and residential areas in Nyala,⁷³³ a livestock market and an area near a hospital in Saraf Omra.⁷³⁴ RSF shelling of residential areas reportedly caused casualties, especially in El Fasher.⁷³⁵ According to estimates by OHCHR, the siege of El Fasher ongoing since May 2024, as of December 2024 had reportedly caused 782 deaths and 1 143 cases of injured civilians; according to its own statement this was not a comprehensive figure.⁷³⁶ This death toll was described by Sudanese political analyst Kholood Khair as a 'gross undercount'.⁷³⁷ Ayin Network reported that the town of Koma in North Darfur had been subjected to 52 SAF airstrikes between March and November 2024 resulting in 132 fatalities, with one strike in October alone killing 61 people and injuring 207, according to local residents.⁷³⁸ The Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab based on open source research reported that the same airstrike, which occurred on 4 October, had killed at least 65 people and wounded about 200 more, describing it as one of the deadliest reported airstrike in the ongoing conflict.⁷³⁹ Kabkabiya, another town in North Darfur, was reportedly hit by 20 air raids between April and November 2024, resulting in the death of 30 civilians.⁷⁴⁰ In December 2024, Zamzam IDP camp south of El Fasher was subjected to daily artillery shelling attributed to the RSF for two weeks, leaving 80 people killed and up to 400 injured.⁷⁴¹

⁷²⁷ LSHTM, 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁸ AOAV, Invisible and severe death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁹ AOAV, Invisible and severe death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁰ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷³¹ DNHR, Sudanese Air Force Bombs High School in Nyala, South Darfur, Causing Civilian Casualties, 19 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷³² Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on Aerial Bombardment by Military Warplanes in Nyala City and Belil Area, South Darfur State, 11 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷³³ ACJPS, South Darfur: SAF Airforce Unit launches airstrike on RSF sites in Nyala, 18 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁴ Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on Airstrike by Sudanese Armed Forces in Saraf Omra, North Darfur State – El Fasher, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁵ Sudan Tribune, Nine killed in shelling of North Darfur capital, 11 November 2024, [url](#); Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on the Artillery Shelling of Abu Shouk IDP Camp by the RSF, North Darfur, El Fasher – October 7, 2024, 10 October 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Nine dead in RSF shelling of mosque in North Darfur capital, 2 July 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Indiscriminate RSF shelling of North Darfur capital continues unabated, 7 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁶ OHCHR, Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur since May 2024, 20 December 2024, [url](#), para. 4

⁷³⁷ Khair, K., [@KholoodKhair, X], posted 21 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁸ Ayin Network, Two towns in North Darfur – permanent targets for Sudan's airstrikes, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷³⁹ Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, SAF Airstrike Campaign in North Darfur: Markets Damaged, Civilians Impacted 10 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁷⁴⁰ Ayin Network, Two towns in North Darfur – permanent targets for Sudan's airstrikes, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴¹ NPR, Sudan's biggest refugee camp was already struck with famine. Now it's being shelled, 21 December 2024, [url](#)





In August, Zamzam IDP Camp was classified as experiencing famine, while nearby Abou Shouk and Al Salam IDP camps were said to possibly experience famine.⁷⁴² These three camps together sheltered up to 600 000 IDPs, with a risk of famine also extending to the rest of El Fasher with another 800 000 inhabitants.⁷⁴³ An investigation by Reuters revealed that the severe level of malnutrition at Zamzam camp, housing an estimated half a million IDPs, had previously been underestimated due to the fact that indicators did not sufficiently take the conflict into consideration as a driver of famine. Meanwhile, the violence, RSF roadblocks as well as communication blackouts reportedly made it difficult to conduct surveys necessary for food insecurity assessment.⁷⁴⁴ An August 2024 IPC report explained that, due to the volatile situation around El Fasher, the Famine Review Committee (FRC) was not able to get any data indirect deaths related to malnutrition or lack of health services in Zamzam IDP camp. The estimated increase of 26% in graves registered by satellite images between 18 December 2023 and 3 May 2024 was the only evidence available indicating an increase in fatalities.⁷⁴⁵ Sortony camp, 110km west of El Fasher, housing over 42 000 IDPs, was reported by local humanitarian workers to be in similar conditions as Zamzam camp.⁷⁴⁶

From 1 February 2024 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 1 024 security incidents in the Darfur region with a total estimate of 4 483 fatalities.⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴² FEWS NET, Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 5 September 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁴³ FEWS NET, Famine (IPC Phase 5) confirmed in part of Al Fasher, North Darfur, 1 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁴ Reuters, The world's hunger watchdog warned of catastrophe in Sudan. Famine struck anyway, 5 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁵ IPC, Famine Review Committee: Combined Review Of: I) The Famine Early Warning System Network (Fews Net) IPC Compatible Analysis For IDP Camps In El Fasher, North Darfur; And II The IPC Sudan Technical Working Group Analysis Of Zamzam Camp (North Darfur), Sudan, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 13

⁷⁴⁶ Radio Dabanga, 'Two to three children buried daily' in Sortony camp as famine looms over Darfur, 6 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁷ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



Estimated number of fatalities: 1 February 2024 - 30 November 2024




Figure 9: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Darfur region, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁷⁴⁸

2.2.5. Conflict related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Media and rights groups at several instances reported conflict-related infrastructure damage in North Darfur, caused by SAF airstrikes hitting health facilities,⁷⁴⁹ markets⁷⁵⁰ as well as an airstrike on El Daein, East Darfur, which hit a hospital and a market.⁷⁵¹ RSF shelling hit health facilities⁷⁵² as well as markets⁷⁵³ in and around El Fasher in North Darfur. Between 10 May and mid-August 2024, MSF recorded hospitals in El Fasher being bombarded 11 times. During that time, according to MSF, 2 500 casualties arrived at MSF-supported hospitals in the area and 370 patients passed away from their injuries. Saudi hospital, the largest hospital in North Darfur and the only remaining hospital to provide surgeries, was hit during a bombardment in

⁷⁴⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁹ Ayin Network, Two towns in North Darfur – permanent targets for Sudan’s airstrikes, 25 November 2024, [url](#); Darfur Victims Support Organisation, Report on Airstrike by Sudanese Armed Forces in Saraf Omra, North Darfur State – El Fasher, 15 November 2024, [url](#); MSF, Bomb kills two children and puts El Fasher hospital out of action amid fighting, 12 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁰ Amnesty International, Sudan: SAF airstrike on crowded market a flagrant war crime, 12 December 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, [مقتل 59 شخصاً في غارات جوية للجيش السوداني استهدفت سوقاً بشمال دارفور](#) [Activists: 59 people killed in SAF airstrikes that targeted market in North Darfur], 4 October 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, Over a Dozen Civilians Killed as Army Launches Another Airstrike in El Fasher, 5 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵¹ DNHR, BREAKING: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) warplanes have launched devastating airstrikes in East and North Darfur, 21 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵² DNHR, Continued Airstrikes and Bombings Devastate Darfur: Civilians Bear the Brunt, 27 August 2024, [url](#); ADF, As Sudan War Continues, Fighting Splits Along Ethnic Lines in Darfur, 28 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵³ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army shoots down 20 RSF drones in El Fasher, 29 November 2024, [url](#); DNHR, Continued Airstrikes and Bombings Devastate Darfur: Civilians Bear the Brunt, 27 August 2024, [url](#)



August.⁷⁵⁴ RSF artillery shelling of Abu Shouk IDP camp in November 2024 reportedly caused significant damage⁷⁵⁵ while numerous houses there had already been destroyed due to the camp's location in the conflict zone.⁷⁵⁶

A September report by the Yale School of Public Health's Humanitarian Research Lab analysed that the escalation in fighting between the RSF and the SAF in El Fasher was 'likely to effectively reduce what is left of El-Fasher to rubble'.⁷⁵⁷ A map created by The Guardian based on data gathered by the London-based Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) shows villages damaged or destroyed in targeted fires across Sudan, with many such locations in the Darfur region targeted between October 2023 and March 2024, especially in South Darfur, East Darfur and around the North Darfur state capital El Fasher.⁷⁵⁸

2.2.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of the start of December 2024, there were over 5.4 million IDPs documented in Darfur, of those 1 831 920 in South Darfur, 1 603 671 in North Darfur, 923 509 in Central Darfur, 783 668 in East Darfur and 311 277 in West Darfur. Most IDPs were displaced within the respective state, in South Darfur 95% of all IDPs, in North Darfur 89%, in Central Darfur 74% and in West Darfur 89%. As for East Darfur, 46% of IDPs hailed from Khartoum, 28% from South Darfur and 20% from within the state.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁴ MSF, Last hospital in El Fasher risks closure during intensive bombardment on the city, 14 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁵ DNHR, Still, in Abu Shouk Camp, El Fasher lives with worries about the artillery she is shelling by RSF, 24 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁶ Sudan Tribune, RSF accused of atrocities in fresh attack on El Fasher camp, 22 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁷ Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Free-Fire Zone: Widespread Aerial and Artillery Bombardment across El-Fasher, 13 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁷⁵⁸ Guardian (The), Increasing number of villages torched across Sudan shows conflict is intensifying – report [Map], 17 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)



State of Displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
South Darfur	South Darfur	1 740 866 (95%)
North Darfur	North Darfur	1 423 119 (89%)
Central Darfur	Central Darfur	682 915 (74%)
West Darfur	West Darfur	275 902 (89%)
East Darfur	Khartoum	360 240 (46%)

Table 2. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement. This table only displays the state of origin with the highest percentage of IDPs in each state of displacement.⁷⁶⁰

According to an IOM Flash Alert of mid-October 2024, about 410 376 persons had been displaced from El Fasher since the beginning of April 2024 due to fighting between the SAF and the RSF there, making El Fasher the second most common area of origin for Sudan’s IDPs after the capital Khartoum.⁷⁶¹ The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in October 2024 noted that there were about 2.8 million people in and around El Fasher with no option to escape or to access humanitarian assistance.⁷⁶²

2.3. The Kordofans

For information on the conflict background in the Kordofans, as well as developments before February 2024, see section 1.2.4 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)).

2.3.1. Actors involved and territorial control

The RSF as of October 2024 controlled most areas of Kordofan apart from several towns with SAF army garrisons⁷⁶³ and areas controlled by the SPLM-N-al-Hilu, mostly in South Kordofan.⁷⁶⁴

⁷⁶⁰ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶¹ IOM, DTM Sudan, Focused Flash Alert: Conflict In Al Fasher, North Darfur State, Update 004, 17 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁷⁶² NRC, Staff accounts: Siege and bombardment of Sudan’s El Fasher pushes children, adults to the limits of survival, 9 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶³ Ayin Network, Kordofan: the land of militias and the RSF’s fragile hold, 18 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁴ Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)



In West Kordofan, largely controlled by the RSF, the only areas reportedly still under state control were Al Nuhud, Babanusa, the Heglig oil field and the city of Lagawa.⁷⁶⁵ In South Kordofan, the state capital Kadugli remained under SAF control during the reference period,⁷⁶⁶ with roads leading out of the city blocked by either the RSF or SPLM-N forces.⁷⁶⁷ In North Kordofan, the SAF held on to the state capital El Obeid, which in June 2024 came under siege by the RSF.⁷⁶⁸

SPLM-N-al-Hilu, a faction under its leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu that seeks self-governance for the Nuba, was operating in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan,⁷⁶⁹ reportedly holding territories there.⁷⁷⁰ It has remained neutral in the SAF-RSF war, having occasionally clashed with both sides,⁷⁷¹ while seeming to be more open to cooperation with the SAF.⁷⁷²

According to Ayin Network, the RSF have resorted to recruiting local militias in the Kordofans rather than deploying its official soldiers, leading to individual militia leaders becoming de facto local rulers with fragile RSF alignment especially in West and North Kordofan. This in turn led to internal conflicts, such as clashes between the RSF and a former allied militia in Umm Ruwaba, North Kordofan in September 2024.⁷⁷³ Sources similarly reported tensions between the SAF and allied militias in Kordofan, with the SAF in September 2024 being confronted with threats by a group in Kadugli that previously allied with the army,⁷⁷⁴ and clashes erupting between the SAF and local allied forces in Al Nuhud in November 2024.⁷⁷⁵ Both conflict parties reportedly enlisted militias and mercenaries locally, supplying them with weapons while maintaining only loose command and control.⁷⁷⁶

The Abyei region, disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, as of October 2024 had about 400 South Sudanese security forces stationed in its southern part, in violation of the demilitarised status of the region.⁷⁷⁷ The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) as of August 2024 had 2 854 troops stationed in the region.⁷⁷⁸

⁷⁶⁵ Ayin Network, Al-Nuhud: The army could lose the strategic city due to in-fighting, 11 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁶ Darfur 24, Army Deployed in Kadugli Market In Preparation for Possible Attack by Affiliate Militia, 17 September 2024, [url](#); Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, 22 August 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁷ Sudan War Monitor, Humanitarian talks between SAF and SPLM-North collapse, 22 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁸ Darfur 24, Humanitarian Situation Deteriorates in El Obeid, North Kordofan, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁶⁹ Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), pp. 12, 27

⁷⁷⁰ UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 17; Sudan War Monitor, Humanitarian talks between SAF and SPLM-North collapse, 22 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷¹ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Humanitarian talks between SAF and SPLM-North collapse, 22 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷² PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷³ Ayin Network, Kordofan: the land of militias and the RSF's fragile hold, 18 October 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷⁴ Darfur 24, Army Deployed in Kadugli Market In Preparation for Possible Attack by Affiliate Militia, 17 September 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷⁵ Ayin Network, Al-Nuhud: The army could lose the strategic city due to in-fighting, 11 November 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁷⁶ ACAPS, Sudan: Scenarios - A region-by-region analysis of possible developments affecting humanitarian needs and operations in Sudan until December 2025, October 2024, [url](#), p. 12

⁷⁷⁷ UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2024/740, 14 October 2024, [url](#), para. 3,4

⁷⁷⁸ UN Peacekeeping, UNISFA Fact sheet, n.d., [url](#)



2.3.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In West Kordofan, the RSF took control of the state capital Al-Fula on 20 June 2024,⁷⁷⁹ described by Ayin network as ‘the first major RSF advance in several months’, putting the RSF in control of major oil fields in the area.⁷⁸⁰ During the reference period, repeated clashes were reported between the SAF and the RSF in and around Babanusa.⁷⁸¹ As of September 2024, an RSF siege of the SAF military garrison in Babanusa that had commenced in January 2024⁷⁸² was reported to be ongoing but making little progress.⁷⁸³ The Misseriya, the largest ethnic group in the region, reportedly remained split in its support for the conflict parties.⁷⁸⁴

In February 2024, SPLM-N-al-Hilu seized Habila town in South Kordofan from the RSF,⁷⁸⁵ leading to a counterattack by the RSF which turned into fighting between RSF-affiliated Arab tribes and Nuba.⁷⁸⁶ In March 2024, further clashes between the RSF and SPLM-N-al-Hilu reportedly occurred in Umm Safifa and Karkaraya.⁷⁸⁷ According to the October 2024 report by the UN Secretary-General, South Kordofan witnessed an increase in violence from June 2024 involving the SAF, the RSF and the SPLM-N-al-Hilu,⁷⁸⁸ the three main armed groups in the state, each trying to expand their territorial control there.⁷⁸⁹ As of August 2024, clashes escalated in Dilling as the SAF tried to break a blockade imposed by the SPLM-N on their supply lines. Meanwhile, the state capital Kadugli remained besieged by the RSF, and the restriction of commercial flows caused food prices to soar.⁷⁹⁰

In North Kordofan, the RSF and the SAF reportedly clashed repeatedly, particularly in and around the state capital El Obeid.⁷⁹¹ An attack on a village near El Obeid in October 2024 reportedly resulted in 20 deaths.⁷⁹² In May 2024, the SAF managed to recapture Jabal Al-Ain

⁷⁷⁹ Radio Dabanga, Complex conditions in West Kordofan lead to ‘extremely dire’ humanitarian situation, 2 December 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudan’s RSF captures key army stronghold of el-Fula, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁰ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁷⁸¹ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 5; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 7; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 10, 16 February 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁷⁸² PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸³ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁷⁸⁴ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 10, 16 February 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁷⁸⁵ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁶ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁷⁸⁷ Sudan War Monitor, Clashes between Popular Forces and RSF in South Kordofan continue for the second consecutive day [استمرار المعارك بين الجيش الشعبي والدعم السريع بجنوب كردفان لليوم الثاني على التوالي], 7 March 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁸⁸ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 11

⁷⁸⁹ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁰ FEWS NET, Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 5 September 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁷⁹¹ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 11; Darfur 24, Humanitarian Situation Deteriorates in El Obeid, North Kordofan, 30 October 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, 10 killed as RSF attacked Haraz village, west of Al-Obeid, North Kordofan, 14 May 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, Both Sudan army and RSF claim control of Mount Kordofan, 9 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹² Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces attack kills 20 in North Kordofan village, 8 October 2024, [url](#)



military base 20 km outside the city.⁷⁹³ That same month, the RSF captured Umm Rawaba area on the road connecting North Kordofan and White Nile state.⁷⁹⁴

According to the report by the UN Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei covering the period from October 2023 to mid-April 2024, the security situation there remained tense, witnessing a rise in casualties due to intercommunal clashes in southern and central Abyei, especially between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka communities.⁷⁹⁵ For the reference period mid-April to the end of September 2024, the UN Secretary-General noted that the security situation was still tense but witnessed a decrease in kidnapping incidents and intercommunal violence.⁷⁹⁶ In July 2024, SAF forces withdrew from Al-Meiram area near Abyei to South Sudan following clashes with the RSF.⁷⁹⁷

2.3.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Among the 367 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) reported by ACLED in the Kordofans between 1 February to the end of November 2024, 158 were coded as battles, 67 as explosions/remote violence and 142 as violence against civilians. In 166 instances, civilians were the primary or only target. Security incidents were recorded across all Kordofan states, with about 41 % in North Kordofan, 31 % in West Kordofan and 27 % in South Kordofan. An additional 24 security events were recorded in Abyei, many of them ethnically motivated attacks mostly recorded in February 2024.⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁹³ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army recaptures key base in North Kordofan, 7 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁴ Radio Dabanga, RSF recaptures North Kordofan town, 20 May 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁵ UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2024/354, 1 May 2024, [url](#), para. 6,7

⁷⁹⁶ UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2024/740, 14 October 2024, [url](#), para. 7

⁷⁹⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Darfur 24, Sudanese army withdraws to South Sudan as RSF captures Al-Meiram in West Kordofan, 4 July 2024, [url](#)

⁷⁹⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)






Figure 10: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Kordofan region, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁷⁹⁹

2.3.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

A November 2024 report by the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) found that in Khartoum State alone, 90 % of fatalities went unrecorded, mainly attributing this to the lack in infrastructure needed to document the data.⁸⁰⁰ Based on this report, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) argued that taking Khartoum’s estimated 90 % as an indication, the death toll especially in the Kordofans was probably far higher than recorded.⁸⁰¹

Among the most significant security incidents affecting civilians were RSF attacks on villages and SAF airstrikes.⁸⁰² Several attacks against civilians by RSF troops were reported in the Kordofans during the reference period: in February 2024, RSF troops stormed villages near Habila, South Kordofan, reportedly killing dozens of people and burning down several

⁷⁹⁹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁰ LSHTM, 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰¹ AOAV, Invisible and severe death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



villages.⁸⁰³ According to ACLED, many of the killed residents were Nuba, who have traditionally been recruited into either the SAF or the SPLM-N-al-Hilu.⁸⁰⁴ According to a statement signed by 11 Sudanese civil society organisations, atrocities committed by the RSF in Habila and the surrounding area near Dilling included the killing of more than 76 civilians, the kidnapping of women and girls, some of whom were released and reported sexual violence, and the forced disappearance of dozens of men and boys.⁸⁰⁵ In October 2024, at least 20 people were killed in an RSF attack on a village in the countryside of El Obeid, North Kordofan.⁸⁰⁶ Later that same month, RSF troops reportedly attacked Donki al-Hur locality in West Kordofan, resulting in multiple casualties.⁸⁰⁷

SAF airstrikes hitting residential areas or civilian infrastructure were reported throughout the reference period in West Kordofan,⁸⁰⁸ South Kordofan⁸⁰⁹ and North Kordofan.⁸¹⁰ On 14 March 2024, the SAF bombed a school in the Hadra area in South Kordofan, leading to the death of 11 children and 2 teachers.⁸¹¹ The SAF in October 2024 bombed RSF-controlled Hamrat Al-Sheikh, 290 km northwest of El Obeid and far away from any frontline, causing 30 civilian deaths and injuries to more than 100 people.⁸¹² The airstrike reportedly targeted a crowded market in the town centre.⁸¹³ The town had previously been bombed in February 2024, reportedly targeting an RSF gathering, but leading to civilian casualties according to the rights group Emergency lawyers.⁸¹⁴ Following the RSF takeover of control of Al-Fula in West Kordofan, the SAF employed artillery and airstrikes targeting the city, causing dozens of civilian casualties.⁸¹⁵

In August 2024, a local SPLM-N-al-Hilu leader warned of famine in the Nuba mountains, with over 20 % of the population severely undernourished and more than 30 % of children malnourished. He attributed the famine to a bad harvest, airstrikes, and battles between the SAF and the RSF disrupting farming activities, while the SPLM-N-controlled areas had taken in

⁸⁰³ Radio Dabanga, RSF attacks on South Kordofan's Habila leave dozens dead and villages destroyed, 23 February 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁴ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁵ ISHR, Civil society demands immediate intervention and thorough investigation in South Kordofan, Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁶ Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces attack kills 20 in North Kordofan village, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁷ DNHR, Donki al-Hur Locality, West Kordofan State, Sudan, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁸ Darfur 24, Air raid on Al-Fula kills 10 members of one family, 23 June 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁰⁹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 60, 137

⁸¹⁰ Al-Rakoba, محامو الطوارئ: مقتل ثمانية من أسرة واحدة جراء غارة على شمال كردفان [Emergency Lawyers: 8 members of one family killed in airstrike in North Kordofan], 3 December 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, 30 Killed As Army Launches Airstrike on Hamrat al-Sheikh, North Kordofan, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹¹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 137; Ayin Network, South Kordofan: School bombed, civilians face conflict from three fronts, 18 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹² Sudan War Monitor, Wave of SAF airstrikes in North Darfur kills dozens of civilians, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹³ Darfur 24, 30 Killed As Army Launches Airstrike on Hamrat al-Sheikh, North Kordofan, 6 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁴ Sudan Tribune, Rights group denounces repeated bombings in Sudan's North Kordofan, 19 February 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 5; Darfur 24, Air raid on Al-Fula kills 10 members of one family, 23 June 2024, [url](#)





an estimated over one million IDPs since the beginning of the conflict.⁸¹⁶ Later that same month, the civil authority of the SPLM-N-al-Hilu reported 109 deaths in areas under its control in South Kordofan and Blue Nile resulting from starvation.⁸¹⁷ By October 2024, the SPLM-N authorities stated that 646 people in the Nuba mountains had lost their lives due to starvation, while more than 52 000 people suffered from malnutrition.⁸¹⁸ In December 2024, the Famine Review Committee (FRC) based on field assessments reported deaths of children and adults in IDP camps and clinics in West and South Kordofan as a result of starvation.⁸¹⁹ There were reports of deaths in Dilling and Habila locality in South Kordofan, as the blocking of roads by the warring parties made it impossible for locals to access health services.⁸²⁰

From 1 February 2024 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 367 security incidents in the Kordofans with a total estimate of 1 514 fatalities. During that same time, 59 fatalities were recorded in the Abyei region.⁸²¹

⁸¹⁶ Radio Dabanga, Famine devastates Sudan's Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, 15 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁷ Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N reports 109 malnutrition deaths in Sudan's South Kordofan, Blue Nile, 22 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁸ Sudan Tribune, Famine tightens grip on Sudan's Nuba Mountains, hundreds dead, 17 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸¹⁹ IPC, Famine Review Committee: Sudan, December 2024, 24 December 2024, [url](#), p. 16

⁸²⁰ International Service for Human Rights, Sudan: End the siege on Dilling and Habila in South Kordofan, 10 January 2025, [url](#)

⁸²¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



Estimated number of fatalities: 1 February 2024 - 30 November 2024




Figure 11: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Kordofan region, 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁸²²

2.3.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Media sources reported on damage to civilian infrastructure caused by airstrikes, such as the SAF's bombing of Al-Fula in June 2024, resulting in the destruction of the state's legislature⁸²³ and a strike targeting the passport and civil registry.⁸²⁴ In North Kordofan, SAF airstrikes in May 2024 targeting RSF positions in Al-Rahad and Umm Rawaba reportedly caused significant property damage.⁸²⁵

As the RSF took control of Umm Rawaba in May 2024, the fighters reportedly attacked villages surrounding the town, burning down houses and looting.⁸²⁶ In October 2024, RSF troops reportedly attacked Donki al-Hur locality in West Kordofan, committing arson and looting.⁸²⁷ A map created by The Guardian based on data gathered by the London-based Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) shows villages damaged or destroyed in targeted fires across Sudan, with many such locations in the Kordofans targeted between October 2023 and March 2024, especially in the Nuba mountains and near El Obeid.⁸²⁸

⁸²² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸²³ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 5

⁸²⁴ Darfur 24, Air raid on Al-Fula kills 10 members of one family, 23 June 2024, [url](#)

⁸²⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army recaptures key base in North Kordofan, 7 May 2024, [url](#)

⁸²⁶ Radio Dabanga, RSF recaptures North Kordofan town, 20 May 2024, [url](#)

⁸²⁷ DNHR, Donki al-Hur Locality, West Kordofan State, Sudan, 30 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸²⁸ Guardian (The), Increasing number of villages torched across Sudan shows conflict is intensifying – report [Map], 17 April 2024, [url](#)

2.3.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of the start of December 2024, there were over one million IDPs documented in the Kordofans, including 449 688 in South Kordofan, 394 564 in West Kordofan and 201 628 in North Kordofan. Most IDPs in South Kordofan also originated from the state (78 %), while the state also hosted a sizeable IDP population from Khartoum (14 %). Similarly, the majority of IDPs in West Kordofan were from the state itself (72 %) while about 16 % were from Khartoum. In North Kordofan, about 61 % of registered IDPs were displaced from Khartoum, followed by 19 % from South Kordofan and about 14 % from North Kordofan.⁸²⁹

State of Displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
South Kordofan	South Kordofan	352 138 (78%)
West Kordofan	West Kordofan	284 606 (72%)
North Kordofan	Khartoum	123 099 (61%)

Table 3. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement. This table only displays the state of origin with the highest percentage of IDPs in each state of displacement.⁸³⁰

The RSF attacks on Habila and Dilling area in February 2024 reportedly led to the displacement of more than 40 000 people from the villages there.⁸³¹ Following the takeover of Al-Fula by the RSF in June 2024, reportedly 60-70 % of the city's population was displaced.⁸³²

2.4. Central

For the purposes of this report, the region denoted as Central in this section comprises Al Jazirah, Sennar, Blue Nile and White Nile states.

For information on the conflict background in Al Jazirah state, as well as developments there before February 2024, please refer to section 1.2.3 of the previous report ([EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus, April 2024](#)). Sennar, White Nile and Blue Nile states were not dealt with in the

⁸²⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁰ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸³¹ ISHR, Civil society demands immediate intervention and thorough investigation in South Kordofan, Sudan, 1 March 2024, [url](#); Radio Dabanga, RSF violence in Sudan's Nuba Mountains and El Gezira continues, 1 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸³² Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Darfur 24, Air raid on Al-Fula kills 10 members of one family, 23 June 2024, [url](#)



previous report, therefore some information going back to April 2023 was included for those states.

2.4.1. Actors involved and territorial control

Since December 2023, the RSF has seized Al Jazirah state by invading at least 137 villages and localities, controlling more than 90 % of the state apart from Al-Manaqil and nearby villages in the south as of November 2024.⁸³³ The takeover of Al Jazirah allowed the RSF to push further south into Sennar state in the summer of 2024.⁸³⁴ The RSF in Al-Jazirah were reportedly having difficulties controlling and commanding their troops,⁸³⁵ its hierarchical structure having broken down and competing factions operating independently.⁸³⁶ In March 2024, the SLM-MM under Darfur governor Minni Minnawi announced that it would join the SAF in its military operations against the RSF in Al Jazirah.⁸³⁷ Similarly, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) announced it was joining the fighting alongside the SAF in Al Jazirah, undertaking a recruitment drive in eastern Sudan.⁸³⁸ Beside these Darfur armed groups, the SAF in its endeavour to retake Al Jazirah was increasingly relying on Islamist militia originally mobilised under the Bashir regime.⁸³⁹ The May 2024 SAF offensive to retake Al Jazirah reportedly faced coordination issues between the SAF regular troops and allied armed groups such as the SLA-MM, JEM, SPLM-N-Agar and the SLM-Tambour.⁸⁴⁰

As for Sennar, by November 2024 the last stronghold of the RSF was the state capital,⁸⁴¹ which was recaptured by the SAF in December 2024.⁸⁴² Clashes between the SAF and the RSF in White Nile were ongoing as of December 2024.⁸⁴³

The SPLM-N-Agar, a splinter faction of the SPLM-N led by Malik Agar, has aligned its forces with the SAF⁸⁴⁴ and in February 2024 started moving troops from Blue Nile towards Wad Madani in Al Jazirah.⁸⁴⁵ In March 2024, SPLM-N-Agar troops were reportedly ambushed by the RSF on their way from Sennar to Wad Madani, suffering a high number of casualties.⁸⁴⁶ As of August 2024, the SPLM-N-Agar forces were still present in Blue Nile state and mobilising

⁸³³ Ayin Network, Al-Jazeera: Over 130 villages invaded by RSF, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army launches offensive to recapture key states, 18 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3; Reuters, Unruly RSF fighters sow chaos in Sudan's farming heartland, 9 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁶ Mada Masr, RSF accused of poisoning hundreds in besieged Hilaliya, eastern Gezira | Tens of thousands displaced from Gezira to eastern Sudan, 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁷ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁸³⁸ Sudan War Monitor, JEM to join battle on Gedaref front, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸³⁹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁸⁴⁰ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁸⁴¹ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴² Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF attack in Blue Nile, retakes key town in Al Jazirah, 7 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴³ Sudan Tribune, Fighting erupts in Sudan's Blue Nile and White Nile states, 8 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan – Advance unedited version, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024, [url](#), para. 26

⁸⁴⁵ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁴⁶ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 3



troops there.⁸⁴⁷ The SPLM-N-al-Hilu faction, which was not aligned with either conflict party⁸⁴⁸ reportedly held territories in Blue Nile state,⁸⁴⁹ namely the New Funj area.⁸⁵⁰

2.4.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

(a) Al Jazirah

In December 2023, Al Jazirah state fell to the RSF and the SAF withdrew from the state capital Wad Madani, only keeping a limited presence in the western periphery of the state towards Gedaref and Sennar. In March 2024, ACLED described the state as a ‘conflict hotspot’, where the RSF tried to prevent the SAF from advancing towards Khartoum.⁸⁵¹ The RSF’s control over the state was marked by numerous reports of attacks on villages and looting,⁸⁵² as well as killings among the local population.⁸⁵³ Ayin Network between February and October 2024 recorded over 130 RSF invasions of localities in Al Jazirah, with ensuing violence affecting civilians including killings, torture, looting, and in some cases rape.⁸⁵⁴

On 20 October 2024, Abu Aqla Keikel, an RSF commander, defected and joined the SAF, reportedly in exchange for an amnesty.⁸⁵⁵ This led to an uptick in RSF attacks on villages in Al Jazirah, targeting members of Keikel’s ethnic group in an apparent retaliation for his defection.⁸⁵⁶ Between 20 and 25 October, the RSF reportedly carried out major attacks across the state, committing mass killings, sexual violence against women and girls, and looting of markets and homes.⁸⁵⁷ According to Human Rights Watch, at least 30 towns and villages were attacked, including Rufaa, Tamboul, Al-Sireha, and Azrag, pointing out that this number was probably an underestimation of the reality on the ground.⁸⁵⁸

⁸⁴⁷ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁸⁴⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan – Advance unedited version, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024, [url](#), para. 31

⁸⁴⁹ UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 17

⁸⁵⁰ Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N El Hilu: ‘Over three million people face famine in southern Sudan, aid obstructed’, 29 September 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵¹ ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵² Al Jazeera, Dozens killed by paramilitary RSF in Sudan’s Gezira, aid groups say, 26 October 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵³ Sudan Tribune, RSF forces army retreat in Sudan’s Al Jazirah state, 5 December 2024, [url](#); AA, 42 dead in attack by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces on village, 22 November 2024, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Dozens killed by paramilitary RSF in Sudan’s Gezira, aid groups say, 26 October 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Sudan’s Wad al-Noura families speak of RFP’s carnage, intentional targeting children, 18 June 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁴ Ayin Network, Al-Jazeera: Over 130 villages invaded by RSF, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁵ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan’s al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#); Mada Masr, *«الدعم السريع» بالجزيرة ينضم للجيش في صفقة تضمنت العفو عنه* [RSF commander in Al Jazirah joins army in a deal that includes amnesty for him], 20 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁶ OHCHR, Sudan: Escalating violence in Al-Jazirah, 29 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁷ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: Escalating violence in Al-Jazirah, 29 October 2024, [url](#); BBC News, New wave of mass killings in Sudan alarms UN, 27 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁵⁸ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#)



Over the course of 2024, the SAF led several offensives to recapture the state,⁸⁵⁹ recapturing some areas in the south of the state,⁸⁶⁰ with clashes ongoing as of December 2024, including near the state capital Wad Madani⁸⁶¹ and Umm Al-Qura locality.⁸⁶²

(b) Sennar

In June 2024, the RSF rapidly advanced into Sennar state⁸⁶³, taking control of the capital Sinja late that month, as well as other localities including Abu Hajar and Dinder.⁸⁶⁴ The RSF also seized the strategically important Jebel Moya mountain range overlooking Sennar city.⁸⁶⁵ By July 2024, much of Sennar state had been taken over by the RSF⁸⁶⁶ and their advance slowed down due to seasonal rains and the movement of some of their troops to White Nile.⁸⁶⁷ The RSF was accused of attacks on civilians in Sennar, among them indiscriminate shootings of villagers and attempted abduction and sexual violence targeting women in Galgani village in August⁸⁶⁸ and the shelling of a crowded market in Sennar city in September 2024⁸⁶⁹ as well as the killing of at least 15 civilians south of Abu Hajar that same month.⁸⁷⁰

In October 2024, the SAF launched a military operation to recapture areas of Sennar state, managing to reclaim Dinder and Suki.⁸⁷¹ The army further managed to retake Jebel Moya, going into the offensive for the first time in months, according to a political analyst.⁸⁷² As of November 2024, Sinja was described as the last major RSF stronghold in Sennar state,⁸⁷³ with the RSF cut off from troops in neighbouring Al Jazirah and White Nile states.⁸⁷⁴ At the beginning of December 2024, the SAF had managed to retake most towns in Sennar state, including its capital Sinja.⁸⁷⁵

⁸⁵⁹ Sudan War Monitor, Offensive closes in on Wad Madani, 3 December 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army launches offensive to recapture key states, 18 October 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁸⁶⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF attack in Blue Nile, retakes key town in Al Jazirah, 7 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, RSF forces army retreat in Sudan's Al Jazirah state, 5 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶² Ayin Network, Escalation of fighting in Al-Jazeera State, 7 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶³ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁶⁴ Darfur 24, RSF accused of killing 15 civilians in a village in Sennar State, 12 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁵ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁶ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 18

⁸⁶⁷ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁶⁸ AP, Sudan's paramilitary fighters killed 85 people in an attack on a central village, residents say, 17 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁶⁹ BBC News, Crowded market shelled in Sudan killing more than 20, 9 September 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, 30

Children Killed and Injured in Sennar Shelling, UNICEF Says, 12 September 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁰ Darfur 24, RSF accused of killing 15 civilians in a village in Sennar State, 12 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷¹ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷² Ayin Network, New Battlefronts in Darfur, recapture of Jebel Moya, 19 October 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷³ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁴ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF attack in Blue Nile, retakes key town in Al Jazirah, 7 December 2024, [url](#)



(c) Blue Nile

Conflict broke out in Blue Nile in July 2023, when the rebel group SPLM-N clashed with army forces around Al-Kurmuk,⁸⁷⁶ with the army reportedly repelling the attack with artillery and air support, followed by a period of relative calm lasting into spring 2024.⁸⁷⁷ In August 2024, the RSF began expanding its military attacks into Blue Nile state,⁸⁷⁸ moving from neighbouring Sennar into the Tadamun area and clashing with SAF forces around Qali.⁸⁷⁹ Even though this attack was initially repelled, the Damazin resistance committee stated that the RSF later returned to raid the area.⁸⁸⁰ While the RSF initially advanced further in September 2024, taking the town of Roro, they later withdrew and joined their main forces stationed in Sennar state. As of November 2024, however, the RSF reported to have made some advances again, confirming their presence around 70 km from the state capital Damazin.⁸⁸¹

(d) White Nile

The RSF expanded into White Nile state from October 2023,⁸⁸² using their base in Jebel Awliya 40 km south of Khartoum to push into White Nile. After the takeover of Jebel Awliya by the RSF in November 2023,⁸⁸³ the RSF seized parts of northern White Nile, pushing the SAF to retreat further south to the large urban centres of the state. While there were occasional reports of clashes and raids by the conflict parties, the frontlines had reportedly remained static as of November 2024.⁸⁸⁴ In November 2024, local media reported several instances of RSF attacks on villages in White Nile, such as the looting of villages in the Umm Rimta locality⁸⁸⁵ and the killing of civilians.⁸⁸⁶ RSF troops reportedly employed hit-and-run tactics, carrying out raids in smaller groups to loot localities and intimidate residents and, subsequently, withdrawing to Jebel Awliya base.⁸⁸⁷

2.4.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be

⁸⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: January 2023 – January 2024, n.d., [url](#); Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N El Hilu launches new attack in Blue Nile region and wins terrain in South Kordofan, 11 July 2023, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁷ STPT and SCRN, Blue Nile, its conflict dynamics, and the potential implications for the wider war in Sudan 2017 – 2024, 24 March 2024, [url](#), p. 10

⁸⁷⁸ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 11; Darfur 24, Army, RSF Battles Move to Blue Nile, 4 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁷⁹ Al Taghyeer, الدعم السريع تتسلل إلى محافظة التضامن بالنيل الأزرق [RSF infiltrate into Tadamun governorate in Blue Nile], 3 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁰ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Rising prospects for Sudan govt participation in Swiss ceasefire talks | War spills over into Blue Nile | Military acquires advanced weaponry, 10 August 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸¹ Al Taghyeer, الدعم السريع يستعيد السيطرة على مناطق بولاية النيل الأزرق [RSF regain control of areas in Blue Nile state], 22 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸² International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: January 2023 – January 2024, n.d., [url](#)

⁸⁸³ Sudan War Monitor, Rapid collapse of SAF defenses in Jebel Aulia, 20 November 2023, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁴ Sudan War Monitor, RSF attack market in White Nile, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁵ Sudan Tribune, RSF attacks spark mass displacement in Sudan's White Nile state, 9 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁶ Al Taghyeer, مقتل وإصابة 10 مواطنين في هجوم للدعم السريع على السيل الأبيض [10 civilian casualties in RSF attack on Al-Sayyal in White Nile], 24 November 2024, [url](#); Al Taghyeer, 6 ويصيب 7 في النيل الأبيض [RSF attack kills 6 and injures 7 in White Nile], 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁸⁷ Sudan Tribune, RSF attacks spark mass displacement in Sudan's White Nile state, 9 November 2024, [url](#)



read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) Network, a Uganda-based women's rights NGO, in June 2024 published a report on conflict-related sexual violence in Al Jazirah. Based on cases documented by SIHA, the RSF taking control of areas first involved entering the villages and shooting into the air, followed by looting village businesses and then moving into the houses, searching for SAF soldiers or other combatants. They would target men – often leading to killings - and perpetrate sexual violence against women and girls in the houses.⁸⁸⁸

The SAF carried out airstrikes in the Central region targeting areas under RSF control, leading to civilian casualties.⁸⁸⁹ According to Sudan War Monitor, SAF strikes showed a pattern of targeting markets in RSF-controlled territory with the aim of disrupting commercial activity thought to be benefitting the RSF. Additionally, as SAF warplanes purportedly lacked the capacity to hit moving RSF targets in the field, the tactic was instead to target crowded spaces such as markets where RSF members were also suspected to gather.⁸⁹⁰

Among the 1 393 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) reported by ACLED between 15 April 2023 and the end of November 2024, 321 were coded as battles, 328 as explosions/remote violence and 744 as violence against civilians. In 846 instances, civilians were the primary or only target. Security incidents in the Central region were recorded especially in Al Jazirah state, accounting for about 74 % of overall incidents, followed by Sennar with 16 %, White Nile with 8 % and Blue Nile with 21 %.⁸⁹¹

⁸⁸⁸ SIHA Network, Gezira State and the Forgotten Atrocities - a report on conflict-related sexual violence, June 2024, [url](#), p. 4

⁸⁸⁹ Sudan War Monitor, Airstrike hits village market in Al-Jazira State, 27 November 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Dozens killed in mosque air strike in Sudan's Wad Madani, 21 October 2024, [url](#); Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on the Airstrike on Kamerab Village, Sennar State, 18 October 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, 100 People Killed and Injured in Army Airstrikes on Hasahisa, 8 October 2024, [url](#); Akhbar Sudan, سقوط ضحايا وتدمير منازل اثر غارات جوية على ولاية سنار اليوم [Casualties and destruction of homes as a result of air strikes on Sennar State today], 12 September 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁰ Sudan War Monitor, Airstrike hits village market in Al-Jazira State, 27 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)






Figure 12: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Central region of Sudan, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁸⁹²

2.4.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Fatality estimations could be found for Al Jazirah state only: according to the local monitoring group Al Jazirah Conference, the number of fatalities since the RSF had seized control of the state in December 2023 had reached 7 000 after one year, while 2 000 people suffered disabilities due to injuries.⁸⁹³

The Egyptian independent news outlet Mada Masr in a November 2024 article featured a map depicting killings perpetrated by RSF in several Al Jazirah localities based on information from field sources as well as numbers provided by authorities. According to these investigations by Mada Masr, between 20 October and 10 November alone, 1 245 people were killed by the RSF in Al Jazirah state.⁸⁹⁴ Similarly, the local monitoring group Al Jazirah Conference documented the killing of more than 1 237 civilians in attacks by the RSF in eastern and northern Al Jazirah state between 20 October and 11 November 2024.⁸⁹⁵ In June 2024, the RSF attacked Wad Al-Noura village in Al Jazirah, shelling the locality for several hours leading

⁸⁹² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹³ Sudan Tribune, Death toll in Al Jazirah reaches 7,000 as RSF violence continues, 11 December 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁴ Mada Masr, RSF accused of poisoning hundreds in besieged Hilaliya, eastern Gezira | Tens of thousands displaced from Gezira to eastern Sudan [Map], 13 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁵ Darfur 24, مؤتمر الجزيرة: مقتل أكثر من ألف شخص على يد الدعم السريع خلال ثلاث أسابيع [Al Jazirah Conference: More than a thousand people killed by RSF in three weeks], 11 November 2024, [url](#)



to at least 100 civilian deaths according to estimations of the local resistance committee. According to BBC News, this reported death count could possibly make this one of the deadliest attacks since the outbreak of the war.⁸⁹⁶ Residents pointed out that a reason behind the attack might have been retaliation for some village members having taken up arms against the RSF.⁸⁹⁷

In October 2024, the defection of RSF commander Abu Aqla Keikel sparked violent retribution against the population of Al Jazirah state.⁸⁹⁸ The RSF besieged Al-Hilaliya town, home of the defected commander Keikel. Reports of the takeover of the town by the RSF involved the looting of houses and markets, sexual violence against women and the killing of at least 500 people.⁸⁹⁹ Local sources accused the RSF of poisoning food supplies entering the town which was reportedly a major cause for the high death toll.⁹⁰⁰ Further causes of death were reportedly the lack of food, water and medical care due to a siege imposed by the RSF on the town.⁹⁰¹

From 15 April 2023 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 1 393 security incidents in the Central region with a total estimate of 4 407 fatalities.⁹⁰²

⁸⁹⁶ BBC News, Who was behind one of the deadliest attacks in Sudan?, 15 September 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁷ New Arab (The), Sudan's Wad al-Noura families speak of RFP's carnage, intentional targeting children, 18 June 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁸ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁸⁹⁹ ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰⁰ Mada Masr, RSF accused of poisoning hundreds in besieged Hilaliya, eastern Gezira | Tens of thousands displaced from Gezira to eastern Sudan, 13 November 2024, [url](#); AA, Sudanese activists put civilian death toll in town under RSF siege at 350, 12 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰¹ CFJ, Sudan: CFJ reports death of 20 civilians due to RSF siege on Al-Hilaliya, Al-Jazira State, 6 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)



Estimated number of fatalities: 15 April 2023 - 30 November 2024




Figure 13: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Central region, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁹⁰³

2.4.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

In Al Jazirah state, the RSF reportedly redirected irrigation canals, flooding 5 villages as well as farmland.⁹⁰⁴ RSF troops in Al Jazirah dispossessed farmers of their land and supplies and damaged critical irrigation system infrastructure, possibly further increasing food insecurity in the future.⁹⁰⁵ During the escalation of the conflict in Al Jazirah in October 2024, at least six health facilities were attacked, leading to essential health services being disrupted and patients being transferred to alternative health centres, of which only one in four were operational in the state as of November 2024.⁹⁰⁶ A local civilian organisation accused the RSF of destroying and looting essential infrastructure, such as a dialysis centre and the main hospital in Al-Hilaliya, in addition to water wells, grain mills, pharmacies and electrical infrastructure.⁹⁰⁷

In an October 2024 report, the UN Secretary General noted that the recent wave of clashes and the takeover of large parts of Sennar state by the RSF in early July 2024 ‘further damaged food production capacities’ in eastern Sudan, which would likely ‘accelerate the deterioration of the food security situation in other parts of the country’.⁹⁰⁸

⁹⁰³ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰⁴ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰⁵ SIHA Network, Gezira State and the Forgotten Atrocities - a report on conflict-related sexual violence, June 2024, [url](#), pp. 8-9

⁹⁰⁶ UNFPA, “You don’t see young women in some camps”: Harrowing reports of sexual violence and healthcare attacks in Sudan’s Aj Jazirah State, 19 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰⁷ Sudan Tribune, Suspected poisoning kills dozens in besieged Sudanese town, 8 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁰⁸ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 18



2.4.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of the start of December 2024, there were almost 1.6 million IDPs documented in the Central region, of those 654 142 in White Nile, 470 910 in Blue Nile, 282 042 in Al Jazirah and 190 256 in Sennar. Most IDPs in White Nile originated from outside the state, with about 77 % from Khartoum and 10 % from Al Jazirah. Of the IDP population in Blue Nile, 42 % originated from the state itself, while 29 % came from Khartoum and 19 % from Sennar state. In Al Jazirah state, 48 % of documented IDPs originated from within the state, while another 48 % originated from Khartoum state. In Sennar state, about 59 % of IDPs originated from Khartoum state, another 20 % from Al Jazirah and 14 % from Blue Nile.⁹⁰⁹

State of Displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
White Nile	Khartoum	500 744 (77%)
Blue Nile	Blue Nile	196 361 (42%)
Al Jazirah	Al Jazirah	136 204 (48%)
Sennar	Khartoum	111 382 (59%)

Table 4. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement. This table only displays the state of origin with the highest percentage of IDPs in each state of displacement.⁹¹⁰

The IOM DTM in August 2024 estimated that almost 726 000 people had been displaced due to fighting in Sennar state between 25 June and 29 July 2024, with 63 % of them experiencing secondary displacement.⁹¹¹ As of the end of November 2024, IOM reported more than 393 000 displacement movements from Al Jazirah since the escalation of the conflict there on 20 October 2024.⁹¹²

2.5. North

For the purposes of this report, the region denoted as North in this section comprises Northern and River Nile states. As this region was not dealt with in the previous report, the reference period for this section is 15 April 2023 - 30 November 2024.

⁹⁰⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹¹⁰ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹¹¹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Focused Flash Alert: Conflict in Sennar State, Update 001, 4 August 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁹¹² IOM, DTM Sudan - Focused Flash Alert: Conflict in Aj Jazirah State, Update 004, 1 December 2024, [url](#), p. 1



2.5.1. Actors involved and territorial control

In the reference period,⁹¹³ the SAF retained control over the country's north,⁹¹⁴ including the border with Egypt.⁹¹⁵

With the onset of the conflict in mid-April 2023, the RSF claimed to control strategic locations in Northern state's Merowe city,⁹¹⁶ such as its airport and military base, after large numbers of RSF deployment there,⁹¹⁷ a claim which was dismissed by the SAF.⁹¹⁸ A mid-April 2023 article by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) described Merowe city as 'a key part [...] of the SAF's home base' and Northern state as the 'heartland of Sudan's military'.⁹¹⁹

In December 2023, the Sudan War Monitor reported that RSF forces had ventured into the countryside of River Nile state, without managing to establish a 'significant presence'⁹²⁰ in the state described as one of the SAF's strongholds in the country by the Sudan Conflict Monitor, published by the Ayin Network and other organisations, in March 2024.⁹²¹ According to Political Geography Now, all the checkpoints on the unpaved routes through the desert connecting Mellit district in North Darfur with Al Dabbah city in Northern State, which had previously been controlled by a number of neutral and pro-SAF Joint Force groups, were taken over by the RSF in mid-April 2024.⁹²² A Sudan Times article reported that RSF-affiliated forces entered the Hajar al-Asal areas of River Nile state, close to the border with Khartoum state, on 13 October 2024.⁹²³ ACLED reported on 14 October 2024 that the SAF had regained control of these areas.⁹²⁴

Reports indicated a presence of the SAF-supporting⁹²⁵ Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) forces in River Nile state's Shendi city.⁹²⁶

SAF-supporting Popular Resistance Forces, composed of civilians acting in self-defence, were reportedly present in most areas under SAF control, including Northern and River Nile states.⁹²⁷

⁹¹³ The reference period for the North is between 15 April 2023 and 30 November 2024.

⁹¹⁴ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#); UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 8; Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#); SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

⁹¹⁵ SWP, Sudan's Transition to War and the Limits of the UN's Good Offices, October 2024, [url](#), p. 25

⁹¹⁶ Al Jazeera, Dozens killed in Sudan as army, rival forces fight for power, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹¹⁷ Radio Dabanga, Deadly violence in Sudan capital as army and RSF militia tensions explode, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹¹⁸ Al Jazeera, Dozens killed in Sudan as army, rival forces fight for power, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹¹⁹ MEMRI, One Thirst For Power In Sudan, As Two Armed Factions Maneuver, 14 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹²⁰ Sudan War Monitor, Map: Areas of Control in Central Sudan, 29 December 2023, [url](#)

⁹²¹ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 6

⁹²² PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹²³ Sudan Times, الدعم السريع تتوغل في ولاية نهر النيل ومقتل شخصين [Rapid Support Forces enter River Nile state, killing two people], 15 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹²⁴ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹²⁵ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3; ACLED, One Year of War in Sudan, 14 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹²⁶ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹²⁷ BBC, المقاومة الشعبية في السودان بين الدفاع عن النفس والانزلاق نحو حرب أهلية [Popular resistance in Sudan between self-defence and sliding into civil war], 3 January 2024, [url](#)



In October 2024, the Africa Defense Forum (ADF) reported that many of the SAF's newly recruited fighters were from River Nile State⁹²⁸ and the UN Human Rights Council noted that additional SAF training camps had allegedly been set up in River Nile state 'with the participation of girls under 18'.⁹²⁹

2.5.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In late March 2024, the RSF, operating a drone-launching 'Special Task Battalion', reportedly targeted an army artillery unit in River Nile state's Shendi city,⁹³⁰ while other alleged RSF drones attacking the city were shot down in late April 2024 and three RSF drones targeting Merowe city in Northern state were also shot down by the SAF.⁹³¹ Meanwhile, a drone strike on 2 April 2024 on SAF-controlled⁹³² city of Atbara in River Nile state targeting an SAF-affiliated militia⁹³³ was described in a Middle East Eye (MEE) article as the first such attack on the Al-Bara bin Malik brigade outside Khartoum.⁹³⁴ While no group claimed responsibility for the attack⁹³⁵ and the RSF denied responsibility, speculations were made as to whether the targeted militia itself or dissident SAF elements were the perpetrator. However, Political Geography Now noted that 'in retrospect, it seemed plausible that the strike was indeed carried out by the RSF, as the first of what would become a surge in RSF drone attacks on cities behind enemy lines over the next two months'.⁹³⁶ The above-mentioned MEE article, however, noted that the attack 'highlighted divisions and tensions' within the SAF.⁹³⁷

According to ACLED data, several drone strikes and attempted but intercepted drone strikes have been carried out by the RSF since May 2024 in SAF-controlled states that were not frontlines as of August 2024, including on Shendi in River Nile state.⁹³⁸ In 2024, sources reported an increase in the use of remote violence by both sides,⁹³⁹ including the deployment of airstrikes, drones and artillery fire. An escalation of aerial attacks was also observed in River Nile, which had previously been untouched by such strikes.⁹⁴⁰ In a December 2024 article, Al Taghyeer, citing a military source, reported that a large number of drones had reached

⁹²⁸ ADF, In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹²⁹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 224

⁹³⁰ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹³¹ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹³² Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹³³ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#); Ayin Network et al, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 2; PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁴ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁵ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁶ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁷ Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁸ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

⁹³⁹ ACLED, Regional Overview Africa - August 2024, 6 September 2024, [url](#); Al-Ghad, هجمات بالمسيرات في العاصمة السودانية وولاية نهر النيل [Drone strikes in Sudanese capital and in River Nile state], 30 July 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁰ ACLED, Regional Overview Africa - August 2024, 6 September 2024, [url](#)



Atbara and Merowe regions, with Atbara being particularly exposed. While most drones attacking civilian areas were shot down according to the article, some have hit civilians.⁹⁴¹

Between early December 2023⁹⁴² and mid-January 2024, fighting between the SAF and the RSF reportedly extended to River Nile state.⁹⁴³ Clashes were reported in May and September 2024 around the border of Khartoum and River Nile states.⁹⁴⁴ The clashes in mid-May 2024 reportedly started inside Khartoum and extended into River Nile in an RSF attempt to push the SAF back.⁹⁴⁵ In early October 2024, River Nile state's Shendi city was reportedly attacked by a number of drones after an escalation of clashes in the border area between Khartoum and River Nile states, where the SAF was reportedly trying to regain control of the Al-Jalili oil refinery facilities from the RSF.⁹⁴⁶ Fighting was reported in mid-October 2024 around the Hajar al-Asal area of River Nile state close to the border with Khartoum state,⁹⁴⁷ reportedly resulting in civilian fatalities and injuries.⁹⁴⁸

The UN Human Rights Council noted in its October 2024 report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan that a number of states in the country had declared a state of emergency since the outbreak of the conflict in April 2023, including in states in the north of Sudan, allowing 'joint security forces, including the SAF, its military intelligence and military police, and regular police forces' to enforce the law, including to arrest and detain individuals.⁹⁴⁹ 'Widespread arrests and detention' were documented by the Fact-Finding Mission by both the RSF and the SAF in their respective areas of control since April 2023, including in River Nile state.⁹⁵⁰

2.5.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be

⁹⁴¹ Al Taghyeer, *تزايد هجمات الطائرات المسيّرة يوسّع رقعة الحرب السودانية إلى المناطق الآمنة* [Increased drone attacks extend Sudan's war into safe zones], 3 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴² Independent Arabia, *معارك مستمرة في الخرطوم واشتبكات بولاية نهر النيل* [Ongoing battles in Khartoum and clashes in River Nile State], 2 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴³ Al Khaleej, *القتال السوداني يمتد للمرة الأولى إلى ولاية نهر النيل* [Sudanese fighting extends for the first time to River Nile State], 16 January 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁴ Sudan War Monitor, *RSF launch raids in White Nile, River Nile*, 19 May 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, *Sudan army captures Halfaya Bridge, breaks Kadroo siege*, 29 September 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁵ PolGeoNow, *Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023*, 11 June 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁶ Tag Press, *مسيرات تستهدف مدينة بولاية نهر النيل وتجدد المعارك بين الجيش والدعم السريع لليوم السادس على التوالي* [Drones target a city in River Nile state and fighting between the army and the RSF resumes for the sixth consecutive day], 1 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁷ ACLED, *Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks*, 14 October 2024, [url](#); Sudan Times, *الدعم السريع تتوغل في ولاية نهر النيل ومقتل شخصين* [Rapid Support Forces enter River Nile state, killing two people], 15 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁸ Sudan Times, *الدعم السريع تتوغل في ولاية نهر النيل ومقتل شخصين* [Rapid Support Forces enter River Nile state, killing two people], 15 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁴⁹ UN Human Rights Council, *Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023*, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 51

⁹⁵⁰ UN Human Rights Council, *Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023*, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 240

read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Among the 77 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) recorded by ACLED between 15 April 2023 and 30 November 2024 in Northern and River Nile states, 35 were coded as battles, 20 as explosions/remote violence and 22 as violence against civilians. In 29 instances, civilians were the primary or only target. 71 % of security events were recorded in River Nile state, the majority of them (31 incidents) in Shendi, and about 29 % in Northern state.⁹⁵¹

On April 15, 2023, the Sudan Tribune reported that the RSF took over the airport and airbase in Northern state’s Merowe city, which were reclaimed by the SAF a day later.⁹⁵² Reportedly, fighting caused ‘uncounted casualties’, including of civilians, in Merowe city.⁹⁵³




Figure 14: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in North region of Sudan, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁹⁵⁴

2.5.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict

⁹⁵¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁵² Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army regains control of airport, 16 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁵³ Al Jazeera, Dozens killed in Sudan as army, rival forces fight for power, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁵⁴ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

From 15 April 2023 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 77 security incidents in the northern region with a total estimate of 141 fatalities, many of them combatants.⁹⁵⁵




Figure 15: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in North region, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data⁹⁵⁶

2.5.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

In its October 2024 report on the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, the UN Human Rights Council noted that the RSF, in February 2024, forced Zain Sudan, the third largest provider of telecommunications services in the country, to stop its services in River Nile state. Since many Sudanese rely on online payment solutions to access food and other essential goods, and as civilians’ access was hindered due to the network disruptions, this had a great impact on the daily life of civilians in River Nile.⁹⁵⁷

Mid-January 2024, Agence France-Presse (AFP) with reference to a medical source in River Nile state’s Shendi city, reported a landmine explosion on a bus in northern Sudan transporting passengers from Al Jazirah state to Shendi city, which resulted in ten civilian

⁹⁵⁵ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁵⁶ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁵⁷ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268

fatalities. AFP noted that the landmine explosion ‘appeared to be the first such incident during the country's war’.⁹⁵⁸

2.5.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 3 December 2024, there were over 1.5 million IDPs documented in the North, including 534 262 in Northern state and 994 550 in River Nile state. Most IDPs in Northern state originated from Khartoum (87 %), while the second-largest group of the state's IDP population originated from Al Jazirah (7 %) and the third-largest group originated from the state itself (2 %). Similarly, the majority of IDPs in River Nile were from Khartoum (79 %) while about 11 % originated from Al Jazirah and 7 % originated from the state itself. Another 2 % originated from Sennar state.⁹⁵⁹

State of Displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
Northern	Khartoum	465 339 (87%)
River Nile	Khartoum	788 247 (79%)

Table 5. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement. This table only displays the state of origin with the highest percentage of IDPs in each state of displacement.⁹⁶⁰

In March 2024, the Sudan Tribune reported that IDPs in River Nile state were facing shortages of food and other essential supplies. According to a humanitarian aid responsive in River Nile state, an estimated 1 980 000 displaced families were living in 288 shelters across the state, including 95 shelters in Atbara city.⁹⁶¹ As of July 2024, the Sudanese Red Crescent reported Northern state to have become one of the states with the largest share of IDPs particularly from Khartoum.⁹⁶² Many IDPs suffered from chronic conditions, causing the best-equipped hospital in the region, Wadi Halfa, to be severely overcrowded.⁹⁶³ While hospitals were overcrowded and reportedly lacked treatment for malnutrition, food in Northern state was available but not affordable to most IDPs.⁹⁶⁴

A November 2024 Al Taghyeer article reported that more than 34 IDPs from Omdurman had been expelled by the population from River Nile state's Makniya area due to their Christian faith.⁹⁶⁵

⁹⁵⁸ AFP, Ten killed in Sudan landmine explosion: medical source, 21 January 2024

⁹⁵⁹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁶⁰ IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, اوضاع معقدة تواجه مليوني نازح في نهر النيل مع دخول رمضان [Complex conditions faced by two million displaced individuals in River Nile as Ramadan begins], 11 March 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁶² SRCS, Northern State – Aldaba, SRCS -NS Multi-Sectors Rapid Assessment Report, 31 July 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁶³ ACAPS, Impact of long-term displacement in the North, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁹⁶⁴ ACAPS, Impact of long-term displacement in the North, 22 May 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁹⁶⁵ Al Taghyeer, طرد أكثر من 34 نازحًا من جبال النوبة بولاية نهر النيل بسبب انتمائهم الديني [More than 34 IDPs expelled from Nuba mountains in River Nile state due to their religious affiliation], 1 November 2024, [url](#)

2.6. East

For the purposes of this report, the region denoted as East in this section comprises Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states. As this region was not dealt with in the previous report, the reference period for this section is 15 April 2023 - 30 November 2024.

2.6.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period,⁹⁶⁶ the SAF maintained control over the eastern states of the country,⁹⁶⁷ including the Red Sea coast and Port Sudan,⁹⁶⁸ where the SAF ministries have relocated to in 2023.⁹⁶⁹ In December 2023, the Sudan War Monitor reported that RSF forces had ventured into the countryside of Gedaref state but had failed to establish a 'significant presence' there.⁹⁷⁰ In July 2024, the Sudan Tribune reported that RSF forces were present at the borders of the state with Al Jazirah and Sennar states.⁹⁷¹ In October 2024, ACLED reported that the SAF managed to hold the last remaining route connecting Sennar city with Gedaref state.⁹⁷²

A number of armed groups, namely, SLM-MM, SLM-Tambour, and JEM, which originated as rebels in Darfur, have reportedly deployed forces and established SAF-supported training camps in the east,⁹⁷³ namely in Gedaref and Kassala states.⁹⁷⁴ Some Pro-SAF groups have reportedly provided fighters for mobile forces supporting the SAF in southeastern Sudanese states, including in Gedaref.⁹⁷⁵ In late March 2024, more than a thousand new SLM-MM fighters graduated in Gedaref state and were preparing to enter the war. In early April 2024, SLM-MM fighters were deployed to the El Fau (or Al-Fau, El Fao) frontline in Gedaref, where SLM-Tambour fighters were also present. In March 2024, new JEM fighters were trained in Kassala state.⁹⁷⁶ The group had so far limited its activities to training and support operations in Omdurman. However, in March 2024, JEM troops were present in the outskirts of Kassala and planning to head to western Gedaref. According to the Sudan War Monitor, a visit to Kassala by a Sudanese commander-in-chief in February 2024 and the graduation of more than

⁹⁶⁶ The reference period for the East is between 15 April 2023 and 30 November 2024.

⁹⁶⁷ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan [map], 31 May 2024, [url](#); SWP, Sudan's Transition to War and the Limits of the UN's Good Offices, October 2024, [url](#), p. 25; UNSG, Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, [url](#), para. 8

⁹⁶⁸ Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁶⁹ SWP, Sudan's Transition to War and the Limits of the UN's Good Offices, October 2024, [url](#), p. 25; SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

⁹⁷⁰ Sudan War Monitor, Map: Areas of Control in Central Sudan, 29 December 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁷¹ Sudan Tribune, هجوم بمسيرات انتحارية على احتفال للمقاومة الشعبية بلقصارف وتوقيف مشتبته [Suicide drone attack on popular resistance in Gedaref, suspect arrested], 11 July 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷² ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷³ Sudan War Monitor, Eritrea-backed militias deploy in eastern Sudan, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan's El Fasher, 24 June 2024, [url](#), p. 9

⁹⁷⁵ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 88

⁹⁷⁶ PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#)



thousand new JEM forces indicated ‘its forthcoming deployment to the frontline’.⁹⁷⁷ In October 2024, ACLED reported the presence of training camps for the allied Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements (JFASM) in Gedaref and Kassala states, noting that ‘thousands of recruits’ had been trained there in the previous months.⁹⁷⁸

Popular resistance forces supporting the SAF made up of civilians acting in self-defence, were reportedly present in most areas under SAF control, including in Gedaref and Kassala states.⁹⁷⁹ The SAF has also been reported to arm and pay Popular Defence Forces (PDF)⁹⁸⁰ in Gedaref and Kassala, likely to fight against the RSF.⁹⁸¹

In late October 2024, the two Eritrea-backed pro-SAF militias National Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD) forces and the Eastern Corps, the military wing of the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice (UPFLJ),⁹⁸² were deployed across rural and a few urban areas of Kassala state, which according to a Sudan War Monitor article had been ‘relatively unaffected by the ongoing conflict’.⁹⁸³

In addition, a presence of members of an armed tribal group composed of members of the Beja community was reported during the reference period in eastern Sudan.⁹⁸⁴ The armed group ‘considers itself as the rightful possessor of the lands of eastern Sudan’, is led by Dirar Ahmed Dirar, also known as ‘Shaiba Dirar’ and was reportedly headquartered in Port Sudan.⁹⁸⁵

A report published by the UN Human Rights Council in October 2024 noted that additional SAF training camps had allegedly been set up in Port Sudan ‘with the participation of girls under 18’.⁹⁸⁶

2.6.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Several drone strikes and attempted but intercepted drone strikes have been carried out by the RSF since May 2024 in SAF-controlled states that were not frontlines as of August 2024, including on Gedaref city of Gedaref state. The location of the targeted cities, according to ACLED, ‘well within SAF-controlled areas and away from frontlines, highlight the growing

⁹⁷⁷ Sudan War Monitor, JEM to join battle on Gedaref front, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷⁸ ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF’s strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF’s setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁷⁹ BBC, المقاومة الشعبية في السودان بين الدفاع عن النفس والانزلاق نحو حرب أهلية [Popular resistance in Sudan between self-defence and sliding into civil war], 3 January 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁰ A pro-government militia established in 1989 shortly after the military coup by al-Bashir to fight Sudanese rebel groups. In early June 2020, the PDF was disbanded and integrated into the SAF as the ‘Reserve Department’; ACLED, Sudan: Conflict Intensifies Following the Breakdown of Jeddah Talks, 23 June 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁸¹ ACLED, Sudan: Conflict Intensifies Following the Breakdown of Jeddah Talks, 23 June 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁸² An alliance of 17 smaller movements from eastern Sudan, which joined the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) in November 2011, initially aiming to fight the National Congress Party’s central government, including through armed rebellion. The SRF later eroded because of ‘ideological differences and personal interests’; Small arms survey, HSBA Reference Portfolio: Sudan Actors, Groups, and Events Post-April 2023, n.d., [url](#)

⁹⁸³ Sudan War Monitor, Eritrea-backed militias deploy in eastern Sudan, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁴ MEE, Port Sudan: Army and Beja fighters face off in Burhan stronghold, 19 September 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁵ MEE, The Sudanese armed leader gaining power in the vital Red Sea region, 2 February 2023, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁶ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 224



vulnerability of regions previously considered safe from direct conflict'.⁹⁸⁷ Sources reported that the first drone strikes since the outbreak of the conflict reached Gedaref state around 9 April 2024, targeting SAF-related locations in Gedaref city and El Fau.⁹⁸⁸ According to ACLED, a drone targeting SAF commander Al-Burhan during a military ceremony in the Red Sea state in late July 2024 similarly highlighted the reach of RSF drones.⁹⁸⁹ 'Sporadic attacks through airstrikes or shelling' on Gedaref state were also noted in the October 2024 report of the UN Human Rights Council's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission to Sudan.⁹⁹⁰

At the start of the conflict in mid-April 2023, 'significant clashes' were reported in Kassala city of Kassala state.⁹⁹¹ Ongoing clashes were reported during the reference period in 2024 on the border between Gedaref and Al Jazirah states near El Fau,⁹⁹² and in Gedaref city in early October 2024.⁹⁹³ In July 2024, the Sudan War Monitor reported that a new front was emerging along the western border of Gedaref state with Sennar state.⁹⁹⁴ The presence of RSF forces on Gedaref state's border with Al Jazirah and Sennar states reportedly prompted the authorities to prepare for an emergency and activate the popular resistance.⁹⁹⁵ A September 2024 report of the Sudan Conflict Monitor, published by the Ayin Network and other organisations, noted that some fighting continued around Gedaref, although the RSF's ambitions to expand its territorial gains appeared to have diminished.⁹⁹⁶ Late October 2024 saw an intensification of fighting,⁹⁹⁷ including in Gedaref.⁹⁹⁸ An October 2024 Mada Masr article reported 'an escalation of military tensions in the disputed Fashaga region' along Gedaref state's border to Ethiopia and 'growing concerns over the Sudanese military's continued loss of strategic positions, particularly in the eastern [...] states.'⁹⁹⁹

⁹⁸⁷ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁸ Al Jazeera, *قصف بالمسيرات في القضارف والجيش السوداني يتقدم بالجزيرة* [Drone strikes in Gadarif and advances of SAF in Al Jazirah], 9 April 2024, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, *تهدد عمق الجيش السوداني في ولاية القضارف* [RSF drones threaten SAF in Gedaref State], 9 April 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁸⁹ ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁹⁰ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 60

⁹⁹¹ UNOCHA, Sudan: Clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces & and Rapid Support Forces (16 April 2023), 16 April 2023, [url](#), p. 1

⁹⁹² Sudan Tribune, *الدعم السريع تهاجم مناطق حدودية بين ولايتي القضارف والجزيرة* [RSF attack border areas between Gedaref and Al Jazirah states], 10 August 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, *تبادل للقصف المدفعي بين الجيش والدعم السريع في المحور الشرقي* [Exchange of artillery shelling between SAF and RSF on eastern axis], 31 July 2024, [url](#); PoGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, *الجيش والدعم السريع يتبادلان القصف المدفعي قرب الفاو و فرار للأهالي صوب القضارف* [Army and RSF exchange artillery fire near El Fau and people flee towards Gedaref], 22 May 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁹³ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 25 September – 3 October 2024, 7 October 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁹⁹⁴ Sudan War Monitor, The New Gedaref Front, 6 July 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁹⁵ Sudan Tribune, *هجوم بمسيرات انتحارية على احتفال للمقاومة الشعبية بلقضارف وتوقيف مشتبته* [Suicide drone attack on popular resistance in Gedaref, suspect arrested], 11 July 2024, [url](#)

⁹⁹⁶ Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁹⁹⁷ GPC, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update – Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁹⁹⁸ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 27 October – 2 November 2024, 8 November 2024, [url](#), p. 2

⁹⁹⁹ Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Abiy Ahmed visits Port Sudan - Source: Military prepares to strike RSF rear lines to cut off supplies - RSF nears South Sudan, Ethiopia borders, 12 July 2024, [url](#)



In mid-September 2024, sources reported clashes in Port Sudan between the Sudanese military and fighters from a local Beja community.¹⁰⁰⁰ Reportedly, these were the first clashes in Port Sudan, which had remained relatively unaffected by the conflict¹⁰⁰¹ since the SAF had seized an RSF military base there on 17 April 2023.¹⁰⁰² Citing analysts, an Al Jazeera article noted that the clashes reflected growing tensions between eastern tribes and the army, with a number of tribes fearing that the army's dominant presence was threatening tribal land ownership.¹⁰⁰³

The UN Human Rights Council noted in its October 2024 report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan that since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, a number of states in the country had declared states of emergency including in regions of Gedaref and Eastern Sudan, allowing 'joint security forces, including the SAF, its military intelligence and military police, and regular police forces' to enforce the law, including to arresting and detaining individuals.¹⁰⁰⁴ Sources reported arbitrary detentions in Gedaref state during the reference period targeting foreigners, particularly Ethiopian refugees, and citizens for alleged RSF support, foreign influence and activism.¹⁰⁰⁵ In an article published in July 2024, the Sudan Tribune noted that Sudanese military intelligence in Gedaref state arrested and tried civilians on tribal and religious grounds, as well as activists calling for an end to the war.¹⁰⁰⁶

According to a September 2024 report of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and other organisations, the spread of the conflict into eastern Sudan, including into agriculture-rich Gedaref state, could worsen the 'already dire food security situation [...] dramatically'.¹⁰⁰⁷

Child recruitment in the context of popular mobilisation was reported in the October 2024 UN Human Rights Council's Independent International Fact-Finding Mission report in Kassala, Gedaref and Red Sea states.¹⁰⁰⁸

¹⁰⁰⁰ Africanews, Clashes in Port Sudan for first time since war began, 13 August 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Analysis: Port Sudan fighting reflects tribal-army tensions, 21 September 2023, [url](#); MEE, Port Sudan: Army and Beja fighters face off in Burhan stronghold, 19 September 2023, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰¹ Africanews, Clashes in Port Sudan for first time since war began, 13 August 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰² MEE, Port Sudan: Army and Beja fighters face off in Burhan stronghold, 19 September 2023, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰³ Al Jazeera, Analysis: Port Sudan fighting reflects tribal-army tensions, 21 September 2023, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰⁴ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 51

¹⁰⁰⁵ Sudan War Monitor, Crackdown in Gedaref targets foreigners, 21 May 2024, [url](#); MEE, Sudan war intensifies as wave of arrests hits Gedaref, 23 May 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Mass arrests in eastern Sudanese states as RSF advance, 5 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰⁶ Sudan Tribune, محامو الطوارئ: احتجاج العشرات في ولاية القضارف بذريعة التعاون مع الدعم السريع [Emergency lawyers: dozens detained in Gedaref state on pretext of cooperating with RSF], 24 July 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰⁰⁷ DRC et al., If bullets miss, hunger won't. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, [url](#), p. 10

¹⁰⁰⁸ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 222





2.6.3. Security incidents

The difficult and dangerous environment for media work and reporting in general has led to significant underreporting of security incidents in Sudan; as such this paragraph should be read in conjunction with section [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

Throughout the week of late September/early-October 2024, airstrikes and clashes were reported in a number of Sudanese cities, including Gedaref, ‘resulting in substantial civilian casualties’.¹⁰⁰⁹ On 6 November 2024, the RSF stormed the village Qaili Al-Jabal in the Butana neighbourhood in Gedaref state, killing six civilians and causing the displacement of villagers.¹⁰¹⁰

Among the 59 security events (battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians) reported by ACLED between 15 April 2023 and 30 November 2024, 32 were coded as battles, 8 as explosions/remote violence and 19 as violence against civilians. In 21 instances, civilians were the primary or only target.¹⁰¹¹

¹⁰⁰⁹ UNHCR, Sudan Situation 25 September – 3 October 2024, 7 October 2024, [url](#), p. 2

¹⁰¹⁰ Sudan Tribune, [قتلى وموجة نزوح في هجوم للدعم السريع على منطقة قبلي الجبل بولاية القضارف](#) [Deaths and displacement in a Rapid Support Forces attack on the Qaili al-Jabal area in Gedaref state], 7 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹¹ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)






Figure 16: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in East region of Sudan, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data¹⁰¹²

2.6.4. Civilian casualties

As of December 2024, there were no reliable statistics available on direct and indirect conflict deaths. For more information on the difficulty of reporting and obtaining data in the conflict see sections [1.1.4 Security incidents and civilian deaths estimates](#) and section [1.3.2 Communication and media presence](#).

In September 2024, health authorities reported that a cholera outbreak had killed 388 people and infected another 13 000 across the country, with Kassala and Gedaref states being the most affected.¹⁰¹³ MSF identified the IDPs sheltering in the state as particularly affected.¹⁰¹⁴ For Kassala state, 6 868 cases and 198 deaths were reported at the beginning of November 2024.¹⁰¹⁵ That same month, there was a surge in malaria cases with almost 5 000 cases recorded in Gedaref state, prompting the Ministry of Health to start a vaccination campaign. According to the 2023 World Malaria report, Sudan accounted for 49 % of malaria deaths in the region.¹⁰¹⁶

From 15 April 2023 to 30 November 2024, ACLED observed 59 security incidents in Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea states with a total estimate of 78 fatalities.¹⁰¹⁷

¹⁰¹² EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹³ AP, Cholera is spreading in Sudan as fighting between rival generals shows no sign of abating, 23 September 2024

¹⁰¹⁴ MSF, Cholera in Sudan: "If this is life, I wonder what hell is", 9 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹⁵ UN News, First famine, now cholera and dengue fever surge hits war-torn Sudan, 4 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹⁶ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Gedaref hit by malaria outbreak, thousands infected, 30 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹⁷ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

**Estimated number of fatalities: 15 April 2023
- 30 November 2024**




Figure 17: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in East region, 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024, based on ACLED data¹⁰¹⁸

2.6.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

The October 2024 UN Human Rights Council report on the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan noted that the RSF, in February 2024, forced Zain Sudan, the third largest provider of telecommunications services in the country, to stop its services in Port Sudan. Since many Sudanese rely on online payment solutions to access food and other essential goods, and as civilians’ access was hindered due to the network disruptions, this had a great impact on the daily life of civilians.¹⁰¹⁹

In another October 2024 report, the UN Secretary General noted that the recent wave of clashes and the takeover of large parts of Sennar state by the RSF in early July 2024 ‘further damaged food production capacities’ in eastern Sudan, which would likely ‘accelerate the deterioration of the food security situation in other parts of the country’.¹⁰²⁰

No information on explosive remnants of war in the eastern states could be found within the time constraints of this report.

¹⁰¹⁸ EUAA analysis based on publicly available ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰¹⁹ UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 268

¹⁰²⁰ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 18



2.6.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 3 December 2024, there were almost 1.8 million IDPs documented in the East, of those 1 159 414 in Gedaref state, 351 912 in Kassala and 282 159 in Red Sea state. Almost half of the IDPs in Gedaref state originated from Khartoum (48 %), while the second-largest group of the state’s IDP population originated from Al Jazirah (38 %) and the third-largest group from Sennar state (11 %). Close to half of the IDPs in Kassala were from Al Jazirah (49 %) while about 46 % originated from Khartoum and the third-largest group originated from Sennar state (4 %). Almost half of the IDPs in Red Sea were from Khartoum (46 %) while about 25 % originated from Al Jazirah. 12 % originated from the state itself and another 8 % originated from Sennar state.¹⁰²¹

State of Displacement	State of origin	Number of IDPs
Gedaref	Khartoum	559 431 (48%)
Kassala	Al Jazirah	171 192 (49%)
Red Sea	Khartoum	130 271 (46%)

Table 6. This table provides information collected by IOM field teams on displacement since 15 April 2023 at state level. It disaggregates data into states of origin and displacement. This table only displays the state of origin with the highest percentage of IDPs in each state of displacement.¹⁰²²

Kassala state, which has ‘remained relatively unaffected by the ongoing conflict’, has received a large number of IDPs from the western and central states, as well as refugees from Eritrea and Ethiopia, mainly Tigrayans. Kassala state was also home to one of the country’s largest refugee camps Al Shagarab, near the state capital.¹⁰²³ According to a local quoted in an Al-Hurra article, Gedaref state was hosting thousands of people who had fled the conflict in Khartoum and Al Jazirah.¹⁰²⁴ New displacement movements to eastern Sudan were reportedly caused by clashes and the RSF’s takeover of large parts of Sennar state in early July 2024, ‘further straining already overcrowded reception sites in eastern Sudan’.¹⁰²⁵ In mid-August 2024, the Sudan Tribune reported continued displacement from conflict areas, particularly Sennar state, into Gedaref and Kassala states.¹⁰²⁶ In late October 2024, Radio Dabanga reported continued displacement movements to Gedaref and Kassala states due to clashes in

¹⁰²¹ IOM, DTM Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²² IOM, DTM Sudan – Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²³ Sudan War Monitor, Eritrea-backed militias deploy in eastern Sudan, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²⁴ Al Hurra, كيف توسعت دائرة المعارك في السودان؟ [A year full of conflict: How the circle of battles expanded in Sudan], 10 April 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²⁵ UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 18

¹⁰²⁶ Sudan Tribune, جوع وجوف و مطر! [النازحون من سنار إلى القضارف... جوع وجوف و مطر!] [People displaced from Sennar to Gedaref: hunger, fear and rain], 15 August 2024, [url](#)



eastern Al Jazirah state.¹⁰²⁷ Mass attacks targeting civilians there led to the displacement of over 135 000 people mainly fleeing to Gedaref, Kassala and River Nile states. Of those, an estimated 14 000 people arrived in seven locations in Gedaref alone.¹⁰²⁸

In March 2024, MSF reported of worsening living conditions for displaced persons, including overcrowded shelters and inadequate health services, which threatened the spread of diseases, such as cholera, typhoid and dysentery.¹⁰²⁹ Sources reported that IDPs in Kassala were experiencing widespread food insecurity and limited access to clean water as a result of the humanitarian crisis caused by the ongoing conflict in the country.¹⁰³⁰

Following the SAF's recapture of Sinja, the capital of Sennar state, on 23 November 2024,¹⁰³¹ an article in Al Taghyeer in late November reported that busses organised by humanitarian organisations were returning IDPs, who had fled to Kassala state, to cities in Sennar state.¹⁰³²

¹⁰²⁷ Radio Dabanga, [استمرار موجات النزوح على القضارف ووصول نحو 6000 أسرة إلى حلفا وتسجيل حالاتي وفاة](#) [Displacement waves continue in Gedaref, about 6 000 families arrive in Halfa, two deaths recorded], 31 October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²⁸ NRC et al., Al Jazirah Displacement Crisis in Gedaref - Rapid Needs Assessment by the Rapid Response Mechanism, October 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰²⁹ MSF, Displaced by war, people in eastern Sudan urgently need food, water and shelter, 26 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰³⁰ Sudan Tribune, [النازحون من سنار إلى القضارف... جوع وجوف و مطر!](#) [People displaced from Sennar to Gedaref: hunger, fear and rain], 15 August 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, [القضارف السودانية في القضايف في القضايف](#) [Drinking water crisis increases the plight of the displaced in Sudan's Gedaref], 7 May 2024, [url](#); MSF, Displaced by war, people in eastern Sudan urgently need food, water and shelter, 26 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰³¹ Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army regains control of Sinja, 23 November 2024, [url](#)

¹⁰³² Al Taghyeer, [كسلا: انطلاق الفوج الأول من رحلات عودة النازحين إلى سنار](#) [Kassala: The first batch of return trips for displaced persons to Sennar begins], 30 November 2024, [url](#)



Annex 1: Bibliography

Oral sources

Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah, Yousra. Interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024. Elbagir Ahmed Abdullah is the Africa Correspondent for Sky News.

Human rights analyst with in-depth expertise on the country. Interview with EUAA, 10 December 2024.

Public sources

AA (Anadolu Agency), 42 dead in attack by Sudan's Rapid Support Forces on village, 22 November 2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/42-dead-in-attack-by-sudan-s-rapid-support-forces-on-village/3399535>, accessed 17 December 2024

AA (Anadolu Agency), Sudan says 1 killed, 17 injured in RSF shelling in Omdurman, 19 January 2025, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-says-1-killed-17-injured-in-rsf-shelling-in-omdurman/3455353>, accessed 20 January 2025

AA (Anadolu Agency), Sudan war: End in sight as army gains ground against RSF?, 18 November 2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-war-end-in-sight-as-army-gains-ground-against-rsf/3392969>, accessed 17 December 2024

AA (Anadolu Agency), Sudanese activists put civilian death toll in town under RSF siege at 350, 12 November 2024, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudanese-activists-put-civilian-death-toll-in-town-under-rsf-siege-at-350/3391243>, accessed 17 December 2024

Abdel Aziz, A., Leveraging Humanitarian Aid in Wartime Sudan, in: Middle East Report 310, Spring 2024, <https://merip.org/2024/04/leveraging-humanitarian-aid-in-wartime-sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024

ACAPS, Sudan - West Darfur pre-crisis profile, 18 July 2023, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20230718_ACAPS_Thematic_report_Sudan_West_Darfur_conflict.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

ACAPS, Sudan Snapshot of humanitarian access, 19 June 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20240619_ACAPS_Sudan_Analysis_Hub_Snapshot_of_humanitarian_access.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

ACAPS, Sudan: Scenarios - A region-by-region analysis of possible developments affecting humanitarian needs and operations in Sudan until December 2025, October 2024, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241007_ACAPS_Scenarios_Sudan.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024





ACJPS (African Center for Justice and Peace Studies), South Darfur: SAF Airforce Unit launches airstrike on RSF sites in Nyala, 18 September 2024, https://files.cdn-files-a.com/uploads/7315212/normal_66eb326f0f022.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

ACJPS (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies), Ethnic Cleansing in the Volatile Darfur, 4 November 2024, https://files.cdn-files-a.com/uploads/7315212/normal_6728abfcee8f5.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

ACJPS (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies), Sudan War Update: Security And Humanitarian Situation In North Darfur, 11 December 2024, https://files.cdn-files-a.com/uploads/7315212/normal_67595e7ce021c.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan, 16 September 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/09/16/artillery-shelling-and-airstrikes-surge-in-sudan-september-2024/>, accessed 19 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Curated Data Files, Africa, as of 6 December 2024, https://acleddata.com/curated-data-files/#Africa_1997-2024_Dec6, accessed 16 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan's al-Jazirah state, 18 November 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/11/18/defection-and-violence-against-civilians-in-sudans-al-jazirah-state-november-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall, 23 August 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/08/23/drone-warfare-reaches-deeper-into-sudan-as-peace-talks-stall-august-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), One Year of War in Sudan, 14 April 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/04/14/sudan-situation-update-april-2024-one-year-of-war-in-sudan/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Regional Overview Africa - August 2024, 6 September 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/09/06/africa-overview-august-2024/>, accessed 18 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: Conflict Intensifies Following the Breakdown of Jeddah Talks, 23 June 2023, <https://acleddata.com/2023/06/23/sudan-situation-update-june-2023-conflict-intensifies-following-the-breakdown-of-jeddah-talks/>, accessed 18 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/03/15/sudan-situation-update-march-2024-sudan-escalating-conflict-in-khartoum-and-attacks-on-civilians-in-al-jazirah-and-south-kordofan/>, accessed 17 December 2024





ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: Setting the Stage for a Long War, 17 January 2024, <https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2024/sudan/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: The RSF sets its eyes on North Darfur, 17 May 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/05/17/sudan-situation-update-may-2024-the-rsf-sets-its-eyes-on-north-darfur/>, accessed 16 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/02/16/sudan-situation-update-february-2024-sudan-the-saf-breaks-the-siege/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan, 12 July 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/07/12/sudan-situation-update-july-2024-the-rsf-marches-on-sennar-and-west-kordofan/>, accessed 17 December 2024

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan, 12 January 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/01/12/sudan-situation-update-januar-2024-the-rapid-support-forces-rsf-gains-ground-in-sudan/>, accessed 20 January 2025

ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, <https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024/>, accessed 16 December 2024

ADDO (African Digital Democracy Observatory), War propaganda.. concept and application in the Sudan war, Medium, 15 November 2024, <https://disinfo.africa/war-propaganda-concept-and-application-in-the-sudan-war-6350f289a0e0>, accessed 18 December 2024

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), As Sudan War Continues, Fighting Splits Along Ethnic Lines in Darfur, 28 May 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/05/as-sudan-war-continues-fighting-splits-along-ethnic-lines-in-darfur/>, accessed 16 December 2024

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), Attacks on Sudan's Hospitals Are Crippling Health Care System, 20 August 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/08/attacks-on-sudans-hospitals-are-crippling-health-care-system/>, accessed 21 January 2025

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), Darfur's Joint Force Helps Sudan's Army Retake Key Areas, 22 October 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/10/darfurs-joint-force-helps-sudans-army-retake-key-areas/>, accessed 16 December 2024

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), Drones Supplied by Iran and UAE Threaten to Prolong the Conflict in Sudan, 9 July 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/drones-supplied-by-iran-and-uae-threaten-to-prolong-the-conflict-in-sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024





ADF (Africa Defense Forum), In Sudan, RSF Invokes Tradition to Force Children Onto Battlefield, 8 October 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/10/in-sudan-rsf-invokes-tradition-to-force-children-onto-battlefield/>, accessed 18 December 2024

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), Iran Seeks Influence In Sudan Through An Influx Of Weapons – Analysis, Eurasia Review, 20 October 2024, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/20102024-iran-seeks-influence-in-sudan-through-an-influx-of-weapons-analysis/>, accessed 20 January 2025

ADF (Africa Defense Forum), Sudanese Armed Forces Agrees to Russian Red Sea Base in Exchange for Weapons, 25 June 2024, <https://adf-magazine.com/2024/06/sudanese-armed-forces-agrees-to-russian-red-sea-base-in-exchange-for-weapons/>, accessed 20 January 2025

AFP (Agence France-Presse), Egypt's Sisi assures Sudan army chief of 'continued support', 5 November 2024, available by subscription at: <https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/>, accessed 18 December 2024

AFP (Agence France-Presse), Sudan authorities block cross-border aid to stricken Darfur, 25 February 2024, available by subscription at: <https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/>, accessed 18 December 2024

AFP (Agence France-Presse), Ten killed in Sudan landmine explosion: medical source, 21 January 2024, available by subscription at: <https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Africanews, Cholera fears as Sudan faces a worsening water crisis, 20 October 2024, <https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/20/cholera-fears-as-sudan-faces-a-worsening-water-crisis/>, accessed 19 December 2024

Africanews, Clashes in Port Sudan for first time since war began, 13 August 2024, <https://www.africanews.com/2023/09/19/clashes-in-port-sudan-for-first-time-since-war-began/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Africanews, Sudan war: RSF rejects proposed humanitarian aid route to Darfur, 22 March 2024, <https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/22/sudan-war-rsf-rejects-proposed-humanitarian-aid-route-to-darfur/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Agenzia Nova, Sudan: Government accuses Emirates of supplying RSF with long-range drones launched from Chad, 3 December 2024, <https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/sudan-il-governo-accusa-gli-emirati-di-aver-fornito-alle-rsf-droni-a-lungo-raggio-lanciati-dal-ciad/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Ahmed, Z., Alnoor, F.A., Awadalla, A., Crystal, C., Homeida, A., Howarth, C.N., Khoshnood, K., Mooney, O., Noureldin, E.M., Poole, D.N., Raymond, N.A., Zawalski, A. et al., Widespread damage to healthcare facilities in Khartoum State, Sudan, Yale HRL (Yale Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health) and SAPA (Sudanese American Physician's Association), 10 December 202, <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/d1e6ab8f-7b7e-4474-97ed-33da9a4515f4>, accessed 20 January 2025





Akhbar Sudan, سقوط ضحايا وتدمير منازل اثر غارات جوية على ولاية سنار اليوم, [Casualties and destruction of homes as a result of air strikes on Sennar State today], 12 September 2024, <https://www.sudanakhbar.com/1567892>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Hurra, عام من الصراع.. كيف توسعت دائرة المعارك في السودان؟, [A year full of conflict: How the circle of battles expanded in Sudan], 10 April 2024, <https://www.alhurra.com/sudan/2024/04/10/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%9F>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, After a year of war in Sudan, what is the situation now?, 11 April 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/11/why-did-war-break-out-in-sudan-a-year-ago-where-does-it-currently-stand>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Analysis: Port Sudan fighting reflects tribal-army tensions, 21 September 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/21/analysis-port-sudan-fighting-reflects-tribal-army-tensions>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, At least nine killed in drone attack on hospital in Sudan's Darfur, 14 December 2024; <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/14/at-least-nine-killed-20-injured-in-sudan-hospital-attack>, accessed 20 January 2025

Al Jazeera, Dozens killed by paramilitary RSF in Sudan's Gezira, aid groups say, 26 October 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/26/dozens-killed-by-paramilitary-rsf-in-sudans-gezira-aid-groups-say>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Dozens killed in Sudan as army, rival forces fight for power, 15 April 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/15/army-and-rival-forces-clash-as-power-struggle-rocks-sudan>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Fierce fighting in Khartoum endangers Sudanese civilians, 31 December 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/12/31/fierce-fighting-in-khartoum-endangers-sudanese-civilians>, accessed 20 January 2025

Al Jazeera, Inside the last functioning hospital in Sudan's Khartoum North, 10 October 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/inside-the-last-functioning-hospital-in-sudans-khartoum-bahri>, accessed 20 January 2025

Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's army on the verge of recapturing Khartoum?, 27 September 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/27/is-sudans-army-on-the-verge-of-recapturing-khartoum>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's army regaining ground lost in the civil war?, 19 October 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/10/19/explainer-is-sudans-army-regaining-ground-lost-in-the-civil-war>, accessed 17 December 2024



Al Jazeera, Sudan army says its forces enter Wad Madani in push to retake city from RSF, 11 January 2025, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/11/sudan-army-says-its-forces-enter-wad-madani-in-push-to-retake-city-from-rsf>, accessed 20 January 2025

Al Jazeera, Sudan's army launches major offensive on Khartoum, 26 September 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/9/26/sudans-army-launches-major-offensive-to-retake-khartoum>, accessed 19 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Sudan's civilians pick up arms, as RSF gains and army stumbles, 24 December 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/24/sudans-civilians-pick-up-arms-as-rsf-gains-and-army-stumbles>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Sudan's RSF captures key army stronghold of el-Fula, 20 June 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/20/sudans-rsf-captures-key-army-stronghold-of-el-fula>, accessed 16 December 2024

Al Jazeera, The Sudan crisis: A power struggle by design, 18 May 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/18/the-sudan-crisis-a-power-struggle-by-design>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, Visualising the war in Sudan: Conflict, control and displacement, 14 November 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/14/visualising-the-war-in-sudan-conflict-control-and-displacement>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Jazeera, قصف بالمسيرات في القصارف والجيش السوداني يتقدم بالجزيرة [Drone strikes in Gadarif and advances of SAF in Al Jazirah], 9 April 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/4/9/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Khaleej, الاقتتال السوداني يتمدد للمرة الأولى إلى ولاية نهر النيل [Sudanese fighting extends for the first time to River Nile State], 16 January 2024, <https://www.alkhaleej.ae/2024-01-16/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Taghyeer, تزايد هجمات الطائرات المسيّرة يوسع رقعة الحرب السودانية إلى المناطق الآمنة [Increased drone attacks extend Sudan's war into safe zones], 3 December 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/12/03/%D8%AA%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%91%D8%B9-%D8%B1/>, accessed 18 December 2024



Al Taghyeer, طرد أكثر من 34 نازحًا من جبال النوبة بولاية نهر النيل بسبب انتمائهم الديني [More than 34 IDPs expelled from Nuba mountains in River Nile state due to their religious affiliation], 1 November 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/11/01/%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-34-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AD%D9%8B%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Taghyeer, كسلا: انطلاق الفوج الأول من رحلات عودة النازحين الى سنار [Kassala: The first batch of return trips for displaced persons to Sennar begins], 30 November 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/11/30/%D9%83%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%88%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Jazeera, أزمة مياه الشرب تزيد محنة النازحين في القضارف السودانية [Drinking water crisis increases the plight of the displaced in Sudan's Gedaref], 7 May 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.net/programs/2024/5/7/%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al Taghyeer, الدعم السريع يتسلل إلى محافظة التضامن بالنيل الأزرق [RSF infiltrate into Tadamun governorate in Blue Nile], 3 August 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/08/03/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Taghyeer, السودان: هجوم للدعم السريع يقتل 6 ويصيب 7 في النيل الأبيض [RSF attack kills 6 and injures 7 in White Nile], 20 November 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/11/20/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%88%d9%85-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-6-%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%b5%d9%8a%d8%a8-7/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al Taghyeer, لدعم السريع يستعيد السيطرة على مناطق بولاية النيل الأزرق [RSF regain control of areas in Blue Nile state], 22 November 2024, <https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/11/22/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%b9%d9%8a%d8%af-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%b7%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%85%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%82/>, accessed 17 December 2024



Al Taghyeer, مقتل وإصابة 10 مواطنين في هجوم للدعم السريع على السيل بالنيل الأبيض [10 civilian casualties in RSF attack on Al-Sayyal in White Nile], 24 November 2024,

<https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/2024/11/24/%d9%85%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-%d9%88%d8%a5%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-10-%d9%85%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b7%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%87%d8%ac%d9%88%d9%85-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Al-Ghad, هجمات بالمسيرات في العاصمة السودانية وولاية نهر النيل [Drone strikes in Sudanese capital and in River Nile state], 30 July 2024,

<https://www.alghad.tv/%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%A-D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Al-Rakoba, فصيل من قوات تمبور تعلن انضمامها للدعم السريع بزنجي [Faction of Tambour forces announces that it is joining RSF in Zalingei], 11 June 2024,

<https://www.alrakoba.net/31949914/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B6%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Al-Rakoba, محامو الطوارئ: مقتل ثمانية من أسرة واحدة جراء غارة على شمال كردفان [Emergency Lawyers: 8 members of one family killed in airstrike in North Kordofan], 3 December 2024,

<https://www.alrakoba.net/32013693/%d9%85%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%88-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b7%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%b1%d8%a6-%d9%85%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%84-%d8%ab%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a3%d8%b3%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%af/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Amin, M. and Rickett, O., What is the future of the Sudanese Armed Forces?, MEE (Middle East Eye), 4 April 2024, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-crisis-saf-army-future>, accessed 18 December 2024

Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/AFR5482522024_SudanArmsEmbargo_EN.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Amnesty International, New weapons fuelling the Sudan conflict, 25 July 2024,

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2024/07/new-weapons-fuelling-the-sudan-conflict>, accessed 20 January 2025

Amnesty International, Sudan: French-manufactured weapons system identified in conflict – new investigation, 14 November 2024,



<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/11/sudan-french-manufactured-weapons-system-identified-in-conflict-new-investigation/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Amnesty International, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/03/sudan-internet-shutdown-threatens-delivery-of-humanitarian-and-emergency-services/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Amnesty International, Sudan: SAF airstrike on crowded market a flagrant war crime, 12 December 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/sudan-armed-forces-saf-killed-dozens-in-an-air-strike-on-a-crowded-market-in-the-rapid-support-forces-rsf-controlled-town-of-kabkabiya-in-north-darfur/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Amnesty International, Sudan: Urgent need for civilian protection in wake of escalating violence, 30 October 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/10/sudan-urgent-need-for-civilian-protection-in-wake-of-escalating-violence/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in April 2024, 10 May 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-april-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in August 2024, 10 September 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-august-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in February 2024, 10 March 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-february-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in July 2024, 10 August 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-july-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in June 2024, 10 July 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-june-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in March 2024, 10 April 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-march-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in May 2024, 10 June 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-may-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in October 2024, 10 November 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-october-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Explosive Violence in September 2024, 10 October 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/explosive-violence-in-september-2024/>, accessed 17 December 2024

AOAV (Action on Armed Violence), Invisible and severe death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 15 November 2024, <https://aoav.org.uk/2024/invisible-and-severe-death-toll-of-sudan-conflict-revealed/>, accessed 16 December 2024





AP (Associated Press), Cholera is spreading in Sudan as fighting between rival generals shows no sign of abating, 23 September 2024, available by subscription at:

<https://www.dowjones.com/professional/factiva/>, accessed 20 January 2025

AP (Associated Press), Sudan's paramilitary fighters killed 85 people in an attack on a central village, residents say, 17 August 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/sudan-war-rsf-village-galgani-0e63ef15da694a558934ad2b32d6cc9b>, accessed 17 December 2024

Asharq Al-Awsat, Clashes Renew Between Sudanese Army, RSF in Khartoum, 3 September 2024, <https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5057019-clashes-renew-between-sudanese-army-rsf-khartoum>, accessed 19 December 2024

Asharq Al-Awsat, Sudan Doctors' Union: War Death Toll Tops 40,000, 26 June 2024, <https://english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5034313-sudan-doctors%E2%80%99-union-war-death-toll-tops-40000>, accessed 17 December 2024

Asharq Al-Awsat, Ukraine Fights Russia in Sudan, 9 March 2024, <https://english.aawsat.com/features/4901321-ukraine-fights-russia-sudan>, accessed 18 December 2024

Asharq Al-Awsat, مسيرات «الدعم السريع» تهدد عمق الجيش السوداني في ولاية القضارف [RSF drones threaten SAF in Gedaref State], 9 April 2024,

<https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7/4957786-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%91%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81>, accessed 18 December 2024

Ayin Network, Al-Jazeera: Over 130 villages invaded by RSF, 19 November 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/al-jazeera-8/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Al-Nuhud: The army could lose the strategic city due to in-fighting, 11 November 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/west-kordofan-5/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Ayin Network, Egypt's intervention in Sudan's war, 27 December 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/egyptsaf/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Ayin Network, Escalation of fighting in Al-Jazeera State, 7 December 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/al-jazeera-9/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Kordofan: the land of militias and the RSF's fragile hold, 18 October 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/kordofan-6/>, accessed 16 December 2024





Ayin Network, More weapons embolden Sudan's army to reject critical peace talks, 26 August 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/arms-2/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Ayin Network, New Battlefronts in Darfur, recapture of Jebel Moya, 19 October 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/darfur-12/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Ayin Network, Port Sudan: Humanitarian Aid Commission accused of aid graft, 21 August 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/hac/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Ayin Network, South Kordofan: School bombed, civilians face conflict from three fronts, 18 March 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/sk/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 10, 16 February 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SCM_10.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/SCM_11_2.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/SCM_12.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 13, 23 May 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SCM_13.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 14, 30 June 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SCM_14.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/SCM_15.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Sudan Conflict Monitor # 16, 10 September 2024, https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SCM_162.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

Ayin Network, Systematic starvation, a ceasefire is critical, 13 August 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/famine/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Ayin Network, Two towns in North Darfur – permanent targets for Sudan's airstrikes, 25 November 2024, <https://3ayin.com/en/airstrikes-2/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Badi, E., Sudan is caught in a web of external interference. So why is an international response still lacking?, 17 December 2024, Atlantic Council, 17 December 2024,





<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/sudan-rsf-saf-uae-intervention/>, accessed 20 January 2025

BBC News, Crowded market shelled in Sudan killing more than 20, 9 September 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cn024xe9gg5o>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, Evidence of Iran and UAE drones used in Sudan war, 13 June 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2vvjz652j1o>, accessed 18 December 2024

BBC News, Famine-hit Sudan camp gets first aid convoy in months, 22 November 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g7y551newo>, accessed 18 December 2024

BBC News, Key Sudanese city could fall to rebels imminently – US, 11 June 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cevz25n292o>, accessed 17 December 2024

[BBC News, Last civilian hospital in besieged Sudan city closed, 10 June 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crggj9r8r4mo](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crggj9r8r4mo), accessed 20 January 2025

BBC News, New wave of mass killings in Sudan alarms UN, 27 October 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8rll0xv8gko>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, Sudan army launches major attack on capital Khartoum, 26 September 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgeyq2g288wo>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, Sudan death toll far higher than previously reported – study, 14 November 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crln9lk51dro>, accessed 20 January 2025

BBC News, Sudan rejects UN call for peace force to protect civilians, 8 September 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93pv3z36dxo>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, Sudan's El Fasher battle: Satellite images of Darfur show RSF destruction, 23 May 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c722lppyn65o>, accessed 16 December 2024

BBC News, Sudan's military leader survives drone strikes – army, 31 July 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxe28n6ydr7o>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, Who was behind one of the deadliest attacks in Sudan?, 15 September 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2n2r5395lo>, accessed 17 December 2024

BBC News, المقاومة الشعبية في السودان بين الدفاع عن النفس والانزلاق نحو حرب أهلية [Popular resistance in Sudan between self-defence and sliding into civil war], 3 January 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cqq1kkn1dk5o>, accessed 18 December 2024

Blanchard, L., [@LaurenBinDC, X], posted 13 December 2024, <https://x.com/LaurenBinDC/status/1867346361982800047>, accessed 20 January 2025

Carlson, K., Sudan is awash with weapons: how the two forces compare and what that means for the war, The Conversation, 15 May 2023, <https://theconversation.com/sudan-is-awash-with->





[weapons-how-the-two-forces-compare-and-what-that-means-for-the-war-205434](#), accessed 18 December 2024

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Largest Displacement Crisis in the World: The Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation in Sudan, 12 June 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/06/the-largest-displacement-crisis-in-the-world-the-humanitarian-situation-in-sudan?lang=en>, accessed 20 January 2025

CFJ (Committee for Justice), Sudan: CFJ reports death of 20 civilians due to RSF siege on Al-Hilaliya, Al-Jazira State, 6 November 2024, <https://www.cfjustice.org/sudan-cfj-reports-death-of-20-civilians-due-to-rsf-siege-on-al-hilaliya-al-jazira-state/>, accessed 20 January 2025

CFR (Council on Foreign Relations), Civil War in Sudan, 3 October 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan>, accessed 17 December 2024

Chatham House, Securitizing the Ethiopia–Sudan border: How cross-border conflict is shaping trade and the control of land, 4 April 2024, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/04/securitizing-ethiopia-sudan-border-how-cross-border-conflict-shaping-trade-and-control-land>, accessed 18 December 2024

CIEDR (Counter-IED Report), Sudan: Heavy rains expose landmines north of Bahri in Khartoum, 5 August 2024, https://counteriedreport.com/sudan-heavy-rains-expose-landmines-north-of-bahri-in-khartoum/?lcp_page0=2, accessed 19 December 2024

Clingendael, From Catastrophe to Famine, February 2024, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2024-02/PB_Sudan_famine.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

Clingendael, Sudan’s agricultural input supply in times of war, December 2024, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2024-12/Clingendael_Report_Sudans_agricultural_input_supply_war.pdf, accessed 21 January 2025

Conflict Observatory, Foreign Facilitators of Weapons Fueling Sudan's Civil War, October 2024, <https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/items/1f62fa12bb9848f287ebe91751ddc97f/data>, accessed 18 December 2024

CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), ‘Back to the dark ages’: Editor Ataf Mohamed on Sudan’s wartime communications blackout, 21 March 2024, <https://cpj.org/2024/03/back-to-the-dark-ages-editor-ataf-mohamed-on-sudans-wartime-communications-blackout/>, accessed 18 December 2024

CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), CPJ urges Sudan authorities to end suspensions of 3 news outlets, 3 April 2024, <https://cpj.org/2024/04/cpj-urges-sudan-authorities-to-end-suspensions-of-3-news-outlets/>, accessed 18 December 2024





CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), One year into Sudan's civil war, its media faces grave threats, 12 April 2024, <https://cpj.org/2024/04/one-year-into-sudans-civil-war-its-media-faces-grave-threats/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Dahab, M., AbuKoura, R., Checchi, F., Ahmed, A., Abdalla, O., Ibrahim, M., Abdelmagid, N., Alabden, I.Z., Omer, L., Alhaffar, M., Ekoriko, P., Ali, Z.I.A., Grundy, C., Ndow, M., Cassini, L. and McGowan, C., War-Time Mortality in Sudan: A Capture-Recapture Analysis, 12 November 2024, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/63b733b6-3fec-4d30-94e6-b25814ca7509-MECA.pdf?abstractid=5016438&mirid=1>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur 24, 10 killed as RSF attacked Haraz village, west of Al-Obeid, 14 May 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/05/14/10-killed-as-rsf-attacked-abu-haraz-village-west-of-al-obeid/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, 100 People Killed and Injured in Army Airstrikes on Hasahisa, 8 October 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/10/08/100-people-killed-and-injured-in-army-airstrikes-on-hasahisa/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur 24, 30 Children Killed and Injured in Sennar Shelling, UNICEF Says, 12 September 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/09/12/30-children-killed-and-injured-in-sennar-shelling-unicef-says/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur 24, 30 Killed As Army Launches Airstrike on Hamrat al-Sheikh, North Kordofan, 6 October 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/10/06/30-killed-as-army-launches-airstrike-on-hamrat-al-sheikh-north-kordofan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, Air raid on Al-Fula kills 10 members of one family, 23 June 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/06/23/air-raid-on-al-fula-kills-10-members-of-one-family/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, Army Deployed in Kadugli Market In Preparation for Possible Attack by Affiliate Militia, 17 September 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/09/17/army-deployed-in-kadugli-market-in-preparation-for-possible-attack-by-affiliate-militia/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, Army, RSF Battles Move to Blue Nile, 4 August 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/08/04/army-rsf-battles-move-to-blue-nile/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur 24, Humanitarian Situation Deteriorates in El Obeid, North Kordofan, 30 October 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/10/30/humanitarian-situation-deteriorates-in-el-obeid-north-kordofan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, Over a Dozen Civilians Killed as Army Launches Another Airstrike in El Fasher, 5 September 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/09/05/over-a-dozen-civilians-killed-as-army-launches-another-airstrike-in-el-fasher/>, accessed 16 December 2024





Darfur 24, RSF accused of killing 15 civilians in a village in Sennar State, 12 August 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/08/12/rsf-accused-of-killing-15-civilians-in-a-village-in-sennar-state/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur 24, Sudanese army withdraws to South Sudan as RSF captures Al-Meiram in West Kordofan, 4 July 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/en/2024/07/04/sudanese-army-withdraws-to-south-sudan-as-rsf-captures-al-meiram-in-west-kordofan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur 24, مؤتمر الجزيرة: مقتل أكثر من ألف شخص على يد الدعم السريع خلال ثلاث أسابيع [Al Jazirah Conference: More than a thousand people killed by RSF in three weeks], 11 November 2024, <https://www.darfur24.com/2024/11/11/%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B4%D8%AE%D8%B5-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Darfur Victims Support Organisation, Report on Airstrike by Sudanese Armed Forces in Saraf Omra, North Darfur State – El Fasher, 15 November 2024, <https://darfurvs.org/2024/11/15/report-on-airstrike-by-sudanese-armed-forces-in-saraf-omra-north-darfur-state-el-fasher/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on Aerial Bombardment by Military Warplanes in Nyala City and Belil Area, South Darfur State, 11 November 2024, <https://darfurvs.org/2024/11/11/report-on-aerial-bombardment-by-military-warplanes-in-nyala-city-and-belil-area-south-darfur-state/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on the Airstrike on Kamerab Village, Sennar State, 18 October 2024, <https://darfurvs.org/2024/10/18/report-on-the-airstrike-on-kamerab-village-sennar-state/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Darfur Victims Support Organization, Report on the Artillery Shelling of Abu Shouk IDP Camp by the RSF, North Darfur, El Fasher – October 7, 2024, 10 October 2024, <https://darfurvs.org/2024/10/10/report-on-the-artillery-shelling-of-abu-shouk-idp-camp-by-the-rsf-north-darfur-el-fasher-october-7-2024/>, accessed 20 January 2025

De Waal, A., Sudan is collapsing – here's how to stop it, Chatham House, 21 March 2024, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-02/sudan-collapsing-heres-how-stop-it>, accessed 20 January 2025

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), BREAKING: Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) warplanes have launched devastating airstrikes in East and North Darfur, 21 August 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/08/21/breaking-sudanese-armed-forces-saf-warplanes-have-launched-devastating-airstrikes-in-east-and-north-darfur-targeting-key-locations-and-causing-significant-civilian-casualties/>, accessed 16 December 2024

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Continued Airstrikes and Bombings Devastate Darfur: Civilians Bear the Brunt, 27 August 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/08/27/continued->





[airstrikes-and-bombings-devastate-darfur-civilians-bear-the-brunt/](#), accessed 16 December 2024

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Donki al-Hur Locality, West Kordofan State, Sudan, 30 October 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/10/30/donki-al-hur-locality-west-kordofan-state-sudan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Field Report: Escalating Crisis in North and Central Darfur, 12 September 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/09/12/field-report-escalating-crisis-in-north-and-central-darfur/>, accessed 20 November 2024

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Still, in Abu Shouk Camp, El Fasher lives with worries about the artillery she is shelling by RSF, 24 November 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/11/24/still-in-abu-shouk-camp-el-fasher-lives-with-worries-about-the-artillery-she-is-shelling-by-rsf/>, accessed 16 December 2024

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Sudanese Air Force Bombs High School in Nyala, South Darfur, Causing Civilian Casualties, 19 December 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/12/19/sudanese-air-force-bombs-nyala-school/>, accessed 20 January 2025

DNHR (Darfur Network for Human Rights), Update from Zamzam IDP Camp, El Fasher, North Darfur State, Sudan, 6 August 2024, <https://dnhr.org/2024/08/06/update-from-zamzam-idp-camp-el-fasher-north-darfur-state-sudan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Mercy Corps and NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), If bullets miss, hunger won't. Beyond the numbers: Hunger and conflict in Sudan, September 2024, <https://pro.drc.ngo/media/qdiey15f/if-bullets-miss-hunger-won-t-beyond-the-numbers-hunger-and-conflict-in-sudan.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

DW (Deutsche Welle), Rape is being used as a weapon of war in Sudan, 2 July 2024, <https://www.dw.com/en/crisis-in-sudan-sexual-violence-rape-and-ethnic-attacks/a-69538323>, accessed 20 January 2025

DW (Deutsche Welle), Sudanese refugees in Germany decry forgotten war, 21 April 2024, <https://www.dw.com/en/sudanese-refugees-in-germany-decry-forgotten-war/a-68883454>, accessed 18 December 2024

DW (Deutsche Welle), Sudan's escalating conflict worsens humanitarian situation, 16 October 2024, <https://www.dw.com/en/sudan-conflict-escalates-and-exacerbates-humanitarian-situation/a-70502836>, accessed 18 December 2024

Elhag, A., RSF's Battle Successes in Sudan: The Consequences of Legitimizing Hemedti, TWI (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 10 February 2024, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/rsfs-battle-successes-sudan-consequences-legitimizing-hemedti>, accessed 18 December 2024





Erem News, عشرات القتلى في غارات جوية للجيش السوداني على دارفور [Dozens killed in SAF air raids in Darfur], 21 November 2024, <https://www.erenews.com/news/arab-world/kyz3o1c>, accessed 16 December 2024

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), 5 things you should know about how conflict in Sudan is devastating agriculture and people's food security, 15 April 2024, <https://www.fao.org/emergencies/resources-repository/news/detail/5-things-you-should-know-about-how-conflict-in-sudan-is-devastating-agriculture-and-peoples-food-security/en>, accessed 18 December 2024

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), Sudan: Cereal production down by over 40 percent, likely exacerbating hunger, 16 April 2024, <https://www.fao.org/newsroom/detail/sudan--cereal-production-down-by-over-40-percent--likely-exacerbating-hunger/en>, accessed 18 December 2024

FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Clashes in Sudan's breadbasket threaten national food availability, 1 February 2024, https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-02/Sudan-Food-Security-Alert-202401_1.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Famine (IPC Phase 5) confirmed in part of Al Fasher, North Darfur, 1 August 2024, <https://fews.net/east-africa/sudan/alert/august-2024>, accessed 18 December 2024

FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 9 October 2024, https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-10/Alert-Sudan-202410_0.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network), Sudan Food Security Alert Update, 5 September 2024, https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-09/Sudan-Famine-Monitoring-Alert-202409_0.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

Free Press Unlimited, Support for Sudan Media Forum's Silence Kills' campaign, 6 November 2024, <https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/current/support-sudan-media-forums-silence-kills-campaign>, accessed 18 December 2024

Free Press Unlimited, Support needed for Sudanese media to keep All Eyes On Sudan, 8 July 2024, <https://www.freepressunlimited.org/en/current/support-needed-sudanese-media-keep-all-eyes-sudan>, accessed 20 January 2025

Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024, 16 October 2024, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/sudan/freedom-net/2024>, accessed 18 December 2024

FSC (Food Security Cluster), Global Acute Malnutrition by WHZ (Weight-for-Height), 2020, https://fscluster.org/handbook/Section_three_whz.html, accessed 18 December 2024

GPC (Global Protection Cluster), At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 29, 15 July 2024, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/attachments/57b52711-7ecd-4c67-ac33->





[a0cc0fd3e2bc/At%20a%20Glance_Protection%20Impact%20from%20the%20Conflict_No.%2029_2024.08.02.pdf](#), accessed 19 December 2024

GPC (Global Protection Cluster), At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 26
15 April 2024, 18 April 2024, available at: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/5ca68d60-bcc7-403e-94cc-9179be00a910/at_a_glance_protection_impact_from_the_conflict_update_26_2024.04.15.pdf, accessed 19 December 2024

GPC (Global Protection Cluster), At a Glance: Protection Impacts of the Conflict: Update no. 25,
15 March 2024, 18 March 2024, https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/at_a_glance_protection_impact_from_the_conflict_update_25_2024.03.15.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

GPC (Global Protection Cluster), Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update –
Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, 28 October 2024, available at:
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/aa6f0c2d-a33a-48aa-bd78-e8437604175c/AI%20Jazirah%20POC%20Flash%20Update_26%20October%202024.pdf,
accessed 17 December 2024

Guardian (The), Airstrike on North Darfur market kills more than 100, says Sudan lawyers’
group, 10 December 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/10/airstrike-north-darfur-market-kills-people-sudan>, accessed 19 December 2024

Guardian (The), In El Fasher you face only death’: Sudan city empties as paramilitaries close in,
2 October 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/oct/02/el-fasher-sudan-city-paramilitary-rsf>, accessed 21 January 2025

Guardian (The), Increasing number of villages torched across Sudan shows conflict is
intensifying – report, 17 April 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/apr/17/increasing-number-of-villages-torched-across-sudan-shows-conflict-is-intensifying-report>, accessed 16 December 2024

Guardian (The), Monday briefing: Charting the forgotten crisis in Sudan, 26 February 2024,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/26/first-edition-sudan-crisis>, accessed 17
December 2024

Hamza, A., On The Offensive: Military Tactics and Peace Talks for Sudan’s Takeover, African
Arguments, 16 April 2024, <https://africanarguments.org/2024/04/on-the-offensive-military-tactics-and-peace-talks-for-sudans-takeover/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Horner, J., Nuba Hopes and Fears: Fuelling SPLA-North Mobilization in South Kordofan, Small
Arms Survey, March 2024, <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-HSBA-SituationUpdate-2024-South-Kordofan-Sudan-EN.pdf>, accessed 19 December 2024

Howarth, C.N., Khoshnood, K., Nathaniel A. Raymond et al., Update: RSF Attacks on Zamzam
IDP Camp, Widespread SAF Bombardment and RSF Targeted Razing in El-Fasher, Yale HRL
(Yale Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health), 19 December 2024,





<https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/037142d5-a83f-48e4-a29e-f0c960eacfe4>, accessed 20 January 2025

HRW (Human Rights Watch), “Khartoum is not Safe for Women”: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls in Sudan’s Capital, 28 July 2024, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/07/sudan0724web_0.pdf, accessed 19 December 2024

HRW (Human Rights Watch), “The Massalit Will Not Come Home”: Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity in El Geneina, West Darfur, Sudan, 9 May 2024, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/05/sudan0524web_0.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Civilians at Risk as Large-Scale Fighting Looms in Darfur, 18 April 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/18/civilians-risk-large-scale-fighting-looms-darfur>, accessed 17 December 2024

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Fanning the Flames: Sudanese Warring Parties’ Access To New Foreign-Made Weapons and Equipment, September 2024, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2024/09/sudan_weapons_0924_briefing-FINAL-web.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Sudan: One Year of Atrocities Requires New Global Approach, 12 April 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/13/sudan-one-year-atrocities-requires-new-global-approach>, accessed 21 January 2025

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/10/sudan-rapid-support-forces-target-civilians>, accessed 17 December 2024

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Sudan: Widespread Sexual Violence in the Capital, 28 July 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/07/28/sudan-widespread-sexual-violence-capital>, accessed 17 December 2024

HRW (Human Rights Watch), Sudan’s Victims Survived Killings; Now They Face Starvation, 27 November 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/27/sudans-victims-survived-killings-now-they-face-starvation>, accessed 21 January 2025

HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Should Rally to Halt Unfolding Atrocities in Darfur, 17 May 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/17/world-should-rally-halt-unfolding-atrocities-darfur>, accessed 17 December 2024

Hudson, C. and Strucke, M., Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis: What Was Old Is New Again, CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), 17 December 2024, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-12/241217_Hudson_Sudan_Crisis.pdf?VersionId=yUOej1iqmil7rf3_gQ_bUvPA2IFVQyAN, accessed 20 January 2025



Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security Database Signal Alert, National aid workers facing increased fatal attacks in Sudan, 29 October 2024,

https://www.aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/awsd-signal-alert_sudan_finalen.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Sudan faces health crisis as conflict devastates medical infrastructure, 8 August 2024, <https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/sudan-faces-health-crisis-conflict-devastates-medical-infrastructure>, accessed 18 December 2024

ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Sudan: Community kitchens bring vital food relief to thousands in North Darfur as humanitarian conditions worsen, 19 November 2024, <https://www.icrc.org/en/news-release/sudan-community-kitchens-bring-vital-food-relief-north-darfur>, accessed 18 December 2024

Independent Arabia, معارك مستمرة في الخرطوم واشتباكات بولاية نهر النيل [Ongoing battles in Khartoum and clashes in River Nile State], 2 December 2024,

<https://www.independentarabia.com/node/523276/%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%85-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84>, accessed 18 December 2024

Index on Censorship, The deadly challenges of reporting on Sudan's "forgotten war", 15 February 2024, <https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2024/02/the-deadly-challenges-of-reporting-on-sudans-forgotten-war/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care in Sudan 16-19 October 2024, 4 November 2024, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/attachments/00d9d118-18e4-4784-bc49-905e84c7d328/40-16-29-October-2024-Attacks-on-Health-Care-in-Sudan.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2025

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: February 2024 – December 2024, n.d., https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=14&crisis_state=&created=custom&from_month=2&from_year=2024&to_month=12&to_year=2024, accessed 16 December 2024

International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch – Sudan: January 2023 – January 2024, n.d., https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database?location%5B%5D=14&crisis_state=&created=custom&from_month=1&from_year=2023&to_month=1&to_year=2024, accessed 17 December 2024

International Crisis Group, Halting the Catastrophic Battle for Sudan's El Fasher, 24 June 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/b198-sudan-el-fasher.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2024



International Crisis Group, Inside Sudan's Catastrophic Civil War, 7 November 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/inside-sudans-catastrophic-civil-war>, accessed 18 December 2024

International Crisis Group, Sudan: A Year of War, 11 April 2024, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/sudan-11iv24.pdf>, accessed 17 December 2024

International Service for Human Rights, Sudan: End the siege on Dillinj and Habila in South Kordofan, 10 January 2025, <https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/sudan-end-the-siege-on-dillinj-and-habila-in-south-kordofan/>, accessed 20 January 2025

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan, Focused Flash Alert: Conflict In Al Fasher, North Darfur State, Update 004, 17 October 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/65691?file=1&type=node&id=44301, accessed 16 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Sudan Mobility Update (12), 10 December 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1461/files/reports/DTM_Sudan_Mobility_Update_12_0.pdf?iframe=true, accessed 18 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Sudan Mobility Overview (3), Bi-Monthly Report September-October 2024, 14 November 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/67391?file=1&type=node&id=45321, accessed 18 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Flash Alert Overview, Update 4, 1 October – 30 November 2024, 3 December 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/68231?file=1&type=node&id=46081, accessed 18 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly) (Dataset), 12 December 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/68796?file=1&type=node&id=46491, accessed 16 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Focused Flash Alert: Conflict in Aj Jazirah State, Update 004, 1 December 2024, <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/dtm-sudan-focused-flash-alert-aj-jazirah-update-004>, accessed 17 December 2024

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Focused Flash Alert: Conflict in Sennar State, Update 001, 4 August 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/dtm_download_track/60376?file=1&type=node&id=41281, accessed 17 December 2024





IOM (International Organisation for Migration), DTM Sudan – Sudan Mobility Update (7), 17 September 2024,

<https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/DTM%20Sudan%20-%20Sudan%20Mobility%20Update%20%2807%29.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2025

IOM (International Organisation for Migration), Sudan Crisis Regional Response Situation Update, 12 December 2024,

<https://sudan.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1606/files/documents/2024-12/sudan-crisis-regional-response-situation-update-64-12-decemeber-.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2025

IOM (International Organization for Migration), DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) Sudan - Countrywide Mobility Update 12 (Bi-Weekly), 12 December 2024,

<https://dtm.iom.int/datasets/dtm-sudan-countrywide-mobility-update-12-bi-weekly>, accessed 17 December 2024

IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), Famine Review Committee: Combined Review Of: I) The Famine Early Warning System Network (Fews Net) IPC Compatible Analysis For IDP Camps In El Fasher, North Darfur; And II The IPC Sudan Technical Working Group Analysis Of Zamzam Camp (North Darfur), Sudan, 1 August 2024,

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_Sudan_July2024.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), Famine Review Committee: Sudan, December 2024, 24 December 2024,

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_Sudan_Dec2024.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), Famine Review Committee Sudan, December 2024 - Conclusions and Recommendations, 24 December 2024,

https://reliefweb.int/attachments/be986af3-2c0a-4e02-bd40-a3345d8eff6d/IPC_Famine_Review_Committee_Report_Sudan_Dec2024.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), IPC Overview and Classification System, undated, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/en/>,

accessed 18 December 2024

IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification), SUDAN: Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot I April 2024 - February 2025, 27 June 2024,

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Sudan_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Snapshot_Jun2024_Feb2025.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

IPS (Inter Press Service), Sudan Ravaged By Disease, Famine, and War, 25 November 2024,

https://www.ipsnews.net/2024/11/sudan-ravaged-disease-famine-war/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sudan-ravaged-disease-famine-war, accessed 18 December 2024





IRC (International Rescue Committee), Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help, last updated 7 January 2025, <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-sudan-what-happening-and-how-help>, accessed 20 January 2025

ISHR (International Service for Human Rights), Civil society demands immediate intervention and thorough investigation in South Kordofan, Sudan, 1 March 2024, <https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/sudan-investigate-the-massacre-of-76-civilians-and-abduction-of-women-in-south-kordofan/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Jamal, A., Key actors in the Juba peace agreement: Roles, impacts, and lessons, Rift Valley Institute, 14 September 2023, <https://riftvalley.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/RVI-2023.09.14-Key-Actors-in-the-JPA.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

Jamestown Foundation (The), Can the SAF Defeat the RSF in Sudan?, 9 June 2023, <https://jamestown.org/program/can-the-saf-defeat-the-rsf-in-sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Jones, M., Has Sudan's Conflict Reached a Turning Point?, RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), 27 November 2024, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/has-sudans-conflict-reached-turning-point>, accessed 17 December 2024

Khair, K., [@KholoodKhair, X], posted 21 December 2024, <https://x.com/KholoodKhair/status/1870499699213647899>, accessed 20 January 2025

Libya Observer (The), UNHCR reports massive influx of Sudanese refugees into Kufra, 14 October 2024, <https://libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/unhcr-reports-massive-influx-sudanese-refugees-kufra>, accessed 18 December 2024

London Politica, Weaponry of the SAF & RSF, 16 May 2023, <https://londonpolitica.com/sudan-conflict-1/weaponry-of-the-saf-rsf>, accessed 18 December 2024

LSHTM (The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), 'Invisible and severe' death toll of Sudan conflict revealed, 13 November 2024, <https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/newsevents/news/2024/invisible-and-severe-death-toll-sudan-conflict-revealed>, accessed 16 December 2024

Mada Masr, RSF accused of poisoning hundreds in besieged Hilaliya, eastern Gezira | Tens of thousands displaced from Gezira to eastern Sudan, 13 November 2024, <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2024/11/13/news/politics/rsf-accused-of-poisoning-hundreds-in-besieged-hilaliya-eastern-gezira-tens-of-thousands-displaced-from-gezira-to-eastern-sudan/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Abiy Ahmed visits Port Sudan - Source: Military prepares to strike RSF rear lines to cut off supplies - RSF nears South Sudan, Ethiopia borders, 12 July 2024, <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2024/07/12/news/u/sudan-nashra-abiy-ahmed-visits-port-sudan-source-military-prepares-to-strike-rsf-rear-lines-to-cut-off-supplies-rsf-nears-south-sudan-ethiopia-borders/>, accessed 18 December 2024





Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Rising prospects for Sudan govt participation in Swiss ceasefire talks | War spills over into Blue Nile | Military acquires advanced weaponry, 10 August 2024, <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2024/08/10/news/u/sudan-nashra-rising-prospects-for-sudans-govt-participation-in-swiss-ceasefire-talks-war-spills-over-into-blue-nile-military-acquires-advanced-weaponry/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, <https://www.madamasr.com/en/2024/11/20/news/politics/sudan-nashra-rsf-floods-villages-in-gezira-clashes-intensify-in-fasher-sudan-split-on-russian-veto/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Mada Masr, «الدعم السريع» بالجزيرة ينضم للجيش في صفقة تضمنت العفو عنه [RSF commander in Al Jazirah joins army in a deal that includes amnesty for him], 20 October 2024, <https://www.madamasr.com/2024/10/20/news/u/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B6%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AC/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Marsden, R., The war in Sudan is intensifying. Coordinated pressure is needed to prevent the country's fragmentation, Chatham House, 18 September 2024, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/09/war-sudan-intensifying-coordinated-pressure-needed-prevent-countrys-fragmentation>, accessed 17 December 2024

McGregor, A., Russia Switches Sides in Sudan War, The Jamestown Foundation, 8 July 2024, <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-switches-sides-in-sudan-war/>, accessed 18 December 2024

MEE (Middle East Eye), Port Sudan: Army and Beja fighters face off in Burhan stronghold, 19 September 2023, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/port-sudan-crisis-soldiers-beja-fighters-face-off>, accessed 18 December 2024

MEE (Middle East Eye), Sudan war intensifies as wave of arrests hits Gedarif, 23 May 2024, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-war-intensifies-arrests-gedarif-death-darfur>, accessed 18 December 2024

MEE (Middle East Eye), Sudan: Fighting breaks out in el-Fasher following RSF attack, 14 September 2024, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-fighting-el-fasher-after-paramilitary-attack>, accessed 16 December 2024

MEE (Middle East Eye), Sudan: Hundreds of families flee intense fighting near Khartoum, 7 September 2024, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-hundreds-families-flee-intense-fighting-near-khartoum>, accessed 20 January 2025

MEE (Middle East Eye), The Sudanese armed leader gaining power in the vital Red Sea region, 2 February 2023, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-east-red-sea-region-dirar-ahmed-dirar>, accessed 18 December 2024





MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute), One Thirst For Power In Sudan, As Two Armed Factions Maneuver, 14 April 2023, <https://www.memri.org/reports/one-thirst-power-sudan-two-armed-factions-maneuver>, accessed 18 December 2024

Mercy Corps, Grave Malnutrition Emergency is Unfolding in Sudan's Conflict-Affected Central and South Darfur States, 18 July 2024, <https://www.mercycorps.org/press-room/releases/grave-malnutrition-emergency-central-south-darfur>, accessed 18 December 2024

Middle East Council on Global Affairs, The War in Sudan: Unfolding Humanitarian Crisis and Diplomatic Impasse, 4 November 2024, https://mecouncil.org/?post_type=events-list&p=472584, accessed 18 December 2024

Mnejja, K., Internet in Conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), 19 September 2024, <https://timep.org/2024/09/19/internet-in-conflict-sudans-battle-for-connection/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Moatinoon, Sudanese Refugees Flow into Al-Kufra City, Municipality Unable to Assist, 7 February 2024, <https://www.moatinoon.com/cgi-bin/sales?arlang=English&argenkat=News&arcod=240207011952&type=article>, accessed 21 January 2025

MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), A war on people: The human cost of conflict and violence in Sudan, July 2024, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/MSF-Report_A-war-on-people-%E2%80%93-The-human-cost-of-conflict-and-violence-in-Sudan-07.22.2024-_ENG.pdf, accessed 21 January 2025

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), After a year of war in Sudan, a rapid scale up of response is needed to avoid catastrophe, 12 April 2024, <https://www.msf.org/after-year-war-sudan-rapid-scale-response-needed>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Bomb kills two children and puts El Fasher hospital out of action amid fighting, 12 May 2024, <https://www.msf.org/sudan-bomb-kills-two-children-and-puts-el-fasher-hospital-out-action-amid-fighting>, accessed 16 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Cholera in Sudan: "If this is life, I wonder what hell is", 9 December 2024, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/cholera-sudan-if-life-i-wonder-what-hell>, accessed 20 January 2025

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Displaced by war, people in eastern Sudan urgently need food, water and shelter, 26 March 2024, <https://www.msf.org/displaced-war-people-eastern-sudan-urgently-need-food-water-and-shelter>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Food must be delivered to people starved by blockade in Zamzam camp, 13 September 2024, <https://www.msf.org/food-must-be-delivered-people-starved-blockade-zamzam-camp>, accessed 18 December 2024



[MSF \(Médecins Sans Frontières\), Last hospital in El Fasher risks closure during intensive bombardment on the city, 14 August 2024, https://www.msf.org/last-hospital-el-fasher-risks-closure-during-intensive-bombardment-city, accessed 20 January 2025](https://www.msf.org/last-hospital-el-fasher-risks-closure-during-intensive-bombardment-city)

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), MSF suspends delivery of care in Khartoum's Turkish hospital, 10 July 2024, <https://www.msf.org/msf-suspends-delivery-care-turkish-hospital-sudan>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Sudan – General Reference Map, 3 July 2024, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/347c3bce-09d5-48bb-a4d4-1f5116915af3/SDN_RefMap_A1L_3Jul2024.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), Sudan: "The situation remains extremely difficult", 12 March 2024, <https://msf.org.au/article/project-news/sudan-situation-remains-extremely-difficult>, accessed 21 January 2025

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Sudan: Health system on the verge of collapse in Khartoum, 18 January 2025, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/sudan-health-system-verge-collapse-khartoum>, accessed 20 January 2025

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Sudan: Last hospital in El Fasher risks closure amid intense bombardment, 14 August 2024, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/sudan-last-hospital-el-fasher-risks-closure-amid-intense-bombardment>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Sudan: Last hospital in El Fasher under threat from intense bombardment of the city, 14 August 2024, <https://msf.org.uk/article/sudan-last-hospital-el-fasher-under-threat-intense-bombardment-city>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Sudan: Zamzam displacement camp under attack, 2 December 2024, <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/sudan-zamzam-displacement-camp-under-attack>, accessed 18 December 2024

MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières), Supply blockade forces MSF to stop care for 5,000 malnourished children in Sudan, 10 October 2024, <https://www.msf.org/supply-blockade-forces-msf-stop-care-5000-malnourished-children-sudan>, accessed 18 December 2024

Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, <https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documenten/directives/2024/05/30/general-country-of-origin-information-report-on-sudan/General+COI+Report+on+Sudan+May+2024.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2024

New Arab (The), Are the RSF recruiting children to fight in Sudan's war?, 28 February 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/are-rsf-recruiting-children-fight-sudans-war>, accessed 18 December 2024



New Arab (The), RSF 'closing in' on Sudanese army HQ in North Darfur's El Fasher, 16 November 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/news/rsf-closing-sudanese-army-north-darfurs-el-fasher>, accessed 17 December 2024

New Arab (The), Sudan files AU complaint against Chad over arms: minister, 5 November 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/news/sudan-files-au-complaint-against-chad-over-arms-minister>, accessed 20 January 2025

New Arab (The), Sudan's Wad al-Noura families speak of RFP's carnage, intentional targeting children, 18 June 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/news/sudans-wad-al-noura-families-speak-rsfs-carnage>, accessed 17 December 2024

New Arab (The), Water crisis batters war-torn Sudan as temperatures soar, 23 June 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/features/water-crisis-batters-war-torn-sudan-temperatures-soar>, accessed 18 December 2024

New Arab (The), Will Russia's support for Sudan's army turn the tide in the war?, 3 June 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-russias-support-sudans-army-turn-tide-war>, accessed 18 December 2024

New Arab (The), Will the army's push for Khartoum turn the tide of Sudan's war?, 8 October 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/analysis/will-armys-push-khartoum-turn-tide-sudans-war>

New York Times (The), Disaster by the Numbers: The Crisis in Sudan, 7 January 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/07/world/africa/sudan-genocide-numbers.html>, accessed 20 January 2025

NPR (National Public Radio), Sudan's biggest refugee camp was already struck with famine. Now it's being shelled, 21 December 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/12/21/g-s1-39301/sudan-darfur-zamzam-camp-rsf-attack-famine>, accessed 20 January 2025

NPR, Sudan's biggest refugee camp was already struck with famine. Now it's being shelled, 21 December 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/12/21/g-s1-39301/sudan-darfur-zamzam-camp-rsf-attack-famine>, accessed 21 January 2025

NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), Save the Children and DRC (Danish Refugee Council), Al Jazirah Displacement Crisis in Gedaref - Rapid Needs Assessment by the Rapid Response Mechanism, October 2024, available at: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/7e6c850f-382f-4527-b603-efc91a771a78/2024_11_06_RNA%20AI%20Fao%20AI%20Jazeera%20Attack_RRM.pdf, accessed 20 January 2025

NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), Staff accounts: Siege and bombardment of Sudan's El Fasher pushes children, adults to the limits of survival, 9 October 2024, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/october/staff-accounts-siege-and-bombardment-of-sudans-el-fasher-pushes-children-adults-to-the-limits-of-survival/>, accessed 16 December 2024





NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), Sudan crisis: People are dying of hunger, 5 August 2024, <https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2024/sudan-crisis-people-are-dying-of-hunger/>, accessed 20 January 2025

NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council), Sudan: World ignores countdown to famine, 22 November 2024, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/november/sudan-world-ignores-countdown-to-famine/>, accessed 18 December 2024

NRC et al., Joint statement: Telecommunications blackout in Sudan, 13 May 2024, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2024/may/sudan-telecommunications-joint-statement/>, accessed 18 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), High Commissioner outlines 'insidious disregard for human life' in Sudan, 1 March 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/high-commissioner-outlines-insidious-disregard-human-life-sudan>, accessed 20 January 2025

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades, warn UN experts, 17 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/sudan-faces-one-worst-famines-decades-warn-un-experts>, accessed 21 January 2025

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan: Escalating violence in Al-Jazirah, 29 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2024/10/sudan-escalating-violence-al-jazirah>, accessed 17 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan: Türk expresses grave concern at escalating violence in El-Fasher, 26 April 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2024/04/sudan-turk-expresses-grave-concern-escalating-violence-el-fasher>, accessed 17 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan: UN Fact-Finding Mission outlines extensive human rights violations, international crimes, urges protection of civilians, 6 September 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/sudan-un-fact-finding-mission-outlines-extensive-human-rights-violations>, accessed 17 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan: UN expert calls for urgent protection of civilians in Khartoum amid alarming reports of summary executions, 2 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/sudan-un-expert-calls-urgent-protection-civilians-khartoum-amid-alarming>, accessed 17 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Under siege: the situation of human rights in El Fasher, North Darfur since May 2024, 20 December 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/sudan/ohchr-sudan-country-office-fasher-north-darfur-siege-may-1-en.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2025

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), Using starvation as a weapon of war in Sudan must stop: UN experts, 26 June 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press->





[releases/2024/06/using-starvation-weapon-war-sudan-must-stop-un-experts](#), accessed 18 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights), Sudan: Türk sounds alarm over hostilities in El Fasher, warns of serious human rights violations, 26 September 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/09/sudan-turk-sounds-alarm-over-hostilities-el-fasher-warns-serious-human>, accessed 16 December 2024

OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights), Sudan conflict: 24 million children exposed to a year of brutality and rights violations, UN committee says, 18 March 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/03/sudan-conflict-24-million-children-exposed-year-brutality-and-rights>, accessed 18 December 2024

PolGeoNow (Political Geography Now), Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2023, 11 June 2024, <https://www.polgeonow.com/2024/06/sudan-war-map-2024-june-darfur-joint-force-rebels.html>, accessed 16 December 2024

Protection Cluster Sudan, Protection of Civilians' Note: Conflict in Darfur: Key Protection Impacts in September-October 2024, 28 November 2024, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/attachments/f8ed2eb2-f457-4c7c-9452-de34169d0c6f/Protection%20of%20Civilians%E2%80%99%20Note%20-%20Conflict%20in%20Darfur%20-%20Key%20Protection%20Impacts%20in%20September-October%202024%20%2828%20November%202024%29.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, 'Colombian mercenaries fighting in Sudan with alleged UAE links', 28 November 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/colombian-mercenaries-fighting-in-sudan-with-alleged-uae-links>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Communications blackout continues in large parts of Sudan, 19 February 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/communications-blackout-continues-in-large-parts-of-sudan>, accessed 4 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, 'Two to three children buried daily' in Sortony camp as famine looms over Darfur, 6 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/2-to-3-children-buried-daily-in-sortony-camp-as-famine-looms-over-darfur>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Battles continue in Sudan, air raids on East Darfur hospital kill four, 21 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/battles-continue-in-sudan-air-raids-on-east-darfur-hospital-kill-four>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Both Sudan army and RSF claim control of Mount Kordofan, 9 May 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/both-sudan-army-and-rsf-claim-control-of-mount-kordofan>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Complex conditions in West Kordofan lead to 'extremely dire' humanitarian situation, 2 December 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/complex-conditions-in-west-kordofan-lead-to-extremely-dire-humanitarian-situation>, accessed 16 December 2024



Radio Dabanga, Darfur and Sudan aid distribution hampered as bridges succumb to floods, 26 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-and-sudan-aid-distribution-hampered-as-bridges-succumb-to-floods>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Darfur armed movements renounce neutrality in Sudan war, 17 November 2023, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/armed-movements-renounce-neutrality-in-sudan-war>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Darfur rebel faction denies attacking village in eastern Sudan, 5 July 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/darfur-rebel-faction-denies-attacking-village-in-eastern-sudan>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Deadly violence in Sudan capital as army and RSF militia tensions explode, 15 April 2023, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/deadly-violence-in-sudan-capital-as-army-and-rsf-militia-tensions-explode>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, El Burhan calls for Sudan's 'young and capable' civilians to fight against RSF, 29 June 2023, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/el-burhan-calls-for-sudans-young-and-capable-civilians-to-fight-against-rsf>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Famine devastates Sudan's Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, 15 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/famine-devastates-sudans-nuba-mountains-blue-nile>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Fighting forces families to flee Khartoum neighbourhoods, 4 March 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/fighting-forces-families-to-flee-khartoum-neighbourhoods>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Growing armed presence in eastern Sudan fuels fears of escalation, 31 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/growing-armed-presence-in-eastern-sudan-fuels-fears-of-escalation>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Indiscriminate RSF shelling of North Darfur capital continues unabated, 7 June 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/indiscriminate-rsf-shelling-of-north-darfur-capital-continues-unabated>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Malnutrition and extrajudicial killing reported by Khartoum residents, 22 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/malnutrition-and-extrajudicial-killing-reported-by-khartoum-residents>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Medicines hard to find in war-torn Sudan, kidney patients desperate, 5 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/medicines-hard-to-find-in-war-torn-sudan-dialysis-patients-desperate>, accessed 21 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Newborn among five killed in SAF airstrike in Central Darfur, 2 September 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/newborn-among-five-killed-in-saf-airstrike-in-central-darfur>, accessed 16 December 2024



Radio Dabanga, Nine dead in RSF shelling of mosque in North Darfur capital, 2 July 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/nine-dead-in-rsf-shelling-of-mosque-in-north-darfur-capital>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, North Darfur: Joint Force seizes ‘strategic areas’, Zaghawa and Arab leaders sign accord, 3 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/north-darfur-joint-force-seizes-strategic-areas-zaghawa-and-arab-leaders-sign-accord>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, RSF attacks on South Kordofan’s Habila leave dozens dead and villages destroyed, 23 February 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rsf-attacks-on-south-kordofans-habila-leave-dozens-dead-and-villages-destroyed>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, RSF denies accusations of bombing North Darfur displaced camp, 3 December 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/zamzam-camp-rsf-denies-accusations-of-bombing-darfur-displaced>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, RSF recaptures North Kordofan town, 20 May 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rsf-seizes-um-rawaba-amid-deadly-north-kordofan-violence>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, RSF violence in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains and El Gezira continues, 1 March 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/rsf-violence-in-sudans-nuba-mountains-and-el-gezira-continues>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N El Hilu launches new attack in Blue Nile region and wins terrain in South Kordofan, 11 July 2023, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/splm-n-el-hilu-launches-attack-in-blue-nile-region-and-wins-terrain-in-south-kordofan>, accessed 17 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, SPLM-N El Hilu: ‘Over three million people face famine in southern Sudan, aid obstructed’, 29 September 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/splm-n-el-hilu-over-three-million-people-face-famine-in-southern-sudan-aid-obstructed>, accessed 17 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Sudan closes El Gedaref border crossing with Ethiopia, 5 September 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-closes-el-gedaref-border-crossing-with-ethiopia>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Sudan doctors alarmed at ‘mysterious’ eye disease outbreak, 12 August 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-doctors-alarmed-at-mysterious-eye-disease-outbreak>, accessed 21 January 2025

Radio Dabanga, Sudan’s RSF ‘stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment’, 11 November 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudans-rsf-stoke-ethnic-tensions-with-tribal-recruitment>, accessed 18 December 2024



Radio Dabanga, Two Darfur movements form 'neutral military alliance' to protect civilians, 2 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/two-darfur-movements-form-neutral-military-alliance-to-protect-civilians>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, استمرار موجات النزوح على القضايف ووصول نحو 6000 أسرة إلى حلفا وتسجيل حالتين وفاة [Displacement waves continue in Gedaref, about 6 000 families arrive in Halfa, two deaths recorded], 31 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/ar/all-news/article/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AD-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D9%88%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Tamazuj, Group of SLM-Tambour forces defect to the RSF in Zalingei, 10 June 2024, <https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/group-of-slm-tambour-forces-defect-to-the-rsf-in-zalingei>, accessed 16 December 2024

Radio Tamazuj, Heavy rains expose landmines north of Bahri in Khartoum, 5 August 2024, <https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/heavy-rains-expose-landmines-north-of-bahri-in-khartoum>, accessed 20 January 2025

Radio Tamazuj, RSF legal advisor: We no longer consider Minni Minnawi governor of Darfur, 2 April 2024, <https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/news/article/rsf-legal-advisor-we-no-longer-consider-minni-minnawi-governor-of-darfur>, accessed 16 December 2024

Ramzy, S., The Conflict in Sudan: Military Landscape Shifts and Settlement Prospects, EPC (Emirates Policy Center), 21 March 2024, <https://epc.ae/en/details/scenario/the-conflict-in-sudan-military-landscape-shifts-and-settlement-prospects>, accessed 18 December 2024

Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains A Window into the Sudan Crisis, August 2024, <https://d3jwam0i5codb7.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Nuba-Mountains-Aug-2024-D3.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

Refugees International, The Nuba Mountains: A Window into the Sudan Crisis, 22 August 2024, <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/the-nuba-mountains-a-window-into-the-sudan-crisis/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Reuters, An elaborate global system exists to prevent famine. It's failing., 4 December 2024, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/famine-response-overview/?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=twitter, accessed 18 December 2024

Reuters, Dozens of UAE flights head to airstrip UN says supplies arms to Sudan rebels, 12 December 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/uae-flights-flood-airstrip-un-says-supplies-weapons-sudan-rebels-2024-12-12/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Reuters, Head of Sudan's RSF accuses Egypt of being involved in airstrikes on group's troops, 10 October 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/head-sudans-rsf-accuses-egypt-being-involved-airstrikes-groups-troops-2024-10-09/>, accessed 18 December 2024



Reuters, Sudan's cemeteries swell with fresh graves as hunger and disease spread, 20 June 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-hunger-graves/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Reuters, Sudan's conflict: Who is backing the rival commanders?, 12 April 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-conflict-whos-backing-rival-commanders-2023-05-03/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Reuters, Sudan's famine-hit Zamzam camp comes under fire, say residents and MSF, 3 December 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-famine-hit-zamzam-camp-comes-under-fire-say-residents-msf-2024-12-03/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Radio Dabanga, Sudan journalists: '90% of media infrastructure wiped out by war', 2 October 2024, <https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-journalists-90-of-media-infrastructure-wiped-out-by-war>, accessed 5 December 2024

Reuters, Sudan's SPLM-N rebel group declares famine in its territory, 14 August 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-splm-n-rebel-group-declares-famine-its-territory-2024-08-14/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Reuters, Sudan suspends work of Al Arabiya, Al Hadath and Sky News Arabia channels, state news agency says, 3 April 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-suspends-work-al-arabiya-al-hadath-sky-news-arabia-channels-state-news-2024-04-02/>, accessed 4 December 2024

Reuters, The world's hunger watchdog warned of catastrophe in Sudan. Famine struck anyway., 5 December 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/graphics/FAMINE-RESPONSE/SUDAN/zdvxqkqxnpx/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Reuters, Unruly RSF fighters sow chaos in Sudan's farming heartland, 9 August 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/unruly-rsf-fighters-sow-chaos-sudans-farming-heartland-2024-08-09/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Reuters, Who is fighting in Sudan?, 15 April 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/who-are-sudans-rapid-support-forces-2023-04-13/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Rinaldi, A.S., How Sudan's RSF became a key ally for the UAE's logistical and corporate interests, MEE (Middle East Eye), 1 September 2024, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-rsf-key-ally-uae-logistical-and-corporate-interests>, accessed 20 January 2025

Save the Children, Sudan: Over 2 million babies born into 18 months of devastating conflict, 14 October 2024, <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/sudan-over-2-million-babies-born-18-months-devastating-conflict>, accessed 18 December 2024

Scales, S.E., Erhardt-Ohren, B., Guha-Sapir, D., Dalouk, K. and Haar, R.J., Sudan's civil war has left at least 62,000 dead by our estimate – but the true figure could be far higher, The Conversation, 31 October 2024, <https://theconversation.com/sudans-civil-war-has-left-at-least>





[62-000-dead-by-our-estimate-but-the-true-figure-could-be-far-higher-242073](#), accessed 17 December 2024

SIHA (Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa) Network, Gezira State and the Forgotten Atrocities - a report on conflict-related sexual violence, June 2024, <https://sihanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Research-Report-on-CRSV-in-Gezira-State.pdf>, accessed 17 December 2024

Small arms survey, HSBA Reference Portfolio: Sudan Actors, Groups, and Events Post-April 2023, n.d., <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/project/hsba/reference-portfolio>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Protection Cluster, Eastern Sudan Protection of Civilians Flash Update: Escalation of Conflict in Jazira, 26 October 2024, [https://reliefweb.int/attachments/aa6f0c2d-a33a-48aa-bd78-e8437604175c/AI Jazirah POC Flash Update_26 October 2024.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/attachments/aa6f0c2d-a33a-48aa-bd78-e8437604175c/AI%20Jazirah%20POC%20Flash%20Update%2026%20October%202024.pdf), accessed 23 December 2024

SRCS (Sudanese Red Crescent Society), Northern State – Aldaba, SRCS -NS Multi-Sectors Rapid Assessment Report, 31 July 2024, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/attachments/5fea49c1-fb42-461d-98e9-91bd81fecb5e/SRCS-NS-AIDaba%20Locality-BRANCH%20Emergency%20Report%202024.pdf>, accessed 20 January 2025

STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker) and SCRNS (Sudan Crisis Research Network), Blue Nile, its conflict dynamics, and the potential implications for the wider war in Sudan 2017 – 2024, 24 March 2024, <https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/BlueNileEN.pdf>, accessed 17 December 2024

STPT (Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker), Humanitarianism under siege. Millions at risk as belligerents abuse humanitarian aid, August 2024, <https://sudantransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/DivertingAidENSS.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Times (The), Rapid Support Forces capture key town in West Kordofan, 9 October 2024, <https://thesudantimes.com/sudan/rapid-support-forces-capture-key-town-in-west-kordofan/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Times, الدعم السريع تتوغل في ولاية نهر النيل ومقتل شخصين [Rapid Support Forces enter River Nile state, killing two people], 15 October 2024, <https://sudantimes.net/2024/10/15/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [People displaced from Sennar to Gedaref: hunger, fear and rain], 15 August 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article289581/>, accessed 18 December 2024





Sudan Tribune, 15 civilians killed in Omdurman market by RSF shells, 23 September 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291267/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, 65 killed in Omdurman as RSF shells civilian areas, 10 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294492/>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Army retreats from north Khartoum Bahri under army drone attacks, 7 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294355/>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Cholera outbreak surpasses 43,000 cases in Sudan, death toll tops 1,100, 28 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293995/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Darfur holdout group denounces RSF attack on its supply convoy in El Fasher, 29 March 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article283885/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Death toll in Al Jazirah reaches 7,000 as RSF violence continues, 11 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294548/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Dozens killed in mosque air strike in Sudan's Wad Madani, 21 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article292352/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Egypt rejects RSF leader's accusations of support for Sudanese army, 18 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article292244/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Eight Darfur groups unveil plan to reclaim cities from Rapid Support Forces, 28 April 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article284996/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, El Fasher receives major reinforcements as fighting with RSF intensifies, 6 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291776/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Famine tightens grip on Sudan's Nuba Mountains, hundreds dead, 17 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article292196/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Fighting erupts in Sudan's Blue Nile and White Nile states, 8 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294392/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Journalists under attack, media devastated amidst Sudanese conflict, 4 May 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article285195/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Khartoum clears over 30,000 explosive remnants from Omdurman, 11 September 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article290735/>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Khartoum reports 9 dead, 121 injured from RSF shelling, 30 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article295274/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Libya: IRC launches emergency response for nearly 100,000 Sudanese refugees, 11 August 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article289388/>, accessed 21 January 2025





Sudan Tribune, Malnutrition kills 12 children in Khartoum as aid groups struggle, 25 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article295101/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Nine killed in shelling of North Darfur capital, 11 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293178/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Only functioning hospital in El Fasher destroyed by RSF shelling, 25 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article295105/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces attack kills 20 in North Kordofan village, 8 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291836/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces seize Sudanese army base in Central Darfur, 31 October 2023, <https://sudantribune.com/article278858/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Rights group denounces repeated bombings in Sudan's North Kordofan, 19 February 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article282415/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, RSF accused of atrocities in fresh attack on El Fasher camp, 22 May 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article285982/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, RSF attacks spark mass displacement in Sudan's White Nile state, 9 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293106/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, RSF forces army retreat in Sudan's Al Jazirah state, 5 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294283/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, RSF forms civilian administration in Khartoum, 29 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294032/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, RSF seize control of Sudanese army base in East Darfur, 21 November 2023, <https://sudantribune.com/article279589/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N reports 109 malnutrition deaths in Sudan's South Kordofan, Blue Nile, 22 August 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article289853/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Sudan army repels RSF attack on strategic base in Khartoum Bahri, 3 September 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article290342/>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan army retakes village near Wad Madani, RSF counterattack repelled, 20 September 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291142/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan army says broke Damazin siege, recaptures towns, 26 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293884/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Sudan army, RSF clash over strategic mountain in Sennar, 3 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291661/>, accessed 21 January 2025





Sudan Tribune, Sudan closes Ethiopia border after Fano militia seizes town, 2 September 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article290290/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan reiterates accusations of UAE support for RSF, urges UN action, 12 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article291983/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Burhan allows UN to use three airports for aid delivery, 25 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293840/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Dilling faces famine as war isolates South Kordofan, 25 July 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article288740/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudan's military announces progress in restoring defence capabilities, 12 April 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article284391/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army advances in Omdurman, regaining control of key areas, 4 August 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article289099/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army denies RSF control of Sinjah, fighting continues amidst displacement, 30 June 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article287590/>, accessed 21 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army deploys Turkish Bayraktar drones in Khartoum, 30 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294057/>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum, but war with RSF drags on, 20 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293602/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army launches offensive to recapture key states, 18 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article292211/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army recaptures key base in North Kordofan, 7 May 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article285307/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army receives armoured vehicles to counter RSF snipers, 13 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article292010/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army regains control of airport, 16 April 2023, <https://sudantribune.com/article273048/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF attack in Blue Nile, retakes key town in Al Jazirah, 7 December 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294357/>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army shoots down 20 RSF drones in El Fasher, 29 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article294026/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, Suspected poisoning kills dozens in besieged Sudanese town, 8 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.com/article293076/>, accessed 17 December 2024



Sudan Tribune, الجيش والدعم السريع يتبادلان القصف المدفعي قرب الفاو و فرار للأهالي صوب القضارف [Army and RSF exchange artillery fire near El Fau and people flee towards Gedaref], 22 May 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article285955/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [RSF attack border areas between Gedaref and Al Jazirah states], 10 August 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article289342/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [Complex conditions faced by two million displaced individuals in River Nile as Ramadan begins], 11 March 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article283198/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, تبادل للقصف المدفعي بين الجيش والدعم السريع في المحور الشرقي [Exchange of artillery shelling between SAF and RSF on eastern axis], 31 July 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article288918/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [Deaths and displacement in a Rapid Support Forces attack on the Qaili al-Jabal area in Gedaref state], 7 November 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article293016/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [Emergency lawyers: dozens detained in Gedaref state on pretext of cooperating with RSF], 24 July 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article288644/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [Activists: 59 people killed in SAF airstrikes that targeted market in North Darfur], 4 October 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article291700/>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan Tribune, [Suicide drone attack on popular resistance in Gedaref, suspect arrested], 11 July 2024, <https://sudantribune.net/article288095/>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor and OSINT Sudan, Map of the Areas of Control in Sudan, 31 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/map-of-the-areas-of-control-in-sudan-2ea>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Airstrike hits village market in Al-Jazira State, 27 November 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/kab-al-jiddad-bombing>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Al-Burhan rejects talks with RSF in blow to peace efforts, 20 November 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/burhan-defiant-speech>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Clashes between Popular Forces and RSF in South Kordofan continue for the second consecutive day [استمرار المعارك بين الجيش الشعبي والدعم السريع بجنوب كردفان لليوم الثاني على التوالي], 7 March 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/831>, accessed 16 December 2024



- Sudan War Monitor, Crackdown in Gedaref targets foreigners, 21 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/crackdown-in-gedaref-targets-foreigners>, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Darfur Joint Force declares war on Rapid Support Forces, 12 April 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/darfur-joint-force-declares-war-on>, accessed 16 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Eritrea-backed militias deploy in eastern Sudan, 15 November 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/eritrea-backed-militias-deploy-in>, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Full Text: UN Panel of Experts Report on Sudan, 23 January 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/full-text-un-panel-of-experts-report>, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Hadi Idriss blames Minnawi and Jibril for security deterioration in North Darfur, 23 April 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/hadi-idriss-blames-minnawi-and-jibril>, accessed 16 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Humanitarian talks between SAF and SPLM-North collapse, 22 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/nuba-mountains-talks-collapse>, accessed 16 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Iran's air bridge to the Sudanese military, 17 October 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/evidence-iran-weapons-deliveries>, accessed 20 January 2025
- Sudan War Monitor, JEM to join battle on Gedaref front, 22 March 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/jem-to-join-battle-on-gedaref-front>, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Map: Areas of Control in Central Sudan, 29 December 2023, https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/khartoum-control-map-dec-2023?utm_source=publication-search, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Mass arrests in eastern Sudanese states as RSF advance, 5 July 2024, https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/mass-arrests-in-eastern-sudanese?utm_source=publication-search, accessed 18 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Mercenary aviation: Russian cargo planes helped both sides in Sudan's war, 26 October 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/retraction-statement-ilyushin>, accessed 20 January 2025
- Sudan War Monitor, Offensive closes in on Wad Madani, 3 December 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/army-offensive-wad-madani>, accessed 17 December 2024
- Sudan War Monitor, Rapid collapse of SAF defenses in Jebel Aulia, 20 November 2023, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rapid-collapse-of-saf-defenses-in>, accessed 17 December 2024





Sudan War Monitor, RSF are likely using Turkish-made rocket launchers, 25 July 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-are-likely-using-turkish-made>, accessed 20 January 2025

Sudan War Monitor, RSF attack market in White Nile, 25 November 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-attack-market-in-white-nile>, accessed 17 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, RSF launch raids in White Nile, River Nile, 19 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-launch-raids-in-white-nile-river>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, RSF suffers losses in El Fasher offensive, 14 September 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-suffers-losses-in-el-fasher-offensive>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army captures Halfaya Bridge, breaks Kadroo siege, 29 September 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-seizes-halfaya-bridge>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army continues offensive following savage RSF reprisal attacks, 31 October 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-continues-offensive-following>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army regains control of Sinja, 23 November 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-regains-control-of-sinja>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Sudan army seizes Khartoum bridgehead in surprise attack, 26 September 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudan-army-seizes-khartoum-bridgehead>, accessed 19 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Sudan's military strike deal with SPLM-North on humanitarian access, 6 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/sudans-military-strike-deal-with>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, The New Gedaref Front, 6 July 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/the-new-gedaref-front>, accessed 18 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Understanding the fighting in El Fasher, 25 May 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/understanding-el-fasher-battle>, accessed 16 December 2024

Sudan War Monitor, Wave of SAF airstrikes in North Darfur kills dozens of civilians, 6 October 2024, <https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/wave-of-saf-airstrikes-in-north-darfur>, accessed 16 December 2024

Suliman, M., The Deepfake is a powerful weapon in the war in Sudan, African Arguments, 23 October 2024, <https://africanarguments.org/2024/10/the-deepfake-is-a-powerful-weapon-in-the-war-in-sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024





SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), How (Not) to Talk About the War in Sudan, 22 April 2024, <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/mta-spotlight-30-how-not-to-talk-about-the-war-in-sudan>, accessed 20 January 2025

SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2024RP05_SudanAfterBashir.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), Sudan's Transition to War and the Limits of the UN's Good Offices, October 2024, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2024RP14_SudansTransitionToWar_WEB.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

Tag Press, مسيرات تستهدف مدينة بولاية نهر النيل و تجدد المعارك بين الجيش والدعم السريع لليوم السادس على التوالي [Drones target a city in River Nile state and fighting between the army and the RSF resumes for the sixth consecutive day], 1 October 2024, <https://www.tagpress.net/131500/%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88/>, accessed 18 December 2024

TNH (The New Humanitarian), Health services non-functional as women bear the brunt of Sudan's war, 9 October 2024, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/10/09/health-services-non-functional-women-bear-brunt-sudan-war-qbv-sea>, accessed 18 December 2024

TNH (The New Humanitarian), Inside the battle for El Fasher: "Innocent lives are lost every day", 27 November 2024, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/27/inside-battle-el-fasher-innocent-lives-are-lost-every-day>, accessed 16 December 2024

TNH (The New Humanitarian), Warring parties target local aid volunteers as fighting escalates in Sudan, 13 November 2024, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/13/warring-parties-target-local-aid-volunteers-fighting-escalates-sudan-err>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN (United Nations), Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, accessed 18 November 2024

UN (United Nations), Sudan faces one of the worst famines in decades, warn UN experts, 17 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/10/sudan-faces-one-worst-famines-decades-warn-un-experts>, accessed 21 January 2025



UN (United Nations), Sudan war keeps reaching across borders, Security Council hears, 5 November 2024, <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2024/11/99960/sudan-war-keeps-reaching-across-borders-security-council-hears>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/A-HRC-57-CRP-6-en.pdf>, accessed 16 December 2024

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan – Advance unedited version, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/advance-versions/A_HRC_57_23_AdvanceUneditedVersion.docx, accessed 17 December 2024

UN News, ‘Unimaginable trauma’ haunts Sudan’s displaced while violence, famine threaten millions, 7 June 2024, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/06/1150781>, accessed 20 January 2025

UN News, First famine, now cholera and dengue fever surge hits war-torn Sudan, 4 November 2024, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1156461>, accessed 20 January 2025

UN News, Sudan: UN expert warns of child recruitment by armed forces, 16 October 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1142397>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN News, UN chief and officials condemn fighting between Sudanese forces, 15 April 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1135702>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN Peacekeeping, UNISFA Fact sheet, n.d., <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unisfa>, accessed 16 December 2024

UN Press, Russian Federation Vetoes Security Council Resolution Aimed at Strengthening Measures to Protect Civilians, Increase Humanitarian Aid Access in Sudan, 18 November 2024, <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15901.doc.htm>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN Press, Warning 26 Million People Facing Acute Hunger in Sudan, Senior World Food Programme Official Tells Security Council Political Will, Leadership Key to Stopping Famine, SC/15784, 6 August 2024, <https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15784.doc.htm>, accessed 18 December 2024

UN Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, S/2024/65, 15 January 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4039195/files/S_2024_65-EN.pdf?ln=en, accessed 20 January 2025

UN Security Council, Resolution 2724 (2024) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 9568th meeting, on 8 March 2024, S/RES/2724 (2024), 8 March 2024,



https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4040187/files/S_RES_2724_%282024%29-EN.pdf, accessed 17 December 2024

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), “You don’t see young women in some camps”: Harrowing reports of sexual violence and healthcare attacks in Sudan’s Aj Jazirah State, 19 November 2024, <https://www.unfpa.org/news/%E2%80%9Cyou-don%E2%80%99t-see-young-women-some-camps%E2%80%9D-harrowing-reports-sexual-violence-and-healthcare>, accessed 20 January 2025

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), In Sudan, city’s last remaining hospital shelled: “We need support now”, 28 October 2024, <https://www.unfpa.org/news/sudan-city%E2%80%99s-last-remaining-hospital-shelled-%E2%80%9Cwe-need-support-now%E2%80%9D>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), One year of war in Sudan, April 2024, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/Sudan-one-year-of-war-Sitrep_April-2024.pdf, accessed 18 November 2024

UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), Sudan Emergency Situation Report #13, 27 May 2024, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/UNFPA_Sudan_Emergency_Situation_Report_%2313-2.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), UN agencies warn of spiraling Sudan crisis as civilians face grave risks and famine threat grows amid access barriers, Joint UNHCR-UNICEF Statement, 25 October 2024, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/un-agencies-warn-spiraling-sudan-crisis-civilians-face-grave-risks-and-famine>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Mid-Year Trends 2024, 29 October 2024, <https://www.unhcr.org/mid-year-trends-report-2024>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Protection Brief Darfur Region, October 2023, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/103953>, accessed 16 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Emergency Population Movements from Sudan, 1 December 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112835>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Emergency: Population movements from Sudan, 15 December 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/113278>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 10 – 16 November 2024, 22 November 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112658>, accessed 18 December 2024





UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 20 – 26 October 2024, 1 November 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112224>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 29 September – 5 October 2024, 11 October 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/111703>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 3 – 9 November 2024, 15 November 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112553>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation, Sudanese Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Libya, 17 November 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112566>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 1 May 2024, 3 May 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/108427>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 7 – 13 March 2024, 15 March 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/107294>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 17 April 2024, 18 April 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/108044>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 9 – 15 May 2024, 17 May 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/108769>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 13 – 19 June 2024, 22 June 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/109460>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 20 – 27 June 2024, 28 June 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/109564>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation, 5 – 11 July 2024, 12 July 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/109880>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation, 9 – 15 August 2024, 19 August 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/110618>, accessed 17 December 2024





UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 23 – 29 August 2024, 2 September 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/110914>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 25 September – 3 October 2024, 7 October 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/111597>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 13 – 19 October 2024, 25 October 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112060>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 27 October – 2 November 2024, 8 November 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112367>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan Situation 24 – 30 November 2024, 6 December 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/112989>, accessed 17 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan, Global Appeal 2025 Situation Overview, November 2024, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/Sudan_Situation_Overview.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Sudan: East Sudan (Kassala & Gedaref) & Blue Nile States - Ethiopian Emergency Situation Update (as of 29 February 24), 21 March 2024, <https://data.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/107427>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Unrelenting violence in Sudan drives continued refugee exodus, 8 November 2024, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unrelenting-violence-sudan-drives-continued-refugee-exodus>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) and RedR UK, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Sector, Emergency Technical Guidelines for Sudan, November 2017, <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/1031/file/Emergency-Technical-Guidelines-2017.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Famine confirmed in Sudan’s North Darfur, confirming UN agencies worst fears, 1 August 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/famine-confirmed-sudans-north-darfur-confirming-un-agencies-worst-fears>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Food and nutrition crisis deepens across Sudan as famine identified in additional areas, 24 December 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/food-and-nutrition-crisis-deepens-across-sudan-famine-identified-additional-areas>, accessed 20 January 2025



UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Humanitarian Situation Report No. 23, Reporting Period 1-30 September 2024, 11 November 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/media/164906/file/Sudan-Humanitarian-SitRep-September-2024.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Humanitarian Situation Report No. 20, 1 January to 30 June 2024, 30 July 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/media/159806/file/Sudan-Humanitarian-SitRep-Mid-Year-2024.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Over Three Million Children at Heighted Risk of Cholera and other Deadly Diseases in Sudan, 17 September 2024, <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/press-releases/over-three-million-children-heighted-risk-cholera-and-other-deadly-diseases-sudan>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 23, 11 November 2024, [https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/15106/file/UNICEF Sudan - Humanitarian Situation Report - September 2024.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/15106/file/UNICEF%20Sudan%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20-%20September%202024.pdf), accessed 18 December 2024

UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), Water, sanitation and hygiene, n.d., <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/water-sanitation-and-hygiene>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan: Clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces & and Rapid Support Forces (16 April 2023), 16 April 2023, [https://reliefweb.int/attachments/37a9b3d9-1fbf-4f13-92ec-c55fbf3f453f/Flash Update - Sudan - 13 Apr 2023.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/attachments/37a9b3d9-1fbf-4f13-92ec-c55fbf3f453f/Flash%20Update%20-%20Sudan%20-%2013%20Apr%202023.pdf), accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, 30 December 2024, <https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1220/document/sudan-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025>, accessed 20 January 2025

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot September 2024, 30 October 2024, [https://www.unocha.org/attachments/028aa9fd-8924-4f4d-881f-f554e1c4757e/Sudan_Humanitarian_Access_Snapshot_September_2024 %281%29.pdf](https://www.unocha.org/attachments/028aa9fd-8924-4f4d-881f-f554e1c4757e/Sudan_Humanitarian_Access_Snapshot_September_2024%281%29.pdf), accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan welcomes the decision to keep Adre border crossing point open for aid supplies for another three months, 14 November 2024, <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/humanitarian-coordinator-sudan-welcomes-decision-keep-adre-border-crossing-point-open-aid-supplies-another-three-months>, accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Response Dashboard October 2024, 19 November 2024, https://www.unocha.org/attachments/32b852b5-5042-48b9-a7b2-23bb7aa302b0/SDN_Hum_Response_Dashboard_Oct24.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024



UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan: Adre border crossing situation update, Flash Update No. 01, 27 August 2024, https://www.unocha.org/attachments/803a583d-8375-4076-9e7a-a2eccc2f7cc9/SDN_240826_Adre_border_crossing_point_situation_update_Flash_Update_No_01_FINAL.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan, Humanitarian Update, 1 October 2024, available at: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/0c69b5d3-fb2a-47f4-bca2-d860d8a27cde/SUDAN_20241001_Humanitarian_Update_01October2024_FINAL.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Update, 1 November 2024, available at: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/5d2a86ea-bb05-46bc-b719-c40f4e903ade/SUDAN_20241101_Humanitarian_Update_01November2024_FINAL.pdf, accessed 18 December 2024

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, December 2024, <https://www.unocha.org/attachments/77fabd0e-abbf-4739-9142-21bed07fc92b/Sudan%20-%20Humanitarian%20Needs%20and%20Response%20Plan%20Executive%20Summary%20%28December%202024%29.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2025

UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Sudan Humanitarian Access Snapshot December 2024, 12 January 2025, <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-access-snapshot-december-2024>, accessed 21 January 2025

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Children and armed conflict in the Sudan, S/2024/443, 7 June 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4055088/files/S_2024_443-EN.pdf, accessed 16 December 2024

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4065051/files/S_2024_759-EN.pdf?ln=en, accessed 16 December 2024

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Abyei, S/2024/740, 14 October 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4064475/files/S_2024_740-EN.pdf?ln=en, accessed 16 December 2024

UNSG (United Nations Secretary-General), Situation in Abyei, S/2024/354, 1 May 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4046297/files/S_2024_354-EN.pdf?ln=en, accessed 16 December 2024

US, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), World Factbook, Sudan, last updated: 12 December 2024, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024





USDOS (US Department of State), 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-trafficking-in-persons-report/sudan/>, accessed 18 December 2024

USUN (United States Mission to the United Nations), Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Determination of Genocide in Sudan, 7 January 2025, <https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield-on-the-determination-of-genocide-in-sudan/>, accessed 21 January 2025

VOA (Voice of America), Analysts: Presence of foreign actors complicates Sudan war situation, 20 June 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/analysts-presence-of-foreign-actors-complicates-sudan-war-situation/7663775.html>, accessed 18 December 2024

VOA (Voice of America), UN experts say Sudan paramilitaries are recruiting in Central African Republic, 14 June 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/un-experts-say-sudan-paramilitaries-are-recruiting-in-central-african-republic/7657034.html>, accessed 18 December 2024

WFP (World Food Programme), Sudan updates: WFP supports Khartoum's grassroots kitchens as famine threatens capital, 24 July 2024, <https://www.wfp.org/stories/sudan-updates-wfp-supports-khartoums-grassroots-kitchens-famine-threatens-capital>, accessed 20 January 2025

WFP (World Food Programme), WFP announces major surge in food aid into Sudan's hard-to-reach areas, 22 November 2024, <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-announces-major-surge-food-aid-sudans-hard-reach-areas>, accessed 18 December 2024

WHO (World Health Organisation), High-level mission to Sudan reaffirms WHO commitment, calls for urgent action to address and end the extreme health and humanitarian crisis, 9 September 2024, <https://www.who.int/news/item/09-09-2024-high-level-mission-to-sudan-reaffirms-who-commitment-calls-for-urgent-action-to-address-and-end-the-extreme-health-and-humanitarian-crisis>, accessed 18 December 2024

WHO (World Health Organisation), Sudan surpasses 100 attacks on healthcare since 2023 armed conflict began, 24 September 2024, <https://www.emro.who.int/media/news/in-sudan-there-have-been-more-than-100-attacks-on-health-care-since-the-armed-conflict-began.html>, accessed 18 December 2024

World (The), Journalist says parts of Sudan's capital are now 'almost unrecognizable', 7 June 2024, <https://theworld.org/stories/2024/06/07/journalist-says-parts-of-sudans-capital-are-now-almost-unrecognizable>, accessed 18 December 2024

World Vision, Unprecedented hunger, mental health tragedy, and gender-based violence: The crisis for children and families in Sudan, 19 August 2024, <https://www.wvi.org/sites/default/files/2024-08/Sudan%20report%201.pdf>, accessed 21 January 2025

WRC (Women's Refugee Commission), Sudan Family Planning Association (SFPA), Gender in Emergencies Group (GiE), Sudan: Different Needs, Ignored Priorities, October 2024,





<https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Sudan-scoping-study-final.pdf>, accessed 18 December 2024

WSJ (Wall Street Journal), Ukraine Is Now Fighting Russia in Sudan, 6 March 2024, <https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-is-now-fighting-russia-in-sudan-87caf1d8>, accessed 18 December 2024

Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, El-Fasher Situation Report: RSF Advances on 6th Division as Zamzam Prepares for Attack, 11 November 2024, <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/42454c21-d294-4e91-8d0b-a5d8d96169e8>, accessed 21 January 2025

Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Free-Fire Zone: Widespread Aerial and Artillery Bombardment across El-Fasher, 13 September 2024, <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/5821eb40-d432-4e71-867d-53870f829e7a>, accessed 16 December 2024

Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, SAF Airstrike Campaign in North Darfur: Markets Damaged, Civilians Impacted 10 October 2024, <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/8dd82c98-f290-4892-84a6-df84fa229d99>, accessed 16 December 2024

Yale School of Public Health – Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, <https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/a1b264c5-985d-4987-a32b-74a8dab0c95b>, accessed 16 December 2024

Zaldan, Y., To End Sudan's War, Pressure the UAE, FP (Foreign Policy), 29 August 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/29/sudan-war-rsf-saf-uae-arms-hemeti-burhan/>, accessed 20 January 2025



Annex 2: Terms of Reference

The report should provide information about the general security situation in Sudan as regards conflict-related violence and the humanitarian situation and provide data at regional level where available. The reference for the topics already addressed in the [EUAA report Sudan - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#) is 1 February 2024 – 30 November 2024. For other topics the reference period is 15 April 2023 – 30 November 2024.

General description of the security situation

- **Overview of conflict**
 - Political developments
 - Main conflict dynamics
 - Territorial control
 - Security trends and armed confrontations during the reference period
- **Actors in conflict**
 - Major state and non-state armed groups
 - Brief description and capacity
 - Nature of methods and tactics used
 - Recruitment
 - International actors
- **Impact of the security situation on civilian population**
 - Humanitarian situation
 - Communication and media presence

Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by region

The below structure is to be replicated for each region:

- Actors involved in conflict during the reference period and control/presence
- Recent security trends
- Security incidents
- Civilian casualties
- Conflict related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
- Conflict-induced displacement and return

State grouping:

- Khartoum
- Darfur (states included: North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur, East Darfur, Central Darfur)
- The Kordofans (states included: North Kordofan, South Kordofan, West Kordofan)
- Central (states included: Al Jazirah, Sennar, White Nile, Blue Nile)
- North (states included: Northern, River Nile)
- East (states included: Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea)



Publications Office
of the European Union

