



Sudan: Country Focus

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Country of Origin Information Report

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Cover photo: TINE, CHAD - MAY 4: Sudanese refugees from Zamzam camp outside of El Fasher, in Darfur, receive food at an Emergency Response Room Communal Kitchen in a transit camp near the Sudan-Chad border, Lynsey Addario, ©Getty Images, 2025, [Sudanese refugees from Zamzam camp outside of El Fasher, in Darfur,... News Photo - Getty Images](#)

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- Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, CEDOCA – Documentation and Research Centre
- The Netherlands, Country of Origin Information Division (AB), Migration, Displacement and Country of Origin Information (COI) Department (MOA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)

All parts of this report have been reviewed by at least one reviewer.

The review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of the EUAA.





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Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). It is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 30 April 2026. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the [Introduction](#).



Glossary and abbreviations

Term	Definition
ACERWC	African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
ACJPS	African Center for Justice and Peace Studies
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
ADF	Africa Defense Forum
AU ACHPR	African Union African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
BBMB	Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
Darfur	Historically the entire Darfur region, which was divided into three states in 1994 and then subsequently into five states in 2011. Sometimes it is also referred to as Greater Darfur. <i>Darfur</i> literally means 'Land of the Fur (people)'.
DNHR	Darfur Network for Human Rights
ERRs	Emergency Response Rooms
ESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
<i>Falangayat</i>	Slur used towards individuals of African ethnicity in Sudan related to a Darfuri term used to describe persons subjected to enslavement
<i>Faza'a</i>	An ancient pre-Islamic Sudanese tradition that allows tribes to call on their members and allies for support against attacks by other tribes or to take revenge for killings
FCS	Food Consumption Scores
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFC	Forces for Freedom and Change
FGM/C	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting
FGMCRI	Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting Research Initiative
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme)



GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	General Intelligence Service
GPG	Global Partners Governance
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
HeRAMS	Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internal Displaced Person
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IMS	International Media Support
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
OM	International Organisation for Migration
IRB	Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
<i>Jana jaish</i>	Child soldiers
JMMI	Joint Market Monitoring Initiative
<i>Kizan</i>	Members of Sudan's political Islamic movement that ruled alongside al-Bashir and now support the SAF and target civil society organisations 'in revenge' for overthrowing them in 2019
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MICS	Multiple Indicator Survey
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MSF	Doctors Without Borders
MSHT	Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking
NNGO	National/Local Non-Governmental Organisations
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
RC	Resistance Committees
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
<i>Shamassa</i>	Street children
SARHO	Sudan Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations
SDG	Sudanese pound





SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SEARO	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Risk Overview
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SHRH	Sudan Human Rights Hub
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SIHA	Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa
SIHA Net	Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa Network
SJH	Sudan Justice Hub
Somoud	Alliance formed following a split within the Taqaddum coalition. Somoud literally means “steadfastness” or resilience.
SPLM-N	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - North
SPSC	Sudanese Professionals and Syndicates Coordination
SOGIESC	Sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics
SSDC	Sudanese Security and Defense Council
Stj-SY	Syrians For Truth & Justice
Taqaddum	Coordination Body of Civilian Democratic Forces, coalition established in October 2023. Taqaddum literally means “Progress”.
Taasis	Sudan Founding Alliance. Taasis literally means “Foundation”.
TSC	Transitional Sovereignty Council
UN FFM	United Nations Independent Fact-Finding Mission
UN HRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UN OHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNoDC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USDoS	United States Department of State
WHO	World Health Organisation





Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of applications for international protection from Sudanese nationals, and in particular for use in updating EUAA's Country Guidance on Sudan.

The report covers the period of 22 March 2025 – 30 April 2026 and it provides an update of the [EUAA COI report: Sudan: Country Focus](#) published in February 2025.

Methodology

This report was drafted by EUAA and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ countries,¹ as mentioned in the [Acknowledgements](#) section.

This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023)² and the EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2023).³

Defining the terms of reference

The Terms of Reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA informal COI specialist network on Sudan and from policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Sudan. The ToR also builds on previous EUAA COI reports on Sudan covering the same topics. The ToR for this report can be found in [Annex 2](#) of this report.

Collecting information

The information gathered is a result of research using public, specialised paper-based and electronic sources until 30 April 2026. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until June 2026.

Research challenges

The present report has encountered a number of research challenges, including:

- lack of or limited reporting on some of the issues covered by the ToR due to the communication outage affecting media coverage and communication opportunities in wide parts of the country, for extended periods of time during the reference period [as outlined in Chapter [1.3.2.\(g\)](#)];

¹ All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.

² EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, [url](#)

³ EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, [url](#)



- targeting of media personnel reporting on the issues addressed by the report, often resulting in self-censorship and relocation [as outlined in Chapter [2.3.2 \(g\)](#)];
- the sensitivity of the issues at stake.

Additionally, information on key socio-economic indicators for Khartoum, within the time reference period of this report, was limited among the sources consulted within time constraints.

Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Terms of Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised in June 2026. EUAA also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

Sources

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and NGOs; international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Sudanese and regionally-based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Sudan. All information from these sources was consulted within time constraints and within the research constraints posed by Sudan's challenging information-gathering environment.

Structure and use of the report

The report is divided into three parts. The first chapter presents an overview of Sudan's political context and state structure. This section should be read in conjunction with the Section 1.1.3 (b) on armed groups in Sudan of the [EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#) and Section 1.2.1 of the [EUAA Sudan: Security Situation report \(February 2025\)](#). It provides information on the rule of law and administration of justice, the judiciary and the country's human rights situation.

The second chapter focuses on the treatment of specific groups of population and profiles affected by the current conflict, reflecting the situation during the reference period. More specifically, the report addresses the situation of perceived political opponents, conscripts and draft evaders, journalists and other media personnel, humanitarian and health personnel, ethnic groups, women and girls, children and LGBTIQ+ persons. While most of the information addresses and reflects the ongoing context affected by the conflict, the section on LGBTIQ+ draws primarily on pre-existing legal and societal framework rather than conflict-specific



developments, given the scarce information available on the conflict's direct impact on this group. Chapter two should be read in conjunction with the Section [1.3. Human rights situation](#) in the country.

The third chapter outlines the socio-economic situation in Khartoum.







1. Country overview

1.1. Political situation and functioning of the government

1.1.1. Governance

(a) Fragmented authority

Sudan has been affected by an armed conflict since April 2023, when fighting broke out in Khartoum between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as well as their respective allied militia groups, before spreading to other parts of the country.⁵

By the end of 2025, two de facto governments have been established in Sudan: the official one, the Government of Hope led by the SAF in Port Sudan, and a self-proclaimed one, the Government of Peace and Unity, established in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, by the RSF. Each administration was nominally civilian but remained militarily controlled.⁶ Governance became increasingly fragmented, with taxation, authority and administrative systems operating outside the traditional unified national framework in the areas controlled by the RSF.⁷

In May 2025, Sudan's army chief and Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), General al-Burhan, appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister,⁸ ending the period since Abdalla Hamdok's resignation in 2022 during which Sudan operated without a prime minister.⁹ Idris was tasked to head a 22-member 'non-partisan technocratic government'¹⁰ and he gradually formed its cabinet over several months.¹¹

The formation process was constrained by pressure from armed groups signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA).¹² Armed group leaders threatened to withdraw their

⁵ ICG, Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace, 13 April 2025, [url](#)

⁶ Arab Center Washington DC, Sudan's War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

⁷ Horn Review, 'Tasis Alliance' Shift from State, Capture to State Replacement in Sudan, 16 April 2026, [url](#); XCEPT, "Contested borderlands: Rapid Support Forces governance and negotiated sovereignty in Sudan", November 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁸ Arab Center Washington DC, Sudan's War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, 31 October 2025, [url](#); MEMO, Kamil Idris sworn in as Sudan's new prime minister, 1 June 2025, [url](#); Ayin, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

⁹ IFPRI, Siddig, Khalid; Kirui, Oliver K.; and Dorosh, Paul. 2026. War and Resilience: The Multifaceted Impacts of Sudan's Conflict and Pathways to Recovery. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, [url](#), p. 6

¹⁰ Arab Center Washington DC, Sudan's War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, 31 October 2025, [url](#); MEMO, Kamil Idris sworn in as Sudan's new prime minister, 1 June 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan's PM unveils 'Hope Government', rejects political quotas, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

¹¹ IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#)

¹² The 'Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan' (JPA) is a peace deal signed on 3 October 2020 between the Transitional Government of Sudan and representatives of several armed groups. The Agreement covered a wide range of areas, including governance, security and transitional justice and was intended to inform the future



alliance with the SAF if removed from office. Following mediation, the commanders of the Joint Forces - an alliance of Darfur-based armed groups that signed the JPA and subsequently aligned themselves with the SAF some months after the beginning of the conflict¹³ - retained the Finance, Mining, and Social Development portfolios. The Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC) – established in 2019 as a joint military-civilian legislative body for a 3-year transitional period and subsequently reconstituted following the 2021 coup¹⁴ – proceeded with appointing the Ministers of Defence and Interior.¹⁵ The composition of the cabinet drew criticism from Sudanese political and civilian actors for ‘lacking broad representation’¹⁶ and due to several ministerial appointments being linked to the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudan’s Islamist Movement.¹⁷ This raised concerns about both the return to positions of influence of figures associated with the al Bashir era (1989-2019) and the exclusion of pro-democracy forces.¹⁸ In January 2026, the newly appointed Sudan prime minister, Kamil Idris, announced the official return of the national institutions to the capital, Khartoum,¹⁹ nearly three years after the national government had relocated to Port Sudan.²⁰

(b) Constitutional changes

In 2025, the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC)²¹ amended the Constitutional Charter signed in 2019.²² The new Constitutional Document came into force after being published in the Official Gazette on 23 February 2025.²³ Reported amendments included extending the transitional period by 39 months, eliminating all references to the RSF and the SAF,²⁴ assigning the army a majority representation on the TSC,²⁵ and delaying the transition to civilian rule.²⁶ The changes also reportedly prohibited holders of foreign nationality from government positions and removed references to the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of political parties, unions and civil society organisations²⁷ that opposed former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019²⁸ and subsequently evolved including through a split in 2021.²⁹

constitutional negotiation process. For additional information see: IDEA, The Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan, 2021, [url](#); RVI, Paying For Peace: The Political Economy Of The Juba Peace Agreement, 2023, [url](#)

¹³ ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴ Sudanist (The), Sudan’s Government Structure, 1 February 2026, [url](#)

¹⁵ Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#); Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: High-level security talks in Cairo between Sudan, Egypt, Libya over border triangle | PM names five ministers, armed groups retain ministerial portfolios | Ethiopian militias breach eastern border, 11 July 2025, [url](#); IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#); Afrocen, Sudanese Prime Minister Appoints Five New Ministers, 28 July 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶ Sudan Post, Kamil Idris expands Port Sudan cabinet with five new Ministers, 16 July 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷ Ayin, Sudan Conflict Monitor #22, 21 August 2025, [url](#)

¹⁸ Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments ‘give Sudan military absolute control’, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹ BBC News, Sudan's government returns to capital after nearly 3 years of war, 11 January 2026, [url](#)

²⁰ Security Council Report, Monthly Forecast, February 2026, [url](#), p. 6

²¹ Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments ‘give Sudan military absolute control’, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

²² Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments ‘give Sudan military absolute control’, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

²³ Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments ‘give Sudan military absolute control’, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

²⁴ IDEA, Sudan - February 2025, n.d., [url](#);

²⁵ The New Arab, Changes to Sudan's constitutional document seek to cement army control, 21 February 2025, [url](#)

²⁶ IDEA, Sudan - February 2025, n.d., [url](#);

²⁷ New Internationalist, ‘We are the true voice of the people’: Sudan’s civilian resistance is still alive, 23 May 2023, [url](#)

²⁸ Al Jazeera, Analysis: Can Sudan’s civilian leaders save their country from collapse?, 29 September 2023, [url](#)

²⁹ Sudan in the news, FFC Democratic Bloc Briefing: Is Egypt playing divide-and-rule in Sudan?, 26 March 2023, [url](#)



The amendments further stipulated that Sudan's foreign policy would be formulated and implemented under the supervision of the TSC. A legal commentator deemed these measures as 'illegitimate, and entirely unconstitutional', arguing they consolidated military control over legislative, executive and judicial powers and granted military leaders immunity from accountability for actions spanning from the General Command sit-in dispersal in 2019³⁰ to the ongoing war.³¹ According to Ayin Network, a Sudanese media network of Sudanese journalists, the constitutional amendments granted Al-Burhan – the head of Sudan's TSC and commander of the SAF – and the military, extensive powers over all state institutions, including authority to appoint the Chief Justice, Supreme Court justices, the Prime Minister and his cabinet, as well as the Auditor General.³²

(c) Corruption within state institutions

Corruption levels in Sudan remained extremely high, as reflected in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI), where the country's score declined from 15³³ to 14 out of 100 in 2025, compared with the previous year, ranking 175 out of 182 countries.³⁴ This positioned the country well below the sub-Saharan regional average and indicated a continued decline between 2022 and 2025.³⁵

Reporting by Transparency International (TI) indicated that corruption within institutions aligned with Sudan's authorities was both publicly acknowledged by senior officials and embedded in governance structures.³⁶ Complaints about administrative corruption, including bribery and illegal fees imposed by military personnel and officials, could trigger repression rather than accountability according to a Sudanese writer.³⁷

(d) Self-proclaimed RSF parallel government

In 2025, the RSF established a parallel self-proclaimed government³⁸ in the areas under its control, namely most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile states.³⁹ For additional information on territorial control see Section 1.1.3. of the [EUAA Sudan: Security Situation report \(February 2025\)](#).

³⁰ Following the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 by his own security forces—the SAF and the RSF—protests and sit-ins continued in Khartoum, demanding a transition to civilian rule. This unrest culminated in the so-called June attacks, when security forces violently cracked down on protesters in multiple instances, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths, over nine hundred injuries, and dozens of people reported missing. See HRW, "They were shouting 'Kill Them' – Sudan's Violent Crackdown on Protesters in Khartoum, 17 November 2019, [url](#)

³¹ Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments 'give Sudan military absolute control', 26 February 2025, [url](#)

³² Ayin, Sudan Conflict Monitor #20, 26 May 2025, [url](#)

³³ TI, Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, May 2025, [url](#), p. 10

³⁴ TI, Corruption Perceptions Index, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁵ TI, Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption, May 2025, [url](#), p. 10

³⁶ Ayin network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #20, 26 May 2025, [url](#)

³⁷ HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#); Atalayar, Sudan crisis: Khartoum in 2026, capital of epidemics and the failure of voluntary return, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

³⁸ The Sudan Times, Sudan's TASI Alliance: What it is, who leads it, what comes next?, 2 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁹ Jamestown, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan's War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)



In February 2025, it called for the signing of a founding charter in Nairobi,⁴⁰ an initiative supported by a coalition of armed movements from Darfur and Kordofan,⁴¹ including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) and other groups.⁴² Later, in March 2025, the RSF unilaterally proclaimed the 'Government of Peace and Unity',⁴³ commonly referred to as 'the Taasis State',⁴⁴ with the signing of a transitional constitution.⁴⁵ The document called for the abolition of the 2019 Constitutional document and all preceding laws and for the establishment of a secular state,⁴⁶ organised into federal, regional, and local levels.⁴⁷ It mandated military reforms, dissolved militias, and ensured equal citizenship, while granting regions self-determination. The document outlined a governance structure with a transitional phase leading to elections, without any fixed timetable.⁴⁸ It also called for a single national army, with the signatories as the 'nucleus'.⁴⁹

The RSF parallel government has not received international recognition. The African Union urged its members to not recognise the RSF parallel government and reaffirmed its support for the Sudan's transitional government formed in May 2025.⁵⁰ The UN security council rejected the RSF declaration of a parallel administration⁵¹ and the United Nations Secretary-General expressed concern about the signing of the RSF charter, noting that it risked fragmenting the country and further entrenching the crisis. Other international actors expressed similar concerns.⁵²

Within the time constraints of this report, only limited information on the implementation of RSF civil administrations in areas under its control could be found among the sources consulted.

According to the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) report that investigated governance dynamics in Sudan's borderlands, including through interviews with local informants conducted between February and April 2025, the RSF approaches to civil administration varied across southern and western regions. These ranged from co-opting and rebranding 'pre-existing state bureaucracy', adopting 'informal practices' based on 'loyalty, kinship, and economic pragmatism' or implementing a 'hybrid governance' as a combination of the two. 'RSF efforts remain fluid and uneven, often relying on violence and coercion' with authority grounded in 'perceived legitimacy, relational power, and negotiated tolerance by

⁴⁰ Dabanga, Hemedti: Sudan 'Government of Peace and Unity' to issue new currency and IDs, 16 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹ Conversation (The), Sudan's rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴² Reuters, Sudan's RSF and allies formalise vision for parallel government, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

⁴³ IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁴ Jamestown, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan's War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵ IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷ IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁸ IDEA, Sudan – February 2025, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁹ Reuters, Sudan's RSF and allies formalise vision for parallel government, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰ RFI, African Union rejects Sudan rebel group's parallel government, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹ UN, Security Council rejects creation of rival government in Sudan, 13 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵² OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 16



local actors' rather than formal rules, accompanied by 'varying degrees of military oversight and opportunistic revenue extraction.'⁵³

The RSF has established governance bodies tasked with implementing border policy and acting as state-level counterparts to Chadian authorities. In West Darfur, the RSF West Darfur Civil Administration, formed in 2024, has replaced the former state government and issued movement permits mirroring the official government's visas, custom duties and travel permits. This included entry permits for UN and NGO staff (valid for six months, extendable) allowing entry and movement in El Geneina (West Darfur) from Chad, 15-days commodity permits for goods and commercial vehicles, and 15-days travel permits to move across West Darfur localities. The RSF West Darfur Area Command coordinated with Chadian authorities on police and border security and worked with the RSF Civil Administration and Chambers of Commerce on economic issues. In early 2025, the RSF revealed the intention to establish a joint border unit with Chad aimed at safeguarding livestock and commercial activities; however this initiative had not yet been implemented as of February 2025.⁵⁴ At the beginning of 2026, the civilian administration in East Darfur state announced the establishment of 'the region's first banking institution' to address the lack of banking and online banking services in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.⁵⁵

1.1.2. Political situation

(a) Political parties and civilian alliances

Two broad political blocs have emerged since the beginning of the conflict in 2023: the Democratic Bloc, which grouped 'parties and armed groups aligned with the SAF', and Taasis (Arabic for Foundation), a coalition of political parties and armed movements supporting the RSF.⁵⁶ The Democratic Bloc included the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led by Jafar al-Mirghani,⁵⁷ the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Gibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), led by Minni Minnawi.⁵⁸ In February 2026, the alliance convened to discuss the formation of the transitional legislative council.⁵⁹ Taasis comprised 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N and other political and civil factions signatories of a founding charter signed in Nairobi in February 2025.⁶⁰ In July 2025, Taasis formed a 15 members council⁶¹ and Mohamed Hassan al-Ta'aishi was appointed as prime minister.⁶²

⁵³ XCEPT, "Contested borderlands: Rapid Support Forces governance and negotiated sovereignty in Sudan", November 2025, [url](#), pp. 15, 28, 35

⁵⁴ XCEPT, "Contested borderlands: Rapid Support Forces governance and negotiated sovereignty in Sudan", November 2025, [url](#), pp. 22, 28

⁵⁵ Sudan Tribune, RSF, Tasis coalition move to establish parallel central bank and banking system, 9 January 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁶ Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Democratic Block seeks to form transitional legislative council, 6 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Democratic Bloc split over unauthorized talks in Ethiopia, 16 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Democratic Block seeks to form transitional legislative council, 6 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF, allies sign charter for parallel government, 23 February 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, Charter for formation 'parallel govt' in Sudan signed in Nairobi, 24 February 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹ Sudan Times (The), Tasis will serve all Sudanese, not divide them, ex-minister says, 27 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶² Sudan Time (The), Who's who in Tasis: The 15 figures shaping Sudan's civilian govt, 26 July 2025, [url](#)



The complexity of the political landscape was deepened by the establishment of the RSF parallel government as a second coalition of allied forces alongside the one led by the Sudanese army. The RSF-led coalition brought together armed groups, ethnic factions and party offshoots while the Sudanese army led a front of armed movements, Islamists, and splinter factions from the FFC.⁶³

Within the SAF-aligned front, sources reported the presence of 'Islamist networks', while SAF representatives denied any formal alliance with these actors.⁶⁴ However, ministerial appointments within Prime Minister Kamil Idris's cabinet were reported as being linked to the NCP and the Islamist Movement.⁶⁵ For additional information on the new government see section [1.1.1 \(a\) Fragmented authority](#). Sources also reported that Islamist groups conducted coordinated messaging campaigns targeting political leaders and civilian organisations 'accusing them of collaborating with the RSF against the SAF in pursuit of political power'.⁶⁶ For additional information see section [1.3.3. \(a\) on Online propaganda and disinformation](#). Islamist actors were involved in aspects of popular mobilisation, including mobilisation along tribal lines⁶⁷ and the recruitment of children.⁶⁸ For additional information see section [2.2. Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups](#). In Khartoum, fighters linked to the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion (BBMB) and other informal armed groups, operating through civil support structures (*isnad madani*), were involved in the harassment of Emergency Response Room (ERR) volunteers, reportedly contributing to their displacement from affected areas.⁶⁹ For additional information see section [2.1.2. Resistance committees](#). In March 2026, the United States designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, notably the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the BBMB, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.⁷⁰

The main civilian opposition bloc, Taqaddum (Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces), dissolved in February 2025, further reshaping the political landscape.⁷¹ For additional information see section [2.1.1. Political party members and other perceived opponents](#) on the situation of political opponents abroad. Members who chose to take political positions within the RSF-aligned parallel administration reorganised under Taasis, while those who rejected the parallel government formed a separate group called Sumoud (Arabic for Resilience/Perseverance).⁷² Sumoud brought together political parties and civil society

⁶³ Arab Weekly (The), Sudan's RSF-led coalition declares parallel government, deepening risk of partition, 28 July 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴ Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁵ Sudan Post, Kamil Idris expands Port Sudan cabinet with five new Ministers, 16 July 2025, [url](#); Ayin, Sudan Conflict Monitor #22, 21 August 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments 'give Sudan military absolute control', 26 February 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁶ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, [url](#), p. 30; SWP, The Weaponization of Social Media in Sudan's War, 23 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁷ Emirates Policy Center, 'Tribalization' of Sudan's conflict: incentives, restraints and potential trajectories, 22 November 2024, [url](#); Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan's system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#); Eureporter, Khartoum: a ruined capital controlled by Sudan's Islamists, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁸ Ayin Network and SHRH, Child Soldiers: widespread participation in Sudan's war, 10 August 2025, [url](#), video from 08'00"

⁶⁹ TIMEP, Sudan's Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, [url](#); ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 4

⁷⁰ USDOS, Designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, 9 March 2026, [url](#); Fikra Forum, Sanctions and Sudan's Muslim Brotherhood: Decoupling Burhan from Sudan's Islamists and Iran, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹ Al Jazeera, After splinter, can Sudan's anti-war coalition reinvent itself?, 20 February 2025, [url](#)

⁷² Al Jazeera, After splinter, can Sudan's anti-war coalition reinvent itself?, 20 February 2025, [url](#)



organisations and it was ‘accused by the SAF of supporting the RSF’.⁷³ In December 2025, civilian leaders, including the former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) leader, convened in Nairobi in the attempt to re-establish a civilian ‘third pole’ independent from the warring military parties.⁷⁴ A declaration was signed ‘outlining shared principles to end the war and rebuild the country’. The Nairobi signatories included, among others, the SLM-AW, the Sudanese Congress Party, the Federal Gathering, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and the National Umma Party. Several civilian groups also signed the declaration including the Coordination of the Displaced and Refugees, the Darfur Bar Association, the Alliance of Civilian Forces for Eastern Sudan, and the Coordination of Professionals and Trade Unions.⁷⁵

1.2. Rule of law and administration of justice

1.2.1. Rule of law

The 2025 World Justice Rule of Law Index ranked Sudan 137th out of 143 countries assessed and identified it as the second most declined country globally compared with 2024, reflecting a significant deterioration in the rule of law indicators.⁷⁶ A ‘culture of impunity’ and lack of accountability for ‘atrocious crimes’ appear to be a long-standing pattern, as documented over time by international bodies such as the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which can be considered the result of the inability of the state to uphold the rule of law.⁷⁷

1.2.2. Law enforcement

The UN Human Rights Council Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for the Sudan expressed concerns in October 2024 regarding the collapse of the rule of law in the country, including the disruption of police functions.⁷⁸ In June 2025, the African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) noted that the absence of law enforcement agencies had created a ‘security vacuum’.⁷⁹ Few months later, the Minister of Justice stated that police stations in Khartoum state were operating ‘effectively and efficiently’ and had the resources needed to enforce the law. On the same occasion, the Ministry of Justice announced plans to review legislation governing police operations, including provisions granting immunity to officers ‘performing their duties.’⁸⁰ In September of the same year, the authorities set up a new security unit in

⁷³ Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁴ Al Jazeera, War in Sudan: Humanitarian collapse, fighting, deadlock, December 2025, 31 December 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudan political groups, rebel faction sign anti-war declaration in Nairobi, 17 December 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁶ WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index 2025 Global Press Release, 28 October 2025, [url](#); World Justice Project, 2025 WJP Rule of Law Index, Sudan, [url](#)

⁷⁷ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 34

⁷⁸ UN OHCHR, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para. 315

⁷⁹ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁸⁰ SUNA, Ministries of Justice and Interior Discuss Legal Conditions in Khartoum State, 4 August 2025, [url](#)





Khartoum to face gangs specialised in phone and handbag snatching such as the ‘Nine Tall’ gangs.⁸¹ Security experts cited by Ayin network noted that the ‘fragile’ policing capacity in Khartoum, combined with limited court operations, has constrained the effectiveness of the newly established unit. Furthermore, despite the expansion of the civil registry offices by the Ministry of Interior, insufficient attention had been given to neighborhood policing, leaving the capital ‘vulnerable to further lawlessness’.⁸²

1.2.3. Judiciary

The functioning of the judicial institutions nationwide decreased by 95 % since the beginning of the conflict in 2023. As of June 2025, courts or formal legal proceedings were not functioning in most regions.⁸³ Reporting indicated that Sudan's judiciary has been systematically weaponised to criminalise humanitarian action, silence dissent, and intimidate displaced persons and perceived opponents.⁸⁴

Prosecutorial and judicial oversight was inadequate, as noted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in April 2026, with detainees having no or limited access to legal counsel.⁸⁵ Lawyers seeking to assist civilians detained on charge of collaboration with the RSF in SAF-controlled areas reportedly were ‘harassed, threatened, and sometimes accused of the same charges as their clients.’⁸⁶

In an interview to Dabanga in February 2025, a legal expert raised concerns that the constitutional changes have undermined judicial independence and the capacity of domestic courts to provide effective oversight of accountability.⁸⁷ As noted by Syrians for Truth and Justice in January 2026, ‘across multiple jurisdictions’ in Sudan, judicial ‘proceedings marked by due process violations’ have reportedly resulted in ‘death sentences and long prison terms based on coerced or fabricated evidence, political retaliation, or ethnic profiling.’⁸⁸ A lawyer and human right defender reported in February 2026 that the absence of a unified judiciary has made it difficult to assess the integrity of legal proceedings, with the justice system increasingly used ‘to perpetuate violence and discrimination’.⁸⁹ In February 2026, the Emergency Lawyers, a Sudanese human rights monitoring and legal advocacy group, noted that justice institutions in areas controlled by the SAF and the RSF were suffering severe dysfunction.⁹⁰

⁸¹ Ayin, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #3, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸² Ayin, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #3, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

⁸³ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁸⁴ EIPR, Over a Thousand Days of War in Sudan: State disintegrates amid failed domestic leadership and weak international response, 27 January 2026, [url](#)

⁸⁵ HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)

⁸⁶ International Service for Human Rights, Sudan: Over 25 women face charges that could lead to execution, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁷ Dabanga, Legal expert: Constitutional amendments ‘give Sudan military absolute control’, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

⁸⁸ Stj-SY, Over a Thousand Days of War in Sudan, 29 January 2026, [url](#)

⁸⁹ Dabanga, Reports of amnesty for Sudanese women facing death by stoning: ‘Pardon suspends execution but does not invalidate the sentence’, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

⁹⁰ Dabanga, EU envoy warns of ‘dangerous regression’ after women sentenced to death by stoning in Sudan, 15 February 2026, [url](#)





In August 2025, Wahbi Mohamed Mukhtar was appointed president of the Constitutional Court. However, the membership of the Court remained incomplete, limiting its powers. The appointment was criticised and the move called ‘unconstitutional’.⁹¹ The Constitutional Court had been inactive since its term expired in January 2020, without the appointment of new judges.⁹²

1.2.4. Administration of justice

In May 2025, the SAF-led government introduced new fees on 52 legal services and criminal litigation procedures offered by the public prosecution office.⁹³ In June, ACJPS indicated a 78 % decrease in accessible legal services for displaced persons.⁹⁴ The mandatory fees ranged from 1 000 Sudanese pounds (SDG) [approximately EUR 1.5] to 100 000 SDG [approximately EUR 142], covering a range of services including ‘filing a complaint to issuing arrest or release orders, exhumation requests and any directive issued by the prosecutor during investigations’. The new legal measures took effect in Sennar State, Northern State, and River Nile State between April and June 2025.⁹⁵ The introduction of fees was criticised by both the Sudanese Lawyers' Union Steering Committee and the Sudanese Bar Association.⁹⁶ Historically, criminal litigation was provided free of charge, and the introduction of new fees is seen by legal professionals and former officials as an interference with the independence and role of the Public Prosecution.⁹⁷ Critics argued that it effectively commodified justice, undermining protection for victims and their property, and appeared to contravene the 2019 Transitional Constitution’s guarantees of access to justice (Art. 48), equality before law (Art. 53) and right to litigation (Art. 56).⁹⁸ In June 2025, protests of lawyers held in Khartoum against the measure were reportedly met with ‘violent dispersal’ and 12 attorneys were arrested.⁹⁹

There was a growing use of anti-terrorism courts and summary trials.¹⁰⁰ In August 2025, the Minister of Justice highlighted that the establishment of the Constitutional Court was expected to enable it to review applications from death row inmates with final sentences, potentially reducing the number of individuals awaiting execution.¹⁰¹ For additional information on death penalty see section [1.3.2. \(h\)](#).

Following SAF advances in Al Jazirah, Khartoum, and North Kordofan, administrative measures were implemented and included the redeployment of prosecutors, the reactivation of prosecution offices, and the re-opening of police stations. The UN OHCHR noted that ‘these

⁹¹ Dabanga, El Burhan appoints Constitutional Court president amid criticism, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

⁹² Sudan Tribune, Al-Burhan reappoints controversial judge to head Sudan’s Constitutional Court, 30 August 2025, [url](#)

⁹³ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 57

⁹⁴ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁹⁵ Atar Network, Justice for sale? How new prosecution fees threaten equality before the law in Sudan, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁶ اللجنة التسييرية لنقابة المحامين السودانيين [Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association], [Facebook], بيان [statement], 30 May 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁷ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁸ Atar Network, Justice for sale? How new prosecution fees threaten equality before the law in Sudan, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

⁹⁹ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#), p. 6

¹⁰⁰ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 53

¹⁰¹ SUNA, Ministries of Justice and Interior Discuss Legal Conditions in Khartoum State, 4 August 2025, [url](#)



developments were overshadowed by widespread due process concerns, reports of torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and summary executions by both the RSF and the SAF, and their allied armed movements.' It also noted that 'conditions in SAF-controlled prisons—especially in Wad Madani—remained dire, amidst overcrowding, disease outbreaks and overall neglect contrary to international human rights law'.¹⁰²

The UN OHCHR reported that, since April 2023, the National Committee for Investigating Crimes and Violations of National Law and International Humanitarian Law reportedly received at least 120 000 complaints against the RSF and 300 against the SAF and affiliated forces. According to the Committee, more than 4 800 cases have been referred to the courts, many involving individuals prosecuted in absentia.¹⁰³ The COI report published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in December 2025 noted, based on consulted confidential sources, that 'citizens were unable to turn to the Sudanese authorities if the perpetrators were SAF soldiers or were connected with the Sudanese security apparatus in some other way'.¹⁰⁴

Administration of justice in RSF-controlled areas

According to Rights for Peace,¹⁰⁵ 'the RSF has established courts in areas under its control in Darfur, but there is no publicity on their functioning and legal basis'.¹⁰⁶ According to a report by UN HRC released in January 2026, 'no formal justice system was operational in RSF-controlled areas'. The same document reported the establishment of emergency courts directly linked to security forces, such as the one established in West Kordofan in August 2025, 'composed of "the public prosecutor", the legal adviser of the RSF and the director of the Military Police'.¹⁰⁷

1.3. Human rights situation

1.3.1. Legal and institutional framework

The 2019 Constitutional charter stipulated that all rights and freedoms contained in international human rights agreements, pacts, and charters ratified by the Republic of Sudan were an integral part of the new constitution (Article 42(2)).¹⁰⁸

Sudan is a party to seven of the nine core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the International Convention for

¹⁰² UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025 [url](#), para. 56

¹⁰³ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 55

¹⁰⁴ Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan (December 2025), 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 66

¹⁰⁵ Rights for Peace is a UK registered human rights organisation working to strengthen the rights and resilience of conflict-affected communities to prevent mass atrocities, About us, [url](#)

¹⁰⁶ Rights for Peace, Sudan Fact-Finding Mission shows systematic ethnic persecution, including sexual violence: Two-year renewal needed, 16 October 2025, [url](#)

¹⁰⁷ UN OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 101

¹⁰⁸ IDEA, Sudan's Constitution of 2019, [url](#), p. 19



the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).¹⁰⁹ At the regional level, it is a party to, among others, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).¹¹⁰ Sudan has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discriminations against women (CEDAW), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.¹¹¹

1.3.2. General situation

Since the outbreak of the conflict, several human rights bodies have documented 'atrocious crimes' and obstruction of humanitarian assistance by both the SAF and the RSF.¹¹² UN OHCHR reported patterns of 'continued pervasiveness of sexual violence', 'retaliatory violence against civilians', mostly ethnic based, targeting of alleged collaborators with opposing parties¹¹³ as well as systematic 'threats and intimidation against civil society actors' in the first half of 2025.¹¹⁴

The UN Human Rights Council's (UN HRC) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) for Sudan reported in September 2025 that 'both parties to the conflict violated international human rights and humanitarian law, with most violations amounting to war crimes.'¹¹⁵ Dabanga reported findings by the Adala Centre for Studies and Research, a Sudanese research centre, indicating a marked escalation in violations in December 2025 including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, kidnappings for ransom, widespread looting and forced displacement.¹¹⁶ Findings from a report by the Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH), drawing on 35 000 pieces of open-source data, satellite imagery and witness accounts gathered between April 2023 and June 2025, showed 'systematic' patterns of abuse committed by both the SAF and the RSF, including extrajudicial killings, torture, indiscriminate violence, enforced disappearances, forced recruitment and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).¹¹⁷

(a) Extrajudicial killings

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) reported a threefold rise in documented killings outside the immediate conduct of hostilities between

¹⁰⁹ UN OHCHR, Ratification of 18 International Human Rights Treaties, Status of ratification, n.d., [url](#)

¹¹⁰ UN HRC, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, [url](#), para. 35

¹¹¹ AU, list of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Union convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa (Kampala convention), 8 July 2024, [url](#); UN OHCHR, Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, Sudan, [url](#)

¹¹² ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 34

¹¹³ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 2

¹¹⁴ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 58

¹¹⁵ UN HRC, Sudan: A War of Atrocities, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

¹¹⁶ Dabanga, Rights report warns of 'sharp escalation in killings against Darfur civilians', 13 January 2026, [url](#)

¹¹⁷ SHRH, A Record of Violations in Sudan April 2023 – June 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)



February and April 2025, going from 97 in February 2025, to 150 in March 2025, and 334 in April 2025. UN OHCHR linked the rise to a wave of ‘summary executions’ in Khartoum following the SAF and allied forces’ recapture of formerly RSF-held territory in late March 2025, during which reprisals were reportedly carried out against individuals accused of collaborating with the RSF. According to one reported witness, those subjected to reprisals included youth aged 14 or 15.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the ACHPR FFM observed that ‘both the SAF and the RSF carried out extrajudicial killings’ against individuals perceived to support the opposing party to the conflict. The victims died from ‘gunshots, beatings, torture, and summary executions’.¹¹⁹ In April 2025 reports of mass arrests by the SAF of people alleged to be supporters or members of the RSF circulated on social media. Ayin Network reported that at least 20 individuals had been executed, some publicly, while others had been taken to unknown locations.¹²⁰ ‘Summary killings’ by SAF-affiliated fighters were reported in Sennar and North Kordofan states.¹²¹ In January 2025 at least 210 deaths due to ‘summary executions and attacks on villages perceived to be supportive of one of the fighting parties’ occurred in Al Jazirah state ‘in the context of hostilities between RSF and SAF’ for control of the territory.¹²² For additional information see section [2.1. Perceived political opponents](#). The Nuba Mountains Observatory for Human Rights reported the execution of nine detainees in the period between January and April 2026.¹²³

In RSF-controlled areas, numerous incidents of summary executions were reported in North Darfur occurring during the fighting, including extrajudicial killings of humanitarian personnel and civilians found hiding in improvised bomb shelters’ (known as *khanadiq*¹²⁴) or attempting to flee.¹²⁵ RSF commanders were directly implicated in atrocities and showed no intention to stop them, as illustrated by the case of an RSF field commander that appeared in several videos either personally executing or ordering the execution of detainees in October 2025.¹²⁶ Survivors who fled El Fasher after the fall of the city in October 2025, described witnessing the shooting of groups of men and ‘seeing hundreds of dead bodies’ left in the streets and along main roads out of the city.¹²⁷ A large number of videos posted by RSF fighters themselves showed the perpetration of mass killings.¹²⁸ The civilians who stayed in the city were labelled by the RSF as collaborators of its enemies and individuals found carrying supplies were immediately executed. Women and children trying to flee the city were

¹¹⁸ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 33

¹¹⁹ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 43

¹²⁰ Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #19, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

¹²¹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 31, 35

¹²² UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 31

¹²³ Dabanga, Sudan rights group: ‘9 detainees executed, 246 held in South Kordofan’, 22 April 2026, [url](#)

¹²⁴ *Khandaq* (Arabic: خندق) (Plural: *Kanadiq*) refers to a trench or defensive ditch. In the context of the Sudan war, the term is commonly used to describe holes dug by armed groups or civilians, particularly around El Fasher and other contested areas, to fortify positions, block enemy movement, or provide cover from shelling and gunfire. DNHR, Every Day Bombs, Hunger, and Loss of Life Accounts of Forgotten Victims in North Darfur, 25 September 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 19

¹²⁶ Jamestown, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁷ Al, Sudan: El Fasher survivors tell of deliberate RSF killings and sexual violence – new testimony, 25 November 2025, [url](#)

¹²⁸ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)



deliberately run over by RSF drivers, according to The New Humanitarian.¹²⁹ In April 2025, a summary execution of at least 17 civilians accused of collaborating with the SAF, including two women, was carried out by RSF fighters in Al-Halba, a village in the White Nile state.¹³⁰ For additional information see section [2.5. Ethnic groups](#). A source interviewed by the Sudan Tribune in February 2026 noted that in Khartoum ‘the RSF used land designated for a medical complex hospital near Obaid Khatim Street to bury the dead in both individual and mass graves.’ The same source estimated that ‘more than 1 000 bodies are buried at the site.’¹³¹

(b) Arbitrary arrests and detention

Both the SAF and the RSF were implicated in arbitrary detention of civilians and military personnel being held without legal process or formal charges, often indefinitely, as found by an investigation by the SHRH. The RSF reportedly used detention as a tool for ransom and ethnic targeting ‘particularly against non-Arab communities’, and the SAF using imprisonment to suppress those it perceived as RSF collaborators.¹³² The ACHPR FFM recorded violations by the SAF and the RSF including arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention across Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Blue Nile, Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan, Northern and Sennar states.¹³³ For additional information see section [2.1. on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups](#).

Multiple SAF-aligned forces organised into so-called security cells have been involved in unlawful detentions. The security cells included the General Intelligence Service (GIS), the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), and on occasion a military-affiliated militia, the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Battalion (BBMB).¹³⁴ Often arrests happened at checkpoints and Starlink satellite internet access points, usually following telephone searches that allegedly identified “‘anti-war” content’ or other material interpreted as evidence of ‘collaboration’ with the opposing party to the conflict.¹³⁵ UN OHCHR reported that the SAF held under arrest up to 4 000 individuals – ‘including civil society actors and perceived opponents’ – as they recaptured Al Jazirah state’s capital, Wad Madani, in January 2025.¹³⁶

In September 2025, Ayin network reported that the RSF have ‘tightened restrictions on civilian movement in areas under their control,’ particularly affecting young men attempting to travel to territories held by the SAF for work or study. In one reported incident in Umm Bader, North Kordofan, approximately 66 young men and students were allegedly arrested by the RSF and

¹²⁹ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁰ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 36

¹³¹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan University reports \$258 million in war losses and campus mass graves, 8 February 2026, [url](#)

¹³² SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹³³ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 78

¹³⁴ HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)

¹³⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 59

¹³⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 47; MEMO, Sudan announces arrest of 4,000 collaborators with RSF,” 29 May 2025, [url](#)





transferred to detention facilities in Darfur, while women were permitted to continue their journey. Families reported that some detainees were released only after payment of ransom.¹³⁷

In April 2025, the ACJPS reported an increase in unlawful detention and torture by SAF-aligned forces in Sinjah town, primarily attributed to the MIS, targeting women human rights defenders ‘working to support women’, aid workers providing food to the displaced, and displaced people from Darfur, following the army’s recapture of Sennar state in November 2024.¹³⁸ For additional information on arbitrary arrests and detention of women and girls, see section [2.6.2. Violence against women and girls](#).

(c) Enforced disappearances

Enforced disappearances, namely taking individuals into custody and then holding them incommunicado while their whereabouts remain unknown, have become a systematic pattern of the Sudan conflict. Investigations by local and international organisations indicated that both the SAF and the RSF, as well as affiliated militias and security bodies, were implicated in these practices.¹³⁹ These kidnappings and abductions occurred since the conflict broke out in 2023 and ‘intensified since the beginning of 2025’.¹⁴⁰

In May 2025, the Emergency Lawyers found that ‘the most alarming aspect’ of SAF’s arbitrary arrest campaigns was that ‘in many cases, there is no trial or even imprisonment. Instead punishment is carried out immediately.’ The group documented field executions and enforced disappearances, particularly in Khartoum state.¹⁴¹

The ACHPR FFM recorded violations by the SAF and the RSF including enforced disappearances across Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Blue Nile, Darfur, Kassala, Khartoum, Kordofan, Northern and Sennar states.¹⁴²

Multiple social media posts have reported instances of individuals disappearing under unknown circumstances, later being located in detention centres or remaining unaccounted for.¹⁴³ In April 2026, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Sudan reported that the number of missing persons cases recorded had reached over 11 000, with an increase of more than 40 % in the previous 15 months.¹⁴⁴ For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#), section [2.3.2 on journalists and other media personnel](#) and section [2.4.2 on the situation of aid workers](#).

¹³⁷ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #3, 30 September 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁸ ACJPS, Sennar state: Deep concern about the increased cases of unlawful detention and the use of torture by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sinjah town, 29 April 2025, [url](#)

¹³⁹ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁰ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 89

¹⁴¹ Sudan Times (The), SAF junta’s ‘report a collaborator’ spurs arrests, abuses, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴² ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 78

¹⁴³ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁴ ICRC, Sudan: the human cost of three years of war, 13 April 2026, [url](#), p. 9





(d) Treatment in detention and prison conditions

Both parties designated former prisons, military compounds and civilian buildings as detention centres across multiple locations. In Greater Khartoum, through the conflict, the SAF controlled the Hatab detention centre and the Sirkab detention centre, while the RSF controlled multiple detention centres across the capital including the Al-Saliha 50 department detention centre, the Dar Al-Tawba detention centre (known as Soba prison), the former family and child protection department converted into a detention facility, the Al Nakeel police station, the Riyadh detention centre and an unofficial detention site in Omdurman.¹⁴⁵ In RSF-controlled areas, homes, schools, and abandoned government buildings were frequently used as makeshift detention sites.¹⁴⁶

UN OHCHR confirmed at least ten deaths in custody of individuals detained by both the RSF and the SAF between January and June 2025, ‘including a well-known Sudanese footballer, volunteer medics, and local humanitarian volunteers.’¹⁴⁷ Accounts from Soba prison indicated that between four and ten detainees died daily, ‘and on some days up to eighty, largely due to malnutrition and treatable illnesses.’ Bodies were reportedly removed daily by trucks and buried at undisclosed locations.¹⁴⁸ In Wad Madani prison, a cholera outbreak reportedly resulted in the deaths of up to 300 detainees.¹⁴⁹

Some former detainees reported having witnessed mass executions. It has been estimated that more than 500 people have died in custody since the start of the war.¹⁵⁰

Large-scale burial sites were reportedly uncovered in Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman, including at a former RSF base in Garri and a school in Al-Salha, where hundreds of detainees allegedly died as a result of torture, starvation, or denial of medical care.¹⁵¹

Conditions in both formal and informal detention facilities remained harsh regardless of the detaining party, and were characterised by overcrowding, insufficient food and water, no access to medical care despite widespread disease and torture. SHRH indicated that the RSF were using detention as part of a broader strategy of ethnic cleansing, which was mostly directed against Darfur’s non-Arab communities.¹⁵²

Testimonies collected by HRW between June 2025 and February 2026 indicated ill-treatment against detainees, included women, by the SAF and its affiliated groups in areas retaken from the RSF, including Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Gedaref, Red Sea, and Northern states.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁵ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁴⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 45

¹⁴⁷ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 45

¹⁴⁸ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 46

¹⁴⁹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 47

¹⁵⁰ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵¹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 49

¹⁵² SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵³ HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)



Both factions employed severe beatings to extract forced confessions and held individuals in prolonged detainment without trial.¹⁵⁴ Testimonies recounted the deliberate execution of detainees in front of others to instil fear. In one case, a nine-year-old boy was shot dead during an RSF interrogation session, while survivors were forced to watch and threatened with the same fate.¹⁵⁵

SAF-run facilities, including military camps in Rufaa and Wad Madani, were ‘used for coercive interrogations.’ Former detainees described severe conditions in RSF detention, including prolonged *incommunicado* detention, systematic beatings, electric shocks, deprivation of food and water, and the withholding of medical treatment.¹⁵⁶

For additional information on detention of women and girls, see Section [2.6.2. \(d\) on detention](#).

(e) Torture and ill-treatment

UN OHCHR received numerous accounts of ‘torture and other forms of ill-treatment’ in places of formal and informal detention, which included severe beatings, electric shocks, burning inflicted with heated metal rods, sexual violence, and torture involving prolonged suspension.¹⁵⁷ The ACHPR also documented the use of beatings against civilians by both the SAF and the RSF. These beatings often occurred during arrests, detention and random searches and seizures.¹⁵⁸ The beatings appeared to be an exertion of power to force civilians to comply with combatants’ demands and to punish non-compliance. They also served as an interrogation technique.¹⁵⁹ An investigation by the SHRH reported that both the SAF and the RSF were implicated in the torture of civilians. The RSF, in particular, was reportedly torturing civilians through ‘beatings, starvation, acts of humiliation and degradation and psychological abuse.’¹⁶⁰

The ACHPR received reports about the use of electrocution by the RSF to torture civilians. On 25 January 2025, the SAF tortured a victim to death by electrocution and poured nitric acid on his wounds.¹⁶¹ In August 2025, the Committee for Justice (CFJ), an independent human rights monitoring and advocacy group,¹⁶² documented instances of victims ‘being tied to trees for days, shackled with heavy iron chains, and subjected to repeated beatings’ by the RSF.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁴ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#); UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 47

¹⁵⁵ UN HRC, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, 26 August 2025, [url](#)

¹⁵⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 45

¹⁵⁷ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 45

¹⁵⁸ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), paras. 51, 52

¹⁵⁹ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 53

¹⁶⁰ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶¹ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 56

¹⁶² CFJ, Who we are, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁶³ UN Human Rights Council, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, 26 August 2025, [url](#)



Numerous videos circulating on X, as reported by the SHRH, provided evidence of various torture methods used by the RSF against detainees, civilians, and opposition members. These recordings depict individual being ‘beaten with metal rods and lashes, buried alive, burned with heated objects or chemicals, starved, subjected to prolonged psychological torment under indefinite detention, and sexually assaulted’. Other reported methods included ‘forcing detainees into stress positions, administering electric shocks, and conducting mock executions’.¹⁶⁴ For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups](#).

(f) Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV)

Multiple sources indicated that comprehensive statistics on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in Sudan were lacking and all confirmed that GBV was widespread in active conflict areas.¹⁶⁵ While girls and women were primarily targeted, men and boys were also affected.¹⁶⁶ According to UNICEF’s data, approximately 66 % of child rape involved girls and 33 % involved boys.¹⁶⁷ Survivors frequently bear cultural blame within Sudan’s patriarchal society, exposing both male and female survivors and their families to severe stigma, shame, and social exclusion.¹⁶⁸ For more information on conflict related sexual violence against women and girls, see section [2.6.2. \(a\) Conflict Related Sexual Violence \(CRSV\)](#).

The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa (SIHA) noted that there were documented SGBV cases affecting men and boys in Darfur, Al Jazirah and Khartoum, although no clear attribution to a specific actor was made. One reported case involved an assault perpetrated by a soldier affiliated with the SPLM-N-al-Hilu. Men attempting to protect women and girls from sexual violence, frequently faced violence themselves. According to the organisation, documented cases involving men and boys were limited as survivors often requested for their testimonies not to be recorded or shared. This has been particularly observed in Darfur and Al Jazirah, where survivors have explicitly requested that their cases remained undocumented.¹⁶⁹ Underreporting was reportedly due to shame, fear of prosecution through anti-sodomy laws, or rejection by families.¹⁷⁰

(g) Victims of trafficking in human beings

Trafficking in human beings presents various forms, including sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, forced marriage, forced labour,¹⁷¹ recruitment of child soldiers or recruitment of

¹⁶⁴ SHRH, Sudan’s Shadow Prisons: Captivity, Torture, and Enforced Disappearance May 2025, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶⁵ UNICEF, Sudan’s child rape and sexual violence crisis, March 2025, [url](#), p. 2; UN WOMEN, Gender alert: Three years of war: Sudanese women on the frontlines of humanitarian and local peacebuilding efforts, April 2026, [url](#), p.7; The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan (December 2025), 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 107

¹⁶⁶ UNICEF, Sudan’s child rape and sexual violence crisis, March 2025, [url](#), p. 2; LAW, Beyond the Headlines: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

¹⁶⁷ UNICEF, Sudan’s child rape and sexual violence crisis, March 2025, [url](#), p. 10

¹⁶⁸ UNICEF, Sudan’s child rape and sexual violence crisis, March 2025, [url](#), p. 3

¹⁶⁹ SIHA, More than numbers, Report on the State of Violence Against Women and Girls in Sudan - 2023-2025, December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷⁰ ISS, More focus needed on sexual violence against males in Sudan, 5 September 2024, [url](#)

¹⁷¹ UN, Understanding human trafficking, n.d., [url](#)



children to commit crimes.¹⁷² A definition of ‘trafficking in human beings’ is provided in the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.¹⁷³

In 2021, the transitional Sudanese authorities launched the 2021-2023 national action plan to combat trafficking in human beings.¹⁷⁴ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees¹⁷⁵ however, reported that the military coup of October 2021 resulted in the postponement of the roll-out of the National Action Plan.¹⁷⁶

In August 2025, UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provided assistance to victims of trafficking in Sudan, having identified 312 victims of trafficking in eastern Sudan. The UNHCR report provided information about security operations in Kassala state that resulted in the arrest of persons ‘with alleged links to smuggling and human trafficking.’¹⁷⁷ Another operation of the Sudanese security forces resulted in the arrest of traffickers in human beings and the release of 65 victims in eastern Kassala in September 2025.¹⁷⁸ In November 2025, the UN reported on trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation and slavery and the recruitment and use of children as fighters in RSF-controlled areas in and around El Fasher.¹⁷⁹ The report echoed the findings of a previous year report about the increase of trafficking in persons, particularly involving women and girls.¹⁸⁰

In a March 2026 Child Protection Brief, UNHCR provided information on young Sudanese refugee boys and girls taking irregular routes to Europe through traffickers and smugglers via South Sudan, noting that the risks are ‘particularly severe for unaccompanied and separated children who continue to be highly vulnerable to exploitation both within South Sudan and across border’.¹⁸¹ A 2024 report on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT) by Global Partners Governance (GPG),¹⁸² found that precarious living conditions affecting Sudanese refugees in the region – particularly in Egypt – together with a rise in the number of unaccompanied or separated Sudanese child refugees resulted in an increase in forced child labour.¹⁸³ As further noted by the GPG, since the onset of the conflict, the overall state capacity ‘to respond to victims of MSHT or to take action against perpetrators’ has been ‘significantly

¹⁷² UNODC, Human Trafficking FAQs, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁷³ Council of Europe, Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, 2005, [url](#), article 4 (a)

¹⁷⁴ UN Sudan, UNHCR and IOM welcome government new action plan to combat human trafficking in Sudan, 31 August 2021, [url](#); EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Sudan launched its National Action Plan to counter and prevent human trafficking, 30 August 2021, [url](#)

¹⁷⁵ UN Sudan, UNHCR and IOM welcome government new action plan to combat human trafficking in Sudan, 31 August 2021, [url](#); EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Sudan launched its National Action Plan to counter and prevent human trafficking, 30 August 2021, [url](#)

¹⁷⁶ UNHCR Sudan, Fact Sheet on Mixed movements January-June 2022, n.d., [url](#)

¹⁷⁷ UNHCR Regional Bureau EHAGL Mixed Movement Flash Update, August 2025, [url](#), p. 1

¹⁷⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudan security forces free 65 foreign hostages in Kassala raids, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

¹⁷⁹ UN OHCHR, Sudan: UN experts call for urgent action to combat trafficking in El Fasher, 27 November 2025, [url](#)

¹⁸⁰ UN OHCHR, Sudan: Trafficking for sexual exploitation and recruitment of children on the rise, warn UN experts, 22 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁸¹ UNHCR, Sudan Situation Protection Brief – Child Protection March 2026, 14 April 2026, [url](#), p. 4

¹⁸² Global Partner Governance is an international development organisation supporting legislative efforts to address human trafficking, including through producing research on the subject [url](#)

¹⁸³ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, August 2024, [url](#), ii. Executive summary

reduced.’ The report also noted that vulnerability to trafficking was more acute among IDPs, returnees and refugees.¹⁸⁴

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) was committed by members of the RSF in areas under their control, as well as by aid workers in humanitarian settings such as IDP and refugee camps.¹⁸⁵ Individuals receiving aid in Sudan were reportedly at a higher risk of SEA by aid workers, with data placing Sudan within the top four riskiest humanitarian settings for SEA globally.¹⁸⁶

Children in Sudan are at specific risk of facing trafficking in the form of forced marriage, sexual exploitation, forced recruitment by armed groups and child labour.¹⁸⁷ For additional information on child marriage, see section [2.6.2. \(b\) Forced marriage](#); for additional information on sexual exploitation, see section [2.6.2. \(a\) Conflict Related Sexual Violence](#); for additional information on forced recruitment of children by armed groups, see [section 2.7.2. Child soldiers](#); for additional information on child labour, see section [2.7.3. Labour exploitation](#).

(h) Death penalty

According to Sudanese criminal law, death sentences may be implemented only after all remedies are exhausted, including a final appeal to the Constitutional Court. As of April 2026, based on the consulted sources, the Constitutional Court was yet to be re-established, precluding the implementation of death sentences.¹⁸⁸ Between January and June 2025, at least 108 death sentences were reportedly issued in Sudan, mainly by criminal and anti-terrorism courts, as well as more than 70 long-term and life sentences, mostly for ‘alleged collaboration with the RSF’. Monthly totals averaged between 12 and 15 death sentences ‘issued in multiple states by courts in Al Jazirah (Wad Madani, Managil), Blue Nile (Damazine), Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum (Omdurman, Karrari), North Kordofan (El Obeid), Northern (Dongola, Merowe and Karima), Red Sea (Port Sudan), River Nile (Atbara, Shendi, Damer), Sennar (Sennar, Sinjah), and White Nile (Kosti, Kenana) states.’¹⁸⁹ As of October 2025, the death row section of Singa Prison, Sennar state, was reportedly overcrowded.¹⁹⁰ Ayin network noted in March 2026 that ‘courts in Wad Medani had handed down hundreds of death and life sentences to individuals accused of collaborating with the RSF.’¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁴ GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, August 2024, [url](#), p.ii, 6, 2.2

¹⁸⁵ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 19

¹⁸⁶ UN Country Team Sudan, Inter-Agency Risk Assessment on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Sudan, March 2025, [url](#); IASC, The Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Risk Overview (SEARO) Index, 2026 Global Index, December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁸⁷ UNICEF, Geneva Palais briefing note: Children in Sudan: a generation at risk, 14 March 2025, [url](#); EC, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Sudan’s children are suffering – this is how conflict is destroying their future, 18 August 2025, [url](#); GPG, The impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, August 2024, [url](#) p.ii

¹⁸⁸ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 52-53

¹⁸⁹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 52-53

¹⁹⁰ UN HRD, Sudan: death sentence issued against HRD Abubakr Mansour Mohamed Hamza and arbitrary arrest of his defense counsel (joint communication), 8 January 2026, [url](#)

¹⁹¹ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week, Ayin News Bulletin, 17 March 2026, [url](#)

The legal accusations brought forward were mainly based on provisions contained in the Sudanese Criminal Code (Articles 26, 50, 51, and 186), including “‘conspiracy’, ‘waging war against the state’, and ‘crimes against humanity’”.¹⁹²

Some of the women imprisoned within SAF-controlled areas, at least 25 of whom were between 19 and 26 years old, had received death sentences on accusations of collaboration with the RSF as of April 2025.¹⁹³ For additional information on women and girls, see Section [2.6.2. Violence against women and girls.](#)

For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#) and section [2.5 on Ethnic groups.](#)

1.3.3. Access to information, misinformation and media landscape

(a) Control over access to information and digital communication

Since April 2023, both the SAF and the RSF imposed internet shutdowns as a mean to block information flows. The UN OHCHR noted that the recurring blackouts and internet shutdowns – often justified by authorities on security grounds but reportedly imposed arbitrarily – have significantly constrained access to information, restricted free expression, and isolated communities.¹⁹⁴ Besides this, widespread internet infrastructure failures and power outages have affected access to internet, hampering the delivery of aid and worsening the humanitarian crisis. For example, Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), volunteer-led community initiatives which relied on Whatsapp groups and other social media for processing humanitarian requests - such as evacuation needs, identification of safe routes and exits, transportation options, and access to basic needs - were unable to function during shutdowns leaving requests unprocessed.¹⁹⁵ For additional information on ERR see sections [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#) and [2.4 on Humanitarian and health personnel.](#)

Between 2024 and 2025, multiple nationwide outages were observed, mostly government-directed,¹⁹⁶ leaving citizens without phone or internet access for months at a time.¹⁹⁷ The SAF ordered the suspension of internet services in areas under RSF control, particularly across Darfur and Kordofan.¹⁹⁸ On July 2025, the Sudanese Telecommunications and Post Regulatory Authority (TPRA) announced the blocking of WhatsApp’s voice and video call features, starting from 15 July 2025 until further notice. TPRA cited ‘security concerns’ and the need to protect the ‘higher interests of the state’.¹⁹⁹

In February 2026 Access Now – a non-governmental global organisation working in the field on digital civil rights – reported that both warring parties have seized devices, damaged

¹⁹² UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 52-53

¹⁹³ International Service for Human Rights, Sudan: Over 25 women face charges that could lead to execution, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹⁴ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025 [url](#), p. 13

¹⁹⁵ AI, Sudan: Internet shutdown threatens delivery of humanitarian and emergency services, 8 March 2024, [url](#)

¹⁹⁶ Cloudflare Radar, Traffic in Sudan, n.a., [url](#)

¹⁹⁷ New Lines Magazine, Sudanese People Don’t Have the Luxury of Hating Elon Musk, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹⁸ Freedom House, Freedom on the net 2025, December 2025, [url](#)

¹⁹⁹ Accessnow, #KeepItOn: Time to end Sudan’s isolation; lift the WhatsApp block now, 25 September 2025, [url](#)



servers, and ordered companies to restrict access in parts or all of Sudan, documenting four communication shutdowns in 2025, including one during the RSF final offensive on El Fasher in North Darfur.²⁰⁰ Due to the restrictions, many users use virtual private networks (VPNs), satellite services like Starlink, or foreign SIM cards to stay connected, which involve high costs, technical barriers, and legal uncertainty.²⁰¹

Despite being unlicensed in Sudan and subject to a 2024 ban on the import, possession, and use, Starlink devices reportedly entered the country through informal and illegal channels, largely controlled by the RSF.²⁰² The Sudanese army confiscated thousands of devices in areas under its control while, in territories controlled by the RSF, a ‘black market quickly developed’.²⁰³ Starlink internet services came at high costs²⁰⁴ with single terminals reportedly sold for 2500 USD and a 500 USD annual tax per device enforced in many areas, especially in Darfur. A number of temporary internet cafés also emerged, where users could access the service for hourly fees ranging from two or three to six USD, depending on the location.²⁰⁵ A COI report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands published in December 2025 noted that, based on consulted confidential sources, in some areas of the country ‘Starlink cafés were under the control of one of the warring parties and the private ownership of a Starlink modem could arouse the suspicion of the same actors’.²⁰⁶

Media landscape

Sudan’s media environment has shifted from ‘a pluralistic and diverse post-revolutionary environment to a “parallel battlefield” in which information warfare proceeds alongside the armed conflict.’²⁰⁷ Many of the warring groups have established their own media outlets,²⁰⁸ causing independent journalists to be absorbed into partisan platforms or forced into silence. At the same time the information landscape was flooded with war propaganda, disinformation, rumours, and hate speech to fuel violence, racism, and division.²⁰⁹

Poor or absent internet connectivity, along with military control of online content in some areas, has created a significant digital divide across the country deepening ‘social and geographic fragmentation’. Community radio stations represent key sources of information at local level, despite constraints in connectivity and resources.²¹⁰

Press freedom in Sudan is ‘under unprecedented strain’ as journalists are ‘arrested, intimidated or forced to flee’.²¹¹ As of November 2025, more than 400 journalists had fled the

²⁰⁰ Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

²⁰¹ Dabanga, Sudan to block WhatsApp calls citing security concerns, 21 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁰² Freedom House, Freedom on the net 2025, December 2025, [url](#)

²⁰³ Geeska, Starlink on the ruins of Sudan’s networks, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

²⁰⁴ Freedom House, Freedom on the net 2025, December 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁵ Geeska, Starlink on the ruins of Sudan’s networks, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

²⁰⁶ The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan (December 2025), 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 77

²⁰⁷ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, [url](#), p. 4

²⁰⁸ ADF, Sudan’s Warring Sides Target Citizens with Digital Disinformation Campaigns, 20 June 2023, [url](#); Reuters, Sudanese journalist returns to newsrooms decimated by war, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

²⁰⁹ UNESCO, Despite the dire circumstances, journalists in Sudan continue their work with remarkable resilience, 2 June 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁰ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, [url](#), p. 4

²¹¹ Press Freedom Unlimited, Press freedom in Sudan continues to crumble, 12 November 2025, [url](#)



country since the beginning of the conflict in April 2023.²¹² In 2025, the Sudan Media Forum (SMF), a network of Sudanese journalists in Sudan and in exile, estimated that only 250 – 300 journalists remained active inside Sudan, compared with at least 1 500 journalists before the war. Journalists still operating in the country, including around 70 still reporting from conflict zones, were often working in hiding or anonymously.²¹³

Information production and information access have remained vulnerable to frequent disruption due to violence, internet blackouts, threats to journalists, and ‘coordinated information manipulation campaigns.’²¹⁴ Since the beginning of the conflict in 2023, 90 % of domestic media infrastructure has been destroyed,²¹⁵ forcibly closed or brought under the control of the warring parties.²¹⁶ At the very beginning of the war, RSF forces seized state television and other media outlets in Omdurman, later looting equipment from state, local, and international broadcasters²¹⁷ and destroying media archives.²¹⁸ According to the Sudanese Journalists' Syndicate (SJS), after the war began, some 27 newspapers ceased operations, along with 32 radio stations and 8 television stations.²¹⁹ As a result, Sudanese increasingly rely on social media and Arab TV channels for news.²²⁰

(b) Online propaganda and disinformation

Disinformation and propaganda campaigns in Sudan can be traced back to 2019 and 2021.²²¹ In 2026, the proliferation of informal information networks including ‘propaganda hubs, fake pages and influencer hubs,’ was reportedly filling the void left by formal media,²²² with large use of social media to circulate fabricated or misleading news to shape the public opinion.²²³

The 2026 report from Thomson Foundation concluded that ‘information manipulation is not a side effect of Sudan’s war but part of its strategy.’²²⁴ Even ordinary citizens face severe punishment for posting on social media.²²⁵ Internet freedom declined sharply, as security forces carried out widespread arrests in retaliation for people's online activity.²²⁶

In May 2025, so called ‘Report a Collaborator’ pages began appearing on Facebook.²²⁷ These pages claimed to provide a space for reporting alleged RSF collaborators, allowing for

²¹² Press Freedom Unlimited, Press freedom in Sudan continues to crumble, 12 November 2025, [url](#)

²¹³ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁴ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, [url](#), p. 3

²¹⁵ Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

²¹⁶ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, [url](#), p. 6-7

²¹⁷ CPJ, Journalists shot, beaten, and harassed covering conflict between Sudan’s rival military groups, 30 May 2023, [url](#); CPJ, CPJ urges Sudanese paramilitary forces to cease using media institutions as detention centers, 12 December 2023, [url](#)

²¹⁸ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

²¹⁹ Reuters, Sudanese journalist returns to newsrooms decimated by war, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

²²⁰ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

²²¹ Tahrir Institute (The), Beyond the Battlefield: Sudan’s Virtual Propaganda Warzone, 14 January 2025, [url](#)

²²² Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

²²³ Beam Reports, Share Mania: Mapping Misinformation and Disinformation in Sudan, 15 January 2023, [url](#)

²²⁴ Thomson Foundation, How disinformation is shaping Sudan’s conflict: a new report, 8 January 2026, [url](#)

²²⁵ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, [url](#), p.4

²²⁶ Freedom House, Freedom on the net 2025, December 2025, [url](#); SUNA, [Facebook], السجن أربعة سنوات لمدان بتهمة الإساءة وسب قيادات الدولة , [Four-year prison sentence for man convicted of insulting and defaming state leaders], posted on February 10, 2025, [url](#)

²²⁷ Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#)



individuals to be identified on the basis of suspicion, ethnic or geographic affiliations.²²⁸ The human rights group Emergency Lawyers described it as a ‘tool for persecuting civilians’.²²⁹

According to a study on the media ecosystem in Sudan by Internews, published in October 2025, both the SAF and the RSF maintained sophisticated media operations, funding television stations, social media campaigns and digital platforms. A wide range of media manipulation techniques were being used by both, including deepfakes, recycled footage, false casualty reports and propagandistic content, including graphically horrifying images of violence. Meanwhile, ethnic-based incitement, particularly targeting Darfuri and Nuba communities, was circulating widely on social media. According to the same study, disinformation campaigns, orchestrated by multiple actors, including the SAF, the RSF and remnants of the former regime, aimed to undermine opposition voices, discredit journalists and media outlets and spread misleading content about both the conflict and the humanitarian conditions throughout Sudan’s digital ecosystem.²³⁰

According to an analysis conducted by Build Up, a global non-profit organisation specialising in digital conflict and peacebuilding research, a divergence in platform usage between warring parties was noted, with the RSF reportedly more active and popular on TikTok, and the SAF relying primarily on Facebook while civilian actors were absent online.²³¹ As reported by the study by Internews, the RSF produced high-quality multimedia content, reportedly with support from lobbyists and public relations firms. While their presence on Facebook was removed by Meta in August 2023 for violation policies on dangerous organisations, the RSF has remained active across other platforms, including X, TikTok, WhatsApp and Telegram. Their tactics reportedly included trolling campaigns targeting pro-revolution accounts and using automated accounts. The group has been accused of appropriating more than 900 dormant accounts on X. Their content is often produced in English.²³² The study found that Islamist groups have escalated their propaganda efforts, employing coordinated messaging strategies and systematic campaigns targeting political leaders and civilian organisations. These narratives frequently accused such actors of collaborating with the RSF and seeking political gain, while those advocating for an end of hostilities or maintaining neutrality were framed as ‘traitors’ and conspirators.²³³

The SAF appeared to be employing conventional online authoritarian tactics. It frequently countered RSF narratives while promoting claims of military success and positioning itself as a defender of Sudan’s unity and information. The authors of the Internews study further noted the dissemination of misleading information, including inaccurate representations of designed safe zones and the downplaying atrocities.²³⁴ Sudanese civilians have reportedly relied on social media channels as a key source of information for safety and planning movement.

²²⁸ Assayha, Life Imprisonment and Executions The campaign to Report a Collaborator terrifies, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

²²⁹ Sudan Times, (The), SAF junta’s ‘report a collaborator’ spurs arrests, abuses, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

²³⁰ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, [url](#), p. 29, 30

²³¹ Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#); Build Up, Sudan’s Digital Battleground, 31 March 2025, [url](#), p. 7

²³² Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, [url](#), p.30; SWP, The Weaponization of Social Media in Sudan’s War, 23 April 2026, [url](#)

²³³ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, [url](#), p. 30; SWP, The Weaponization of Social Media in Sudan’s War, 23 April 2026, [url](#)

²³⁴ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem 2025, 28 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 29, 30





However, disinformation campaigns have reportedly undermined the reliability of these sources. Some individuals reported that they based their movements in conflict-affected areas on online content only to discover it was part of deceptive narratives that exposed them to higher risk of violence.²³⁵

Fabricated narratives targeting humanitarian actors became increasingly common.²³⁶ Disinformation has also hindered humanitarian efforts as both warring parties accused local and international humanitarian organisations of siding with one or the other party, affecting their funding and operational capacity.²³⁷ For additional information see section [2.1 on Perceived political opponents](#).

²³⁵ TIMEP, Beyond the Battlefield: Sudan's Virtual Propaganda Warzone, 14 January 2025, [url](#)

²³⁶ CDAC Network, Sudan's information war, August 2025, [url](#)

²³⁷ Thomson Foundation, Information Manipulation in Sudan, 8 January 2026, [url](#), p. 75





2. Treatment of specific profiles and groups of population

2.1. Perceived political opponents

2.1.1. Political party members and other perceived opponents

(a) Situation of political party members and perceived opponents

Since the onset of the war in 2023, the political landscape in Sudan is fragmented. Military interference has constrained the space for independent political organisations, while the fragmentation among political parties and limited coordination have further reduced their capacity.²³⁸ For additional information on political parties see section [1.1.2 Political situation](#).

Following the signing of the Nairobi declaration in December 2025,²³⁹ — see section [1.1.2 Political situation](#) for additional information — ‘hundreds’ of individuals were detained in what Khalid Omer Yousif, former minister and leading figure of the FFC, described as a ‘new phase of repression’ against opponents of the war. In a December 2025 interview to the media outlet The National, he said arrests were ‘happening everywhere, in every state in Sudan’. Many of those arrested reportedly faced charges that could carry death penalty.²⁴⁰

Situation of political opponents abroad

From at least April 2024, the Sudanese authorities extended their crackdown on dissent targeting anti-war figures and political opponents living abroad. In 2024, Sudan’s prosecution opened a criminal case against the former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok and 15 other Taqaddum leaders, many of whom were abroad, on charges including ‘inciting war against the state’ and ‘undermining constitutional order’, some punishable by death penalty.²⁴¹ In January 2025, the state news agency SUNA published a public notice for fugitive defendants. The list of individuals included the former leaders of the Taqaddum Coordination Committee, activists, and journalists, considered fugitives under the 1991 Criminal Act and the Empowerment Removal Law.²⁴² Some of the individuals on the list who have fled abroad reported to the UN Independent International FFM difficulties in the renewal of passports and difficulties in travelling.²⁴³ The authorities have reportedly refused to renew the passports of Sudanese opposition figures living abroad.²⁴⁴ In January 2026, an anti-terrorism court in Port Sudan

²³⁸ Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 Sudan, 26 February 2025, [url](#)

²³⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan political groups, rebel faction sign anti-war declaration in Nairobi, 17 December 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁰ National (The), Sudan's civilian anti-war activists detained in crackdown, 24 December 2025, [url](#)

²⁴¹ Radio Tamazuj, Sudan's Hamdok faces accusations of ‘inciting war’, 4 April 2024, [url](#)

²⁴² SUNA, Announcement of publication for fugitive defendants, 13 January 2025, [url](#)

²⁴³ UN OHCHR, Paths to justice: accountability for atrocities in the Sudan, Independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, 24 October 2025, [url](#), para. 22

²⁴⁴ National (The), Sudan's civilian anti-war activists detained in crackdown, 24 December 2025, [url](#)



launched proceedings against 201 defendants, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, with cases heard in person and in absentia.²⁴⁵

(b) Situation of members of trade unions and professional associations

Since the coup of 25 October 2021, trade union activities have been suspended by decrees issued by the military authorities. In July 2025, authorities reportedly ordered the dissolution of the leadership of all trade unions and replaced them with ‘preparatory committees’, appointed by the Registrar General of Labour Organisations²⁴⁶ under Decision No. 9.²⁴⁷ Some observers commented that the decision did not outline a clear timeline or process for new union elections, and granted the Registrar undefined discretionary power.²⁴⁸

Between April 2023 and July 2025, the Sudanese Professionals and Syndicates Coordination (SPSC) documented more than 290 serious violations against trade unionists and workers, including ‘arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, torture, ill-treatment and denial of medical care, targeted killings of and attacks on workers employed in the health, transport and humanitarian sectors, gender-based violence (GBV) against women workers and unionists, threats and harassment leading to forced displacement, seizure and destruction of union offices, mass dismissals without due process in Khartoum and Western Sudan for alleged ‘collaboration’ with the RSF, withholding of salaries for a period of more than two years, forced labour, and bans on union activities’. According to the report this led to a ‘near-total paralysis of independent trade unions’.²⁴⁹

(c) Situation of other perceived opponents

In 2024, sources indicated that the SAF’s Military Intelligence Service (MIS) targeted people, often based on their presumed or real ethnic identity, for allegedly supporting the RSF,²⁵⁰ including Arab tribes from Kordofan²⁵¹ and tribes from West Darfur.²⁵²

With the progressing of the conflict, reports received by UN OHCHR in 2025 raised additional concerns regarding the prosecution and sentencing by Sudanese courts in SAF-controlled areas of individuals originating from the Kordofan and Darfur regions, particularly on allegations of affiliation with the RSF.²⁵³ The ACHPR FFM noted that ‘civilians were also extrajudicially killed for being perceived to support the opposing side of the conflict while others, especially in the Darfur region were targeted and killed because of their ethnicity’.²⁵⁴

²⁴⁵ Sudan Tribune, Port Sudan anti-terrorism court begins trial of RSF leader and Hamdok, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

²⁴⁶ Sudan Media Forum, Sudanese Unions Face State Takeover, Deepening Labour Crisis, 23 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁷ ILNSS, The Tragic Situation of Workers and Trade Unionists in Sudan and the Systematic Violations during the War, 13 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁸ Sudan Media Forum, Sudanese Unions Face State Takeover, Deepening Labour Crisis, 23 July 2025, [url](#)

²⁴⁹ SPSC, Report on the Tragic Situation of Workers and Trade Unionists in Sudan and the Systematic Violations during the War, 11 August 2025, [url](#), pp. 2-4

²⁵⁰ UN OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#); ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁵¹ ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁵² Sudan Tribune, Sudanese military accused of ethnically targeted detentions, 24 July 2024, [url](#)

²⁵³ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 54

²⁵⁴ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 38



For more information on ethnic groups and individuals from Darfur and Kordofan see [2.5 Ethnic groups](#).

2.1.2. Resistance committees

Throughout the conflict, pro-democracy activists were systematically targeted. Retaliatory attacks in areas retaken by the opposing warring party and directed against pro-democracy activities and groups were described as a recurring pattern. In particular, the RSF ‘perceive[d] Resistance Committees (RC) and Emergency Resistance Rooms (ERRs) as posing a direct threat to their ability to govern areas under their control’.²⁵⁵

The Resistance Committees (RC),²⁵⁶ originally formed in 2013 during a set of protests against the regime,²⁵⁷ represented Sudan’s pro-democracy grassroots movement.²⁵⁸ Consisting mainly of younger people from a variety of social and economic backgrounds,²⁵⁹ these RC played a key role in the 2019 revolution and later mobilised against the 2021 coup, becoming influential actors through their community-based activism. When the war erupted in 2023, RC shifted towards humanitarian efforts, creating ERRs.²⁶⁰

ERRs, whether newly established or reactivated in April 2023, volunteered to fill the gap left by a lack of state service provision and limited international presence following the evacuation of international staff from Khartoum.²⁶¹ These initiatives are rooted in the Sudanese *nafeer* tradition,²⁶² which calls for collective action to rescue the needy and rebuild in the face of crises.²⁶³ While some ERRs openly associate with the RCs, others avoid it given the political nature of the RCs. ERRs deliver food, water, emergency medical care, evacuations for thousands of people, and educational activities for children, and are funded by Sudanese diaspora and local groups.²⁶⁴ For additional information on the situation of aid workers see [section 2.4.2](#).

²⁵⁵ TIMEP, Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

²⁵⁶ PeaceRep, Resistance Committees and Sudan’s Political Future, May 2023, [url](#)

²⁵⁷ IFPRI, Siddig, Khalid; Kirui, Oliver K.; and Dorosh, Paul. 2026. War and Resilience: The Multifaceted Impacts of Sudan’s Conflict and Pathways to Recovery. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, [url](#), pp. 40, 41

²⁵⁸ TIMEP, Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

²⁵⁹ IFPRI, Siddig, Khalid; Kirui, Oliver K.; and Dorosh, Paul. 2026. War and Resilience: The Multifaceted Impacts of Sudan’s Conflict and Pathways to Recovery. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, [url](#), pp. 40, 41

²⁶⁰ TIMEP, Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

²⁶¹ Arab Center Washington DC, Sudan’s War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

²⁶² Nafeer (نفير, *nafir*), originally meaning “a call to mobilise”, denotes community mobilisation, volunteering, and mutual aid. Shabaka, Diaspora Collaboration and Mutual Aid, November 2024, [url](#), p. 16

²⁶³ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 1

²⁶⁴ Arab Center Washington DC, Sudan’s War: The Failure of Mediation and the Struggle for Civilian Rule, 31 October 2025, [url](#)



Emergency Resistance Rooms (ERRs)

In Khartoum, security forces detained several ERR volunteers for carrying out relief activities without official permission.²⁶⁵ ACAPS noted in October 2025 that ‘these groups detained volunteers’ in parts of Khartoum, ‘while in Um Durman, they infiltrated some of the ERRs’ and distributed aid, ‘wearing military uniforms and carrying arms, leading to polarisation among the volunteers.’²⁶⁶ In 2025, targeting of ERRs and community kitchens volunteers has persisted, as the SAF view these local aid workers as political opponents and subject them to harassment and detention.²⁶⁷ In SAF-regained areas, ERRs must navigate suspicion of being associated with RCs. The security arm of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), known as ‘security cells’, investigate ERR members and their activities, threatening to suspend National/Local Non-Governmental Organisations (NNGOs) and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) partnering with ERRs.²⁶⁸ In August 2025, a volunteer in the Red Sea ERR was reportedly arrested in Port Sudan for providing humanitarian assistance to war-displaced communities.²⁶⁹ In Khartoum, ERRs’ volunteers reported ‘harassment by SAF-aligned Islamist militias’ operating through civil support groups (known as *isnad madani*), ‘through which fighters from the BBMB and other informal armed groups have taken on civilian roles in aid distribution and service provision in neighbourhoods and towns.’²⁷⁰ In Khartoum, many ERR volunteers have fled due to reprisal attacks. In Southern Khartoum, as many as 80 % of the volunteers have fled the area.²⁷¹ For additional information on the situation of aid workers and healthcare personnel see section [2.4.2.](#) and [2.4.3.](#)

2.1.3. Community leaders, lawyers, and human rights activists

The reinstatement of the National Security Laws in 2023 provided a legal basis for increased restrictions on civil society activities, while the so-called Information Law has been applied ‘to criminalize online expression about the conflict.’²⁷² For additional information see [1.3.3.](#)

[Access to information, misinformation and media landscape.](#)

Reprisals against defenders engaging with regional and international bodies increased, taking the form of ‘travel bans, arbitrary arrests, and threats’.²⁷³ Staff members have been harassed or assaulted. Human rights defenders and civil society actors faced ‘an unprecedented crackdown’ by the authorities, as reported by the organisation Committee for Justice, that in August 2025 documented the killing of at least 41 human rights defenders including teachers’

²⁶⁵ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 3

²⁶⁶ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 4

²⁶⁷ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSR, Aid Worker Security Report 2025, August 2025, [url](#), p. 6

²⁶⁸ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 4

²⁶⁹ Sudan Post, Resistance committees: SAF’s de facto government arrested Red Sea aid worker, 25 August 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁰ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025 [url](#), p. 4

²⁷¹ TIMEP, Sudan’s Counterrevolutionary War: The Systematic Targeting of Pro-Democracy Activists, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

²⁷² UN HRC, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, A/HRC/60/NGO/291, 26 August 2025 [url](#), pp. 2, 3

²⁷³ UN HRC, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, A/HRC/60/NGO/291, 26 August 2025 [url](#), pp. 2, 3



rights advocates, doctors, and journalists in the first six months of 2025.²⁷⁴ At the end of 2025, Munib Abdelaziz, a young activist, was reportedly detained in the town of Magaser, near Dongola, capital of the Northern State, after a speech commemorating the December Revolution of 2018. Commemorations of the December Revolution were violently suppressed in several other SAF-controlled areas, amid open incitement by officials and pro-authority voices.²⁷⁵

UN OHCHR indicated that lawyers representing, ‘or who may potentially represent,’ ‘individuals accused of collaborating with the RSF have reportedly faced threats and intimidation.’²⁷⁶ For example, a lawyer was attacked in Wad Madani in November 2025 while representing an historian accused of RSF collaboration without the prosecution producing any evidence to support the claim.²⁷⁷ In some cases, legal representatives were arrested as in the case of a defence counsel who was detained under Art. 53 (‘Espionage against the State’) reportedly for representing a civilian political organisation.²⁷⁸ In another instance, a human rights lawyer— representing members of the ‘Taqaddum’ coalition²⁷⁹ – was detained in Port Sudan in September 2024 after requesting access to investigation records for political detainees. He was reportedly subjected to physical and psychological torture,²⁸⁰ charged under the Sudanese Criminal Act 1991 and the Anti-Terrorism law, including Articles 53 and 85 of the Criminal Act relating to espionage, undermining the constitutional order and waging war against the State. These charges were subsequently dropped. He was convicted under the Cybercrime Act and sentenced to one year and four months in prison, before being released in October 2025, following the payment of a fine.²⁸¹

In January 2026, a Sudanese lawyer’s committee associated with a faction of the Sudanese Bar Association revoked the licenses of 31 attorneys for allegedly supporting the RSF by joining Taasis political alliance stating that ‘they had joined entities whose practices “contradict the ethics and honour of the legal profession.”’ This move reflected a further widening of divisions within Sudan’s professional unions which have been fragmented by the ongoing conflict between the army and the RSF since April 2023.²⁸²

In October 2025, after being condemned to a 20-year prison sentence and a fine of 10 million SDG [approximately EUR 14 200], Abubakr Mansour Abdela, a lawyer and human rights defender, has been sentenced to death by hanging by the Singa Criminal Court in Sennar state.²⁸³ The Sudanese Observatory for Human Rights indicated that the death sentence was issued without adhering to the appeals court’s ruling. According to the Observatory this is an example of the ‘use of the judicial authorities as a tool to settle political disputes and subdue

²⁷⁴ UN HRC, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, A/HRC/60/NGO/291, 26 August 2025 [url](#), pp. 2, 3

²⁷⁵ The National, Sudan's civilian anti-war activists detained in crackdown, 24 December 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), p. 12

²⁷⁷ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #9, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

²⁷⁸ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 57

²⁷⁹ Front Line Defenders, 21 October 2025 Montaser Abdullah released after sentencing, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Council, Written statement submitted by Committee for Justice, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status*, 26 August 2025, [url](#), p. 2

²⁸¹ Front Line Defenders, 21 October 2025 Montaser Abdullah released after sentencing, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

²⁸² Sudan Tribune, Sudan lawyer admission committee revokes licenses of 31 attorneys, 6 January 2026, [url](#)

²⁸³ UN HRD, Sudan: death sentence issued against HRD Abubakr Mansour Mohamed Hamza and arbitrary arrest of his defense counsel (joint communication), 8 January 2026, [url](#)



opponents’.²⁸⁴ The lawyer was convicted under articles 50 and 51 of the Sudan Criminal Act 1991 on charges of offences against the State and waging war against the State reportedly in connection with the distribution of medicines from his brother’s pharmaceutical company, which the authorities alleged constituted collaboration with the RSF.²⁸⁵

In March 2026, five female journalists and human rights activists were arrested by the RSF in Nyala after they attended a workshop on women’s rights and ‘held incommunicado in undisclosed locations’.²⁸⁶

2.2. Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups

2.2.1. Conscription, mobilisation and forced recruitment by the Sudanese Armed Forces

(a) Conscription

In Sudan, military service is governed by the 1992 National Service Law²⁸⁷ and the 2007 Sudanese Armed Forces Act²⁸⁸ amended in 2013.²⁸⁹ A COI report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands published in December 2025 noted, based on consulted confidential sources, that while the 1992 National Service Law remained in force, it was not ‘actively applied and enforced by the TSC and the SAF’.²⁹⁰

Article 7 of the 1992 National Service Law states that ‘every Sudanese citizen aged from eighteen years to thirty-three years of age is subject to national service’.²⁹¹ Article 9.1 of the 1992 National Service Law states that ‘the duration of service is 24 months’,²⁹² that can be reduced to 12 months for university graduates, high institutes or equivalent, and to 18 months for those having completed secondary high school.²⁹³

²⁸⁴ Altaghyeer, «المرصد السوداني لحقوق الإنسان» يدين حكم الإعدام بحق محامي ويطالب بإلغائه [The Sudanese Observatory for Human Rights condemns the death sentences against a lawyer and demands its annulment], 11 October 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁵ Front Line Defenders, Human rights defender Abubakr Mansour Abdela sentenced to death by hanging, 7 October 2025, [url](#)

²⁸⁶ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week, Ayin News Bulletin, Issue #25, 17 March 2026, [url](#)

²⁸⁷ ICRC, IHL Databases, Sudan, The National Service Act 1992, 1992, [url](#); IRB, Sudan: Information on military service, including for the purpose of attending university; information on punishment for refusing or evading military service, including upon return to Sudan after an extended absence, such as since 2002 (2014-September 2016) [SDN105640.E], 5 October 2016, [url](#)

²⁸⁸ ICRC, IHL Databases, Sudan Armed Forces Act, 2007, 5 December 2007, [url](#); Refworld, Sudan: Armed Forces Act 2007, 5 December 2007, [url](#)

²⁸⁹ WRI, Country report and updates: Sudan, 21 April 2015, [url](#), section 1 Conscription, military service.

²⁹⁰ The Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan (December 2025), 1 December 2025, [url](#)

²⁹¹ ICRC, IHL Databases, Sudan, The National Service Act 1992, 1992, [url](#), art. 7

²⁹² ICRC, IHL Databases, Sudan, The National Service Act 1992, 1992, [url](#), art. 9.1

²⁹³ ICRC, IHL Databases, Sudan, The National Service Act 1992, 1992, [url](#), art. 9.2



One source stated that the 2013 amendment to the Sudanese Armed Forces Act of 2007 raised the maximum age for military service from 33 to 45.²⁹⁴ However, an army source interviewed by Dabanga in February 2025 stated that ‘the average age of soldiers in the army is over 35 years, which is a non-combat age’.²⁹⁵ Further and corroborating information on this raise of age limit could not be found amongst the sources consulted.

(b) Mobilisation

In June 2023, Al-Burhan called for a general mobilisation of ‘all youth and all those capable to defend’²⁹⁶ to join the SAF.²⁹⁷ In November 2025, after the fall of El Fasher, Al-Burhan and the Sudanese Security and Defence Council reiterated a declaration of general mobilisation.²⁹⁸

Recruits under these general mobilisations are called *Mustanfareen* (the mobilised).²⁹⁹ The SAF oversee initial mobilisation and training.³⁰⁰ Civilians have been mobilised under different structures, including directly enlisting in the SAF,³⁰¹ joining neighbourhood defence units,³⁰² and local resistance structures.³⁰³ Mobilisation committees were organised at local, state and federal levels.³⁰⁴ *Mustanfareen* have joined the Popular Resistance or Popular Mobilisation, a coalition of armed factions allied to the SAF, and have received direct support, including weapon supply, and training from the SAF.³⁰⁵ The *Mustanfareen* were described as ‘often young and unaccustomed to handling arms’.³⁰⁶ As reported by Dabanga based on a survey conducted among soldiers in Gedaref, more than 85 % of the soldiers ‘had no more than primary education and most of them said that they had enlisted in the army because they had no job options, and most of them were from poor or very poor classes’.³⁰⁷ One SAF soldier interviewed by Dabanga stated having undergone a three months training before being

²⁹⁴ WRI, Country report and updates: Sudan, 21 April 2015, [url](#)

²⁹⁵ Dabanga, Arming civilians in Sudan: chaos of war fuels spread of weapons and deepens divisions, 12 February 2025, [url](#)

²⁹⁶ SudaNile, البرهان يعلن التعبئة العامة لكل من يستطيع حمل السلاح الانضمام للقوات المسلحة .. اعلان وقف إطلاق النار من جانب واحد [Al-Burhan announces a general mobilisation of all those capable of bearing arms to join the armed forces...a unilateral ceasefire declaration], Text of the 27 June 2023 speech of Al Burhan, 27 June 2023, [url](#)

²⁹⁷ Dabanga, El Burhan calls for Sudan’s ‘young and capable’ civilians to fight against RSF, 29 June 2023, [url](#); UN SC, Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, 31 August 2023, [url](#) para. 5; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sudan: armed popular resistance and widening civil unrest, 15 February 2024, [url](#)

²⁹⁸ The National, ‘No peace, no talks’: Abdel Fattah Al Burhan urges all Sudanese to take up arms, 15 November 2025, [url](#); NinaNews, Al-Burhan announces general mobilization and affirms: the end of the battle will be Darfur, 14 November 2025, [url](#); Khaberni, The Sudanese Defense Council announces general mobilization to confront the Rapid Support Forces, 4 November 2025, [url](#); African Perceptions, Sudan’s Security and Defense Council calls for general mobilization to support army against Rapid Support Forces, 5 November 2025, [url](#)

²⁹⁹ UN HRC, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/57/23, 7 November 2024, [url](#) para.25; ECFR, Split decision: Why Sudan is on the brink of partition-again, 27 February 2025, [url](#)

³⁰⁰ Radio Tamazuj, Q&A: Popular Resistance group seeks unity of resistance in Sudan, 18 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁰¹ UN HRC, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/57/23, 7 November 2024, [url](#) para. 25

³⁰² ADF, Rise of armed groups complicates Sudan’s brutal civil war, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

³⁰³ Radio Tamazuj, North Darfur governor launches popular resistance in El Fasher, 19 February 2024, [url](#); Sudan Scoop, Sudanese Popular Resistance Expands, 1 January 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁴ YeniSafak, Sudan expands volunteer mobilization against paramilitary RSF forces, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

³⁰⁵ Radio Tamazuj, Q&A: Popular Resistance group seeks unity of resistance in Sudan, 18 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁶ Sudan Justice Hub and Ayin Network, Sudan’s mass arming of civilians, 24 February 2024, [url](#)

³⁰⁷ Dabanga, Arming civilians in Sudan: chaos of war fuels spread of weapons and deepens divisions, 12 February 2025, [url](#)



deployed, without having received teaching materials related to human rights concepts.³⁰⁸ As noted by Al Jazeera in 2023, another mobilised young man reported having received 10 weeks of training by the SAF.³⁰⁹

Volunteers were either armed to join military operations or tasked with reconstruction and service provision in territories regained by the SAF.³¹⁰

Mobilisation was also conducted along tribal lines, such as the arming of the members of the Al-Shukryia tribe in Al Jazirah state in December 2024,³¹¹ an Arab group in eastern Sudan.³¹² Islamist organisations reportedly have a level of influence on the popular mobilisation, such as recruiting as well as conducting training for mobilised civilians, and links to the army.³¹³ For further information see section 1.2. Actors of the conflict of the [EUAA Sudan: Security Situation report \(February 2025\)](#).

(c) Forced recruitment

For information on child soldiers, see section [2.7.2. Child soldiers](#).

A COI report published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands in December 2025 noted from a confidential source that in some instances members of the SAF had used fear or explicit coercion to recruit civilians.³¹⁴ An article from The National reported in November 2025 on a recruitment campaign ‘that preys on the poor, fuelled by hate speech and accusation of treason against any man who refuses to join the army’s fight’.³¹⁵

2.2.2. Recruitment and forced recruitment by the Rapid Support Forces

(a) Recruitment by the RSF

The RSF was reported to conduct intensive recruitment campaigns in areas under its control, mobilising fighters along tribal lines, such as the Misseriya, the Ta’aysha and the Rizeigat tribes.³¹⁶ In October 2024, the leader of the RSF, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo, ‘Hemedti’,

³⁰⁸ Dabanga, Arming civilians in Sudan: chaos of war fuels spread of weapons and deepens divisions, 12 February 2025, [url](#)

³⁰⁹ Al Jazeera, Sudan’s civilians pick up arms, as RSF gains and army stumbles, 24 December 2023, [url](#)

³¹⁰ YeniSafak, Sudan expands volunteer mobilization against paramilitary RSF forces, 7 November 2025, [url](#); AA, Sudanese government committee announces continued training, volunteer deployment to fronts against RSF, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

³¹¹ Emirates Policy Center, ‘Tribalization’ of Sudan’s conflict: incentives, restraints and potential trajectories, 22 November 2024, [url](#); Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan’s system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, [url](#)

³¹² Joshua Project, Shukria in Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

³¹³ Reuters, Insight: Sudan’s Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#); Eureporter, Khartoum: a ruined capital controlled by Sudan’s Islamists, 4 September 2025, [url](#); ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: how the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#) under paragraph on Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade

³¹⁴ Netherlands (The), General Country of Origin Information report on Sudan, 1 December 2025, [url](#), pp. 87-88

³¹⁵ The National, Sudan army steps up recruitment drive but more battlefields setbacks may be in store, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

³¹⁶ Dabanga, Sudan’ RSF ‘stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment’, 11 November 2024, [url](#); Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan’s system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, [url](#)



called for a ‘general mobilisation’.³¹⁷ In January 2026, The Horn Review noted that the RSF has used *Faza’a* (a pre-Islamic Sudanese tradition allowing tribes to call on their members and allies for support against attacks by other tribes)³¹⁸ to recruit fighters in South Sudan, primarily in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria states.³¹⁹ In previous reports, it was noted that the RSF also recruited along tribal lines in Chad and Niger members of Baggara Arab groups.³²⁰ The RSF reportedly received support from Colombian mercenaries recruited through private companies registered in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and operating under the ‘Desert Wolves’ (*Lobos del Desierto*) battalion.³²¹

(b) Forced recruitment by the RSF

RSF recruitment along tribal lines and using customary administrations appears to have elements of coercion.³²² According to tribal leaders, ‘going to fight is a tribal duty that cannot be avoided’.³²³ In April 2025, the RSF reportedly threatened tribal leaders in South Darfur with arrests and expulsion from the RSF-controlled areas if they resisted the mobilisation, detaining the sheikh of Borno ‘for refusing the mobilisation drive’.³²⁴ Similar instances of detention of tribal leaders by the RSF have been reported.³²⁵ In 2024, ‘intimidation, torture, summary execution and the withholding of food and medical aid’ was used to recruit men and boys into RSF ranks.³²⁶

Some Colombian mercenaries were deployed in Sudan after recruitment under deceiving circumstances,³²⁷ with one source claiming ‘they had been sent to Sudan against their will’.³²⁸ In November 2024, Colombian media outlet La Silla Vacía reported testimonies from Colombians in Sudan who claimed they were held captive and described their situation as a form of trafficking in human beings, alleging they had been recruited under false pretence

³¹⁷ Dabanga, Sudan’ RSF ‘stoke ethnic tensions with tribal recruitment’, 11 November 2024, [url](#), Sudan Tribune, RSF forcibly recruits from Darfur camp amid mounting losses, 15 November 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁸ ADF, In Sudan, RSF invokes tradition to force children onto battlefield, 8 October 2024, [url](#)

³¹⁹ Horn Review (The), Transnational attrition: mercenary mobilization and the destabilization of the Sudan-South Sudan borderland, 11 January 2026, [url](#)

³²⁰ Yasr Zaidan, Ethno-mercenaryism in Sudan’s RSF and the Sahelian Arab Blet in Africa, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21 October 2025, [url](#); Democracy in Africa, Illegal recruitment fuels RSF militia’s expansion, 5 July 2024, [url](#)

³²¹ Horn Review (The), Transnational attrition: mercenary mobilization and the destabilization of the Sudan-South Sudan borderland, 11 January 2026, [url](#); La Silla Vacía, ‘Lobos del Desierto’: Así operan los mercenarios colombianos en Sudán, 2 March 2025, [url](#); CIG, Blood Money – How UAE support and foreign mercenaries enabled the fall of El Fasher, April 2026, [url](#)

³²² Facts Center for Journalism, Atar Network, n.d., [url](#); Index on Censorship, New magazine Atar fills information void in Sudan, 10 May 2024, [url](#)

³²³ Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan’s system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, [url](#)

³²⁴ Atar Network, Militarising tribes: inside Sudan’s system of war mobilization, 6 October 2025, [url](#)

³²⁵ Committee for Justice, Sudan: RSF arrest ‘Rufa’a’ tribe sheikh in ‘Dinder’ for refusing to cooperate, CFJ demands his release, 29 August 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF detains tribal leader, 16 others in Sudan’s East Darfur, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

³²⁶ CNN, ‘Enlist or die’: fear, looming famine and a deadly ultimatum swell the ranks of Sudan’s paramilitary forces, 21 March 2024, [url](#)

³²⁷ Sudan Tribune, Colombian mercenaries, RSD deployment routes exposed in AFP investigation, 21 December 2025, [url](#); Guardian (The), ‘War is a business’: the Colombian mercenaries training Sudan’s child fighters to ‘go and get killed’, 8 October 2025, [url](#); La Silla Vacía, “Me quiero devolver”: hay más de 300 exmilitares colombianos en la guerra de Sudán, 26 November 2024, [url](#); France24, From the Andes to Darfur: Colombians lured to Sudan’s killing fields, 21 December 2025, [url](#), UN Security Council, Letter dated 5 September 2025 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2025/555*, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

³²⁸ ADF, Colombian mercenaries, hired for UAE security, face fire in Sudan, 7 January 2025, [url](#)



elsewhere; some of those interviewed stated they were not allowed to leave the army and feared reprisals for sharing information.³²⁹ However, in March 2025, La Silla Vacía interviewed a Colombian mercenary who had been deployed in Sudan and was able to return to Colombia upon requesting it. He also estimated that around 80 Colombian mercenaries returned to Colombia from Sudan.³³⁰

For information on child soldiers, see section [2.7.2. Child soldiers](#).

2.2.3. Defection and desertion

Article 169 of the Sudan Armed Forces Act establishes the punishment for desertion as ‘imprisonment, for terms not exceeding five years together with the possibility of deprivation of all, or part of the pension, or privileges.’³³¹

Since the beginning of the conflict between the SAF and the RSF there has been a ‘phenomenon of military commanders changing sides’.³³² In April 2026, Major General al-Nour Ahmed Adam had reportedly defected from the RSF and joined the SAF.³³³ Pursuant to his defection, it was reported that he was stripped of his military rank and sentenced to death in *absentia* by the RSF.³³⁴ In May 2026, Ali Rizqallah Al-Safana, who was considered to be among RSF senior commanders, defected to the SAF. Hemedti later stripped him of his military rank and sentenced him to death in *absentia* for desertion.³³⁵ As reported in the EUAA Country Focus on Sudan (2025), section [2.2 Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups](#), an earlier instance of defection from the RSF to the SAF in October 2024 by Abu Agla Keikel, then a commander of an RSF-aligned force in eastern Al Jazirah state, was followed by large scale retaliatory attacks by the RSF on civilians in Keikel’s home region, as well as on members of his tribe.³³⁶

The Sudan Tribune reported in April 2025 on a speech by Hemedti in which he allegedly ‘called on officers who “had deserted service” to report to the front lines immediately’.³³⁷

On the other side, it was reported in April 2026 that General Hassan Adam Al Hassan of the SAF allied SPLM-N had defected to join the Taasis.³³⁸

³²⁹ La Silla Vacía, “Me quiero devolver”: hay más de 300 exmilitares colombianos en la guerra de Sudán, 26 November 2024, [url](#)

³³⁰ La Silla Vacía, ‘Lobos del Desierto’: Así operan los mercenarios colombianos en Sudán, 2 March 2025, [url](#)

³³¹ Sudan, Armed Forces Act, 2007, 5 December 2007, [url](#)

³³² NovaNews, Sudan, Desertions and changes of sides multiply, but no sign of peace, 1 May 2026, [url](#)

³³³ PBS, A top paramilitary commander defects to Sudan’s military as war enters 4th year, 20 April 2026, [url](#); The Arab Weekly, When an RSF general switches sides, 28 April 2026, [url](#)

³³⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudan paramilitary leader sentences defected general to death, 23 April 2026, [url](#); Darfur24, RSF court sentences defected commander al-Nour al-Qubba to death in absentia, 24 April 2026, [url](#)

³³⁵ Middle East Monitor, Sudan: Hemedti strips defected RSF commander of rank, sentences him to death in absentia, 21 May 2026, [url](#)

³³⁶ HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces target civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Defection and violence against civilians in Sudan’s al-Jazirah state-November 2024, 18 November 2024, [url](#)

³³⁷ Sudan Tribune, Musa Hilal’s group urges tribes to ditch RSF, claims force losing control, 5 April 2025, [url](#)

³³⁸ NovaNews, Sudan, Desertions and changes of sides multiply, but no sign of peace, 1 May 2026, [url](#); Horn Review, Sudan’s new front in Blue Nile, 8 May 2026, [url](#)



In July 2025, Darfur24 reported on SAF soldiers from the 16th and 21st divisions around El Fasher either deserting their position and fleeing or defecting to the RSF. The article cites hunger, poor living conditions and low wages as reasons for desertion or defection.³³⁹

Additional information on the treatment of deserters from the SAF within the reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

2.3. Journalists and other media personnel

2.3.1. Legal framework

The environment for media outlets and journalists remains highly restrictive, despite the constitutional guarantees of freedom of press and access to information under the provisional constitution adopted in 2019.³⁴⁰ Over time, repressive laws restricted press freedom and information access. The Press and Publications Act (2009) granted greater control to the National Council for Press over publications, while the Publication and the National Security Act (2010) criminalised the publication of content that ‘threatens public peace’ or ‘weakens state prestige’.³⁴¹

The Cybercrime Law, enacted in 2018 and amended in 2020, imposed severe penalties, including prison sentences, for many activities carried out online. Article 24 of the amended law raised the maximum prison sentence from one to four years, or flogging, or both, if a citizen publishes ‘false news or reports via the Internet, communications, or any information means or applications, threatening public peace or tranquility, or insulting the prestige of the state’. In addition, Article 21 of the amended law grants the authorities broad discretion to impose penalties under vaguely worded provisions. Under this Article, ‘anyone who publishes ideas, programs, sayings, or acts “contrary to public order and morals” via the Internet or any other means will be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years or flogging or both’.³⁴² In October 2025, the newly elected government approved further amendments to the law.³⁴³ Investigations into ‘information crimes’ no longer required a warrant from a judge. The revised law imposed financial penalties of up to 10 million SDG [equal to around EUR 24] and prison sentences of up to ten years³⁴⁴ for offences related to the use of social media and online reporting.³⁴⁵

In SAF-controlled areas, journalists were required to obtain weekly authorisations from the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the Press and Publications Council. This measure was

³³⁹ Darfur24, SAF affiliates complain of difficulty of war in El Fasher amid widespread hunger, 24 July 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁰ RSF, Sudan, 2025, n.d., [url](#); Skyline international for human rights, Sudan's draconian Cybercrime Law amendments pose grave threat to digital freedoms, 16 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁴¹ RSF, Sudan, 2025, n.d., [url](#)

³⁴² Euromedmonitor, Sudan: Amendments to Combatting Cybercrimes Law make authorities loose to stifle opinion, 8 December 2020, [url](#)

³⁴³ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #5, 14 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁴ Skyline international for human rights, Sudan's draconian Cybercrime Law amendments pose grave threat to digital freedoms, 16 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁵ Ayin Network, Sudan in a week: Ayin News Bulletin #5, 14 October 2025, [url](#)



perceived as coercive, and journalists feared denial of authorisation renewals when covering topics considered to be sensitive or controversial by authorities.³⁴⁶

2.3.2. Situation of journalists and other media personnel

(a) General overview

Sudan remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists.³⁴⁷ It was the second-highest country for journalist deaths in 2024³⁴⁸ and it ranked 156 out of 180 countries in the 2025 Reporter without Borders Press Freedom Index, with all indicators worsening compared to 2024.³⁴⁹ Since April 2023, at least 16 journalists have been killed according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),³⁵⁰ while The Sudan Journalists' Syndicate (SJS) reported 31 journalists' fatalities.³⁵¹ According to Ayin network, 556 journalists have been subject to human rights violations, 500 have been forced to flee the country, 239 have been arrested and detained and 1 000 have lost their jobs.³⁵² A survey conducted by the international NGO Media in Cooperation and Transition (MiCT) found that 90 out of more than 200 Sudanese journalists surveyed have experienced psychological threats and acts of violence.³⁵³

Journalists who remained in the country have been subjected to killings, detentions, enforced disappearance, attacks, and other abuses. As noted by Internews, authorities tightened control over journalism through work permits, movement restrictions, digital surveillance, and violence.³⁵⁴

A journalist in exile, Leima Eljali Abubakr, stated in 2025 that 'journalists and media institutions have become direct targets of the warring factions.'³⁵⁵ As of April 2025, around 70 journalists of those still in Sudan were reportedly working in the conflict zones, many of them forced to work in hiding or anonymously.³⁵⁶ In February 2026, Dabanga confirmed that around 80 % of journalists had lost their work since the start of the conflict.³⁵⁷

Both warring parties have targeted journalists, leaving no safe zones in either SAF- or RSF-controlled areas. While the SAF forces have been accused of arbitrary detentions, interrogations and torture of journalists accused of spreading false information or collaborating with the RSF, the latter has been accused of abductions, extortion and killing of journalists in areas under its control.³⁵⁸ Journalists and media workers have been killed by or

³⁴⁶ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025 [url](#), para. 62

³⁴⁷ CPJ, Record 129 press members killed in 2025; Israel responsible for 2/3 of deaths, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁴⁸ CFR, Violence Is a Growing Threat to Press Freedom Worldwide, 1 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁴⁹ RSF, 2025 Press Freedom Index, 2025, [url](#)

³⁵⁰ CPJ, Record 129 press members killed in 2025; Israel responsible for 2/3 of deaths, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁵¹ Reuters, Sudanese journalist returns to newsrooms decimated by war, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁵² Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #20, 26 May 2025, [url](#)

³⁵³ UNESCO, Sudan conflict one year on: a long-term impact on education, culture and the media, 14 April 2024, [url](#)

³⁵⁴ Internews, Sudanese Media Ecosystem, 2025, p.4, [url](#)

³⁵⁵ UNESCO, Despite the dire circumstances, journalists in Sudan continue their work with remarkable resilience, 2 June 2025, [url](#)

³⁵⁶ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁵⁷ Dabanga, Journalism Under Siege: Panel event explores the war of narratives in Sudan, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁵⁸ Al Jazeera Media Institute, Sudan's Journalists Are Being Silenced: By Bullets, Exile, and Fear, 17 September 2025, [url](#)



after having been targeted by the RSF and the SAF. On February 2025, the SAF arrested a journalist on reportedly false RSF collaboration charges; he died in the hospital after reported torture and denied diabetes treatment.³⁵⁹

Beyond targeted killings, journalists and media workers have been subjected to arbitrary detention, threats and intimidation.³⁶⁰ Reporters without Borders documented around 15 arbitrary detentions of media professionals since April 2023, with 2 of them remaining behind bars as of June 2025.³⁶¹ The CFJ recorded three cases of enforced disappearance and three cases of arbitrary arrest of journalists across Khartoum, Darfur, and Sennar. Some journalists were held for nearly a full year with no indication of which entities were responsible for their detention or their whereabouts.³⁶²

Arbitrary detentions involved media professionals ranging from freelance journalists and employees of the Sudanese public network SNBC, to journalists working for Al-Jazeera, Egyptian TV station Al-Ghad and the Lebanese website Tayyar. Most of these arbitrary detentions lasted several days, although some lasted much longer. Al-Jarida journalist Ali Tarek Arash was held for nearly ten months after his arrest by SAF soldiers due to his articles on abuses against IDPs. Hassan Hamed, a reporter for Independent Arabia, was arrested by SAF forces in October 2023 while reporting from Port Sudan. In January 2024, RSF forces unlawfully arrested media contributor Hassan Hamid. As of April 2025 both remained in detention.³⁶³ In late July 2025, RSF forces abducted Darfur 90.3 radio director³⁶⁴ from the Ardeiba market in El-Geneina in West Darfur,³⁶⁵ confiscating his equipment and reportedly transferred him from a detention centre to Dages Prison, southwest of Nyala in South Darfur in August 2025, despite the absence of formal charges.³⁶⁶ In October 2025, a freelance journalist was reportedly detained by RSF forces during the paramilitary group's advance on the capital of North Darfur.³⁶⁷ According to the organisation ARTICLE 19, the journalist, who had been reporting from El Fasher while the city had been under siege for 18 months, was accused of 'defamation' over his coverage of atrocities.³⁶⁸ In the same month, journalists based in El Fasher interviewed by the CPJ reported that the RSF raided neighbourhoods of the city and used informants to identify journalists.³⁶⁹ According to the Sudan Media Forum (SMF), some journalists have been kidnapped and beaten while others have been ostracised over their coverage of the Sudan conflict.³⁷⁰ In El Fasher, journalists reported being detained due to their journalistic activities, leading to self-censorship and anonymity out of fear of retaliation.³⁷¹ According to information received by Reporters without Borders, at least fifteen journalists have been subjected to cyber-harassment campaigns due to their reporting.

³⁵⁹ CPJ, Sudanese journalist Yahya Hamad Fadlallah dies after army arrest, 22 January 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁰ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#), para. 58

³⁶¹ RSF, News media silenced and at least seven journalists killed in Sudan's two years of war, 7 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁶² CPJ, Sudan: Committee for Justice Condemns Enforced Disappearance and Arbitrary Arrest of Journalists, Calls for Disclosure of Their Fate and Immediate Release, 9 March 2026, [url](#)

³⁶³ RSF, News media silenced and at least seven journalists killed in Sudan's two years of war, 7 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁴ IPI, Sudanese journalist held without explanation since July, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁵ CPJ, Sudanese journalist detained by paramilitary group since July, 10 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁶ IPI, Sudanese journalist held without explanation since July, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁷ CPJ, Sudanese journalist Muammar Ibrahim detained by RSF in El-Fasher, 27 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁸ ARTICLE 19, Sudan: Unfolding atrocities fuel free expression crisis, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

³⁶⁹ CPJ, Hunted, raped, starved: Sudan's journalists under siege in El-Fasher, 1 October 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁰ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁷¹ CPJ, Hunted, raped, starved: Sudan's journalists under siege in El-Fasher, 1 October 2025, [url](#)



Furthermore, foreign journalists who have reported from Sudan told the organisation that RSF soldiers were monitoring their movements.³⁷² For additional information see section [1.3.3. on access to information, misinformation and media landscape](#).

(b) Women journalists

In June 2025, Journalist Leima Eljali Abubakr described pre-war Sudan as a hostile environment for journalists, and particularly for women journalists enduring ‘systemic discrimination’, gender-based violence (GBV), and exclusion from decision-making processes.³⁷³

Of the 1 500 Sudanese journalists active before the conflict only 20 % were women and those currently still active face worse conditions, having to operate in a largely gender insensitive media environment.³⁷⁴ A Sudanese journalist told the Mashawir platform that ‘during the war, women journalists have been subjected to various types of systematic attacks aimed at silencing them and preventing them from reporting facts and covering events. Both sides of the conflict also exert significant pressure on women journalists, including threats of death and physical liquidation [elimination], as well as confiscation of equipment and closure of media institutions.’ As of May 2025, five women journalists have been killed since the beginning of the war according to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate (SJS).³⁷⁵ Four cases of physical assault or injury involving women journalists had been recorded, and 11 women journalists had been victims of shootings. 12 women journalists had been arrested without clear legal orders, often in connection to their journalistic work or writings criticising the authorities, the army, or the RSF.³⁷⁶

In October 2025, a female journalists based in El Fasher told CPJ that she was detained for 45 days in April and May 2025 due to her reporting of the siege of the city. She mentioned another journalist being ‘beat and gang-raped’ after her profession was discovered.³⁷⁷ See section [2.1.3](#) for additional information on female journalists and human rights activists.

2.4. Humanitarian and health personnel

2.4.1. Regulatory framework

Both warring parties established administrative bodies to regulate humanitarian access in areas under their respective control. UN OHCHR noted that the Humanitarian Aid Commission

³⁷² Freedom House, Freedom on the net 2025, December 2025, [url](#);

SUNA, [Facebook], السجن أربعة سنوات لمدان بتهمة الإساءة وسب قيادات الدولة , [Four-year prison sentence for man convicted of insulting and defaming state leaders"], posted on February 10, 2025, [url](#)

³⁷³ UNESCO, Despite the dire circumstances, journalists in Sudan continue their work with remarkable resilience, 2 June 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁴ IMS, Silence kills: The state of media in war-torn Sudan, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁵ Sudan Media Forum, Sudanese women journalists: systematic targeting and a heavy price in wartime, 3 May 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁶ Sudan Media Forum, Sudanese women journalists: systematic targeting and a heavy price in wartime, 3 May 2025, [url](#)

³⁷⁷ CPJ, Hunted, raped, starved: Sudan’s journalists under siege in El-Fasher, 1 October 2025, [url](#)



(HAC) in areas controlled by the SAF, and the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), in areas controlled by the RSF, imposed measures affecting the work of humanitarian organisations as well as civil society organisations, human rights defenders, and journalists.³⁷⁸ In May 2025, the Khartoum state government announced that all voluntary entities were required to register with the HAC – by paying a fee of around 800 USD [about EUR 700] and submitting a list of staff members or volunteers – in order to continue operating.³⁷⁹ Groups providing aid without registration ‘may be considered as operating illegally’. In the same state, HAC officials reportedly encouraged NGOs to channel funding through local merchants rather than ERR volunteers, which resulted in ‘bureaucratic delays’. The measure also led to the suspension of a major NNGO for its partnership with ERRs, raising concerns about the sustainability of ERR operations.³⁸⁰

2.4.2. Situation of aid workers

In 2024, the deadliest year on record for humanitarian workers according to the Aid Worker Security Report 2025, 60 humanitarian workers were killed in Sudan.³⁸¹ The 2025 aid worker security report compiled by the Aid Workers Security Database (AWSDB), a group tracking major incidents globally impacting aid workers, noted a shift in risk and casualty burden from international to local aid organisations particularly in areas where government authorities restricted humanitarian access or where active hostilities prevented international presence.³⁸²

At least 85 Sudanese humanitarian workers were killed between April 2023 and April 2025,³⁸³ while the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB) recorded 139 national aid workers deaths between 2023 and April 2026, alongside 75 wounded, 64 kidnapped and 19 detained.³⁸⁴ Between January and June 2025, as reported by UN OHCHR, at least thirty humanitarian and health workers were killed and 8 injured in North Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah, and West and South Kordofan.³⁸⁵

According to a Sudanese NGO, the lack of governance and security in RSF-controlled areas, has resulted in incidents of arbitrary violence by armed individuals. This has increased the risks faced by humanitarian workers when travelling to unfamiliar areas ‘where controlling forces often presume hostile intent’.³⁸⁶

ERR volunteers working in community-led public kitchens (known as *takaaya*³⁸⁷), a critical source of assistance on the ground, have reportedly been ‘abducted, robbed, arrested, beaten, and killed.’ Activists noted that their visibility within local communities increased their exposure to risk, while ‘it remained unclear whether community kitchen volunteers were targeted because of their humanitarian work or because of their perceived affiliation with one

³⁷⁸ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2026, [url](#), para. 63

³⁷⁹ Al Jazeera, Sudan’s aid workers fear crackdown under strict new army rules, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

³⁸⁰ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 3, 4

³⁸¹ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSDB, The Aid Worker Security Database, 1997-present, [url](#), pp. 1, 5

³⁸² Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSR, Aid Worker Security Report 2025, August 2025, [url](#), p. 7

³⁸³ UN OHCHR, Sudan: A War of Atrocities, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 105

³⁸⁴ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSDB, The Aid Worker Security Database, 1997-present, n.d., [url](#)

³⁸⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 23

³⁸⁶ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSDB, Aid Worker Security Report 2025, August 2025 [url](#), p. 6

³⁸⁷ MEE, Sudan’s takaaya community kitchens collapsing as population starves, 6 November 2025, [url](#)



of the factions in the war'.³⁸⁸ In April 2025, the community kitchen facility in Zamzam IDP camp was burnt down, killing at least two female volunteers.³⁸⁹ For additional information see section [2.1.2. Resistance committees](#).

Emergency lawyers reported an escalation of targeted attacks on aid convoys and humanitarian operations since the outbreak of war in April 2023, with more than 15 documented attacks on humanitarian convoys as of February 2026.³⁹⁰ In early June 2025, a UN humanitarian convoy waiting for security clearance overnight to continue to El Fasher in Al Koma locality, North Darfur, was reportedly hit by multiple drones. The incidents resulted in the deaths of at least five members of the convoy and injuries to several others.³⁹¹ In February 2026, a drone attack hit a World Food Programme (WFP) aid convoy in North Kordofan killing one person and wounding several others, while another strike near a WFP facility in the Blue Nile wounded a WFP employee.³⁹²

Humanitarian personal and ERR members are also exposed to the risk of being kidnapped for ransom.³⁹³ An increase in aid workers kidnappings has been reported in contested or transitional areas, reflecting a pattern of abduction by non-state armed groups for leverage or extortion.³⁹⁴ Available data indicated that 27 aid workers were kidnapped in 2025,³⁹⁵ with ransom demands typically ranging from 2 000 to 5 000 USD [approximately between EUR 1 670 and 4 180] and often increasing once families made initial payments.³⁹⁶ Documented cases included the enforced disappearance of a Red Crescent team of seven aid workers near Kadugli, South Kordofan, in June 2025.³⁹⁷ In April 2025, authorities in Dilling arrested a member of the Dilling ERR for interrogation and, in May 2025, four members of the Central Kadugli ERR were arrested by the SAF-aligned MIS.³⁹⁸

2.4.3. Situation of healthcare personnel

Between January and June 2025, at least 30 humanitarian and health workers were killed and 8 were injured across North Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah, and West and South Kordofan.³⁹⁹ As of October 2025, 46 health workers had been killed in El Fasher and 48 had been injured since the beginning of the conflict.⁴⁰⁰ In April 2025, RSF attacks in North Darfur resulted in at

³⁸⁸ Africanews, More than 100 charity workers killed in Sudan since start of civil war, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁸⁹ SIHA Network, Press Statement – Darfur Genocide Continues: RSF Slaughters Civilians, Women Volunteers, and Children in Zamzam Camp, 12 April 2025, [url](#)

³⁹⁰ Emergency Lawyers, [X], استهداف قوافل الاغاثة الانسانية, تقرير: [Report: humanitarian aid convoys targeted] posted on 7 April 2026, [url](#)

³⁹¹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2026, [url](#), para. 24

³⁹² The Guardian, RSF drone attack kills 24 people fleeing fighting in central Sudan, says doctors group, 7 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁹³ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025, [url](#), p. 4; Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSR, Aid Worker Security Report 2025, August 2025, [url](#), p. 6

³⁹⁴ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSR, Aid Worker Security Report 2025, August 2025 [url](#), p. 6

³⁹⁵ Humanitarian Outcomes, AWSR, Aid Worker Security Database [Sudan], March 2026, [url](#)

³⁹⁶ Africanews, More than 100 charity workers killed in Sudan since start of civil war, 27 February 2026, [url](#)

³⁹⁷ ACJPS, Sudan Human Rights Newsletter, June 2025, [url](#)

³⁹⁸ SIHA, Out of Sight: Sexual Violence and Ethnic Targeting in the Nuba Mountains / South Kordofan, 8 August 2025, p.14, [url](#)

³⁹⁹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 23

⁴⁰⁰ WHO, WHO condemns killings of patients and civilians amid escalating violence in El Fasher, Sudan, 29 October 2025, [url](#)



least ten summary executions of medical and humanitarian personnel, including nine staff members of an NGO providing health care in Zamzam IDP camp ⁴⁰¹ as well as a hospital director during an attack in Umm Kadada district. ⁴⁰² In early May 2025, during a raid on a hospital in the town of El Nuhud in West Kordofan, the RSF shoot and killed two medical professionals and injured a third, severely disrupting the provision of medical services in the area. ⁴⁰³

Following the fall of El Fasher in October 2025, RSF fighters reportedly killed 460 patients and abducted 6 health workers – 4 doctors, a nurse and a pharmacist – at the Saudi Maternity Hospital, the city’s last partially functioning facility. ⁴⁰⁴

According to Insecurity Insight, at least 107 health workers were arrested or detained in 58 incidents across 13 states during the reporting period from 15 April 2023 to 2 February 2026. In the first year of the conflict, most arrests or detentions occurred in Khartoum. Since then, cases have spread to other areas, with increases reported in the Darfur and Kordofan regions. Doctors, emergency medical workers, nurses, pharmacists, and surgeons were arrested or detained by the RSF and the SAF, often on accusations of supporting opposing conflict parties. ⁴⁰⁵ A pattern corroborated by the information supplementing the FFM report released in February 2026, reporting that ‘among men, former government employees, including teachers and doctors, were at heightened risk, often separated from other captives and not seen again.’ ⁴⁰⁶ Staff were often beaten or threatened while in detention. Four health workers arrested by the RSF were reportedly killed while in detention, including a doctor who was arrested in late October 2025 at the Saudi Hospital in El Fasher and shot and killed the following day. Of the 107 health workers arrested, 26 were reportedly released. As of March 2026, the status of the remaining detained health workers remains unclear. ⁴⁰⁷

In December 2025, the Sudan Doctors Network reported that 234 medical personnel were killed since the beginning of the conflict, with more than 500 wounded, 59 reported missing since the beginning of the war. 73 medical workers were being detained in Nyala, South Darfur, under poor conditions. ⁴⁰⁸

In April 2026, the Sudan Doctors Network noted that 20 doctors were held in ‘dire’ conditions in multiple detention facilities in El Fasher. ⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰¹ Relief International, “Zamzam camp, Sudan: A profound tragedy for Relief International as eleven colleagues mercilessly killed”, 13 April 2025, [url](#); BBC News, “‘Death is everywhere’: Sudan camp residents shelter from attacks”, 13 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰² UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 23

⁴⁰³ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 23

⁴⁰⁴ WHO, WHO condemns killings of patients and civilians amid escalating violence in El Fasher, Sudan, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁵ Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care in Sudan, 18 February-3 March 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁶ UN OHCHR, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, 8 July 2026, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, [url](#), para. 71

⁴⁰⁷ Insecurity Insight, Attacks on Health Care in Sudan, 18 February-3 March 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁸ Dabanga, Sudan war: 234 medical workers killed, ‘SGBV on the rise’, 19 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁰⁹ Al Jazeera, Thousands held by paramilitary RSF in Sudan’s el-Fasher: NGO, 27 April 2026, [url](#)



2.5. Ethnic groups

Sudan is composed of approximately 500 different ethnic groups, with Sudanese Arabs accounting for about 70 % of the total population.⁴¹⁰ The country is predominantly Muslim.⁴¹¹ Sudan's ethnic landscape is highly diverse and historically characterised by overlapping identities shaped by language, region, livelihood and political affiliation, rather than rigid ethnic divisions.⁴¹²

For background information on ethnic groups in Sudan, see section 2.4 of the [EUAA Sudan report - Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#) and section 2.5 of [the EUAA Sudan report - Country Focus \(February 2025\)](#).

Ethnic conflict-related profiling and targeting

In 2024, SAF's MIS reportedly targeted individuals, often based on their presumed or real ethnic identity, for allegedly supporting the RSF,⁴¹³ including Arab tribes from Kordofan⁴¹⁴ and tribes from West Darfur.⁴¹⁵ The RSF systematically targeted non-Arab/African groups⁴¹⁶ and carried out unlawful detentions of persons in Darfur based on ethnicity, particularly the Masalit⁴¹⁷ and the Zaghawa.⁴¹⁸ As the conflict continued, the ACHPR FFM observed that 'civilians were also extrajudicially killed for being perceived to support the opposing side of the conflict while others, especially in the Darfur region were targeted and killed because of their ethnicity.'⁴¹⁹

As of April 2026, territorial control of Sudan was divided between the SAF, holding Khartoum and the eastern regions, and the RSF, controlling much of the west.⁴²⁰ The situation of ethnic groups is presented according to areas of control of the warring parties, reflecting the conditions and dynamics on the ground at the time of writing.

For additional information on territorial control in Sudan, please see security situation section of the [EUAA, COI Query - Sudan - Major political, security, humanitarian developments and human rights, 09 April 2025](#).

⁴¹⁰ Minority Rights Group. Sudan, n.d., [url](#)

⁴¹¹ World Peace Foundation, Alex de Waal, The Conflict in Darfur, Sudan: Background and Overview, February 2022, [url](#), pp. 15, 16

⁴¹² Alex de Waal, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement, African Affairs, Volume 104, Issue 415, April 2005, Pages 181–205, [url](#)

⁴¹³ UN OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#); ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁴ ADF, SAF Accused of Targeting Civilians Based on Ethnicity, 6 February 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese military accused of ethnically targeted detentions, 24 July 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁶ Holocaust Encyclopedia, Darfur, 20 March 2026, [url](#); YSPH, HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY, El-Fasher Falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing, 27 October 2025, [url](#) p. 4; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Joint Statement: Genocide Returns to Darfur, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴¹⁷ UN OHCHR, Sudan: This tragedy needs to end, now, urges Deputy High Commissioner, 10 September 2024, [url](#)

⁴¹⁸ Al Jazeera, Threat of RSF invasion looms over el-Fasher in Sudan's Darfur, 4 December 2024, [url](#); Yale School of Public Health, Humanitarian Research Lab, Special Report: Fourteen Arson Attacks on Villages, North Darfur 2-12 October 2024, 16 October 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁴¹⁹ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 16 July 2025, [url](#), para. 38

⁴²⁰ International Crisis Group, Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace, 13 April 2026, [url](#)



2.5.1. Situation in RSF-controlled areas

Non-Arab/African groups in Darfur

According to different definitions, there are between 30 to 90 ethnic groups in Darfur, including the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, which are the largest groups, and other groups such as Tunjur, Meidob, Berti, Birgid, and Daju. Darfur's Arabs comprise about 35 % per cent of the population of the region.⁴²¹ Scholars refer to ethnicity in Darfur as a complex mosaic of multiple identities rather than a binary opposition between Arabs and Africans.⁴²² 'Ethnic labels are complex in Darfur, as explained by the New Humanitarian. 'Both "Africans" and Arabs are Black and Muslim, have been present in Darfur for centuries, and have intermarried with 'some non-Arab groups claiming Arab ancestry and others having become Arabised over time'. Conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs groups 'have historically been rooted in competition over land and natural resources, compounded by drought and the interventions of successive governments in Khartoum.' Across ethnic lines, all communities in Darfur have shared a historical experience of marginalisation by central authorities in Khartoum.⁴²³

As of April 2026, Darfur, the western part of the country, was almost entirely controlled by the RSF and its allied militia.⁴²⁴ These forces have systematically targeted non-Arab/African groups⁴²⁵ such as the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit⁴²⁶ and Berti⁴²⁷ through mass killings, attacks on IDP camps, torture, looting, and arson attacks against homes, villages and crops.⁴²⁸ Waves of ethnically motivated killings have been perpetrated in Darfur, and notably in West Darfur, in 2023 when non-Arab/African groups, and notably the Masalit, have been targeted by the RSF

⁴²¹ Waal, A. De, The Conflict in Darfur, Sudan: Background and Overview, February 2022, [url](#), pp. 15, 16

⁴²² Waal, A. De, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African identities, violence and external engagement, African Affairs, Volume 104, Issue 415, April 2005, [url](#), pp. 181-205; John Ryle, Disaster in Darfur, 12 August 2004, [url](#)

⁴²³ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁴ Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

⁴²⁵ Holocaust Encyclopedia, Darfur, 20 March 2026, [url](#); YSPH, HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY, El-Fasher Falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing, 27 October 2025, [url](#), p. 4; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Joint Statement: Genocide Returns to Darfur, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴²⁶ Holocaust Encyclopedia, Darfur, 20 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴²⁷ YSPH, HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY, El-Fasher Falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing, 27 October 2025, [url](#), p. 4

⁴²⁸ Holocaust Encyclopedia, Darfur, 20 March 2026, [url](#); YSPH, HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY, El-Fasher Falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing, 27 October 2025, [url](#), p. 4; Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Joint Statement: Genocide Returns to Darfur, 15 April 2025, [url](#)



and allied Arab militias.⁴²⁹ Among others, the Burgo,⁴³⁰ the Eringa and the Tama have reportedly been affected by RSF violence.⁴³¹ As indicated by ACAPS in 2025, since the start of the conflict, targeted ethnic groups in Darfur included, but were not limited to, the Dajo, Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.⁴³²

The 2025 UN FFM documented that acts committed by the RSF against ethnic groups included killings, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment, rape and other forms of sexual violence, as well as looting, pillage, and destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,⁴³³ including food, medicine, and relief supplies.⁴³⁴

El Fasher, which had been the last remaining SAF stronghold in Darfur, fell to the RSF on 26 October 2025 following an 18-month siege. The RSF progressively cut off civilians from food, water, medical supplies, and humanitarian assistance,⁴³⁵ including through the construction of an earth berm around the city reaching 68 kilometres in length by late September 2025, designed to block the entry of food and medicines, preventing civilians from fleeing⁴³⁶ and leading people in the city to starvation.⁴³⁷

The Sudanese Doctors Network (SDN) documented dozens of direct killings of civilians in an ethnic cleansing operation in El Fasher in October 2025. In social media footage recorded by RSF soldiers, the troops repeatedly used the slander *falangayat*, a slur used by the RSF to refer to 'African' tribes in Darfur, tracing back to a term used to describe slaves.⁴³⁸ The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reported an increase in dehumanising

⁴²⁹ HRW, Fighting Devastates Sudan's West Darfur, 1 May 2023, [url](#); UN News, Sudan: Attacks based on ethnicity may amount to war crimes, 13 June 2023, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: Tackle Spiralling Violence in West Darfur, 21 June 2023, [url](#); Reuters, Ethnically targeted violence worsens in Sudan's Darfur, rights monitors say, 11 July 2023, [url](#); ADF, Conflict Enflames Historic Ethnic Tensions in West Darfur, 18 July 2023, [url](#); REDRESS, Ruining a country, devastating its people, September 2023, [url](#), pp. 25-26; BBC, Sudan conflict: Ethnic cleansing committed in Darfur, UK says, 18 October 2023, [url](#); BBC, Sudan conflict: Thousands flee fresh ethnic killings in Darfur, 8 November 2023, [url](#); Reuters, Darfur refugees report new spate of ethnically driven killings, 8 November 2023, [url](#); HRW, Darfur Civilians in Jeopardy, 13 November 2023, [url](#); People Dispatch, Ethnic cleansing of West Darfur's El Geneina culminates in largest massacre since onset of war in Sudan, 14 November 2023, [url](#); CNN, 'They called me a slave': Witness testimony exposes alleged RSF-led campaign to enslave men and women in Sudan, 20 November 2023, [url](#); Ayin Network, Ardamata: One of the deadliest attack yet, 23 November 2023, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: New Mass Ethnic Killings, Pillage in Darfur, 26 November 2023, [url](#); see also Tubiana, J. and Craze, J., Darfur: The New Massacres, 10 February 2024, [url](#)

⁴³⁰ Sudan Conflict Observatory, Evidence consistent with alleged body disposal in El-Geneina, Report 010, 14 September 2023, [url](#), pp. 4, 6, 9

⁴³¹ HRW, Sudan: New Mass Ethnic Killings, Pillage in Darfur, 26 November 2023, [url](#)

⁴³² ACAPS, Sudan, Protection Risk Analysis 2025, 31 July 2025 [url](#), p. 1

⁴³³ UN OHCHR, Sudan: 'A War of Atrocities' – Sudan civilians deliberately targeted, UN Fact-Finding Mission reports international crimes on large-scale, September 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁴ UN OHCHR, Sudan: 'A War of Atrocities', September 2025, [url](#); UN OHCHR, Sudan: UN report details horrific patterns of violations committed during RSF takeover of Zamzam IDP camp, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁵ HRW, Sudan: Mass Atrocities in Captured Darfur City, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁶ YSPH, Residents of El-Fasher attempting to escape as RSF attacks continue, 26 September 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁴³⁷ UN News, Famine tightens grip on Sudan, with civilians trapped and aid blocked, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴³⁸ Ayin Network, Al-Fasher: Thousands of civilians detained, 27 October 2025, [url](#)



language, hate speech⁴³⁹ and accounts from survivors described being called slaves and subjected to ethnic slurs by the RSF soldiers.⁴⁴⁰

The city has a predominantly non-Arab population, particularly the Zaghawa and Fur.⁴⁴¹ These communities were among those most acutely affected by the violence. RSF fighters openly stated their intention to eliminate non-Arab communities. Survivors cited fighters as saying: “Is there anyone Zaghawa among you? If we find Zaghawa, we will kill them all” and “We want to eliminate anything black from Darfur.” UN OHCHR reported that ‘Zaghawa and Fur women and girls were targeted during sexual violence, while women perceived as Arab were often spared’.⁴⁴² Reports highlighted RSF executions of civilians, including those with disabilities, during the takeover of El Fasher, alongside abductions for sexual violence.⁴⁴³ Interviews with survivors indicated that many killings went unrecorded and that abductions and ransom demands soared, The New Humanitarian reported.⁴⁴⁴ In an investigation conducted by Lighthouse Reports, Sudan War Monitor and Sky News, two sources from the RSF confirmed that these killings were, at least in part, carried out on the basis of ethnicity. They detailed strategic planning to target specific ethnic groups within the city. One of the commanders explained that the RSF allowed members of non-targeted ethnic groups to flee while forcing others to remain in the city. The paramilitaries also removed non-Arab fighters within their ranks and allied ranks and prevented them from entering the city during the attack. These men were reportedly gathered in nearby towns in order to ensure they would not intervene to stop the massacre of their own ethnic groups.⁴⁴⁵ During the siege, thousands fled the city and nearby camps, bringing the RSF to label people who remained in El Fasher as collaborators of its adversaries, despite the fact that the majority could not afford to leave and were experiencing famine.⁴⁴⁶

The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reported ethnically motivated human rights violations targeting the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities committed by the RSF in El Fasher.⁴⁴⁷ Some observers have characterised the violence in El Fasher, as ‘genocidal’ in its intensity, and scope, as well as in its ‘specific targeting’ of non-Arab Darfuri population.⁴⁴⁸

⁴³⁹ UN OHCHR, Sudan: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – Sudan must address ethnic violence and prevent further escalation, 9 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁰ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴¹ UN, GENEVA / SUDAN FACT FINDING MISSION, 19 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁴² UN OHCHR, Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign, targeting non-Arab communities, UN Fact-Finding Mission says, 19 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁴³ UN OHCHR, Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign, targeting non-Arab communities, UN Fact-Finding Mission says, 19 February 2026, [url](#); HRW, UN Body Finds ‘Hallmarks of Genocide’ in Darfur, 24 February 2026, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: People with Disabilities Targeted in North Darfur, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁴ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁵ Lighthouse reports, The Killing Fields of Al Fashir, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁶ New Humanitarian (The), Pay up or be executed: El Fasher survivors speak of kidnappings and mass killings, 3 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁷ UN OHCHR, Sudan: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination – Sudan must address ethnic violence and prevent further escalation, 9 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁴⁸ Jamestown, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan’s War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)



In the months leading to the April 2025 attack on the Zamzam camp – an IDP camp close to El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur – the RSF blocked all food, water, fuel, and essential goods from entering the camp and systematically attacked those attempting to bring in supplies. To survive, many families resorted to feeding children with animal feed such as peanut shells (known as *ambaz*⁴⁴⁹).⁴⁵⁰

In the same period, in the Umm Kadada locality in North Darfur, the RSF reportedly carried out attacks on villages predominantly inhabited by members of the Berti community, resulting in the killing of at least 45 civilians.⁴⁵¹

The RSF has used sexual violence as ‘a deliberate strategy of domination and humiliation aimed at destroying communities,’ with ‘women reportedly raped in front of relatives and detained for days in conditions of extreme abuse amounting to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment’ as reported by UN OHCHR.⁴⁵² At least 104 survivors of the attack on Zamzam camp – including 75 women, 26 girls, and 3 boys, mostly from the Zaghawa ethnic group – were subjected ‘to rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery, both during the attack and along exit routes.’⁴⁵³ For additional information see section [2.6 on women and girls](#).

The UN HRC FFM found that the systematic pattern of ethnically targeted killings, sexual violence, destruction, and public statements explicitly calling for the elimination of non-Arab communities showed clear genocidal intent.⁴⁵⁴ The scale, coordination, and public endorsement of the operation by senior RSF leadership indicated that the crimes committed in and around El Fasher were systematic.⁴⁵⁵ In January 2025, the US Department of State (USDOS) noted that the RSF perpetrated genocide in the Darfur region during the war and imposed sanctions on Hemedti and RSF-linked entities.⁴⁵⁶ In October 2025, the EU extended the sanction framework established in 2023 against those responsible for destabilising Sudan and obstructing its political transition, to October 2026.⁴⁵⁷

Incidents of ethnic-based targeting, as reported by sources during the updated reference period, included but are not limited to:

- On 11–13 April 2025, the RSF launched a three-day offensive on Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur, killing at least 1 013 civilians, of whom 319 were summarily executed either in the camp or as they attempted to flee. Some were killed in their homes during

⁴⁴⁹ Dabanga, *Surviving on ambaz in North Darfur – when animal fodder becomes food for people*, 4 August 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁰ UN OHCHR, *Sudan: UN report details horrific patterns of violations committed during RSF takeover of Zamzam IDP camp*, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵¹ UN OHCHR, *Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025*, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 37

⁴⁵² UN OHCHR, *Sudan: UN experts appalled by reports of mass atrocities, unlawful killings and sexual violence in El Fasher*, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵³ UN OHCHR, *Sudan: UN report details horrific patterns of violations committed during RSF takeover of Zamzam IDP camp*, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁴ UN OHCHR, *Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign, targeting non-Arab communities*, UN Fact-Finding Mission says, 19 February 2026, [url](#); HRW, *UN Body Finds ‘Hallmarks of Genocide’ in Darfur*, 24 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁵ UN News, *Sudan: ‘Hallmarks of genocide’ found in El Fasher*, 20 February 2026, [url](#); UN OHCHR, *Sudan: Evidence in El-Fasher reveals genocidal campaign*, 19 February 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁶ USDOS, *Genocide Determination in Sudan and Imposing Accountability Measures*, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁷ Consilium, *Sudan: EU extends sanctions regime by one year*, 22 September 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, *EU blacklists seven in Sudan, including RSF leader’s brother*, 29 January 2026, [url](#)



house-to-house searches, others in the main market, schools, health facilities, and mosques.⁴⁵⁸

- Following the capture of Zamzam camp on 13 April 2025, satellite imagery analysed by the Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab indicated that RSF forces were deliberately burning the camp to the ground, with the area of damage equivalent to 165 standard football pitches. RSF forces cut off all roads in and out of the camp, restricting freedom of movement and preventing civilians from fleeing.⁴⁵⁹
- Following the capture of El Fasher in October 2025, reports indicated that approximately 460 patients and companions were killed when RSF forces entered Al-Saudi Maternity Hospital in the city, with other medical centres in the Daraja Oula and Al-Matar neighbourhoods also targeted. Over 6 000 pregnant women were left with no access to medical or reproductive health services.⁴⁶⁰
- On 27 October 2025, RSF fighters reportedly executed civilians in houses and those seeking refuge in Rashid dormitory at El Fasher University. According to testimonies received by SIHA Network, more than 300 patients were killed in Al-Saudi and Plan hospitals, including pregnant women and children.⁴⁶¹

2.5.2. Situation in SAF-controlled areas

Nuba in South Kordofan

Nuba is a collective name referring to ‘ethnic groups of African origin living in the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan or originating from that region’.⁴⁶² A report published in April 2026 by The Nuba Mountains Observatory for Human Rights, as reported by Dabanga, documented ‘228 Nuba civilian inmates and detainees held in prisons, police stations, and military and security detention centres in Kadugli locality, South Kordofan.’ The source reported that ‘the military intelligence, the security service, a security cell and affiliated “irregular groups” were accused of “carrying out arrest campaigns based on suspected cooperation with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - North (SPLM-N)⁴⁶³ or the RSF’.⁴⁶⁴

The Kanabi and Nuba in Al Jazirah

While there are no accurate population estimates, ‘the number of Al-Kanabi inhabitants is significant, especially in Al Jazirah State,’ where they are estimated to constitute roughly half of the population.⁴⁶⁵ The Kanabi include groups like the Bargo, Tama, Hausa, Aringa, Mararit, Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, Daju, Messiria, Awlad Rashid, Rizeigat, Nuba people, and groups of

⁴⁵⁸ CFJ, Sudan: UN report details horrific patterns of violations committed during RSF takeover of Zamzam IDP camp, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁵⁹ YSPH, Human Security Emergency: RSF Forces Capture and Destroy Zamzam IDP Camp, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁰ HRW, Sudan: Mass Atrocities in Captured Darfur City, 29 October 2025, [url](#); SIHA Network, El Fasher and Its Surroundings Face Endless Cycles of Genocide, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶¹ SIHA Network, El Fasher and Its Surroundings Face Endless Cycles of Genocide, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶² Cgrs, The situation of Darfuris and Nuba outside their regions of origin, 28 June 2021, [url](#)

⁴⁶³ In February 2025, the SPLM-N Al-Hilu formed an alliance with the RSF. For additional information see the [EUAA COI Query update – April 2025](#).

⁴⁶⁴ Dabanga, Sudan rights group: ‘9 detainees executed, 246 held in South Kordofan’, 22 April 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁵ CNN, Bodies in the canal, 16 December 2025, [url](#)



South Sudan, along with other smaller tribes.⁴⁶⁶ The Kanabi are a marginalised community often living in small farming settlements known as *kambos*. An investigative report by CNN in collaboration with Sudan War Monitor published in December 2025 noted that the SAF and allied militias, most notably the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), systematically targeted Kanabi farming communities in Al Jazirah and Sennar states. Between October 2024 and May 2025, the SAF and allied militias attacked 39 *kambos* in Al Jazirah and another 18 in neighbouring Sennar state. Attacks on an additional 87 *kambos* were reported across the two states.⁴⁶⁷

Evidence documented ‘shocking incidents’ where Kanabi people, as the residents of agricultural labourers’ camps, were targeted for their ethnic origin, particularly individuals from Tama, Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and Misseriya groups, on allegation of “collaboration with the RSF”.⁴⁶⁸

Drawing on survivor testimonies, verified videos, satellite imagery, and interviews with whistleblowers, Sudan War Monitor (SWM) noted on patterns of mass arrests, killings, village burnings, and bodies reportedly dumped in canals. The findings suggested that the violence was not isolated but part of a broader pattern of reprisals against communities perceived as linked to the RSF, particularly after SAF regained control of Wad Madani and surrounding areas.

In January 2025, a SAF officer quoted by CNN said that ‘anyone who appeared to be Nuba from western Sudan or from the south was immediately shot.’ Another source indicated that ‘they [the Sudan Shield Forces⁴⁶⁹] consider southerners, or people with African features, as second-class citizens – and therefore disposable.’ The report also notes that the SAF, intelligence services, and allied forces denied or minimised responsibility, while local accounts and open-source evidence pointed to coordinated attacks on civilians.⁴⁷⁰

Individuals from Darfur and Kordofan

In the first half of 2025, many arbitrary detention cases by parties to the conflict involved ethnic profiling, particularly of civilians from Darfur and Kordofan.⁴⁷¹ Multiple incidents involving hate speech amounting to incitement to violence were reported, targeting individuals and communities on an ethnic basis. UN OHCHR received footage in which SAF soldiers can be seen engaging in acts of violence against civilians from western Sudan, including unlawful killings, dehumanising and denigrating victims as *wassekh* (dirt), *afan* (mould), *beheema* (animal), and *abnaa e-dheif* (bastards), and referring to *nadhafa* (cleaning operations) in this context.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁶ SAR, Voices from the Margins: The Struggle of Al-Kanabi Communities in Sudan, 24 March 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁷ CNN, Bodies in the canal, 16 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁸ Stj-SY, Over a Thousand Days of War in Sudan, 29 January 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁶⁹ The Sudan Shield Forces is an armed group led by Aby Aqla Keikel. The group was established in 2022, initially siding the SAF, then defecting to the RSF and then going back to fighting for the SAF since October 2024. HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁰ Sudan War Monitor, Investigative Report: The Kanabi Killings, 16 December 2025, [url](#); CNN, Bodies in the canal, 16 December 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷¹ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 44

⁴⁷² UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 65



After re-establishing control over Khartoum and Al Jazirah states in the first quarter of 2025, the SAF reportedly initiated demolishing homes belonging to people allegedly affiliated to the RSF, particularly in areas on the outskirts of Khartoum and in areas formerly under RSF control such as Al Khairat village in East Nile. Residents in the area were mostly originating from Darfur and Kordofan and reportedly as many as 1 000 homes were destroyed.⁴⁷³ SAF officials stated that ‘these districts were sheltering “criminal elements” and functioning as logistical centres for RSF fighters and that these operations are part of a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan aimed at eliminating residual RSF cells.’⁴⁷⁴

The village of Al-Shaqiq, in the Taiba Al-Lahween area, in the Sennar state, was the site of attacks in April 2025, when the SAF-affiliated fighters – namely the BBMB and the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), as well as the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) personnel – allegedly attacked individuals accused of being ‘RSF “collaborators”’. The violence resulted in the killing of at least 38 civilians, including a significant number of women and members of the Rizeigat Arab community. In the same period, in North Kordofan state, SAF and allied fighters – primarily from the BBMB – ‘executed’ at least 36 civilians in villages near El Obeid following territorial advances. The victims included women and children and were from the Hawazma Arab community and other groups ‘perceived to be supportive of the RSF, including the Misseriya and Bedairiya Aulad Habeeb Arab tribes, and the Falata community’.⁴⁷⁵

Evidence collected by HRW suggested that the military targeted individuals from Darfur, profiling them as collaborators with their adversaries because the RSF originates from that region. HRW documented an account of Darfuri civilians sheltering in Khartoum being beaten and detained by security cell members and told they were ‘troublemakers’ and had ‘brought the war’ to the capital.⁴⁷⁶

In April 2025, at least 64 civilians were reportedly summarily executed by SAF-allied fighters in Khartoum city. The perpetrators targeted individuals affiliated with ethnic groups from the Darfur and Kordofan regions, including four men from the native administrations of the Misseriya, Ta’isha, Salamat and Khuzam Arab communities. In a separate incident, *mustanfareen* fighters reportedly entered a local mosque in the Jebel Awliya neighbourhood shortly after afternoon prayers, selected five young men affiliated with ethnic communities from Western Sudan amongst the worshippers, and executed them on the accusation that they had supported the RSF.⁴⁷⁷

2.6. Women and girls

2.6.1. Legal overview

The Sudanese transitional cabinet approved in April 2021 the ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), with

⁴⁷³ Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁴ Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 35

⁴⁷⁶ HRW, Sudan: arbitrary detention by army, security forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁷ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan, 1 January to 30 June 2025, [url](#)



significant reservations on articles 2, 16 and 29 of the Convention.⁴⁷⁸ These reservations have an impact on political and social equality, as well as on acceding equal rights in terms of marriage, divorce and parenting.⁴⁷⁹ However, as of April 2026, Sudan was not listed amongst the countries having signed or ratified the CEDAW.⁴⁸⁰ Sudan is a signatory to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa since 30 June 2008, but has not ratified it yet.⁴⁸¹

A study by UNDP, UN Women, UNFPA and ESCWA on Sudanese legislation affecting gender equality informed that, while the Sudanese constitution establishes equality of all persons before the law without distinction based on their sex, the nationality law, criminal laws, personal status laws and labour laws still include provisions that are discriminatory or not fully addressing gender inequalities.⁴⁸²

The Sudanese legal framework does not include provisions specific to domestic violence and marital rape; however, the 1991 Criminal Act, amended in 2015, includes provisions on rape and sexual harassment.⁴⁸³

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) noted that, in areas under RSF control, such as in Darfur, the Sudanese legal system has become ineffective in investigating incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), resulting in survivors of SGBV no longer reporting incidents to the authorities.⁴⁸⁴ The UN FFM reported in October 2025 that the investigative mechanism set up by the Sudanese authorities to investigate crimes committed by the RSF appeared to register mostly cases related to offences against the state, rather than infringements of human rights or violations of humanitarian law.⁴⁸⁵ For more information on access to justice, see section [1.2. Rule of law and administration of justice](#).

2.6.2. Violence against women and girls

(a) Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)

Since the onset of the armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF in April 2023, SGBV has seen an 'alarming rise' throughout the country's conflict-affected areas,⁴⁸⁶ with a surge of 350 % between the beginning of the conflict in 2023 and June 2025, and by 80% over the previous year alone.⁴⁸⁷ Sources reported evidence of SGBV being committed by both the RSF

⁴⁷⁸ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's cabinet approves CEDAW ratification, 28 April 2021, [url](#); The New Arab, Activists disappointed as Sudan government votes to ratify women's rights convention with reservations, 30 April 2021, [url](#)

⁴⁷⁹ VOA, Sudan ratifies Women's Rights Convention – with exceptions, 29 April 2021, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁰ UN OHCHR, UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for CEDAW – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, n.d., [url](#)

⁴⁸¹ African Union, List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 19 September 2023, [url](#)

⁴⁸² UNDP, Sudan – Gender Justice & The Law, 2018, [url](#)

⁴⁸³ UNDP, Sudan – Gender Justice & The Law, 2018, [url](#), pp. 9, 12-13

⁴⁸⁴ FIDH, "We were threatened with rape and violence for being Masalit" – from persecution in Sudan to precarity and insecurity in Chadian camps, December 2025, [url](#), p. 7

⁴⁸⁵ UN HRC, Paths to justice: accountability for atrocities in the Sudan, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/CRP.7, 24 October 2025, [url](#), para. 7-8

⁴⁸⁶ UN Women, The impact of Sudan's war on women, two years on, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁸⁷ UNFPA, Sudan Emergency Situation report #21, 23 July 2025, [url](#)



and the SAF,⁴⁸⁸ and their allied militias,⁴⁸⁹ with the vast majority of documented cases attributed to members of the RSF.⁴⁹⁰ The UN FFM noted that SGBV by the RSF was used on a ‘large-scale’ and found that the conduct ‘formed part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians’.⁴⁹¹ On 31 March 2026, Ruth Kauffman, emergency health manager for Doctors Without Borders (MSF), stated that ‘sexual violence is a defining feature of this conflict – not confined to frontlines, but pervasive across communities’.⁴⁹²

Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war,⁴⁹³ notably by the RSF targeting women and girls perceived to be of non-Arab ethnicity⁴⁹⁴ – such as Masalit,⁴⁹⁵ Fur, Zaghawa, Tunjur⁴⁹⁶, Berti⁴⁹⁷ – and/or perceived to be supporting the SAF.⁴⁹⁸ For additional information see section [2.5 Ethnic groups](#).

Sexual violence took the form of rape, mass rape, gang rape, sexual assault, abduction, sexual exploitation, sexualised torture, sexual harassment, forced nudity, and forced and child marriage, with both the RSF and the SAF implicated.⁴⁹⁹ In some cases, sexual violence resulted in the death of the victim.⁵⁰⁰ Documented victims of sexual violence were children as young as one year old⁵⁰¹ and women as old as 70 years old⁵⁰².

⁴⁸⁸ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#); UN OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 55

⁴⁸⁹ UN OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 55

⁴⁹⁰ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 8; UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

⁴⁹¹ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 68-70

⁴⁹² MSF, MSF report finds there are no safe places for women and girls in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#)

⁴⁹³ UNFPA, “As widespread as guns and bullets”: Sexual violence used to terrorize Sudan’s women and girls, 19 June 2025, [url](#), para. 3; FIDH, “We were threatened with rape and violence for being Masalit” from persecution in Sudan to precarity and insecurity in Chadian camps, December 2025, [url](#); SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁴⁹⁴ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 64; UN HRC, Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the Independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 73; SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 14

⁴⁹⁵ FIDH, “We were threatened with rape and violence for being Masalit” from persecution in Sudan to precarity and insecurity in Chadian camps, December 2025, [url](#); UN HRC, Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the Independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 19

⁴⁹⁶ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 14; UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 30

⁴⁹⁷ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 14

⁴⁹⁸ UN HRC, Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the Independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 73

⁴⁹⁹ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 58, 66; SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁵⁰⁰ UN OHCHR, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 56

⁵⁰¹ UNICEF, Sudan a crisis of sexual violence against children, 2 March 2025, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁰² UN HRC, Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 72



In 2025, SIHA Network described a pattern of ‘three waves of violence’ in relation to sexual violence by the RSF. The first wave takes place during the takeover of an area, when RSF members and allies resort to widespread rape and gang rape of women and girls. The second wave of violence occurs in areas under RSF control, with sexual violence targeting women visible in public spaces, and rape and gang rape taking place in the street.⁵⁰³ The third wave of violence relates to the abduction of women and girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation,⁵⁰⁴ as well as forced marriage.⁵⁰⁵ The UN FFM noted that sexual violence against women and girls also continued during flight.⁵⁰⁶

The pattern of widespread and systematic use of sexual violence against women and girls of non-Arab ethnicity by the RSF and their allies has been reported during the reference period in North Darfur (El Fasher and surrounding areas),⁵⁰⁷ South Darfur (Nyala and surroundings),⁵⁰⁸ West Darfur (El Geneina and surroundings),⁵⁰⁹ North Kordofan,⁵¹⁰ West Kordofan,⁵¹¹ and South Kordofan.⁵¹² For information on SGBV committed by the RSF during the previous reporting periods see [2.6.\(b\) of the EUAA Sudan Report – Country Focus \(February 2025\)](#) and section [2.5.2 of the EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus \(April 2024\)](#).

The United Nations Independent Fact-finding Mission to the Sudan (UN FFM) reported that sexual violence was also committed by members of the SAF in White Nile, Blue Nile, Khartoum and Northern State, including rape, sexual harassment, and sexualised torture, including in detention. Further, CRSV perpetrated by the SAF appeared to be underreported for fear of retaliation.⁵¹³

⁵⁰³ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵⁰⁴ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 13

⁵⁰⁵ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 13; UN HRC, Sudan, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 58

⁵⁰⁶ UN HRC, Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 77

⁵⁰⁷ UN HRC, Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), paras. 19, 20, 34, 72, 73, 77

⁵⁰⁸ ACJPS, South Darfur State: Internally Displaced women and girls have been targeted and subjected to sexual assault by armed individuals in Nyala town, 2 October 2025, [url](#); Darfur24, Three displaced women killed as violence against women escalates in South Darfur, 13 October 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁰⁹ FIDH, “We were threatened with rape and violence for being Masalit” from persecution in Sudan to precarity and insecurity in Chadian camps, December 2025, [url](#), pp. 4, 6; UN HRC, Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El-Fasher, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 17 February 2026, [url](#), para. 19

⁵¹⁰ SIHA Network, Unchecked brutality in Barah, North Kordofan: testimonies uncover systematic violence against women and girls, 20 November 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese doctors reveals hundreds of civilians killed, 57 women raped in Sudan’s Barra, Babnousa, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹¹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese doctors reveals hundreds of civilians killed, 57 women raped in Sudan’s Barra, Babnousa, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹² Adala Project and SIHA Network, Out of sight: sexual violence and ethnic targeting in the Nuba mountains/South Kordofan, 8 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵¹³ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the Independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 66

(b) Forced marriage

The Council of Europe (CoE) in its resolution 1468 of 2005 defines forced marriage as ‘the union of two persons at least one of whom has not given their full and free consent to the marriage.’ In the same resolution, child marriage is defined as ‘the union of two persons at least one of whom is under 18 years of age’.⁵¹⁴

While article 15 of the Sudanese interim constitution of Sudan of 2005 states that ‘no marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of its parties’,⁵¹⁵ the Personal Status Law for Muslims of 1991 does not define a minimum age of marriage, only mentioning puberty for women under section 34(1) and section 40(3), stating that a minor cannot be married without the permission of a judge.⁵¹⁶ Some sources noted that minority for a woman in this context was understood as under 10 years of age,⁵¹⁷ but this age does not appear to be explicitly stated in the Personal Status Law for Muslims.⁵¹⁸

In November 2020, the Sudanese transitional government agreed to lift Sudan’s reservations to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, including a reservation on child marriage.⁵¹⁹ The Sudanese transitional government also approved a National Strategy and Action Plan for Ending Child Marriage (2020-2030) in Sudan. However, these initiatives were halted before resulting in legal reforms following the military coup in October 2021 and the subsequent war.⁵²⁰

According to UNICEF’s most recent Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data (2014), the percentage of women aged 20-24 married or in union before the age of 18 in Sudan was 34 %.⁵²¹ A 2022 UNICEF Fact Sheet on child marriage in the MENA region noted that ‘the prevalence of female carers age 20-24 years who married at or before age 15 was 26.6 %’.⁵²² UNOCHA’s Sudan Humanitarian Update of June-July 2025 noted that ‘child marriage remains a significant problem’.⁵²³ A 2025 research study conducted in Kassala state noted that child marriage had increased in the state as a consequence of the conflict, including due to returning to villages with stronger norms and customs.⁵²⁴ Other sources noted that families

⁵¹⁴ CoE, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1468, 2005, [url](#)

⁵¹⁵ Sudan, The Interim National Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 2005, article 15 (1), [url](#)

⁵¹⁶ UNDP, Sudan – Gender Justice & The Law, 2018, [url](#) p. 9; Personal Status Laws; Girls Not Brides, Sudan, n.d., [url](#), section on minimum legal framework around marriage; Equality Now, Sudan – the Muslim Personal Law Act of Sudan, 1991, n.d., [url](#); Kakal, Tasneem et al., Intersecting injustices: child marriage and the law in conflict-affected Sudan, International journal for equity in health vol. 24, 27 Nov. 2025, [url](#), p. 2 in Background

⁵¹⁷ UNICEF, Sudan – Regional Study on child marriage, 2017, [url](#), p. 5; Kakal, Tasneem et al., Intersecting injustices: child marriage and the law in conflict-affected Sudan, International journal for equity in health vol. 24, 27 Nov. 2025, [url](#), p. 2 in Background; Girls Not Brides, Sudan, n.d., [url](#), section on minimum legal framework around marriage

⁵¹⁸ Sudan, قانون الأحوال الشخصية للمسلمين لسنة 1991م - قانون السودان [Personal Status Law for the Muslims of 1991 – Law of the Sudan] [url](#), art 34(1)), and 40(3); Equality Now, Sudan – the Muslim Personal Law Act of Sudan, 1991, n.d., [url](#)

⁵¹⁹ UNICEF Sudan, Gender annual report 2020, [url](#), p. 4; The Guardian, Sudan says it will stamp out child marriage and enforce ban on FGM, 27 November 2020, [url](#)

⁵²⁰ UNICEF Sudan, Gender annual report 2020, [url](#), p. 4; Kakal, Tasneem et al., Intersecting injustices: child marriage and the law in conflict-affected Sudan, International journal for equity in health vol. 24, 27 Nov. 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁵²¹ UNICEF, Data Warehouse, Sudan – percentage of women (aged 20-24 years) married or in union before age 18, [url](#)

⁵²² UNICEF, Child marriage in the Middle East and North Africa, February 2022, [url](#), p. 2

⁵²³ UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update June-July 2025, n.d., [url](#), p. 4

⁵²⁴ Kakal, Tasneem et al., Intersecting injustices: child marriage and the law in conflict-affected Sudan, International journal for equity in health vol. 24, 27 Nov. 2025, [url](#), p. 5

were using child marriage as a ‘coping mechanism’ in facing financial issues and access to education.⁵²⁵

The UN FFM noted reports of forced marriages of girls as young as 12 involving members of the RSF, with instances of coercion, including ‘killing or injuring family members’ and threats against family members.⁵²⁶ Forced marriage was often committed by members of the RSF in areas under the control of the paramilitary group.⁵²⁷ Out of the 985 documented cases of SGBV by SIHA Network between January and December 2025, 9 % were cases of child marriage.⁵²⁸

(c) Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C)

Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as all procedures involving partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons’.⁵²⁹

While FGM was criminalised in Sudan in July 2020, and the law provides a penalty of ‘three years’ imprisonment and a fine or closing of the premises where the FGM took place’,⁵³⁰ it remained ‘widely practiced’⁵³¹. FGM is reported to be a deeply rooted practice in Sudan.⁵³² Studies show a slight shift from the most prevalent type III to type I,⁵³³ as well as variations in the age at which it is performed, and the medicalisation of the procedure, being performed by trained medical professionals.⁵³⁴

Due to the on-going conflict there were no recent figures on FGM in Sudan.⁵³⁵ The latest comprehensive data set found on FGM in Sudan dates back to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) of 2014, conducted by the country’s Central Bureau of Statistics, which noted

⁵²⁵ ACAPS, Sudan Impact of the conflict on children, 17 November 2023 [url](#), p. 9; SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 19

⁵²⁶ UN OHCHR, Accelerating action for Sudanese women amid conflict – Statement by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 7 March 2025, [url](#); UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent Fact-finding Mission to the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 63

⁵²⁷ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 19; The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, Forced marriage in Sudan: a silent crime perpetrated in war and peace, 21 November 2024, [url](#)

⁵²⁸ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 12

⁵²⁹ WHO, Eliminating Female genital mutilation: An interagency statement, 2008, [url](#), p. 4

⁵³⁰ FGMCRI, Sudan: The law and FGM, March 2022, [url](#) pp. 3, 5

⁵³¹ Tadwein & Equality Now, Female Genital Mutilation amongst Sudanese Migrants in Greater Cairo: perceptions and trends, May 2025, [url](#), pp. 9, 11

⁵³² Tadwein & Equality Now, Female Genital Mutilation amongst Sudanese Migrants in Greater Cairo: perceptions and trends, May 2025, [url](#), p.p. 7, 9; Bedri, N., et al., Shifts in FGM/C practice in Sudan: communities’ perspectives and drivers, BMC Women’s Health, 30 December 2019, [url](#)

⁵³³ For further information on the types of FGM/C, see Tadwein & Equality Now, Female Genital Mutilation amongst Sudanese Migrants in Greater Cairo: perceptions and trends, May 2025, [url](#), p. 8

⁵³⁴ UNICEF, Female Genital Mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and child marriage in Sudan – are there any changes taking place? , June 2016, [url](#), p. 22; Tadwein & Equality Now, Female Genital Mutilation amongst Sudanese Migrants in Greater Cairo: perceptions and trends, May 2025, [url](#), p. 10; Bedri, N. et al, Shifts in FGM/C practice in Sudan: communities’ perspectives and drivers, BMC Women’s Health, 30 December 2019, [url](#)

⁵³⁵ Tadwein & Equality Now, Female Genital Mutilation amongst Sudanese Migrants in Greater Cairo: perceptions and trends, May 2025, [url](#), p. 6



that the practice was highly prevalent, with 86.6 % of women age 15-49 years reportedly having undergone FGM.⁵³⁶

In a 2022 report the FGM/C Research Initiative and Thomson Reuters Foundation did not find evidence of any judicial prosecution of FGM.⁵³⁷ In 2022, the independent media outlet Assafir Al-Arabi reported on an incident in which a person who sought to report a case of FGM to the police after the law criminalising FGM had been passed, was dismissed by the police officer at the station.⁵³⁸

For information specific to FGM on persons with diverse sex characteristics see section (c) under [2.8.2. Treatment by the authorities and societal attitudes.](#)

(d) Detention

The SAF reportedly held women in prisons on accusations of collaboration with the RSF, while the RSF is reported to have transferred detainees, including women, to Darfur.⁵³⁹ Some of the women detained by the SAF were facing death sentences, in instances on accusation of ‘collaboration with the RSF’.⁵⁴⁰

The UN FFM noted that arrests conducted by the SAF in areas they retook or at their checkpoints were mainly on the suspicion of collaboration with the RSF and lacked due process.⁵⁴¹ The UN FFM also reported on the detention of civilians by the RSF in areas under their control.⁵⁴²

Early 2026, the RSF was keeping over six-hundred women in detention in Korea prison in Nyala, South Darfur, including some pregnant and some with their children. Detention conditions within the prison were reported as dire and included incidents of exploitation of detainees.⁵⁴³ The RSF denied these allegations.⁵⁴⁴ In March 2026 three Sudanese female

⁵³⁶ Sudan, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2014 Final Report, February 2016, [url](#), p. 214

⁵³⁷ FGM/CRI and Thomson Reuters Foundation, Sudan: the law and FGM, July 2018 updated March 2022, [url](#) p. 6

⁵³⁸ Assafir Al-Arabi, Criminalizing Female Genital Mutilation in Sudan: an ongoing battle, 2 August 2022, [url](#)

⁵³⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudanese Army, RSF detain women in ongoing conflict, 20 May 2025, [url](#); SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 21

⁵⁴⁰ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 21; International Service for Human Rights, Sudan: over 25 women face charges that could lead to execution, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁴¹ UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 51

⁵⁴² UN HRC, Sudan: A war of atrocities, Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 5 September 2025, [url](#), para. 45

⁵⁴³ Darfur24, الدعم السريع يحتجز 600 امرأة في معتقلات بجنوب دارفور [The Rapid Support Forces detain 600 women in detention centers in South Darfur], 5 January 2026, [url](#); Türkiye Today, New report details detention of more than 600 women in Darfur prison, 5 January 2026, [url](#); ACJPS, Sudan war: at least 643 women arbitrarily detained in Korea prison in Nyala, South Darfur, 3 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁴ Darfur24, RSF denies detaining women in Nyala prison amid contradictory reports, 7 January 2026, [url](#); The Sudan Times, RSF denies claims of women being held in Nyala prison, 8 January 2026, [url](#); Rapid Support Forces, The RSF denies misleading media reports alleging the detention of civilians by its members in Darfur, 27 January 2026, [url](#)



journalist and several women activists were arrested and detained without formal charges by the RSF in Nyala.⁵⁴⁵

Over 840 women, including pregnant women, had been detained by the SAF between August 2024 and December 2025 in Wad Madani, Gedaref, Port Sudan and Dilling, on accusations of collaboration with the RSF. The report noted that the number of women under RSF detention was unknown.⁵⁴⁶

On 9 January 2026, Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan announced the immediate release of four-hundred women detained in Omdurman prison on public order charges, including mothers detained with their children, and the dropping of all charges against them, as well as the review of cases of women detained on allegations of cooperation with the RSF.⁵⁴⁷

In early February 2026, two women were sentenced to death by stoning on charges of ‘adultery’ in Greater Khartoum and Blue Nile.⁵⁴⁸ On 24 February 2026, the Court of Appeal reportedly reversed the sentence handed down in the Blue Nile State.⁵⁴⁹

2.7. Children

2.7.1. General Overview

Sudan ratified the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990,⁵⁵⁰ the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography in 2004,⁵⁵¹ and the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict in 2005.⁵⁵² It also ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child in 2005.⁵⁵³ The Sudanese Child Act of 2010 provides a national legal framework for the rights of children.⁵⁵⁴

By the end of 2025, UNICEF reported that over 15 million children in Sudan were in need of humanitarian assistance and 5.6 million children were displaced.⁵⁵⁵ Children faced increased protection risks, including child recruitment, exploitation and gender-based violence (GBV),

⁵⁴⁵ Committee for Justice, Sudan: Committee for Justice condemns the arrest of women activists in Nyala following their participations in a workshop on women’s rights, calls for their immediate release, 8 March 2026, [url](#); CPJ, RSF paramilitary group detains 3 female journalists in Sudan’s Darfur, 16 March 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁶ SIHA Network, More than numbers – report on the state of violence against women and girls in Sudan 2023-2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#), p. 21

⁵⁴⁷ Abdul-Fattah Al Burhan, X, 9 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Al-Burhan orders release of 400 female inmates from Omdurman prison, 10 January 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁸ Dabanga Sudan, Two women from El Gedaref and Blue Nile face death by stoning in Sudan prison, 4 February 2026, [url](#); SIHA Network, Gender Alert, 13 February 2026, [url](#); ACJPS, Sudanese courts sentence two women to death by stoning for adultery despite international obligations; 13 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁴⁹ ACJPS, Update: Sudanese courts sentence two women to death by stoning, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁰ UNTC, Convention of the Rights of the Child, n.d., [url](#); UN OHCHR, UN Treaty Body Data Base, ratification status for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵¹ UN OHCHR, UN Treaty Body Data Base, ratification status for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵² UN OHCHR, UN Treaty Body Data Base, ratification status for the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵³ ACERWC, Ratification Table, n.d., [url](#)

⁵⁵⁴ Sudan, The Child Act, 2010, 10 February 2010, [url](#); Sida, Sudan Country Case Study: Child Rights, 2011, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁵ UNICEF, Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 38, 12 February 2026, [url](#), p. 2



and family separation. Over ten million children remained out of a safe learning environment.⁵⁵⁶ In a March 2026 Child Protection brief on Sudan, UNHCR reported that ‘over 58 000 unaccompanied and separated children have been recorded across the countries hosting Sudanese refugees’, noting that the actual scale was likely higher. According to the same source, ‘family separation remains a defining feature of the crisis’.⁵⁵⁷ In February 2026, the UN reported that ‘in parts of North Darfur more than half of all children are acutely malnourished’.⁵⁵⁸ In April 2026, UNICEF reported that ‘famine has been confirmed in El Fasher and Kadugli’, and 4.2 million children were expected to suffer from malnutrition across the country in 2026.⁵⁵⁹

Killings of children have been recorded in 2025.⁵⁶⁰ In April 2026, UNICEF reported that ‘at least 245 children were reported killed or injured’ over the first three months of 2026, a ‘sharp increase’ from the same period in 2025, with most cases in Darfur and Kordofan states. Over 4 300 children were killed or maimed in Sudan since the onset of the conflict, and these numbers do not reflect the full scale of the situation due to underreporting.⁵⁶¹ Children are also victim of conflict-related sexual violence.⁵⁶² Additional information can be found under section [2.6.2. \(a\) Conflict-Related Sexual Violence \(CRSV\)](#).

2.7.2. Child soldiers

Sudan acceded the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict in 2005, is party to the International Labour Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour and has domestic legislation prohibiting the recruitment of children under the age of 18.⁵⁶³ The Armed Forces Law of 2007 sets the age of recruitment at 18, and provides for a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment for the offense.⁵⁶⁴

Both parties to the conflict continued to resort to forced recruitment of children during the reporting period,⁵⁶⁵ ‘particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions’ and ‘often under highly coercive conditions’.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁵⁶ UNICEF, Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No.38, 12 February 2026, [url](#), p. 2

⁵⁵⁷ UNHCR, Sudan Situation Protection Brief – Child Protection March 2026, 14 April 2026, [url](#), p. 4

⁵⁵⁸ UN News, In Sudan, sick and starving children ‘wasting away’, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁵⁹ UNICEF, “The reality for children in Sudan is growing darker hour by hour”, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁰ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 3; UN SG, Children and armed conflict, report of the Secretary-General, A/79/878-S/2025/247, 17 June 2025, [url](#), para. 189

⁵⁶¹ UNICEF, “The reality for children in Sudan is growing darker hour by hour”, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁶² UNICEF, Sudan A crisis of sexual violence against children, 2 March 2025, [url](#); UN SG, Children and armed conflict, report of the Secretary-General, A/79/878-S/2025/247, 17 June 2025, [url](#), para. 190

⁵⁶³ UN, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 219; SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake, 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁶⁴ Sudan Human Rights Hub and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: the future at stake, 24 December 2012, [url](#); Sudan, The Armed Forces Bill, 2007, [url](#), art. 14(1)(d), 178(2).

⁵⁶⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 29; ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 21 October 2025, [url](#), para. 129; Genocide Watch, The recruitment and use of child soldiers in Sudan, 18 March 2025, [url](#); UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), p. 6, para. 39

⁵⁶⁶ UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), p. 6, para. 39



In 2025, Ayin Network, noted that 'local leaders played an important role in the recruitment of children'.⁵⁶⁷ It also collected reports of recruitment of children under the age of eighteen by the SAF under the popular mobilisation scheme, with the involvement of Islamist groups allied to the SAF.⁵⁶⁸ Both the RSF and the SAF were reported to having used child soldiers for social media propaganda, including to encourage child recruitment.⁵⁶⁹

For information related to recruitment, including forced recruitment, of adults see section [2.2. Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups](#).

(a) Recruitment of minors by the RSF and allies

In January 2026, UN OHCHR reported on forced recruitment, including children, by the RSF in West Darfur, and military training of children by the RSF in El Geneina.⁵⁷⁰ In March 2025, over 300 children were reported to have undergone military training by the RSF in El Geneina.⁵⁷¹

In August 2025, the Colombian independent online media La Silla Vacía published an article on Colombian mercenaries training children and youth in an RSF training camp south of Nyala, South Darfur. A Colombian mercenary reported having been asked to be an instructor in a RSF training camp where between 1 000 and 3 000 Sudanese were trained, including children of 10, 11 and 12 years old.⁵⁷² Another Colombian mercenary sent to Nyala with the RSF was quoted by the Guardian as saying 'the camps had thousands of recruits, some adults, but mostly children – lots and lots of children. These are children who have never held a weapon. We taught them how to handle assault rifles and machine guns, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades]. After that, they were sent to the front. We were training them to go and get killed'.⁵⁷³ The involvement of Colombian mercenaries with the training of children recruited by the RSF in Sudan was also reported by Le Monde.⁵⁷⁴

The RSF continued recruiting children in parts of Darfur, including in West Darfur (e.g., in Ban Jadeed, Saraf Jidad, El Geneina, and Kulbus) and along ethnic community lines (such as the Eringa community and the Gimir).⁵⁷⁵ In October 2025, the ACHPR FFM, reported that the RSF 'adopted a systematic pattern of recruiting children to engage in active combat' and noted that the RSF had recruited children in various locations across Central Darfur State, as well as in South Darfur.⁵⁷⁶ In December 2025 young men, including minors, were allegedly kidnapped and forcibly recruited by the SPLM-N and the RSF in South Kordofan (in Rashad, Abu Karshola

⁵⁶⁷ Ayin Network and the Sudan Human Rights Hub (SHRH), Child Soldiers: widespread participation in Sudan's war, 10 August 2025, [url](#), see video from 4'00" and 7'08"

⁵⁶⁸ Ayin Network and SHRH, Child Soldiers: widespread participation in Sudan's war, 10 August 2025, [url](#), video from 08'00"

⁵⁶⁹ Bellinacat, Viral child soldiers on TikTok: the 'Disney Stars' of Sudan's civil war, 20 February 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁰ UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 39

⁵⁷¹ UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 39

⁵⁷² La Silla Vacía, Mercenarios Colombianos entrenan a niños soldado en Sudan, 3 August 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷³ The Guardian, 'War is a business': the Colombian mercenaries training Sudan's child fighters to 'go and get killed', 8 October 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁴ Le Monde, Colombian mercenaries join Rapid Support Forces fighting in Sudan, 5 September 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁵ UN OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan 1 January to 30 June 2025, 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 29; UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 41

⁵⁷⁶ ACHPR, Report of the virtual joint fact-finding mission on the human rights situation in the Sudan, 21 October 2025, [url](#), para. 130



and Al-Abassya Tagali localities).⁵⁷⁷ The RSF reportedly recruited *shamassa* (children of the sun), or street children, in Omdurman since the onset of the war.⁵⁷⁸

(b) Recruitment of minors by the SAF and allies

In a speech of 5 January 2024, the then SAF Assistant-Commander in Chief, Yasser El-Atta, stated that the SAF ‘will train even young children to defend themselves, their people and their land’.⁵⁷⁹ SHRH and Ayin Network noted instances of recruitment of children by the SAF for intelligence gathering.⁵⁸⁰ In 2024, the UN FFM noted having received ‘credible allegations’ of children patrolling with the SAF in Zalingei (Central Darfur) and Nyala (South Darfur) in 2023, as well as reports of children recruited by the SAF as *mustanfareen* (‘volunteers/mobilised’) through popular mobilisation in Khartoum, River Nile, Kassala, Gedaref, Sennar, and Red Sea states. UN OHCHR received reports of forced recruitment of children by the SAF in May 2025 in South Kordofan and in August 2025 in North Kordofan.⁵⁸¹

2.7.3. Labour exploitation

The 2010 Children's Act sets the minimum working age at 14 years, but allows children younger than that age to ‘work in pastoral and agricultural activities’.⁵⁸² The 2024 USDOS report on trafficking in persons for Sudan indicated that ‘[a]lthough information on the worst forms of child labour was difficult to obtain due to the conflict, observers report child labour remains prevalent in Sudan. Criminal groups exploit Sudanese women and girls – particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs) or those from rural areas – in domestic work and in sex trafficking’.⁵⁸³ For additional information, see section [2.6.2. Violence against women and girls](#).

In the report on MSHT in Sudan, GPG reported that, ‘organisations are noting higher rates of child labour and begging’ in Sudan.⁵⁸⁴ The same source detailed that children not benefitting from protection services were often subjected to forced labour, including informal and hazardous labour, unsafe work environments and faced many violations, such as not being duly remunerated and harassment.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁷⁷ Justice Africa Sudan, Statement Condemning Kidnapping and Forced Recruitment in the Nuba Mountains and Calling for Immediate Unconditional Release, 8 December 2025, [url](#); Sudan Human Rights Hub [Facebook], Human Rights Violations Alert – Forced recruitment, posted on 18 December 2025, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁸ Le Monde, The kingdom of the ‘shamassa’, Sudan’s children of war, 4 January 2026, [url](#)

⁵⁷⁹ UN HRC, Findings of the investigations conducted by the independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 223; @algassam1984, YouTube, 12 February 2024, [url](#), quoted extract at 3’15”

⁵⁸⁰ SHRH and Ayin Network, Child soldiers in Sudan: The future at stake, 17 July 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸¹ UN OHCHR, Situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 42

⁵⁸² UN, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Combined fifth and sixth periodic reports submitted by the Sudan under article 44 of the Convention, due in 2015*, 20 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸³ USDOS, 2024 Trafficking in persons report: Sudan, 24 June 2024, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁴ GPG, the impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, August 2024, [url](#), p. 20

⁵⁸⁵ GPG, the impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking in Sudan and the region, August 2024, [url](#), p. 20



In April 2026, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) noted that among forcibly displaced Sudanese families in Sudan, Chad and South Sudan, 18 % of households reported sending children to work, with higher rates reported when families were facing food insecurities.⁵⁸⁶

2.8. LGBTIQ+ persons

2.8.1. Legal framework

(a) Sexual orientation

Legislation on same-sex sexual acts and judicial practice

Article 152 of the Sudanese Criminal Act as amended by Law 12 of 2020 criminalises ‘indecent and immoral acts’ for ‘anyone who commits an act of a sexual nature in a public place or issues signals with sexual meanings that cause harassment of the public’s feeling or public modesty’ while article 151 criminalises ‘gross indecency’.⁵⁸⁷

Article 148 of the Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991 criminalises ‘sodomy’.⁵⁸⁸ Before 2020, the punishment for sodomy included flogging for first and second conviction, and capital punishment for third conviction. Law No 12 of 2020 amended certain provisions of the Sudanese Criminal act and removed flogging and capital punishment as possible sentences and replaced them with up to five years imprisonment for first time offenders, seven years imprisonment for second time offenders, and up to life imprisonment for third time offenders.⁵⁸⁹

In a book published in 2022 titled ‘Queer lawfare in Africa’, the authors also stated that there was no widespread enforcement of article 148 of the Criminal Act in Sudan, but rather that persons with diverse SOGIESC ‘faced risk of arrest and harassment by public order police’ on the basis of several articles of the Criminal Act related to ‘honour’ and ‘morality’.⁵⁹⁰

The 1991 Criminal Act as amended in 2009 was reportedly used to criminalise same-sex activities for both men and women.⁵⁹¹ While the corporal and capital punishment were abolished from the legislation in 2020, it was still reported by NGOs that flogging was being used for offenses of ‘sodomy’.⁵⁹² In 2014, the Swedish International Development Cooperation

⁵⁸⁶ NRC, Exhausted: three years of displacement and the collapse of survival systems in Sudan and the region, 9 April 2026, [url](#), p. 9

⁵⁸⁷ Sudan, Ministry of Justice, General Administration of Legislation - Department of the Official Gazette, Issue no. 1904 on 13-07-2020, Unofficial translation by Redress, n.d., [url](#), p. 7; Sudan, 13/07/2020 الجريدة الرسمية - الإدارة العامة للتشريع شعبة الجريدة [General Directorate of Legislation, Official Gazette Division - Official Gazette - Issue No. 1904 dated 13/07/2020], 13 July 2020, [url](#)

⁵⁸⁸ Sudan, Sudan: 1991 Criminal Act as Amended in 2009, 21 May 2009, [url](#), art. 148

⁵⁸⁹ ILGA World Database, Sudan, Area 1 Legal Framework, criminalization of consensual same-sex acts, [url](#); Equaldex, Sudan, homosexual activity in Sudan, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁰ Queer lawfare in Africa: Legal strategies in contexts of LGBTIQ+ criminalisation and politicisation, A. Jjuuko, S. Gloppen, A. Msosa and F. Viljoen, 2022, ISBN 978-1-7764116-8-9, [url](#), chapter 13

⁵⁹¹ Human Dignity Trust, Sudan Country Profile, 6 January 2026, [url](#); UN HRC, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 302

⁵⁹² USDOS, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, n.d., [url](#); The report did not specify which NGOs reported on the continued use of flogging.



Agency (Sida) noted that two other legal provisions of the Criminal Act had been used at times to prosecute LGBTIQ+ persons: Article 153 on ‘material and displays that violate public morals’ and Article 156 on ‘seduction’.⁵⁹³ These legal provisions were amended in 2020 and still in effect.⁵⁹⁴ For additional information see below [\(d\) Freedom of expression on SOGIESC](#).

Legislation on same-sex partnership

There is no legal framework in relation to same-sex partnerships in Sudan, but same-sex marriage is not recognised, making it de facto unavailable.⁵⁹⁵ The Sudanese personal status law defines marriage as ‘a contract between a man and a woman’.⁵⁹⁶

(b) Gender identity

The Sudanese legislation does not allow transgender persons to change their legal gender.⁵⁹⁷ The Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991 states under the ‘interpretation and explanations’ section (Art. 3) that “man” means the adult male, and “woman” means the adult female’.⁵⁹⁸

(c) Sex characteristics

ILGA World Database noted that name change was ‘nominally possible’ through judicial procedure, based on Article 30 of the Civil Registry Act of 2011 stating that ‘no correction or amendment shall be made in the civil registry except by a final ruling from the competent court that the original registration falls in the area of its jurisdiction’.⁵⁹⁹

(d) Freedom of expression on SOGIESC

Article 153 of the Sudanese Criminal Act of 1991 as amended by the Amendments Law of 2020 criminalises ‘materials and displays that violate public morals’. The provision imposes penalties of fines and imprisonment of up to one month for making, designing, trading or possessing such material, and up to three years of imprisonment for ‘whoever deals in materials that violate public morals or manages an exhibition, theater, cabaret, showroom, or any public place that violates public morals or allows it to be presented’.⁶⁰⁰ Equaldex reported

⁵⁹³ Sida, The Rights of LGBTI People in Sudan and South Sudan, November 2014, [url](#), p. 1

⁵⁹⁴ Redress, unofficial translation of the Republic of Sudan Official Gazette Issue no. 1904 on 13-07-2020, [url](#); Sudan, 13/07/2020 في المؤرخ ١٩٠٤ العدد رقم - الجريدة الرسمية - الإدارة العامة للتشريع [General Directorate of Legislation, Official Gazette Division - Official Gazette - Issue No. 1904 dated 13/07/2020], 13 July 2020, [url](#)

⁵⁹⁵ Germany, BAMF, Länderkurzinformation Sudan SOGI (Sexuelle Orientierung und geschlechtliche Identität): Situation von LGBTIQ-Personen; Stand: 04/2025 [Country brief Sudan SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity): Situation of LGBTIQ people; current status: 04/2025], 7 April 2025, [url](#); ILGA World Database, Sudan, Area 1 Legal Framework, n.d., [url](#) section 14; Equaldex, LGBT Rights in Sudan, n.d., [url](#), section on same-sex marriage

⁵⁹⁶ Sudan, The Muslims Personal Status Act, 24 July 1991, [url](#), art. 11

⁵⁹⁷ Equaldex, Sudan right to change legal gender in Sudan, [url](#); Germany, BAMF: Länderkurzinformation Sudan SOGI (Sexuelle Orientierung und geschlechtliche Identität): Situation von LGBTIQ-Personen; Stand: 04/2025 [Country brief Sudan SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity): Situation of LGBTIQ people; current status: 04/2025], 7 April 2025, [url](#), para. 1.1

⁵⁹⁸ Sudan, 1991 Criminal Act as Amended in 2009, 21 May 2009, [url](#), article 3

⁵⁹⁹ ILGA World Database, Sudan, Area 1 Legal Framework, n.d., [url](#)

⁶⁰⁰ Redress, unofficial translation of the Republic of Sudan Official Gazette Issue no. 1904 on 13-07-2020, [url](#); Sudan, 13/07/2020 في المؤرخ ١٩٠٤ العدد رقم - الجريدة الرسمية - الإدارة العامة للتشريع [General Directorate of Legislation, Official Gazette Division - Official Gazette, Issue No. 1904 issued on 13/07/2020] 13 July 2020, [url](#)



that this Article was used to censor the expression of LGBTIQ+ issues in Sudan.⁶⁰¹ An incident was documented in 2021, where a Sudanese newspaper was suspended for three days after reporting on a demonstration in Khartoum where demonstrators demanded the abolition of article 148 of the Criminal Act.⁶⁰²

2.8.2. Treatment by the authorities and societal attitudes

There is a lack of information related to incidents of violence specifically targeting individuals on the grounds of their diverse SOGIESC since the start of the war. The space that Sudanese LGBTIQ+ movements had found in Sudan between 2018-2021 was subsequently lost, and with it their capacity to report on incidents of violence against persons with diverse SOGIESC in Sudan. In cases where police officers perceived a person as having diverse SOGIESC, it is reported that they would not pursue criminal prosecution but rather subject them to extortion, harassment, and pressure.⁶⁰³ Forced displacement due to the war was reported to be a factor of heightened risk for persons with diverse SOGIESC as they went through checkpoints, or when experiencing a change in their accommodation situation and social life.⁶⁰⁴

(a) Persons with diverse sexual orientation

In the book 'Queer Lawfare in Africa', the authors noted that homophobia was 'widespread' in Sudan.⁶⁰⁵ While there were no recent reports on the treatment of persons with diverse sexual orientation, a 2015 publication noted that Sudanese persons with diverse sexual orientation faced discrimination, police harassment, arbitrary arrest, physical and psychological violence, treatments amounting to torture in detention, sexual violence including rape, as well as murder.⁶⁰⁶

(b) Persons with diverse gender identity and/or expression

Regarding transgender persons, the December 2025 Dutch report, citing a confidential source, noted that there were intersectional factors to consider when it comes to accessing gender transitioning in Sudan. An anecdote was reported of one wealthy/privileged trans person who managed to access gender transition in Sudan, while a person without such privileges could not access gender affirming care.⁶⁰⁷ In an interview transcript published in 2024 in a Sudanese Queer blog, Loud and Queer Sudan, a Sudanese trans woman stated that she managed to obtain legal gender recognition within Sudan. However, no additional

⁶⁰¹ Equaldex, Sudan, censorship of LGBT issues in Sudan, nd.[url](#)

⁶⁰² Darfur24, Al-Dar newspaper Suspended for three days, 18 August 2021, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudanese tabloid suspended for 'false news' about gay demo, 21 August 2021, [url](#)

⁶⁰³ Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 111

⁶⁰⁴ Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information report on Sudan, 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 112

⁶⁰⁵ L. Tønnessen et al, Queer Lawfare in Africa: legal strategies in contexts of LGBTIQ+ criminalisation and politicisation, Pretoria University Press July 2022, [url](#), p. 406

⁶⁰⁶ S. Berkouwer et al, Homosexuality in Sudan and Egypt: Stories of the Struggle for Survival, Harvard Kennedy School, LGBTQ Policy Journal, January 13, 2015, [url](#), pp. 8-13

⁶⁰⁷ Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Country of Origin Information report on Sudan, 1 December 2025, [url](#), p. 113



information was found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report on when the events took place or details on the process.⁶⁰⁸

(c) Persons with diverse sex characteristics

When a resolution on ‘Combating discrimination, violence and harmful practices against intersex persons’ was adopted on 4 April 2024 by the UN HRC, Sudan chose to abstain from the vote.⁶⁰⁹ Information on the treatment of diverse sex characteristics in Sudan was only found in medical journals. A 2014 article titled ‘Pattern of developmental sex disorders in a tertiary hospital in Sudan’ studied 40 patients admitted for ‘developmental sex disorders’ at the Soba University Hospital. The study noted that patients were provided with hormonal treatment, and that surgeries were performed, including on children.⁶¹⁰ Intersex cases were managed by multidisciplinary teams, that included medical professionals, as well as lawyers and religious leaders.⁶¹¹ The study noted that while intersex cases were not uncommon in Sudan, management was difficult as specialised services were only available in Khartoum at the time. It also pointed at sociocultural norms resulting in challenges for intersex individuals, once the naming ceremony done and the sex had been assigned.⁶¹² Two other medical studies of 2015 and 2024 noted that intersex persons and their families in Sudan can experience social stigma and exclusion, psychological pressure and difficulties to access medical facilities.⁶¹³ The risk of FGM was high for intersex children in Sudan, with specific risks for children assigned at birth as female and undergoing FGM, resulting in penis amputation.⁶¹⁴

⁶⁰⁸ Loud and Queer, Amy Abdo; a journey from the past that changed the present and the future, 27 March 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁰⁹ UN HRC, Human Rights Council, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 4 April 2024, 55/14. Combating discrimination, violence and harmful practices against intersex persons, A/HRC/RSE/55/14, 4 April 2024, [url](#), p. 3

⁶¹⁰ H. A. M. Ali et al, Pattern of developmental sex disorders in a tertiary hospital in Sudan, International Journal of Medicine, 1 July 2014, [url](#), paras. 1-3

⁶¹¹ H. A. M. Ali et al, Pattern of developmental sex disorders in a tertiary hospital in Sudan, International Journal of Medicine, 1 July 2014, [url](#), para. 2; Fadl Elmula Imad., Clinical, Cytogenetic, and Molecular characterization of Disorders of Sexual Development (DSD) in Sudan, Genomics & Applied Biology, 2015, [url](#), p. 6

⁶¹² H. A. M. Ali et al, Pattern of developmental sex disorders in a tertiary hospital in Sudan, International Journal of Medicine, 1 July 2014, [url](#), para. 4

⁶¹³ Manal M.E.A. Elkareem et al, Clinical and genetic characteristics of disorders of sex development in Sudanese patients, African Journal of Reproductive Health, April 2024, [url](#), para.4 and p. 18; Fadl Elmula Imad., Clinical, Cytogenetic, and Molecular characterization of Disorders of Sexual Development (DSD) in Sudan, Genomics & Applied Biology, 2015, [url](#), p. 5

⁶¹⁴ Manal M.E.A. Elkareem et al, Clinical and genetic characteristics of disorders of sex development in Sudanese patients, African Journal of Reproductive Health, April 2024, [url](#), para. 4, p. 18; Fadl Elmula Imad., Clinical, Cytogenetic, and Molecular characterization of Disorders of Sexual Development (DSD) in Sudan, Genomics & Applied Biology, 2015, [url](#), p. 4



3. Key socio-economic indicators with focus on Khartoum

3.1. Socio-economic situation

Sudan's economy has been severely destabilised by the ongoing conflict. Significant economic deterioration was recorded across key sectors such as agriculture, industry, and services,⁶¹⁵ alongside the widespread loss of livelihoods and displacement of millions of people.⁶¹⁶ The national economy experienced a sharp decline⁶¹⁷ and triple-digit annual inflation persisting for years.⁶¹⁸ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from 51.67 billion USD in 2022 to 31.51 billion USD in 2025. Projections suggested a total reduction of 48 % by the end of 2025, equivalent to economic losses of 15 billion USD.⁶¹⁹ The inflation rate increased due to the over printing of money, from 200 % in 2020 to 500 % in 2025.⁶²⁰ Consumer price inflation, which reached 359.1 % in 2021, remained extremely high over time reaching 185.7 % in 2023 and 151.1 % in 2024. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated that the public debt rose significantly, reaching 253 % of GDP in 2023 and slightly reduced to 221 % in 2025.⁶²¹ A financial expert cited by the Sudan Media Forum indicated that 'high inflation and currency depreciation have eroded incomes, significantly shrinking the middle class and expanding poverty.'⁶²²

The national currency has collapsed.⁶²³ The value of the SDG against USD on the black market deteriorated from 55 SDG/ 1 USD in 2020 to 601 SDG/ 1 USD in 2023 and 3 500 SDG/ 1 USD in April 2026.⁶²⁴

Between 70 and 80 % of industrial facilities have either ceased operations or sustained damaged due to supply chains disruptions and operational challenges.⁶²⁵

⁶¹⁵ Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M., Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges, 20 August 2025, [url](#), p. 3, 6

⁶¹⁶ Siddig, K. et al., War and Resilience: The Multifaceted Impacts of Sudan's Conflict and Pathways to Recovery. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2026, [url](#), p. 57-58

⁶¹⁷ IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2025, [url](#), p. 129

⁶¹⁸ Africanews, Sudan's war has left the country's economy shattered, 20 January 2026, [url](#); Conversation (The), Sudan's war is an economic disaster: here's how bad it could get, 16 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶¹⁹ Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M., Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges, 20 August 2025, [url](#), p. 3, 6

⁶²⁰ Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M., Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges, 20 August 2025, [url](#), p. 6

⁶²¹ IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2025, [url](#), p. 129

⁶²² Sudan Media Forum, Sudan at the Heart of an Economic Storm: Sharp Contraction and an Uncertain Future, 28 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶²³ Africanews, Sudan's war has left the country's economy shattered, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

⁶²⁴ Africanews, Sudan's war has left the country's economy shattered, 20 January 2026, [url](#); Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M., Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges, 20 August 2025, [url](#), p. 6; the Sudanese Pound exchange rate for April 2026 was retrieved from [Inforeuro](#)

⁶²⁵ Sudan Media Forum, Sudan at the Heart of an Economic Storm: Sharp Contraction and an Uncertain Future, 28 March 2026, [url](#)



The conflict has reshaped economic geography by creating separate economic zones under SAF and RSF control, which has inhibited trade flows, raised prices, and reduced access to food.⁶²⁶ Declining production and persistent logistical disruptions have led to a marked contraction in Sudan's exports — particularly in gold and agricultural commodities.⁶²⁷ Agriculture, a key pillar of the country's economy, has also seen production decline by between 30 % and 50 %. Contributing factors included 'lack of financing, rising input costs, and logistical constraints.'⁶²⁸ The introduction of multiple fees on livestock exporters since the beginning of the war has affected further exports operations.⁶²⁹ At the same time, the depreciation of the SDG has driven up import costs, limiting the country's capacity to procure essential goods.⁶³⁰

The banking system continued to face a liquidity crisis.⁶³¹ Banking operations, most of them based in Khartoum, have been suspended for the most part due to insecurity, power outages, and looting.⁶³² Khartoum Bank lost over 38 % of its funds, and banks entered acute liquidity shortages prompting many users to shift to electronic banking applications licenced by the Central Bank such as Cashie, Cyper Pay, and Bravo. The mobile app Bankak, operated by the Bank of Khartoum, is reportedly widely used, particularly because it allows users to open new accounts entirely online using only the national identification number and allows high financial limits.⁶³³ As of March 2026, the liquidity crisis continued in Khartoum where people rely entirely on banking applications such as Bankak and Okash with transfer fees sometimes reaching fifteen per cent.⁶³⁴

⁶²⁶ IFPRI, War and resilience: The multifaceted impacts of Sudan's conflict and pathways to recovery, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶²⁷ Sudan Media Forum, Sudan at the Heart of an Economic Storm: Sharp Contraction and an Uncertain Future, 28 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶²⁸ Sudan Media Forum, Sudan at the Heart of an Economic Storm: Sharp Contraction and an Uncertain Future, 28 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶²⁹ Sudan Tribune, Sudan livestock exporters halt shipments over 17% vat tax, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

⁶³⁰ Sudan Media Forum, Sudan at the Heart of an Economic Storm: Sharp Contraction and an Uncertain Future, 28 March 2026, [url](#)


⁶³¹ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#); Sudanhizon, Banking Applications After the War: A Missing Competition, 8 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶³² IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 59; IRC, Watchlist Crisis Alert: Sudan — A Catastrophe the World is Choosing to Ignore, 25 June 2024, [url](#), p. 15

⁶³³ Alnilin, غائبة منافسة.. الحرب بعد البنكية التطبيقات, [Banking apps after the war: a lack of competition], 9 March 2026, [url](#)


⁶³⁴ YCON Sudan, Implication of war in Sudan, March 2026 report, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 29





Map 2: Khartoum reference map⁶³⁵

⁶³⁵ MSF, GeoMSF Platform, Khartoum Reference Map, 28 June 2023, [url](https://geo.msf.org)



Map 3: Khartoum neighbourhoods⁶³⁶

Civilian Infrastructure in the capital Khartoum

Khartoum suffered major infrastructure damage.⁶³⁷ Armed actions have damaged Sudan's infrastructure, including roads, supply chains⁶³⁸ and three major bridges.⁶³⁹ According to a report from July 2025, central areas of the capital — including banks, media offices, government buildings, and the Presidential Palace — suffered major destruction. The Jabal Awliya area showed widespread damage to cars, homes, and military vehicles. The walls of the Ministry of Interior in south Khartoum have collapsed and display evidence of gunfire, while military headquarters and other prominent buildings have also been heavily affected. As Khartoum's cemeteries became full due to the rising number of casualties from the conflict, makeshift burial grounds spread across the capital. Sudanese families resorted to burying their loved ones in public spaces and along roadsides.⁶⁴⁰ UNDP Sudan reported in January

⁶³⁶ EUAA visualisation of Khartoum neighbourhoods. Map data: Information Management Working Group (IMWG), OCHA, [url](#); OpenStreetMap contributors available from <https://www.openstreetmap.org/>

⁶³⁷ BISI, Khartoum Under Sudan Armed Forces Governance: Inflation, Supply Shortages, and Urban Damage in Wartime Sudan, March 2026, [url](#)

⁶³⁸ Africanews, Sudan's economy contracts 40% as war rages, 13 August 2024, [url](#); IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 3; Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M. (2025): Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges. International Journal of Sudan Research (IJSR), Vol. 13, Nos 1/2, pp. 25-36, p. 3, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

⁶³⁹ The New Arab, Sudan war leaves Khartoum on brink of total service collapse, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁰ New Arab (The), Khartoum: Destroyed buildings, cars covered in ash tell horrors of war in Sudan capital, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

2026 that schools and hospitals in the country were in ruins, wells contaminated, markets shut and electricity and water supplies were failing.⁶⁴¹

Khartoum's electricity network lost 90 % of its capacity due to shelling, theft, and looting.⁶⁴² As of February 2026, much of the city still lacked power, especially in eastern and southern areas, while some neighbourhoods, like Al-Sahafa, have seen partial restoration. The looting of underground cables and a shortage of transformers— with only 400 arrived out of the 14 000 required — hampered repairs. Despite ongoing outages, sales offices reopened, and public-awareness campaigns warned against dangerous informal connections, with fines up to 300 000 SDG [approximately EUR 95] for violations.⁶⁴³

Telecommunications infrastructure became an early and deliberate target by warring parties, pushing entire regions and cities into prolonged digital isolation.⁶⁴⁴ In February 2024, the RSF had seized control of the data centres of several internet service providers in Khartoum and most areas controlled by the RSF lacked consistent internet connectivity through Sudan's mobile network operators.⁶⁴⁵

Environmental experts warned of a 'catastrophic' situation, highlighting that the collapsed infrastructure in Khartoum, together with outdated land distribution and a lack of modern sewage or water networks, posed major challenges to the reconstruction of the city.⁶⁴⁶ By December 2025, reportedly only one out of thirteen water stations remained operational, severely limiting water supplies.⁶⁴⁷ As of February 2026, most residents across Khartoum continued to face unresolved drinking water shortages, forcing many returnees to relocate to west, central and east Khartoum.⁶⁴⁸

After visiting Khartoum in June 2025, the WFP Sudan representative and country director reported that there was 'widespread destruction, limited access to water, healthcare and electricity, and a cholera outbreak. In parts of the city, life was returning - but many neighbourhoods remain abandoned, like a ghost city'.⁶⁴⁹ In December 2024, the government estimated reconstruction costs in areas regained by the SAF at around 200 USD billion.⁶⁵⁰ By January 2026, the UN had raised the estimate to at least 350 USD billion.⁶⁵¹

3.1.1. Employment

In early 2026, crisis outcomes in Eastern Sudan and Khartoum were expected to persist due to reduced access to income-earning opportunities for both IDPs and the host community,

⁶⁴¹ UNDP Sudan, After 1,000 days of war, Sudan's people can't wait to rebuild their lives, 12 January 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴² New Arab (The), Sudan war leaves Khartoum on brink of total service collapse, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴³ Atar Network, Khartoum struggles to restore water and power after war, 16 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁴ Geeska, Starlink on the ruins of Sudan's networks, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁵ Accessnow, #KeepItOn: Time to end Sudan's isolation; lift the WhatsApp block now, 25 September 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁶ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁷ New Arab (The), Sudan war leaves Khartoum on brink of total service collapse, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁸ Atar Network, Khartoum struggles to restore water and power after war, 16 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁴⁹ New Arab (The), High risk of famine near Sudan capital, says World Food Programme, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁰ Africanews, Sudan's war has left the country's economy shattered, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁵¹ Africanews, Reconstruction underway in Khartoum even as war in Sudan continues, 22 January 2026, [url](#)



resulting from conflict and displacement, widespread destruction of infrastructure, below-average stocks, and high food prices.⁶⁵²

Sudan's labour market has contracted sharply since April 2023, with unemployment rates skyrocketing,⁶⁵³ the economy collapsing, resources diverted to the conflict and an expanded informal sector replacing formal employment and resulting in the war economy taking over a previously struggling economy.⁶⁵⁴

The Sudan Welfare Monitoring Survey, conducted in 2025 among 4 241 households in Blue Nile, White Nile, Kassala, and Red Sea states indicated that employment levels among Sudanese increased between 2024 and 2025, particularly among men and those with a secondary or high school education. Persistent gender disparities continued to limit workforce participation among both Sudanese and refugee women.⁶⁵⁵

Refugees in Sudan, mostly originating from South Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia, largely worked in the informal sector outside camps – primarily in agriculture and small-scale trade.⁶⁵⁶ Employment among refugees saw a slight decline between 2024 and 2025 due to barriers to employment outside refugee camps. Refugees with higher education were an exception, as they have experienced an increase in employment.⁶⁵⁷ The legal framework defined by the 2014 Asylum Regulation Act did not provide clarity on the procedures to obtain work permits. This, coupled with movement restrictions and security concerns, limited job opportunities. Additionally, regional disparities in law enforcement and administrative capacity constrained refugees' access to formal work.⁶⁵⁸

Agricultural labour opportunities — normally a key income source during the harvest — remained scarce due to insecurity, leaving millions of households without viable livelihoods and increasingly dependent on extreme coping strategies, including begging for food.⁶⁵⁹

Public wage erosion and payment disruptions persisted in the country: the Ministry of Finance approved retroactive salary increases in the 2026 budget to begin in March 2026, but these had not been implemented by April 2026, deepening social pressure and reducing confidence in state payments.⁶⁶⁰

⁶⁵² FEWS NET, Famine thresholds no longer met, but credible risk of Famine persists in parts of Sudan, February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁵³ Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Sudan, 2026 [url](#), p. 23

⁶⁵⁴ SudanNile, السودان من ما قبل الثورة إلى فخ الصراع (2017–2026): قراءة اقتصادية في دورة الانهيار والتحول, [Sudan from Pre-Revolution to the Trap of Conflict (2017–2026): An Economic Reading of the Cycle of Collapse and Transformation], 16 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁵⁵ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), pp. 15, 16

⁶⁵⁶ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 17

⁶⁵⁷ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), pp. 15, 16

⁶⁵⁸ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 17

⁶⁵⁹ IPC, SUDAN: Famine threshold for acute malnutrition surpassed in two more North Darfur localities, crisis worsening in Greater Kordofan, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁰ SudanNile, أساتذة الجامعات السودانية يُنفذون إضراباً عن العمل لتدني الرواتب, [Sudanese university professors are on strike over low salaries], 31 March 2026, [url](#)



The World Bank indicated a rise in unemployment in the country from 2022 to 2024, resulting from ‘widespread business closures, economic uncertainty, and a sharp decline in stable job opportunities due to the severe impact of the conflict on the labour market’. Unemployment rates went from 32 % in 2022 to 46 % in 2023 and 47 % in 2024⁶⁶¹ with 4.6 million jobs lost since the beginning of the conflict.⁶⁶² The 2026 World Economic Outlook by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicated an unemployment rate of 60.1% for 2025.⁶⁶³ More than half of the refugees interviewed by the Sudan Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted in 2025 reported that they had not worked between May and July 2025, a slight increase compared to 12 months earlier. The share of refugees relying on food aid increased from 42 % to 45 %.⁶⁶⁴

According to economist Dr Abdel Halim Timan, as reported by Dabanga, the war has increased youth unemployment, due to the widespread disruption to education, particularly in western Sudan. This has deepened inequality and driven some young people towards recruitment by armed groups, increasing the risk of prolonged conflict.⁶⁶⁵

Increased prevalence of child labour is a concerning trend, particularly among households struggling with food security, in refugee communities, and among Sudanese families with lower education levels.⁶⁶⁶ Sudanese boys frequently engage in informal work, such as agriculture, herding, restaurant jobs, and street vending.⁶⁶⁷

Khartoum has been Sudan’s primary industrial, commercial, and manufacturing hub, hosting two thirds of the country’s manufacturing establishments. However, most of the large businesses in Khartoum including factories (wheat mills, food, beverages, pharmaceuticals, car assembly, etcetera), warehouses, car dealers, all the main and small popular markets, shopping malls, electronic shops, and the gold market were looted or destroyed, with some burned to the ground, or forced to shut down.⁶⁶⁸ Before the start of the current conflict, the national unemployment rate in the country stood at 8.4 %, with Khartoum and Central Darfur experiencing respectively 1.5 and 10 times higher unemployment rates than the national average.⁶⁶⁹ Since the beginning of the conflict, more than 60 % of the capital’s residents have reportedly lost their jobs and life savings. A former civil servant who returned to Khartoum in January 2026, reported having been forced into marginal labour during his displacement and finding no work available in a city where business has ceased.⁶⁷⁰ In Khartoum state, ERRs

⁶⁶¹ World Bank (The), Sudan Economic Update, May 2025: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict - Charting a Path to Recovery, 9 June 2025 [url](#), p. 10

⁶⁶² The Journal of Development Studies, What Are the Economic and Poverty Implications for Sudan If the Conflict Continues Through 2025?, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 106-127, 26 June 2025, [url](#); Conversation (The), Sudan’s war is an economic disaster: here’s how bad it could get, 16 July 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁶³ IMF, 2026. World Economic Outlook: Global Economy in the Shadow of War. Washington, DC. April 2026, [url](#), p.42

⁶⁶⁴ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 16

⁶⁶⁵ Dabanga, Economist: ‘Sudan’s middle class, swept away by war, must be revived’, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁶⁶ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), p. 17

⁶⁶⁷ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 19, 20

⁶⁶⁸ UNICEF, The Impact of Sudan's Armed Conflict on the Fiscal Situation and Service Delivery. UNICEF Sudan – Social Policy, November 2023 [url](#), p. 4

⁶⁶⁹ IFPRI and UNDP, The Socioeconomic Impact of Armed Conflict on Sudanese Urban Households: Evidence from a National Urban Household Survey, November 2024, [url](#), p. 1

⁶⁷⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s displaced return to a ‘capital of ruins’ as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)



members have worked unpaid for over two years, many facing burnout, livelihood pressures, and mental health strain.⁶⁷¹ For additional information on ERRs see sections [2.1.2. Resistance committees](#), [2.4.2. Situation of aid workers](#) and [3.1.4. Housing and general living conditions](#).

3.1.2. Poverty

Approximately 38 % of the Sudanese population was estimated to be living in poverty before 2023, compared to 70% in April 2026.⁶⁷²

Based on data from 2023, Sudan ranked 176 out of 193 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index, and is considered 'low human development'.⁶⁷³ Government revenues declined from 10% of the GDP in 2022 to below 5% in 2024, restricting the provision of essential services, while extreme poverty increased from 23% to 59% over the same period.⁶⁷⁴ According to UNDP, 'nearly 6.9 million additional Sudanese were pushed into extreme poverty in 2023 alone' 'as a direct consequence of the fighting.' UNDP indicated in April 2026 that the per capita income levels in Sudan showed a 30-year regression while extreme poverty had reached levels exceeded those recorded at any point in the 1980s.⁶⁷⁵

Following the outbreak of the war, many reportedly lost their livelihoods and sources of income, resulting in increased unemployment and poverty, in the absence of government or private support. In the last years, social safety nets in Sudan have reportedly been largely absent or non-functional, as the limited state-funded welfare initiatives in place, including the retirement fund and the Zakat Chamber,⁶⁷⁶ have stopped operating since the beginning of the conflict.⁶⁷⁷

In January 2025, UNHCR noted that the conflict had posed numerous and significant challenges for both refugees and their host communities in Sudan, resulting in a high dependency on assistance and aid from humanitarian actors.⁶⁷⁸ In many areas, ERRs and soup kitchens were the only functioning safety net after the collapse of government services and limited access for aid agencies.⁶⁷⁹ In Khartoum state, 7 ERRs were set up since the beginning of the war and they were 'running 42 neighbourhood health clinics and communal kitchens, 11 functioning public hospitals and coordinating with local markets, pharmacies, grocery stores, electric, water and telecommunications companies.'⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷¹ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁷² Le Monde, War pushes 70% of Sudanese population into poverty, reports UN, 14 April 2026, [url](#); UNDP, Beyond the Conflict Report, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁷³ UNDP, Human Development Report 2025, 6 May 2025, [url](#), p. 276

⁶⁷⁴ World Bank (The), Overview: Sudan, Economy, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁵ UNDP Sudan, Sudan's war: the price a nation is paying, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁶ "Zakat" is the term for charitable alms that Muslims are expected to pay as a religious duty as one of the five pillars of Islam, paid to specific groups under particular conditions. The Zakat Chamber in Sudan is an organisation responsible for the collection and distribution of Zakat. For additional info see: Arab Reform Initiative, A Critical Study of the Role of Zakat in Social Protection in Sudan from 1980 to 2021, 6 September 2024, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Sudan, 2026, [url](#), p. 21

⁶⁷⁸ UNHCR, Sudan, Country Socioeconomic profile, January 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁷⁹ Islamic Relief, Takaaya: How community kitchens offer a local lifeline to Sudan's hunger crisis, November 2025 [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁸⁰ Khartoum State ERR, About Us, n.d., [url](#)



The fourth round of the Sudan World Bank Welfare Monitoring Survey, covering the period from May to July 2025, found that households ‘increasingly rely on negative coping strategies’ to manage food shortages and income shocks, including reducing spending on health and education, selling assets, and withdrawing children from school.⁶⁸¹ Reducing expenditure on essential non-food items like healthcare and education was the most common coping strategy, particularly among refugees (76 %). Notably, most refugees did not resort to selling household assets as they had too few assets to begin with.⁶⁸² Another source reported data indicating that expenditure on food and beverage represented nearly 53 % of individual income. Housing, transport, and healthcare costs reportedly resulted in a 17 % financial shortfall for the average person, placing them below the poverty line.⁶⁸³

With the exchange rate at 3 700 SDG per USD as of March 2026, a family required around 900 000 SDG per month just for essentials.⁶⁸⁴ UNDP indicated in April 2026 a poverty line of about four USD a day, while at least a quarter of the population is reportedly surviving on less than half that.⁶⁸⁵

Sources further reported that vulnerable groups, including widows and elderly, were among those most reliant on charity kitchens for access to food assistance.⁶⁸⁶

The February 2026 market overview by the Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI), based on data collected through interviews with 1 694 vendors across Sudan, found that the median cost of food items in the national Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) increased by 9% from 214 039 SDG [approximately EUR 65] in January 2026 to 238 369 SDG [approximately EUR 75] in February 2026, with the highest cost recorded in Um Bada district of Khartoum (318 761 SDG) [approximately EUR 100]. In Khartoum, prices increased by 10 % compared with January 2026. The rise was driven by higher prices for several food items, notably onions (+25 %), sorghum (+18 %), sugar (+15 %), vegetable oil (+8 %), cow meat (+7 %), milk (+4 %), and goat meat (+2 %).⁶⁸⁷ In Khartoum, the Kalakla Al-Laffa and Jebel Awlia markets reportedly resumed their activities as of March 2026 with basic food commodities and prices 20 – 30 % higher compared to neighbouring states.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸¹ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 7

⁶⁸² World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), p. 14

⁶⁸³ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁴ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁵ Le Monde, War pushes 70% of Sudanese population into poverty, reports UN, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁶ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁸⁷ IMPACT, JMMI, Sudan, Market overview, 5-14 February 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#), pp. 1, 5

⁶⁸⁸ YCON Sudan, Implication of war in Sudan, March 2026 report, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 29

Price of items as of February 2026	Khartoum districts					
	Jebel Awlia	Um Bada	Bahri	Karrari	Omdurman	Khartoum
Sorghum		2000	1142.9	714.3		
Onions	1000	857.1	1142.9	514.3		571.4
Veg oil	8000	7500	7500	8000	8000	8000
Milk	3000	3600	3000	3000	3000	
Cow meat	20000	21000	19000	22000	28000	24000
Goat meat		29000			35000	
Tomato					1500	
Sugar	3200	3300	3500	3300	4000	4000
Gas cylinder	33000				65000	60000
Gas refill	66000	68000	60000	60000	65000	75000
Water container	3000			3333.3		
Water supply	12.5			20.1	25	
Body soap	1000	1363.6	1500	1500	1000	1500
Tooth paste	1000	1587.3	1000	1587.3	1000	1000
Toothbrush ad	500	500	1000	500	500	500
Laundry soap	1000	1111.1	1000	1176.5	1000	1000
Liquid dish soap	2500	2500	1714.3	2769.2	2500	3500
Sanitary pads	2500	2500	4000	3000	3500	2500

Table 1: Median price of items in Khartoum districts (including food, household and hygiene items) as provided by REACH Sudan, JMMI, analysis tables, 5-14 February 2026. Results from calculating the median price of each monitored item per district (locality). The unit is Sudanese Pounds (SDG).⁶⁸⁹

3.1.3. Food security

Acute food insecurity is widespread, with an estimated 29 million people in need of humanitarian food assistance as of February 2026.⁶⁹⁰

Agriculture represented a key source of income in the rural areas and accounted for more than 39 % of the country's total income.⁶⁹¹ Crop production has fallen below the five-year average in 2025 due to conflict, high production and transport costs, and rainfall variability,

⁶⁸⁹ IMPACT Initiatives, REACH Sudan, JMMI, Analysis Tables (5-14 February 2026), [Median price items (districts)] 26 March 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁰ FEWS NET, Famine thresholds no longer met, but credible risk of Famine persists in parts of Sudan, February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁹¹ Mohamed, E.M. and Lucero-Prisno, D-E, The Effects of Sudan's Armed Conflict on Economy and Health: A Perspective, Health Science Reports, 6 February 2025, [url](#)

while livestock production has been adversely affected by pasture shortages and limited access to veterinary medicines and vaccines.⁶⁹² Access to essential inputs – such as seeds, legumes, vegetables and spare parts for agricultural machinery – and the maintenance of irrigation systems has been curtailed. The conflict has disrupted the entire value chain, from production and transport to processing and retail.⁶⁹³ The destruction of agrifood processing facilities, a large percentage of which were based in Khartoum, has created a major gap in food supply across the country.⁶⁹⁴

The results of the Welfare Monitoring Survey Round IV conducted between May and July 2025 indicated that several areas, particularly in parts of Darfur and Kordofan states, were facing famine or conditions approaching famine, driven by the conflict, market disruption, climate vulnerability, and constrained humanitarian access. Information on food consumption in Northern and eastern states (Nile, Red Sea, Khartoum) suggested a larger share of households with acceptable food consumption and comparatively stronger food security conditions.⁶⁹⁵

Refugees were disproportionately affected by hunger, with urban refugees facing some of the harshest conditions, potentially owing to a lack of food assistance available outside of camp locations. The lack of access to education worsened food insecurity among refugees: those without schooling were most prone to food insecurity, whereas individuals with higher education levels generally enjoyed better food security. The Welfare Monitoring Survey uncovered that non-displaced individuals have better food consumption outcomes than IDPs and refugees. Respectively 61 % and 62 % of IDPs and refugees had insufficient food consumption—categorised as either borderline or poor; compared to 45% of non-displaced.

⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹² Elnour, I.B. and Mokhtar, T.M. (2025): Socio-Economic Impact of the Sudan War: A Critical Analysis of the Humanitarian Crisis and Development Challenges. International Journal of Sudan Research (IJSR), Vol. 13, Nos 1/2, pp. 25-36, August 2025, [url](#), pp. 5, 20


⁶⁹³ FAO, The Sudan Employment and self-employment through agriculture and livelihoods support for vulnerable populations, 2025, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁴ IFRC, Operation update #2, Sudan, Complex Emergency, 8 December 2025, [url](#), p. 2

⁶⁹⁵ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 11

⁶⁹⁶ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), p. 6

While Sudanese households primarily relied on market purchases to source their food, refugees had to count heavily on food aid provided by the WFP and NGOs, which accounts for 61 % of their food supply. Such reliance on food aid was increasingly precarious due to the declining international assistance, and 65 % of surveyed refugees reported that food rations declined since the start of 2025. The significant drop in food rations for refugees was confirmed by operational data from the WFP, which indicated that refugees in Sudan received just 70% of the targeted daily food ration of 2 100 kilocalories per person by mid-2025. The situation was equally alarming among IDPs, and food assistance remained limited: about 43% of food insecure IDPs reported receiving food assistance, compared to 78% of refugees.⁶⁹⁷



Map 4. Sudan Acute Food Insecurity: February 2026 assessed outcomes⁶⁹⁸

The conflict has also exacerbated food insecurity across Sudan. More than half a million children reportedly died from starvation by July 2025.⁶⁹⁹ In April 2025, the WFP reported that the levels of hunger and desperation were ‘extremely high’.⁷⁰⁰ Later, in June 2025, the WFP Sudan representative and country director confirmed that ‘severe’ levels of hunger were found in Jebel Awlia, a town around 40 kilometres south of Khartoum.⁷⁰¹

As of April 2026, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimated that 22 million or more people in Sudan, representing approximately 40–45 % of the population, were in need of food assistance. Projections indicated that food insecurity was expected to worsen between June and September 2026. Estimates for October 2026 suggested that needs were expected to remain stable, indicating sustained high levels of food insecurity. Available data

⁶⁹⁷ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), pp. 11, 2

⁶⁹⁸ FEWS NET, Sudan Acute Food Insecurity: February 2026 assessed outcomes, February 2026, [url](#)

⁶⁹⁹ New Arab (The), Khartoum: Destroyed buildings, cars covered in ash tell horrors of war in Sudan capital, 8 July 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁰ WFP, Operational updates on food assistance to famine-risk populations in Sudan, 25 April 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁰¹ The New Arab, High risk of famine near Sudan capital, says World Food Programme, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

indicated that the 2026 levels were similar to those recorded in 2025 but higher than the five-year average, suggesting a persistent crisis.⁷⁰²

3.1.4. Housing and general living conditions

A geospatial analysis of Khartoum conducted in March 2026 indicated that nighttime light emissions across Khartoum – a satellite-based indicator used as a proxy for measuring economic activity – fell sharply at the onset of conflict in April 2023 and remained low through 2025, indicating a profound contraction in economic activity and population presence. The analysis also indicated structural damage affecting 7.8 % of the urban area.⁷⁰³ Many roads have been cleared from rubble. However, for residents and businesses, many problems remained. More than a third of Khartoum's nine million residents fled when most of the city was captured by the RSF in 2023.⁷⁰⁴ IOM Deputy Director General visited the country in April 2026 and stated 'that 'large numbers of people' were 'returning to areas where homes and critical infrastructure including water, health, electricity, have been heavily damaged'.⁷⁰⁵

In the capital, private properties have been looted and vandalised by the RSF, and violations have also extended to government buildings, university campuses, hospitals and businesses. During the war, RSF members have taken photos and posted videos of themselves and their families relocating to the homes of displaced civilians.⁷⁰⁶ On Liberty Street, Khartoum's main commercial avenue, only a few of the looted shops have reopened. As of January 2026, a tea seller returned to the capital said he earned between 4 000 and 5 000 SDG [approximately between EUR 1.2 and 1.5] a day, less than two euros and about a third of her pre-war income.⁷⁰⁷

As of May 2025, all the capital's power stations have been destroyed. As people returned to their houses they found them turned upside down by looters, with deep holes drilled into walls and roads in efforts to uncover valuable copper wiring. On Sudan's Nile Street, once one of the capital's busiest highways, a ditch about one meter deep and four kilometre long had been dug. Khartoum's two main water stations went out of service early in the war as RSF fighters looted machinery and used fuel oil to power vehicles, according to Khartoum state spokesperson. Those who have remained in Khartoum resorted to drinking water from the Nile or long-forgotten wells, exposing them to waterborne illnesses, and few hospitals equipped to treat them.⁷⁰⁸

Up to 1 000 homes were destroyed by the military once the SAF took control of the capital in 2025 in areas close to the outskirts of Khartoum North. Residents allegedly received minimal warning from authorities.⁷⁰⁹ Additionally, authorities had reportedly launched a campaign to demolish unplanned housing in peripheral areas of the city such as Mandela, Al-Suraiha, Al-

⁷⁰² FEWS NET, Sudan, Latest food insecurity analysis, April 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰³ AOAV, Satellite data analysis reveals scale of destruction in Khartoum as ground reporting falters, 15 April 2026, [url](#); Jiashu Hu, Khartoum's Destruction Mapped with Satellite Data, March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁴ Africanews, Reconstruction underway in Khartoum even as war in Sudan continues, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁵ UN News, Millions of desperate Sudanese return home amid dire conditions as war rages, 21 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁶ Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Sudan, 2026, [url](#), p. 21

⁷⁰⁷ Africanews, Reconstruction underway in Khartoum even as war in Sudan continues, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁸ Asharq Al-Awsat, People Returning to Sudan's Capital: Khartoum is Not Habitable, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁰⁹ Ayin network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#)



Fitayhab, Al-Azba, and Al-Khairat towards the end of 2025. The demolition left residents with no alternative shelter, leaving many to sleep in the open.⁷¹⁰

In December 2025, residents of Khartoum described streets filled with uncollected waste and public areas being used as burial sites.⁷¹¹ The Sudanese Media Forum indicated in January 2026 that the conditions for a safe return were not met yet and that lack of basic services in addition to insecurity and proliferation of weapons persisted. According to the organisation, humanitarian organisations confirmed that more than sixty per cent of potential return areas were uninhabitable.⁷¹²

In March 2026, a national media outlet reported that the government had intensified calls for residents to return to the capital despite the limited access in the city to basic services. Residents who had returned relied on a network of *Takaya* ('charity kitchens') that were themselves reportedly close to collapse due to economic pressure and state repression. Business owners have been reportedly returning to destroyed and empty premises, having to repay the rent accrued during the war. While some neighbourhoods in Omdurman and Khartoum North saw a relative return, major districts like Jabra, Al-Amarat, and Al-Taif reportedly remained ghost towns. Returnees reportedly faced disease outbreaks and soaring prices, prompting some to consider a 'reverse migration' from the capital.⁷¹³

As of April 2026, IOM indicated about four million voluntary returns to Sudan.⁷¹⁴ Khartoum received 1.8 million returnees, 92 % of which from internal displacement. Households who returned to Khartoum state reported slightly more diverse reasons for return compared to other states: the majority (89 %) cited improved security at locations of origin, but 7 % returned primarily for family reunification and 2 % due to depleted resources in areas of displacement.⁷¹⁵ An estimated 82 % of returnees moved back to urban neighbourhoods, and nearly all returnee households (96 %) were staying at their habitual residence. A much smaller group, 2 % of returnee households, reportedly stayed with host families while the other 2 % stayed in collective centres.⁷¹⁶

In April 2026, returns to Khartoum were rising rapidly, placing additional strain on damaged urban infrastructure. Water systems, electricity networks, health facilities, and housing remained heavily affected, complicating efforts to restore basic services.⁷¹⁷ IOM indicated that more than two million additional people are expected to return to Khartoum in 2026.⁷¹⁸ Returning nationals often arrive in fragile conditions. Many communities suffered as a result of damaged infrastructure, limited access to basic services and livelihoods, and inadequate water and sanitation systems.⁷¹⁹ According to a member of the local ERRs, many returnees

⁷¹⁰ Sudan Media Forum, From displacement to demolition: Khartoum's informal residents face new crisis, 29 November 2025, [url](#)

⁷¹¹ New Arab (The), Sudan war leaves Khartoum on brink of total service collapse, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷¹² Atalayar, Sudan crisis: Khartoum in 2026, capital of epidemics and the failure of voluntary return, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹³ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹⁴ IOM, 4 Million Returns to Sudan at Risk Amid Fragile Conditions, IOM Warns, 21 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹⁵ IOM, Sudan displacement and return snapshot, update 4, 12 April 2026 [url](#), p. 18

⁷¹⁶ IOM, Sudan displacement and return snapshot, update 4, 12 April 2026 [url](#), p. 18

⁷¹⁷ IOM, 4 Million Returns to Sudan at Risk Amid Fragile Conditions, IOM Warns, 21 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹⁸ UN News, Millions of desperate Sudanese return home amid dire conditions as war rages, 21 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷¹⁹ IOM, IOM Moves to Expand Response in Sudan, Appeals for USD 277 Million, 31 March 2026, [url](#)



were reportedly from vulnerable groups and had returned after being unable to sustain living costs while displaced or living as refugees abroad.⁷²⁰

In Khartoum state, ERRs initiated water and electricity infrastructure repairs, the rehabilitation of damaged health facilities, and the provision of food and health services. ERR structures vary. Some Khartoum ERRs have developed sophisticated internal systems by establishing technical offices, such as statistics offices for needs assessments, supply, financial, health, gender, and education offices, as well as procurement committees for the purchase of in-kind items. Others remain *ad hoc* and dependent on a small group of volunteers.⁷²¹ In the Al Gereif neighbourhood of Khartoum, ERR volunteers have reportedly managed to restore lights in 70 % of the neighbourhood through the installation of solar panels. Other ERR programming has reportedly restored power to 40 000 people in Bahri. An energy researcher interviewed by Ayin reported that the efforts of the ERRs dwarf those of the government.⁷²²

In April 2026, a technical report for the Khartoum electricity authority revealed an unprecedented electricity crisis marked by a severe power shortage that has disrupted supply across the country. According to the report, electricity production was operational with an estimated shortfall of approximately 3 300 megawatts, largely attributed to the near-total shutdown of thermal generation units reliant on imported fuel and petroleum products.⁷²³ As of April 2026, Sudan's worsening electricity and fuel crisis was disrupting everyday life in Khartoum, forcing households to rely on candles, firewood, and long waits at gas stations, while also driving up transport and food costs.⁷²⁴

The presence of unexploded ordnances in some areas also pose serious risks.⁷²⁵ According to a report from August 2025, the presence of landmines has been confirmed at multiple locations in Khartoum, including anti-personnel mines in Mogran and anti-vehicle mines in Omdurman and Bahri.⁷²⁶

3.1.5. Education

In April 2024, one year after the start of the conflict, UNESCO reported that over 10 000 schools had shut down in the country, resulting in about 19 million children being deprived of schooling.⁷²⁷ Almost a year after, in March 2025, UNOCHA reported that almost 17 million children in Sudan were out of school with 90 % of schools still closed⁷²⁸ and UNICEF estimated that eight million children were out of school as of October 2025.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁰ Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷²¹ ACAPS, Challenges and opportunities for Khartoum state emergency response rooms, 16 October 2025, [url](#), p. 3

⁷²² Ayin Network, Sudan Conflict Monitor #21, 30 June 2025, [url](#)

⁷²³ Actum Sudan, Sudan's Electricity Shortfall Hits 3,300 MW Amid Global Fuel Crisis, 2 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷²⁴ Al Jazeera, Sudan power crisis: Studying using candles, counting gas station trips, 16 April 2026, [url](#); Atar Network, Inside Sudan's fuel crisis: War, market distortions and policy failures, 27 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷²⁵ IOM, IOM Moves to Expand Response in Sudan, Appeals for USD 277 Million, 31 March 2026, [url](#)

⁷²⁶ UNMAS, Khartoum: Explosive Ordnance Threat, Flash Update No 2, August 2025, [url](#)

⁷²⁷ UNESCO, Sudan conflict one year on: a long-term impact on education, culture and the media, 14 April 2024, [url](#)

⁷²⁸ UNOCHA, Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan: Statement by the Humanitarian Coordination Forum (HCF), 4 March 2025, [url](#)

⁷²⁹ UNOCHA, Sudan key facts and figures, February 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)



In Khartoum, many schools were damaged in the conflict or became used as shelters for displaced families or as mass burial sites.⁷³⁰ In June 2025, the Sudanese Teachers' Committee expressed its disagreement with the government's decision to reopen schools citing concerns about security conditions for both students and staff as well as unpaid teachers' wages.⁷³¹

According the 2026 Education Situation overview by the Sudan Education Cluster, bringing together UNICEF, Save the Children and other partners data, 1 830 (48 %) out of 3 796 schools had reopened in Khartoum state as of January 2026, with around 400 000 children (38.3 %) in the state having access to education.⁷³²

In North Darfur only 3 % of its 1 100 schools were open. In West Kordofan, South Darfur and West Darfur, 15 %, 13 % and 27 % of schools were operational respectively.⁷³³ Most regions reported higher enrolment for boys, with significant gender gaps in Khartoum, North Darfur, and East Darfur.⁷³⁴

Access to quality education was limited to families able to afford to travel and relocate abroad, either through sufficient savings or the support from family members living abroad. Within Sudan, education was available only in limited areas controlled by the SAF, while the rest of the population was denied access.⁷³⁵

The results of the Welfare Monitoring Survey Round IV conducted in Sudan in 2025 showed higher primary attendance among refugee children in camps than among non-displaced Sudanese children. This contrasted with administrative data showing low overall refugee enrolment, underscoring vulnerabilities for refugees outside camps.⁷³⁶ Refugee children in camps have slightly higher primary school enrolment rates than both IDPs and non-displaced populations, with boys (74 %) and girls (72 %) both outpacing national averages, indicating that refugee children in surveyed camps have better access to schools supported by UN/NGOs and development partners. Refugee boys continued to lead in secondary education enrolment, while Sudanese girls surpassed refugee girls. These patterns emphasised persistent gender disparities in educational access, with more significant gaps seen in refugee communities compared to Sudanese nationals.⁷³⁷

Three out of four refugee households among those interviewed (1 112 refugee households across 18 states⁷³⁸) cited high school fees and costs as the main reason their children cannot attend school. This was notably less reported among non-displaced (55 %) and internally

⁷³⁰ Sudan Post, Teachers warn: Khartoum still a war zone, 16 June 2025, [url](#)

⁷³¹ Dabanga, Sudanese Teachers' Committee rejects decision to return to schools in Khartoum in absence of security and services, 16 June 2026, [url](#)

⁷³² Global Education cluster, 2026 Education Cluster Overview, January 2026, n.d., [url](#)

⁷³³ Save the Children, Sudan: children have lost about 500 days of learning due to war in one of the world's longest school closures, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷³⁴ World Bank (The), Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026 [url](#), p. 19

⁷³⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Sudan, 2026, [url](#), p. 22

⁷³⁶ World Bank, Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 6

⁷³⁷ World Bank, Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 18

⁷³⁸ World Bank, Sudan - Welfare Monitoring Survey Round IV, 2025, 11 November 2025, [url](#)



displaced households (42 %), underscoring the severe financial pressures refugees faced due to limited income and resources. In several refugee camps, schools have ceased to operate, leaving families with no choice but to send their children to schools outside the camps — a solution that is often prohibitively expensive. Although respondents noted that school fees may not be charged, the costs associated with school materials and uniforms remained too high, leading many families to opt out of sending their children to school.⁷³⁹

Sudanese secondary school certificate exams for the 2024–2025 cohort were held on 13 April 2026 in government-controlled areas, including parts of Kordofan. Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, western Darfur has been excluded from these national exams, leaving a large cohort of students in the region without access to the official Sudanese certificate process. More than half a million students have registered for the secondary school certificate exams, an increase of 344 000 from the exams of the postponed batch 2022–2023, for which more than 220 000 students registered. In 2026, 148 842 students registered to take the exams in Khartoum state, compared to 30 000 students who registered the previous year.⁷⁴⁰ In areas under RSF control, the de facto parallel government announced plans to hold its own school exams in June 2026.⁷⁴¹ Estimates indicate that the number of students from Western Sudan that will not sit the exam range between 250 000 and 280 000 students.⁷⁴²

Following the outbreak of the conflict, the University of Khartoum and other government universities reportedly shifted to online teaching through platforms such as Google Meet, Telegram, and WhatsApp. Universities in combat-affected or RSF-controlled areas faced significant challenges maintaining instruction, with students often hindered by security and limited internet access. Access to academic records has been reportedly challenging for Sudanese students, requiring payment of high fees and repeated visits to key offices.⁷⁴³ In July 2025, the Sudan News Agency (SUNA) reported that Neelain University was hosting entrance exams at its Khartoum campus for the first time in two years, with 987 students sitting the tests.⁷⁴⁴ The Sudan University of Science and Technology in Khartoum reports about 258 million USD in losses, including the destruction of all 300 laboratories, including a nuclear chemistry lab, and extensive looting of medical equipment, computers, power transformers, copper, timber, libraries, and campus facilities. As of February 2026, rehabilitation was ongoing at 9 of the 10 campuses of the Sudan University of Science and Technology, where the first round of January 2026 exams was being held.⁷⁴⁵

3.1.6. Health care

The health care system in the country, both public and private, has largely collapsed. According to the World Bank, both the number of medical facilities and the quality of

⁷³⁹ World Bank, Sudan's Crisis: Navigating Disparities, Resilience, and Recovery for Refugees, IDPs, and Host Communities, 25 January 2026, [url](#), p. 20

⁷⁴⁰ Beam reports, The start of the Sudanese certificate tomorrow. Tas'as intends to hold individual exams in areas under its control, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁴¹ Atar Network, Fleeing war, chasing certificates: The uncertain path of Sudan's students, 13 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁴² Beam reports, The start of the Sudanese certificate tomorrow. Tas'as intends to hold individual exams in areas under its control, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁴³ CMI, Sudanese higher education in crisis, 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁴ University World News, Khartoum universities reopen after two-year wartime break, 26 July 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁴⁵ Sudan Tribune, Sudan University reports \$258 million in war losses and campus mass graves, 8 February 2026, [url](#)



treatment are often insufficient with respect to existing demand. The emigration of doctors and caregivers was also indicated as a serious problem. Public health expenditure amounted to 0.8 % of GDP in 2021 and 1.2 % of GDP in 2022, while data from the following years indicated that this percentage was significantly lower because of high levels of spending on the war.⁷⁴⁶

The WHO Humanitarian Needs Response Plan 2025 found that 10 out of 18 states, including Khartoum, have more than one million people in need of humanitarian health assistance.⁷⁴⁷

The WHO Public Health Situation Analysis released in January 2026 indicated that 719 out of 824 health facilities in Khartoum were classified as non-operational.⁷⁴⁸ The baseline report by the WHO Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) released in October 2025 noted that there were 16 operational hospitals in Khartoum state out of 86. Buildings and equipment conditions were reported as mostly intact while the majority of structures is indicated as non-functioning, with the number of intensive care unit (ICU) beds for 250 000 inhabitants equal to 1.1. The ability to access essential services in Khartoum was also indicated as strongly compromised.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁶ Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report — Sudan, 2026, [url](#), p. 22

⁷⁴⁷ WHO, Sudan Conflict and Complex Emergency, Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), 10 March 2025 [url](#), p. 3

⁷⁴⁸ WHO, Sudan Conflict and Complex Emergency, Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), 6 January 2026 [url](#), p. 19

⁷⁴⁹ WHO, HeRAMS Sudan baseline report 2025 - Operational status of the health system: A comprehensive mapping of the operational status of health service delivery units, 30 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 14, 16, 18, 20, 25,



NEIGHBOURHOOD		BAHRI	JEBEL AWLIA	KARRARI	KHARTOUM	SHARG AN NEEL	UM BADA	OMDURMAN	TOTAL
HOSPITAL	O	-	2	6	1	1	4	2	16
	N/O	11	2	2	37	6	3	5	66
	N/R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	C	1	-	-	2	-	-	1	4
RURAL HOSPITAL	O	2	1	4	-	3	1	-	11
	N/O	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	4
	N/R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	C	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FAMILY HEALTH UNIT	O	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	4
	N/O	26	6	18	2	72	21	15	160
	N/R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	C	9	-	1	-	-	-	-	10
FAMILY HEALTH CENTER	O	1	2	50	2	11	8	-	74
	N/O	54	74	35	47	101	109	69	489
	N/R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	C	11	-	4	3	-	-	-	18
TOTAL	O	3	5	62	4	15	14	2	105
	N/O	92	83	55	86	180	133	90	719
	N/R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	C	21	-	5	5	-	-	1	32

O = At least partially operational - N/O = Not operational - N/R = Not reporting - P/C = Planned / closed

Table 2. Hospitals in Khartoum as October 2025⁷⁵⁰

In Khartoum, data from the Sudanese Doctors network released in December 2025 indicated a gradual recovery of the health system driven by local community initiatives. Of the 120 non-functional hospitals, more than 40 had resumed operations, with 17 more under maintenance and expected to reopen in January 2026. According to the Khartoum Civic Interactive Map developed and maintained by the ERRs of Khartoum, as of April 2026 the operating hospitals in the city are Sururab hospital, Hibrahim Said hospital, Elfateh hospital, Al Nau hospital, Al Buluk hospital, Ombada hospital, Alban Jaded hospital, Turkish hospital, Bashair hospital, Umdawwanban hospital, and Jebel Awlia hospital.⁷⁵¹

To address immediate gaps in care within Khartoum state, 10 mobile clinics were deployed providing basic services to residents in remote or conflict-affected neighbourhoods. Local efforts and NGOs restored 244 out of 282 neighbourhood health centres, while 38 remained non-functional. Major facilities—including Khartoum, Al-Shaab, Bahri, Ahmed Gasim, and Al-

⁷⁵⁰ WHO, HeRAMS Sudan baseline report 2025 - Operational status of the health system: A comprehensive mapping of the operational status of health service delivery units, 30 October 2025 [url](#), p. 76

⁷⁵¹ Khartoumerr, Khartoum Civic map, Interactive map as of 25 April 2026, [url](#)



Amin Children's Hospital—were undergoing restoration and were expected to be fully operational by early 2026.⁷⁵²

Disease outbreaks

Since 2025, Khartoum has experienced repeated disease outbreaks resulting in deaths caused by drinking water contaminated with sewage or exposed to pollution. In January 2026 the Preparatory Committee of the Sudanese Doctors' Union reported hundreds of new dengue infections, including 39 deaths, in the state of Khartoum.⁷⁵³ WHO indicated that Khartoum accounted for almost two-thirds of the reported cases according to data collected in 2025, with an attack rate of 49 per 100 000, particularly concentrated in Karrari locality.⁷⁵⁴

3.2. Mobility and flight connections

The widespread infrastructure damage,⁷⁵⁵ combined with large-scale vehicle theft, has led to the collapse of public transport in the capital. Fewer than 100 of the capital's 750 routes remained in operation, according to the Transport and Communications Authority. Fuel shortages and soaring fares have limited movement for returnees and displaced families.⁷⁵⁶ As of March 2026 civilian movement remained limited in the capital due to active fighting between the SAF and RSF, checkpoints, and the breakdown of basic services, including electricity, water, and healthcare.⁷⁵⁷ In May 2025, the New Arab reported that the reduced policing capacity and the economic collapse have fuelled looting, extortion and organised crime, while residents in some neighbourhoods of Khartoum have described being effectively confined to certain areas out of fear of robbery, kidnapping, and checkpoint-related abuse.⁷⁵⁸

Movements in part of the city remained affected by checkpoints⁷⁵⁹ or selected security points. Trucks were reportedly subject to frequent stops at checkpoints and in some cases required to pay informal sums in order to proceed and avoid expensive transit receipts.

As of February 2026, public transport has only partially resumed, with only certain major hubs such as Jackson terminal operating regularly for inter-city and intra-Khartoum routes. The other two main terminals, Sharwani and Al-Estad, either remained closed or were operating at very low capacity. This has created a fragmented system where many residents rely on

⁷⁵² Sudan Tribune, Sudan doctors network says 284 health facilities resume operations in Khartoum, 31 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵³ Atalayar, Sudan crisis: Khartoum in 2026, capital of epidemics and the failure of voluntary return, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁴ WHO, Sudan Conflict and Complex Emergency, Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), 6 January 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁵ BISI, Khartoum Under Sudan Armed Forces Governance: Inflation, Supply Shortages, and Urban Damage in Wartime Sudan, March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁶ New Arab (The), Sudan war leaves Khartoum on brink of total service collapse, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁷ BISI, Khartoum Under Sudan Armed Forces Governance: Inflation, Supply Shortages, and Urban Damage in Wartime Sudan, March 2026, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁸ New Arab (The), In Sudan's capital, a deteriorating humanitarian and economic crisis leaves no one safe as crime and violence skyrocket, 5 May 2025, [url](#)

⁷⁵⁹ HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)





informal minibuses, rickshaws, or private vehicles rather than a full, coordinated network. Transport fares were reportedly set ‘arbitrarily’ and may vary. Indicative fares included:

- trip from Omdurman to Al-Souq al Arabi, 3 000 SDG [approximately EUR 1];
- trip from Al-Souq al Arabi to the Central Market, 2 000 000 SDG [approximately EUR 0.6];
- trip from southern Khartoum to Omdurman, between 5 000 and 12 000 SDG [approximately between EUR 1.5 and EUR 4] ;
- trip from Al-Kalakla neighbourhood to Al-Souq al Arabi, 3 000 SDG [approximately EUR 1].⁷⁶⁰

Khartoum International Airport was closed to normal civilian traffic after fighting began in April 2023, and it remained largely non-operational for regular commercial service for two years. After the SAF regained control of Khartoum in March 2025, there were limited reopening steps, including a reported civilian flight in October 2025.⁷⁶¹ However, the reopening was halted after the airport was targeted by RSF drone strikes in October 2025, which damaged several newly rehabilitated facilities.⁷⁶² In February 2026, the airport reportedly reopened for limited operations with a Sudan Airways domestic flight to and from Port Sudan.⁷⁶³ Although the airport resumed a domestic route to Port Sudan, available information suggested that operations remained restricted.⁷⁶⁴ In April 2026, flight tracker maps showed an active international connection between Khartoum and Damascus.⁷⁶⁵

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⁷⁶¹ Sudan Tribune, Khartoum airport reopens with first flight after two-year closure, 22 October 2025, [url](#)

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⁷⁶⁴ Visaverge, Khartoum International Airport reopens with Sudan Airways flight from Port Sudan, 1 February 2026, [url](#)

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Annex 2: Terms of Reference

Reference period: 22 March 2025 – 30 April 2026

Estimated length: 60 pages (excluding introduction, maps and bibliography)

Country overview

This section provides a general update on the main structures of the state the administration of justice and the situation of human rights at country level.

System of government

Political situation

Rule of law and administration of justice

Human rights

- Extrajudicial killings
- Arbitrary arrests and detention
- Enforced disappearances
- Treatment in detention and prison conditions
- Torture and physical abuse
- Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence
- Death penalty
- Freedom of expression

Treatment of specific profiles and groups of the population

The research should cover the following profiles:

Perceived political opponents

- Political party members and other perceived opponents
- Resistance committees
- Community leaders, lawyers and human rights activists

Conscripts, draft evaders, forced recruitment to armed groups

Journalists and other media personnel

Humanitarian and health personnel

- Aid workers
- Healthcare personnel

Ethnic groups

General overview of conflict-related ethnic targeting in Sudan, including:

- Non-Arab/African in Darfur
- Nuba in South Kordofan
- Other groups (e.g. Kanabi in Al Jazirah etc.)



Women and girls

General overview of the situation of women and girls in Sudan, including:

- Sexual violence and conflict-related sexual violence
- Forced/early marriage and conflict-related forced/early marriage
- Trafficking in human beings
- Female genital mutilation (FGM)

Children

General overview of the situation of children in Sudan, including:

- Child soldiers
- Labour exploitation
- Trafficking in human beings

LGBTIQ+ persons

Key socio-economic indicators

Information should include general trends at country level with a focus on Khartoum.

- **Socio-economic situation**
 - Employment
 - Poverty
 - Food security
 - Housing and living conditions
 - Education
 - Health care
 - Availability of state support mechanism for individuals without social network
- **Mobility and flight connections**





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