

# Sudan: Security Situation



# **Sudan: Security Situation**

## **Country of Origin Information Report**

**October 2026**



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Cover photo:

KHARTOUM, SUDAN. April 24, 2025. A disabled Sudanese Armed Forces Russian-made T-72 tank near the National Palace in downtown Khartoum. In the buildup to the downfall of the thirty-year Bashir regime, the Sudanese Army was known to have approximately 230 T-72 tanks in service; however, the opposing Rapid Support Forces commandeered many before the war broke out in April 2023, with the majority now destroyed following two years of fighting., Giles Clarke/Avaaz, © Getty Images, 2025, [KHARTOUM, SUDAN. April 24, 2025. A disabled Sudanese Armed Forces... Nieuwsfoto's - Getty Images](#)

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## Disclaimer

This report was written according to the [EUAA COI Report Methodology \(2023\)](#). It is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced.

The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care within a limited timeframe. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist.

Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position.

‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.

Neither EUAA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report.

On 19 January 2022, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) became the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). All references to EASO, EASO products and bodies should be understood as references to the EUAA.

The drafting of this report was finalised on 18 September 2026. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the [Introduction](#)



## Glossary and abbreviations

| Term               | Definition                                                   |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>ACLED</b>       | Armed Conflict Location & Event Data                         |
| <b>AOAV</b>        | Action on Armed Violence                                     |
| <b>CAR</b>         | Central African Republic                                     |
| <b>DTM</b>         | Displacement Tracking Matrix                                 |
| <b>ERRs</b>        | Emergency Response Rooms                                     |
| <b>ERW</b>         | Explosive Remnants of War                                    |
| <b>FHHs</b>        | Female-Headed Households                                     |
| <b>GSLF</b>        | Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces                         |
| <b>ICRC</b>        | International Committee of the Red Cross                     |
| <b>IDP</b>         | Internally Displaced Person                                  |
| <b>IED</b>         | Improvised Explosive Device                                  |
| <b>IOM</b>         | International Organization for Migration                     |
| <b>IPC</b>         | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification                |
| <b>JEM</b>         | Justice and Equality Movement                                |
| <b>JEM-Ibrahim</b> | Justice and Equality Movement faction led by Jibril Ibrahim  |
| <b>JEM-Sandal</b>  | Justice and Equality Movement faction led by Suleiman Sandal |





| Term                  | Definition                                                                |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>JPA</b>            | Juba Peace Agreement                                                      |
| <b>LSHTM</b>          | London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine                              |
| <b>MSF</b>            | Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)                        |
| <b>NGO</b>            | Non-governmental organisation                                             |
| <b>NRC</b>            | Norwegian Refugee Council                                                 |
| <b>OHCHR</b>          | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights           |
| <b>RSF</b>            | Rapid Support Forces                                                      |
| <b>SAF</b>            | Sudanese Armed Forces                                                     |
| <b>SHCC</b>           | Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition                                 |
| <b>SLM-AW</b>         | Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur               |
| <b>SLM-MM</b>         | Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi                            |
| <b>SLM-TC</b>         | Sudan Liberation Movement - Transitional Council                          |
| <b>SPLM-N-Agar</b>    | Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Malik Agar        |
| <b>SPLM-N-Al-Hilu</b> | Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu |
| <b>SSF</b>            | Sudan Shield Forces                                                       |
| <b>UAE</b>            | United Arab Emirates                                                      |
| <b>UNHCR</b>          | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                             |





| Term          | Definition                                                         |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>UNISFA</b> | United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei                    |
| <b>UNMAS</b>  | United Nations Mine Action Service                                 |
| <b>UNOCHA</b> | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| <b>WASH</b>   | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene                                      |
| <b>WHO</b>    | World Health Organization                                          |



# Introduction

The purpose of this report is to provide relevant information for the assessment of applications for international protection, and in particular for use in updating EUAA's country guidance on Sudan.

The report covers the period from 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, and it provides an update of the [EUAA COI report: Sudan: security situation \(February 2025\)](#) and [EUAA query response \(March 2025\)](#).

## Methodology

This report was drafted by ACCORD and reviewed by EUAA and national COI departments in EU+ countries,<sup>1</sup> as mentioned in the [Acknowledgements](#) section.

This report is produced in line with the EUAA COI Report Methodology (2023)<sup>2</sup> and the EUAA COI Writing and Referencing Style Guide (2023).<sup>3</sup>

## Defining the terms of reference

The terms of reference (ToR) of this report were defined by EUAA based on discussions held and input received from COI experts in the EUAA informal COI specialist network on Sudan and from policy experts in EU+ countries within the framework of a Country Guidance development on Sudan. The ToR also builds on previous EUAA COI reports on Sudan covering the same topics. The Terms of Reference for this report can be found in [Annex 2](#) of this report.

## Collecting information

The information gathered is a result of research using publicly available sources until 31 August 2026. Some limited additional information was added during the finalisation of this report in response to feedback received during the quality control process, until 2 October 2026.

## Quality control

To ensure that the authors respected the EUAA COI Report Methodology and that the Terms of Reference were comprehensively addressed, a review was carried out by COI specialists from the countries and organisations listed as reviewers in the [Acknowledgements](#) section. All comments made by the reviewers were taken into consideration and most of them were

---

<sup>1</sup> All EU Member States plus Norway and Switzerland.

<sup>2</sup> EUAA, EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Report Methodology, February 2023, [url](#)

<sup>3</sup> EUAA, Writing and Referencing Guide for EUAA Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports, February 2023, [url](#)



implemented in the final draft of this report, which was finalised on 13 October 2026. EUAA also performed the final quality review and editing of the text.

## Sources

In accordance with EUAA COI methodology, a range of different published documentary sources have been consulted on relevant topics for this report. These include: COI reports by governments; information from civil society, advocacy groups, humanitarian organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); international and NGO human rights reports; reports produced by various bodies of the United Nations; Sudanese and regionally based media and social media; academic publications and think tank reports and specialised sources covering Sudan. All information from these sources was consulted within time constraints and within the research constraints posed by Sudan's challenging information-gathering environment.

Regarding the maps used in the report, the administrative map was obtained from Doctors Without Borders (MSF). The map on the security situation and territorial control was developed and tailored to the needs of the report by [Political Geography Now](#) (PolGeoNow), a specialist mapping project tracking territorial control in conflict and disputed areas worldwide, in coordination with the EUAA.

### Sources on security incidents and civilian casualties

For data on violent incidents, a dataset from the organisation [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project \(ACLED\)](#) has been used. ACLED is an independent conflict monitoring organisation collecting, analysing and mapping information on crisis and conflict in Africa, south and south-east Asia and Middle East. It provides datasets on conflict incidents, coding each incident with the time and place, type of violent incident, the parties involved and an estimate on the number of fatalities. It also provides relevant breakdowns per region, actor, type of incident, and period. The information is collected in a database that is accessible via registration, searchable and kept continuously up to date. The data primarily comes from secondary sources such as traditional media reports, but also from reports by international institutions and non-governmental organisations, targeted new media platforms, and data provided by local partners of ACLED.<sup>4</sup>

ACLED records six event types: battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, protests, riots and strategic developments.<sup>5</sup> For the analysis of the security situation in Sudan in this report, only the following type of events have been included: battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians.

ACLED codes security incidents as follows:

- **Battles:** violent clashes between at least two armed groups. Battles can occur between armed and organised state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination

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<sup>4</sup> ACLED, Methodology, April 2019, [url](#); ACLED, FAQs: ACLED Sourcing Methodology, March 2023, [url](#)

<sup>5</sup> ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#), p. 11



therein. Sub-events of battles are armed clashes, government regaining territory and non-state actor overtaking territory.

- **Violence against civilians:** violent events where an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. It includes violent attacks on unarmed civilians such as sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.
- **Explosions/remote violence:** events where an explosion, bomb or other explosive device was used to engage in conflict. They include one-sided violent events in which the tool for engaging in conflict creates asymmetry by taking away the ability of the targets to engage or defend themselves and their location. They include air/drone strikes, suicide bombs, shelling/artillery/missile attacks, remote explosives/landmines/IEDs, grenades, chemical weapons.

Additionally, ACLED codes actors involved in security incidents as follows: Actor1 is the '[o]ne of two main actors involved in the event (does not necessarily indicate the aggressor)' and Actor2 is the '[o]ne of two main actors involved in the event (does not necessarily indicate the target or victim)',<sup>6</sup> while '[i]n most cases, an event requires two actors, noted in columns 'Actor 1' and 'Actor 2'. 'However, the 'Explosions/Remote violence', 'Riots', 'Protests', and 'Strategic developments' event types can include one-sided events'.<sup>7</sup> When focusing on the involvement of specific actors within certain regions, the drafters based their analysis on all those incidents, where ACLED coded the relevant actor either as 'Actor1' or as 'Actor2'. This approach aims to illustrate the general level of involvement of the respective actors in the conflict without distinguishing between Actor1 and Actor2, as these categories, according to ACLED's methodology, do not indicate any differentiation in terms of content/semantics.

Security incidents numbers and associated graphs at country and governorate level are based on an ACLED dataset that is accessible via registration.<sup>8</sup> Whenever other sources on security incidents were available over the reference period, ACLED's data have been corroborated/contrasted with other data.

The graphs on the estimated number of fatalities in Sudan and the regions are also based on ACLED. Where available, information from other sources documenting civilian casualties in Sudan (Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights - OHCHR, Action on Armed Violence – AOAV) has been included.

AOAV – a UK-registered charity organisation that records, investigates, and disseminates evidence of armed violence against civilians worldwide – gathers data from English-language media reports. It 'does not attempt to comprehensively capture all incidents of explosive violence around the world but to serve as a useful indicator of the scale and pattern of harm'. According to the AOAV's methodology, an incident is recorded only when at least one casualty resulting from the use of an explosive weapon is reported. Casualties are presumed to be civilians unless otherwise specified or there is an indication that those affected were

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<sup>6</sup> ACLED, Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>7</sup> ACLED, Codebook, 3 October 2024, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>8</sup> ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)



combatants. AOA's methodology is subject to several limitations, including underreporting in certain regions and its reliance on English-language sources.<sup>9</sup>

Data on civilians killed in Sudan collected by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) are based on information provided by the OHCHR Country Office in Sudan and the Designated Expert on Human Rights in the Sudan of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. This information is obtained through, among other methods, interviews, monitoring missions, and remote monitoring. The information gathered is corroborated by cross-checking it against several independent sources and the 'reasonable grounds to believe' standard of proof is applied in the assessment of investigated incidents.<sup>10</sup>

## Structure and use of the report

The report is divided into two parts. The first one focuses on the general political and security situation of the country between March 2025 and August 2026 and then addresses the humanitarian situation at country level. The second part of the report addresses the security situation in the individual states, focusing on the actors, conflict dynamics as well as security trends, events, and major impacts on the civilian population.


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<sup>9</sup> AOA, AOA's Explosive Violence Monitor – Methodology, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>10</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 9-10; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 3-4



# Maps



Map 1. Sudan – General Reference Map<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Map 1: MSF, Sudan – General Reference Map, 3 July 2024, [url](https://open.maf.org)



# 1. General description of the security situation

## 1.1. Overview of the conflict

### 1.1.1. Political developments

#### a) Government and political blocks

As of August 2026, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), remained the country's de facto leader.<sup>12</sup> He appointed civilian technocrat, Kamil Idris, as prime minister in May 2025,<sup>13</sup> thus filling a post that had been vacant since 2022 when the previous prime minister resigned and the military took full control of the country.<sup>14</sup> A de facto cabinet was subsequently appointed that included several Islamist and allied figures.<sup>15</sup>

For much of 2025, the main political blocs in Sudan remained the SAF-aligned Democratic Bloc and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) self-proclaimed parallel government. This parallel government was formed in July 2025 on the basis of the Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis) of political parties and armed movements founded in February 2025.<sup>16</sup>

#### b) Civilian coalitions

Meanwhile, in mid-2025, the Somoud alliance, a non-partisan coalition of neighbourhood pro-democracy groups, trade unions, women's movements, and youth groups, emerged under the leadership of former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok.<sup>17</sup> In a separate shift away from alignment with warring parties, a diverse grouping emerged and signed a nine-point political roadmap in Nairobi in December 2025.<sup>18</sup> The roadmap, known as the Declaration of Principles for Building a New Sudan (Nairobi Declaration),<sup>19</sup> was presented as a pro-peace initiative seeking a democratic transition, positioning civilian actors as a 'third pole' against the two main warring military parties. The signatories included the National Umma Party (NUP),<sup>20</sup> an Islamic party<sup>21</sup> that has experienced internal factionalism,<sup>22</sup> including between groups aligned with either the

<sup>12</sup> Reuters, US ties Sudanese army leader's UN visa to ceasefire plan, sources say, 22 September 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan army will push for Burhan to stay in power, senior general says, 13 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>13</sup> Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#); Elhag, A., Kamil Idris and the Illusion of Civilian Leadership in Sudan, TWI, 19 June 2025, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Sudan's Army Chief Names Former UN Official Idris as New Premier, 19 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>14</sup> Elhag, A., Kamil Idris and the Illusion of Civilian Leadership in Sudan, TWI, 19 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>15</sup> Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>16</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>17</sup> Ibrahim, A-M.O., Somoud, al-Fashir, and the Battle for Sudan's Future, TWI, 18 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>18</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>19</sup> Horn Review, Sudan's Civilian Coalition in a Fragmented Political Order, 26 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>20</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>21</sup> Metz, H.C. ed., Sudan: A Country Study – Umma Party, 1991, [url](#)

<sup>22</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Umma factions align on dialogue principles, diverge on handling Burhan's call, 20 August 2026, [url](#); Jamestown Foundation, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan's War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)



SAF or the RSF.<sup>23</sup> Other signatories were the centre-left reformist<sup>24</sup> Sudanese Congress Party (SCoP), the armed group Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW), and civil society organisations.<sup>25</sup>

### c) Political negotiations and peace initiatives

Since 2023, a number of efforts have been made to negotiate an end to the conflict, in which both main warring parties, the SAF and the RSF, have been accused of war crimes<sup>26</sup> and serious violations against civilians,<sup>27</sup> while the RSF, in particular, has been accused of genocide.<sup>28</sup> In the past, peace efforts have been led by the African Union (AU), the regional bloc Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland.<sup>29</sup>

More recent international peace efforts aiming for a power-sharing agreement, led by the Quadrilateral Mechanism (Quad),<sup>30</sup> a group consisting of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE),<sup>31</sup> similarly did not achieve tangible results. The Quad suffered structurally from the UAE and Egypt being both accused of enabling the warring parties while being expected to assume a key role in securing a ceasefire.<sup>32</sup> In addition, by early 2026, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were allegedly supporting opposing sides of the conflict<sup>33</sup> as Saudi Arabia pivoted away from neutrality towards actively supporting the SAF.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, the SAF rejected most efforts at mediation as these placed the RSF on equal terms with the SAF.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the Quad's plans reportedly intended to exclude both warring parties from governing Sudan after the war.<sup>36</sup> In September 2025, the Quad called for a three-month truce to lead to a permanent ceasefire, as well as humanitarian access, and the initiation of a political process for a transition towards civilian governance.<sup>37</sup>

By October 2025, SAF Commander Abdul-Fattah Al-Burhan yielded to international pressure and agreed to negotiations. Representatives of both warring sides engaged in indirect talks in Washington, D.C. At the same time, Al-Burhan continued to insist that any negotiated peace

<sup>23</sup> Jamestown Foundation, RSF Establishes Rival Government as Sudan's War Spirals, 20 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>24</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's opposition SCoP resumes open air addresses, calls to overthrow the regime, 31 December 2016, [url](#)

<sup>25</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>26</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>27</sup> EUISS, The fall of El-Fasher: Sudan's war outpaces truce plan, 4 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>28</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 116

<sup>29</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>30</sup> Horn Review, How a Turkish-Saudi Axis Turned Sudan into a High-Tech Proxy War, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>31</sup> BBC News, The devastating conflict where both sides have reasons to keep fighting, 5 March 2026, [url](#); Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will, Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>32</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>33</sup> Horn Review, How a Turkish-Saudi Axis Turned Sudan into a High-Tech Proxy War, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>34</sup> Le Monde, La guerre au Soudan, premier terrain du « pacte de La Mecque » entre l'Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et le Pakistan [The Sudan war, the primary terrain of the "Mecca Agreement" between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan], 8 September 2026, [url](#); Horn Review, How a Turkish-Saudi Axis Turned Sudan into a High-Tech Proxy War, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>35</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Turkey is winning in Sudan. But for how long?, 10 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>36</sup> FDD, Sudan's Burhan Agrees to Peace Talks, His Hardline Stance Threatens Stalemate, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>37</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese bloc declares Nairobi roadmap, but is it a civilian breakthrough?, 22 December 2025, [url](#)



must lead to the RSF's dissolution.<sup>38</sup> The October talks ended without results, as on the ground the RSF captured El Fasher amid reports of serious acts of violence against civilians.<sup>39</sup>

Following this shift in military dynamics in the field, Egypt, a country firmly opposed to a partition of Sudan, scaled up its diplomatic efforts to end the war,<sup>40</sup> alongside its military cooperation with the SAF.<sup>41</sup> At a January 2026 meeting in Cairo, Egypt and the UN called on the SAF and RSF to allow a countrywide humanitarian truce.<sup>42</sup> While the RSF verbally agreed to a roadmap starting with such a humanitarian truce, neither side responded officially, and Al-Burhan continued to condition his agreement to the plan on the RSF's effective surrender.<sup>43</sup>

The SAF-aligned Democratic Bloc, for its part, comprising political parties and armed factions such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP),<sup>44</sup> held a first meeting in Khartoum in February 2026. At that meeting, it called for a comprehensive national dialogue and established committees to engage with political and civil society actors regarding the formation of a transitional legislative council and working towards a democratic transition.<sup>45</sup>

In April 2026, a conference in Berlin set out the 'Berlin Principles for Sudan'.<sup>46</sup> It was organized by Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the African Union and the European Union with 55 states attending.<sup>47</sup> The principles did not rule out the prospect of the SAF and RSF controlling the country's future transition to peace. They also issued the strongest call to date for external backers of the warring parties to end their support to the SAF and RSF. However, the conference stopped short of explicitly naming the warring parties' foreign backers and made no recommendations as to how arms supply channels should be disrupted.<sup>48</sup>

On the sidelines of the April 2026 Berlin conference, the Quintet, a group consisting of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), IGAD, League of Arab States (LAS), and the United Nations (UN), made initial engagement with Sudanese civilian actors. In late July/early August 2026, consultations were held between the Quintet and Sudanese parties and political blocs, including the NUP and the Democratic Bloc. These and ensuing talks aimed at setting in motion a political process, with an eventual transition to a civilian-led democratic

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<sup>38</sup> FDD, Sudan's Burhan Agrees to Peace Talks, His Hardline Stance Threatens Stalemate, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>39</sup> DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>40</sup> New Arab (The), After El-Fasher's fall, Egypt is desperately trying to end Sudan's civil war, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>41</sup> MEE, Exclusive: Egypt and Turkey boost support for Sudan's army following RSF capture of el-Fasher, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>42</sup> AP, Discussions to end Sudan war resume in Cairo as it nears the 3-year mark, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>43</sup> BBC News, The devastating conflict where both sides have reasons to keep fighting, 5 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>44</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Democratic Bloc split over unauthorized talks in Ethiopia, 16 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>45</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Democratic Block seeks to form transitional legislative council, 6 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>46</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>47</sup> EEAS, Sudan: Co-Host Communiqué on the International Sudan Conference Berlin, 15 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>48</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#)



government.<sup>49</sup> However, the Somoud coalition boycotted these talks and the RSF-aligned Taasis alliance also remained absent.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time, in August 2026, Al-Burhan launched his own political initiative,<sup>51</sup> consulting with representatives of political and civil society groups on preparing an intra-Sudanese dialogue conference.<sup>52</sup> As Al-Burhan announced, criminal prosecution of participants facing charges was to be suspended for the duration of their involvement in national dialogue.<sup>53</sup> These talks resulted in the formation of a preparatory committee for the proposed conference. In September 2026, Quintet representatives undertook a visit to Khartoum, where they met with Burhan, the preparatory committee, and political and civil society actors.<sup>54</sup> The committee insisted that military factions would be barred from negotiations.<sup>55</sup>

#### **d) Self-proclaimed RSF parallel government**

On the other hand, the RSF in February 2025 struck a fragile accord with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu (SPLM-N-Al-Hilu). A new coalition, the Taasis, was formed,<sup>56</sup> comprising, amongst others, armed groups from Darfur, the SPLM-N-Al-Hilu, and elements of the NUP.<sup>57</sup> For further information on the emergence of the Taasis alliance, see section 1.1.2. Political Situation of the [EUAA COI report Sudan: Country Focus \(August 2026\)](#).

On 15 April 2025, the RSF declared a self-proclaimed Government of Peace and Unity as a rival government<sup>58</sup> based on the Taasis alliance.<sup>59</sup> On 30 August 2025, the RSF announced that the new government had been sworn in; RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), was appointed head of its fifteen-member Presidential Council<sup>60</sup> and SPLM-N leader, Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, as his deputy.<sup>61</sup> While the declared objective of the new formation was to create a decentralised political system,<sup>62</sup> the International Crisis Group held that one of the new entity's apparent primary aims was to broaden the RSF's political appeal after the

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<sup>49</sup> Security Council Report, Sudan: Informal Interactive Dialogue, 13 September 2026 [url](#)

<sup>50</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Is the 'Quintet' wasting its time with Sudan's political elites?, 5 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>51</sup> Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's battlefield shaping the terms of its next political phase?, 26 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>52</sup> Security Council Report, Sudan: Informal Interactive Dialogue, 13 September 2026 [url](#)

<sup>53</sup> Al Jazeera, Is Sudan's battlefield shaping the terms of its next political phase?, 26 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>54</sup> Security Council Report, Sudan: Informal Interactive Dialogue, 13 September 2026 [url](#)

<sup>55</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan civilian dialogue panel to meet international envoys, excludes military, 7 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>56</sup> Insights SD, Tasis Government: Reading into the Political Context and Structural Challenges, 11 August 2025, [url](#);

Sudan Times (The), Sudan's Tasis Alliance: What it is, who leads it, what comes next?, 2 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>57</sup> Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan's war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>58</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, RSF Declares Rival Government as Sudan War Hits Two-Year Mark, 16 April 2025, [url](#);

Al Jazeera, Sudan paramilitary declares rival government two years into civil war, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>59</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 16

<sup>60</sup> International Crisis Group, Sudan's RSF Proclaims Parallel Government, Raising Threat of Partition, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>61</sup> International Crisis Group, Sudan's RSF Proclaims Parallel Government, Raising Threat of Partition, 2 September 2025, [url](#); Ramzy, S., Sudan's rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war, The Conversation, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>62</sup> Ramzy, S., Sudan's rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war, The Conversation, 5 August 2025, [url](#)



group's major military defeats in early 2025.<sup>63</sup> The new entity chose Nyala as its base.<sup>64</sup> The new coalition was stricken by disputes over power-sharing,<sup>65</sup> while political deadlock and the resignation of at least one member of the Taasis presidential council continued to impact on the alliance's cohesion in 2026.<sup>66</sup>

The alternative government was rejected by multiple international actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US, the EU, the UN,<sup>67</sup> and the AU.<sup>68</sup> The move was viewed as a further impediment to the peace process and as an attempt by the RSF to seek legitimacy to control humanitarian aid distribution and enhance its access to weapons purchases.<sup>69</sup>

### 1.1.2. Main conflict dynamics

Intense levels of conflict persisted during 2025 as the fighting expanded into new areas.<sup>70</sup> In a large-scale military offensive,<sup>71</sup> the SAF reconquered Sinja (Sennar state) in November 2024,<sup>72</sup> the city of Wad Madani (Al Jazirah state) in January 2025,<sup>73</sup> and eventually Khartoum city in March 2025,<sup>74</sup> and the entirety of Khartoum state in May 2025.<sup>75</sup> Since then, frontlines of hostilities shifted from central Sudan to regions in the south and west<sup>76</sup> (Kordofan and North Darfur)<sup>77</sup> as the RSF refocused its military objectives.<sup>78</sup>

Particularly from May 2025 onwards, Kordofan became a major theatre of conflict as the warring parties sought to seize strategic areas in the region.<sup>79</sup> Notably, control over the

<sup>63</sup> International Crisis Group, Sudan's RSF Proclaims Parallel Government, Raising Threat of Partition, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>64</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#); Ramzy. S., Sudan's rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war, The Conversation, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>65</sup> Ramzy. S., Sudan's rebel force has declared a parallel government: what this means for the war, The Conversation, 5 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>66</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan's RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>67</sup> Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan's war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>68</sup> AU, Publication: Communiqué of the 1293rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council held on 4 August 2025 on Update on the Situation in Sudan., 4 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>69</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>70</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 9

<sup>71</sup> International Crisis Group, Sudan's RSF Proclaims Parallel Government, Raising Threat of Partition, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>72</sup> Sudans Post, SAF recaptures Sennar State capital, Sinja, 23 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>73</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 10

<sup>74</sup> International Crisis Group, Sudan's RSF Proclaims Parallel Government, Raising Threat of Partition, 2 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>75</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 10; Al Jazeera, Sudan's army declares Khartoum state 'completely free' of paramilitary RSF, 20 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>76</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>77</sup> Al Jazeera, Students among 17 dead in RSF drone attack in Sudan's White Nile State, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>78</sup> Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan's war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>79</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 11



strategically located city of Bara (North Kordofan)<sup>80</sup> shifted several times during the reference period.<sup>81</sup>

In June 2025, the RSF captured the strategic border triangle area between Sudan, Egypt and Libya in northwestern Sudan's Northern state,<sup>82</sup> known as the El Uweinat area. The group thus secured access to supplies and reinforcements from Libya<sup>83</sup> while severing military supply routes for SAF-aligned forces that were stationed in El Fasher at the time.<sup>84</sup>

In Darfur, as part of the military offensive to capture El Fasher (North Darfur) launched in May 2024, the RSF conducted a large-scale assault on the Zamzam IDP camp in April 2025, killing civilians, taking hostages and pillaging civilian structures.<sup>85</sup> Continued intense fighting in El Fasher resulted in the RSF's conquest of the city on 26/27 October 2025 following an 18-month siege, with reports of serious acts of violence being committed.<sup>86</sup>

Reporting on events around the capture of El Fasher, the UN independent international fact-finding mission (FFM) for the Sudan concluded that the RSF engaged in 'widespread and systematic' violence. These acts included large-scale killings, mass-scale rape, torture and other cruel treatment, as well as deliberate starvation of residents through the destruction of basic livelihoods and the denial of medical care and humanitarian aid during the prolonged siege.<sup>87</sup> Acts of violence showed an open intent to target members of African communities (non-Arabs), notably the Zaghawa.<sup>88</sup> The mission thus concluded that the RSF had acted 'with genocidal intent' and committed crimes against humanity and war crimes.<sup>89</sup> Meanwhile,

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<sup>80</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>81</sup> Dabanga, Sudanese army claim capture of strategic North Kordofan towns, 26 July 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, SAF confirms loss of Bara as fighting escalates across Sudan, 17 March 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudanese army retakes Bara, secures el-Obeid in North Kordofan, 6 March 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: Appalling reports of summary executions and other serious violations, as RSF makes major territorial gains in El Fasher and North Kordofan, 27 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>82</sup> International Crisis Group, Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War, 20 June 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudan's paramilitary RSF say they seized key zone bordering Egypt, Libya, 11 June 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, SAF evacuates 'strategic' Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle following RSF takeover, 12 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>83</sup> International Crisis Group, Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War, 20 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>84</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Sudan's RSF tighten grip on army supply lines, shifting military balance, 23 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>85</sup> AI, "A Refuge Destroyed": RSF Violations in Darfur's Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons, December 2025, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>86</sup> AI, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur, July 2026, [url](#), pp. 9, 11; UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>87</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 114

<sup>88</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 23, 60, 75

<sup>89</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 116-117



fighting continued in parts of Darfur through to August 2026,<sup>90</sup> with strikes attributed to the SAF targeting RSF-controlled areas in the region, causing civilian casualties.<sup>91</sup>

By late 2025, the conflict had developed into a ‘deeply fragmented’ and ‘ethnically charged’ war. Fighting had escalated significantly as a result of mobilisation of civilians along tribal and ethnic lines for fighting.<sup>92</sup> A proliferation of advanced drones enhanced the warring parties’ combat capabilities, resulting in prolonged fighting<sup>93</sup> and allowing hostilities to continue independently from seasonal weather conditions. By the first half of 2026, attacks by armed drones had become the undisputed primary cause of civilian fatalities; Kordofan was the region most affected by fatal drone strikes on civilians.<sup>94</sup> The use of drones by the RSF and SAF increasingly spread to areas outside Kordofan and Darfur, with strikes hitting targets in states such as Khartoum,<sup>95</sup> White Nile,<sup>96</sup> River Nile,<sup>97</sup> and Red Sea,<sup>98</sup> all located deep inside SAF-held territory at some distance from the main frontlines.<sup>99</sup>

In parallel, fighting on the ground between the SAF and the RSF spread to Blue Nile state in January 2026, involving clashes between the SAF and RSF/SPLM-N-AI-Hilu and SAF airstrikes.<sup>100</sup> Hostilities further intensified in the state in February 2026 and were ongoing as of late August 2026.<sup>101</sup> The town of Kurmuk, situated at the border of Blue Nile state with Ethiopia, changed hands repeatedly between March and August 2026.<sup>102</sup> ACLED noted that the RSF’s new focus on Blue Nile state was aimed at reopening the fight over control of central Sudan (Sennar, Al Jazirah, and Khartoum states).<sup>103</sup>

As of April 2026, both warring sides were reportedly locked in a ‘military impasse’ across the country.<sup>104</sup> However, July 2026 saw an offensive of the SAF and aligned forces in North Kordofan that led to their recapture of the Al Sadarat highway (a key logistical route

<sup>90</sup> MEMO, Sudanese official says army pushes back RSF in two areas of North Darfur, 5 August 2026, [url](#); UN News, Sudan war: Drone attacks damage key aid routes, 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>91</sup> BBC News, Sudan army drone strike on court session kills 35, rights group says, 3 August 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strike kills two in West Darfur, 13 May 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, 10 killed, seven injured in ‘SAF drone strike’ on South Darfur market, 9 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>92</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 8

<sup>93</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 13

<sup>94</sup> UN News, Armed drones leading cause of civilian death in Sudan war: UN rights chief, 11 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>95</sup> UN News, Armed drones leading cause of civilian death in Sudan war: UN rights chief, 11 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>96</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: Türk appalled by surge in deadly drone attacks on civilians in Kordofan and White Nile, 12 March 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Students among 17 dead in RSF drone attack in Sudan’s White Nile State, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>97</sup> Al Jazeera, Drone strike plunges Sudan major cities into darkness as civil war rages, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>98</sup> International Crisis Group, Drone Attacks on Port Sudan Mark Dramatic Escalation, 7 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>99</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 30 July 2025, n.a.

<sup>100</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>101</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army deploys allied reinforcements to Blue Nile after rebel gains, 1 September 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Over 20 killed in Blue Nile clashes as fresh violence triggers mass displacement across Sudan, 12 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>102</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudan army says RSF advance on key town bordering Ethiopia, 13 August 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army recaptures strategic border town of Kurmuk, 8 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Map: Sudanese Rebels Overrun Army Garrison at Ethiopia Border, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>103</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>104</sup> Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)



connecting Khartoum and El Obeid),<sup>105</sup> as well as the towns of Bara, Jabra El Sheikh, Um Sayala,<sup>106</sup> Gereij, and Um Girfa located along the road.<sup>107</sup> This allowed the SAF to restore access to the state capital of El Obeid,<sup>108</sup> a SAF-controlled city which is strategically located between the largely SAF-controlled east and the RSF-held west of the country<sup>109</sup> and has been facing siege-like conditions during the conflict.<sup>110</sup> Despite suffering territorial losses, the RSF continued its campaign to take control of El Obeid as of August 2026.<sup>111</sup>

The RSF's recent defeats on the battlefield were preceded by signs of growing discontent and infighting within the group's core ranks<sup>112</sup> alongside fractures in its alliance with non-Arab factions operating in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states as part of the Taasis alliance.<sup>113</sup> Following the military setback, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo was reported to have called on local tribes to mobilise<sup>114</sup> and join operations in Kordofan as well as participate in a new offensive toward Khartoum.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Videos | Sudanese Army Restores Khartoum–El Obeid Road Link, 27 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>106</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Videos | Sudanese Army Restores Khartoum–El Obeid Road Link, 27 July 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudanese army claim capture of strategic North Kordofan towns, 26 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>107</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Videos | Sudanese Army Restores Khartoum–El Obeid Road Link, 27 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>108</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Videos | Sudanese Army Restores Khartoum–El Obeid Road Link, 27 July 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudanese army claim capture of strategic North Kordofan towns, 26 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>109</sup> BBC News, Fears of a massacre in this city on the front line of Sudan's war, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>110</sup> UN News, Armed drones leading cause of civilian death in Sudan war: UN rights chief, 11 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>111</sup> Reuters, RSF renews assault on Sudan's al-Obeid as drones strike capital, witnesses say, 12 August 2026, [url](#)


<sup>112</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan's RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, [url](#); ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Hit Sudan's RSF ... Has the Breakup Phase Begun?, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>113</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>114</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>115</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

### 1.1.3. Territorial control



**Map 2. Sudan Approximate Territorial Control as of 31 August 2026, Political Geography Now. Circle size indicates the population size of the location, based on estimated population figures.** <sup>116</sup>

Towards August 2026, the situation regarding territorial control was marked by a divide between western and eastern Sudan.<sup>117</sup> Of the country's total 18 states, the RSF controlled the five Darfur states (North, South, East, West and Central Darfur), although with some local

<sup>116</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.d.

<sup>117</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.d.; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

exceptions, as parts of North Darfur either remained under SAF control<sup>118</sup> or were contested between the RSF and SAF, alongside parts of West Darfur.<sup>119</sup> The SLM-AW maintained its area of control in the Jebel Marra mountains in the centre of Darfur in the common border area between North, South and Central Darfur.<sup>120</sup>

Moreover, the RSF controlled sizeable territories in the Kordofan region,<sup>121</sup> including all of West Kordofan and parts of North Kordofan and South Kordofan. Some areas of western and southeastern South Kordofan were contested between the two main warring parties<sup>122</sup> or under the control of SPLM-N,<sup>123</sup> which held the Nuba mountains.<sup>124</sup>

In Blue Nile state, southern areas bordering South Sudan and Ethiopia were mapped as either contested<sup>125</sup> or controlled by the RSF and its allied forces associated with the Taasis coalition.<sup>126</sup> In the Northern state, since June 2025,<sup>127</sup> the RSF has been in control of a small stretch of territory along Sudan's border triangle with Libya and Egypt<sup>128</sup> (the strategic El Uweinat area),<sup>129</sup> control further extended into the northern edges of North Darfur.<sup>130</sup>

The SAF and their allied militias, meanwhile, controlled most of the territory of the 13 states outside Darfur, including the country's capital Khartoum<sup>131</sup> and the eastern, central and northern states,<sup>132</sup> as well as large areas in the south and south-east.<sup>133</sup> This was notably the result of the SAF's military advances that led to their recapture of Wad Madani in Al Jazirah state (January 2025) and of Khartoum state in May 2025 and further allowed the SAF to

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<sup>118</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; AA, Sudanese group accuses RSF of killings, abuses after entering town in West Darfur, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>119</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>120</sup> NL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 140; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 1], 12 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>121</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>122</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>123</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>124</sup> NL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 140

<sup>125</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>126</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>127</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudan's paramilitary RSF say they seized key zone bordering Egypt, Libya, 11 June 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network, Fears and deals, Inside the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle, 7 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>128</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>129</sup> Ayin Network, Fears and deals, Inside the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle, 7 August 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, SAF evacuates 'strategic' Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle following RSF takeover, 12 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>130</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>131</sup> AA, Sudanese group accuses RSF of killings, abuses after entering town in West Darfur, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>132</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>133</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)



retake territory from the RSF in White Nile, North and South Kordofan states.<sup>134</sup> Following the offensive conducted July 2026, the SAF further expanded its control within North Kordofan.<sup>135</sup>

#### 1.1.4. Security trends and civilian deaths estimates

It is difficult to determine the number of people in Sudan who have died during the current war,<sup>136</sup> including as a result of violence, starvation, or lack of healthcare in the context of the conflict.<sup>137</sup> Available data is sparse and its gathering has been described as ‘methodologically weak’, including due to restrictions in access to affected communities.<sup>138</sup>

The ongoing conflict has severely impeded news gathering.<sup>139</sup> Media infrastructure has been destroyed and internet and telecommunications networks have been affected by frequent disruptions.<sup>140</sup> Journalists have been targeted by both warring parties for reporting on atrocities<sup>141</sup> and humanitarian conditions.<sup>142</sup> In addition, propaganda and disinformation have dominated the already tenuous information space, with both the SAF and the RSF using distortion of information and omission of key facts as media strategies.<sup>143</sup> In particular, independent reporting in El Fasher was near-impossible during the siege and hostilities.<sup>144</sup> International media coverage of the conflict has similarly remained limited<sup>145</sup> as foreign journalists have faced significant difficulties entering Sudan due to security concerns<sup>146</sup> and logistical challenges.<sup>147</sup> For more information, see section 1.3.3. Access to information, misinformation and media landscape and section 2.3.2. Situation of journalists and other media personnel of the [EUAA COI report Sudan: Country Focus \(August 2026\)](#).

Estimates of the death toll from the conflict varied widely<sup>148</sup> as the mortality impact of the war remained ‘largely unmeasured’, according to the Sudan Research Group of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM).<sup>149</sup> In August 2025, Tom Perriello, the US

<sup>134</sup> Al Jazeera, After three years of war, Sudan army and RSF locked in military impasse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>135</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudanese army claim capture of strategic North Kordofan towns, 26 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>136</sup> CSIS, The Sudan War in 10 Charts, 17 April 2026, [url](#); ACLED, How to interpret ACLED’s fatality records in Sudan, 15 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>137</sup> CSIS, The Sudan War in 10 Charts, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>138</sup> Dahab, M. et al., War-time mortality in Sudan: a multiple systems estimation analysis, September 2025, [url](#), p. 1583

<sup>139</sup> UN News, Sudanese journalists awarded UNESCO press freedom prize, 30 April 2026, [url](#); ACLED, How to interpret ACLED’s fatality records in Sudan, 15 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>140</sup> Free Press Unlimited, Press freedom in Sudan continues to crumble, 12 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>141</sup> CPJ, Sudan’s 3 years of war, impunity, and the silencing of the press, 15 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>142</sup> Akua, N., Sudan’s Journalists Are Being Silenced: By Bullets, Exile, and Fear, Al Jazeera, 17 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>143</sup> Free Press Unlimited, Press freedom in Sudan continues to crumble, 12 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>144</sup> CPJ, Sudan’s 3 years of war, impunity, and the silencing of the press, 15 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>145</sup> Akua, N., The Hidden Toll of Reporting on the Sudanese Civil War, CJR, 27 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>146</sup> ACLED, How to interpret ACLED’s fatality records in Sudan, 15 April 2026, [url](#); iMedD, Sudan, the black hole of journalism, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>147</sup> iMedD, Sudan, the black hole of journalism, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>148</sup> CSIS, The Sudan War in 10 Charts, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>149</sup> Dahab, M. et al., War-time mortality in Sudan: a multiple systems estimation analysis, September 2025, [url](#), p. 1583



government's former special envoy for Sudan, estimated that the overall number of deaths had exceeded 400 000, without providing any further details for this estimate.<sup>150</sup>

The OHCHR reported at least 3 384 conflict-related civilian deaths<sup>151</sup> between January and June 2025, representing almost 80 % of all civilian deaths (4 238) documented over the entire year 2024.<sup>152</sup> During the one-year period from 16 November 2024 to 15 November 2025, the OHCHR recorded at least 5 359 civilian deaths. Of these, at least 3 700 occurred during the direct conduct of hostilities, including 1 977 in the Darfur region (with North Darfur state accounting for 1 825) and 932 in the Kordofan region.<sup>153</sup> The OHCHR noted that its casualty figures represented 'an under-reporting of the true scale of civilian deaths arising from the conflict'.<sup>154</sup> Due to limited access to conflict areas, OHCHR has predominantly relied on remote monitoring and interviewing to gather data.<sup>155</sup>

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 4 893 security incidents at national level. Of these, 1 437 were coded as battles,<sup>156</sup> 2 031 as explosions/remote violence and 1 425 as violence against civilians. Overall, the number of incidents decreased from 437 in March 2025 to below 400 in April and May 2025 and below 300 in June 2025. Monthly incident numbers subsequently remained between 200 and 300 until June 2026. In July 2026, the number of incidents rose again to 349 before decreasing to 258 in August 2026.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> New York Times (The), Where There's No Debate About Genocide — and No Response, Either, 30 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>151</sup> The OHCHR recording covers civilian casualties during active hostilities and casualties recorded in situations of violence outside active armed conflict; OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1; OHCHR, Guidance on Casualty Recording, 1 December 2019, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>152</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>153</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9, 23

<sup>154</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>155</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 3; OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>156</sup> Please note that ACLED codes drone strikes met with anti-aircraft fire as battles.

<sup>157</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 1: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Sudan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>158</sup>**

During the reference period (1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026), ACLED recorded security incidents in all states of Sudan. The highest numbers of incidents were recorded in North Kordofan (910), North Darfur (876), West Kordofan (632) and South Kordofan states (606), while the lowest numbers were recorded in the states of Sennar (14), Gedaref (16), Kassala (22), and Red Sea (34). Of the 1 425 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’, which resulted in 4 690 recorded fatalities, 888 incidents involved the RSF, 208 the Darfur communal militia, and 82 the military forces of Sudan, including Military Intelligence.<sup>159</sup>

<sup>158</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>159</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Security events by type and region: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 2: Security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians by region in Sudan, 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>160</sup>**

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded a total of 21 863 fatalities across the country, including both combatants and civilians.<sup>161</sup> However, such figures are likely to be lower than the actual total number of overall conflict-related fatalities given the fact that ACLED's recorded numbers represent a minimum count of reported deaths that have immediately resulted from a specific security incident. The numbers thus do not include indirect conflict-related deaths. Moreover, ACLED states that its data may have been affected by underreporting due to access constraints, insecurity, and disruptions in communications.<sup>162</sup>

<sup>160</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>161</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>162</sup> ACLED, How to interpret ACLED's fatality records in Sudan, 15 April 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 3: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Sudan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>163</sup>**

Data on civilian casualties attributable solely to the use of explosive weapons have been provided by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).<sup>164</sup> AOAV's data is based on English-language media reports that contain explicitly stated casualty figures. In its methodology, AOAV explains that, where several media sources report on the same incident, those providing the greatest level of detail or the most recent casualty data are selected. AOAV acknowledges several limitations, often related to the quality and reliability of the source material and the lack of a mechanism of following up media reports with in-depth investigation.<sup>165</sup>

Between March 2025 and June 2026, AOAV recorded 3 394 civilian fatalities among a total of 6 335 civilian casualties linked to explosive weapons use. The number of civilian deaths was highest in the months of April 2025 (456 fatalities), December 2025 (341), and March 2026 (334) and lowest in July 2025 (82), August 2025 (109), and June 2026 (114).<sup>166</sup> According to an estimate by the OHCHR, more than 1 000 civilian deaths had resulted from drone strikes between January and May 2026.<sup>167</sup> By May 2026, attacks by armed drones, by a large margin, had become the primary cause of civilian fatalities in the country.<sup>168</sup>

<sup>163</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>164</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>165</sup> AOAV, AOAV's Explosive Violence Monitor – Methodology, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>166</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>167</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Fuelling Sudan's conflict: weapons, fighters and external support networks, A/HRC/63/23, 1 September 2026, [url](#), para. 19

<sup>168</sup> UN News, Armed drones leading cause of civilian death in Sudan war: UN rights chief, 11 May 2026, [url](#)

## 1.2. Actors in conflict

### 1.2.1. Major state and non-state armed groups

#### a) Brief description and capacity

##### *Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and allied forces*

The SAF is the regular military forces of Sudan<sup>169</sup> and comprises the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy<sup>170</sup> as well as the Military Intelligence, the Central Reserve Police, and the Border Guards.<sup>171</sup> According to Global Firepower, as of January 2026, the SAF had a total strength of 517 500, including 300 000 active personnel, 200 000 reservists, and 17 500 members of paramilitary forces. Among its main forces, the Army accounted for 485 500 and the Air Force for 13 000 personnel.<sup>172</sup> As of mid-2026, the SAF remained under the command of Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan,<sup>173</sup> the country's de facto head of state.<sup>174</sup> As commander-in-chief, he has principal oversight of the SAF's operations.<sup>175</sup> The SAF, whose officer corps has traditionally been dominated by Arab elites from the Nile Valley,<sup>176</sup> have maintained some measure of a centralised command chain,<sup>177</sup> along with staff procedures and a traditional military doctrine centred on territorial defence.<sup>178</sup> The headquarters of the SAF are located in Khartoum and operational commands oversee their forces across different regions.<sup>179</sup>

The SAF have regained control throughout central Sudan,<sup>180</sup> recapturing Wad Madani in Al Jazirah state in January 2025 and Khartoum state in May 2025.<sup>181</sup> SAF troops and allied Darfur Joint Forces maintained control of their stronghold in El Fasher until the city was overrun by the RSF in late October 2025.<sup>182</sup> As of mid-2026, the SAF maintained control of most of the country's northern, eastern and central regions.<sup>183</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, [url](#); Tounsel, C., Sudan's civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>170</sup> Global Firepower, 2026 Sudan Military Strength, last updated 22 January 2026, [url](#); Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>171</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>172</sup> Global Firepower, 2026 Sudan Military Strength, last updated 22 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>173</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 9; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>174</sup> Tounsel, C., Sudan's civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>175</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 9; Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>176</sup> International Crisis Group, A Race against Time to Halt Sudan's Collapse, 22 June 2023, [url](#), p. 9; Sudan War Monitor, Introductory guide to Sudan's new civil war, 21 December 2023, [url](#)

<sup>177</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>178</sup> Cann, A., Sudan's Two Armies: A Comparative Analysis of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, 1 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>179</sup> Sudan Now, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), last updated July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>180</sup> ACLED, Fighting moves to Kordofan as Sudan's east-west divide solidifies, 11 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>181</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 10

<sup>182</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 12; ACLED, El Fasher and Kordofan: the strategic fronts in Sudan's shifting war – Expert comment, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>183</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, [url](#)



The SAF has made increasing use of drones (now a dominant feature of the overall conflict),<sup>184</sup> including Turkish-manufactured drones and missiles (Bayraktar systems<sup>185</sup> such as Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akinci drones<sup>186</sup>), Turkish-Pakistani made drones (YHIA-III), Iranian-made military drones (Mohajer-6 and Ababil-3),<sup>187</sup> Pakistani Shapur drones,<sup>188</sup> alongside commercially purchasable Chinese-made devices.<sup>189</sup> This has allowed the SAF to project aerial power across several fronts at the same time.<sup>190</sup> Reports from US officials alleged that the SAF had used chemical weapons on at least two occasions in 2024.<sup>191</sup> A 2025 investigation by France 24 provided findings that appeared to corroborate the allegations in relation to two incidents in September 2024.<sup>192</sup> Externally, the SAF are reportedly supported by Egypt<sup>193</sup> and Türkiye, both providing diplomatic backing along with material assistance,<sup>194</sup> as well as by Russia and Iran.<sup>195</sup>

The SAF are backed by dozens of militia groups within the country. With the expansion of the war in scale and scope, the SAF have shown a growing reliance on militias to pursue their military goals,<sup>196</sup> including a number of Islamist armed groups.<sup>197</sup> The most prominent Islamist militia is the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade,<sup>198</sup> a Muslim Brotherhood-linked militia<sup>199</sup> whose leaders were linked to Omar al-Bashir's long-term regime<sup>200</sup> (1989–2019).<sup>201</sup> As of August 2026, the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade was commanded by Al-Misbah Abu Zaid<sup>202</sup> (Mubashir Abu Zaid<sup>203</sup>). The brigade is known for its use of advanced weaponry.<sup>204</sup> Its strength is unknown, with estimates ranging widely from around 1 500 fighters<sup>205</sup> to between 20 000<sup>206</sup> and 45 000 fighters. While its strongholds lie in eastern Sudan, the brigade is actively involved

<sup>184</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); ACLED, How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>185</sup> ACLED, How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, [url](#); Washington Post (The), A Turkish arms firm helped fuel Sudan's brutal civil war, records show, 9 March 2025

<sup>186</sup> Soufan Center (The), War Without End: How Drone Warfare and Failed Diplomacy Are Fragmenting Sudan, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>187</sup> ACLED, How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>188</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army receives Pakistani armoured vehicles and drones, military sources say, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>189</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>190</sup> ACLED, How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>191</sup> MEE, US sanctions on Burhan spark Sudanese condemnation of UAE and Biden, 19 January 2025, [url](#); New York Times (The), Sudan's Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say, 16 January 2025, [url](#); USDOS, Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons by Sudan Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 27750 [2025-11896], 27 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>192</sup> France24, Videos show the Sudanese army's use of chlorine gas as a weapon, 9 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>193</sup> BBC News, A simple guide to what is happening in Sudan, 13 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>194</sup> Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>195</sup> DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>196</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>197</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Islamists tactical retreat creates dilemma for army generals, 11 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>198</sup> Reuters, Insight: Sudan's Islamists plot post-war comeback by supporting army, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>199</sup> Gunaratna, R., Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: Genesis, Evolution and Threat, Manara Magazine, 22 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>200</sup> Guardian (The), Militia aligned with Sudanese army accused of executing men in Khartoum, 19 December 2024, [url](#)

<sup>201</sup> Reuters, Sudan's Bashir admits role in 1989 coup during trial, 21 December 2022, [url](#)

<sup>202</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Islamists tactical retreat creates dilemma for army generals, 11 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>203</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>204</sup> Ayin Network, Sudan's army, Islamists, and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, 25 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>205</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>206</sup> Ayin Network, Sudan's army, Islamists, and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, 25 March 2025, [url](#)



in combat in the three Kordofan states. The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade has resisted attempts to fully integrate under the SAF's structures of command<sup>207</sup> and has been accused by critics of independent conduct.<sup>208</sup> In September 2025, the US government sanctioned the brigade due to its Islamist orientation and alleged links to Iran.<sup>209</sup> In January 2026, the EU sanctioned seven individuals, 'in view of the continued grave situation in Sudan' including Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade commander Al-Misbah Abu Zaid.<sup>210</sup>

The Joint Forces, formed in April 2023,<sup>211</sup> comprise Darfuri armed groups that had signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) of 2020.<sup>212</sup> While initially taking a stance of non-alignment, some of these groups aligned with the SAF<sup>213</sup> in November 2023<sup>214</sup> and declared war on the RSF in early 2024.<sup>215</sup> This formation included the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),<sup>216</sup> each comprising around 35 000 fighters,<sup>217</sup> as well as the Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF) and groups linked to the Sudan Liberation Movement – Transitional Council (SLM-TC). Factions of the SLM-TC and the GSLF later split from the SAF alliance, initially adopting a neutral stance before aligning with the RSF.<sup>218</sup> After the fall of El Fasher, Darfuri armed groups that had remained aligned with the SAF were deployed to other areas of Sudan.<sup>219</sup> Most fighters composing the Joint Forces are ethnic Zaghawa.<sup>220</sup>

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Malik Agar (SPLM-N-Agar), known for its experienced battle-hardened forces, has operated alongside the SAF across several fronts, including in Blue Nile and Khartoum states.<sup>221</sup> Its second-in-command general, Hassan Adam al-Hassan, defected to the RSF-aligned Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis) in April 2026.<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>208</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>209</sup> USDOS, Sanctioning Sudanese Armed Group Leader and Islamist Militia with Links to Iran, 12 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>210</sup> Council of the EU, Sudan: Council sanctions seven individuals in view of the dramatic escalation of violence in the country, 29 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>211</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 9; ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>212</sup> ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>213</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), paras. 9-10

<sup>214</sup> Sudan Tribune, Key Darfur groups join Sudanese army in its war against RSF paramilitary forces, 16 November 2023, [url](#)

<sup>215</sup> Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>216</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), paras. 9-10

<sup>217</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>218</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), paras. 10, 12

<sup>219</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>220</sup> Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>221</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>222</sup> Horn Review, Sudan's New Front in Blue Nile, 8 May 2026, [url](#)



The Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), operating in North Kordofan<sup>223</sup> and Al Jazirah state with an estimated strength between 35 000 and 75 000 fighters, played a key role in the SAF's recapture of areas in eastern Sudan,<sup>224</sup> including Al Jazirah state (January/February 2025)<sup>225</sup> and eventually Khartoum (March 2025).<sup>226</sup> The SSF, formed in 2022 by former SAF officer Abu Aqla Keikel<sup>227</sup> and drawing most of its fighters from Arab communities of Al Jazirah state,<sup>228</sup> has, under Keikel's leadership, changed allegiances at different stages of the war. The group defected to the RSF in August 2023 before re-aligning with the SAF in October 2024.<sup>229</sup> Keikel has been placed under sanctions by the EU<sup>230</sup> and the UK for violence against civilians.<sup>231</sup>

The Popular Resistance (*Mustanfareen*) is a more than 70 000-strong national militia constituting a substantial component of the SAF-aligned coalition. Its members are recruited from tribal communities and local militias in the country's east and south<sup>232</sup> and its cadres include individuals from various parts of Sudanese society, including activists who previously opposed Al-Burhan's military rule.<sup>233</sup> The Popular Resistance was formed following the SAF leader's call for general mobilisation in June 2023.<sup>234</sup> Their purpose lies in defending communities and key strategic areas. In El Fasher, they were actively involved in fighting alongside the SAF and the Joint Forces until the city's defences collapsed.<sup>235</sup> Its members have limited training, and their adherence to military orders has been inconsistent, with reports of armed intimidation of civilians at checkpoints, alongside criminal activity.<sup>236</sup>

The SAF alliance further encompasses armed tribal groups operating as community militias defending their own communities while also assisting the SAF. Notable examples are the Zaghawa Council, which contributed to the SAF's defence of its former stronghold in North Darfur state, and the Dar al-Hamar militia from the Kordofan region, which also includes elements opposed to the SAF.<sup>237</sup>

<sup>223</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army and allies recapture key North Kordofan towns, 25 July 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Battles rage in Sudan's North Kordofan with both sides claiming victory, 19 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>224</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>225</sup> Ayin Network, From liberation to persecution: Sudan's army recapture of Al-Jazeera State, 26 February 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Celebrations in Sudan's Wad Madani as army takes over strategic city, 13 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>226</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>227</sup> HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, [url](#); Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>228</sup> HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>229</sup> Elnour, M., Sudan War: Allegiances Shift and Civilians Suffer Regardless, TIMEP, 11 April 2025, [url](#); Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#); HRW, Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village, 25 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>230</sup> Global Sanctions, EU sanctions Sudanese commanders and funders, 18 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>231</sup> UK, FCDO, UK Sanctions List: KAIKAL Abu Aqla Mohamed, last updated 5 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>232</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>233</sup> MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>234</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#); MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>235</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 13

<sup>236</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>237</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)



### *Rapid Support Forces (RSF)*

The paramilitary<sup>238</sup> RSF, formally established in 2013, are a decentralised<sup>239</sup> highly mobile force led by Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.<sup>240</sup> Their ranks are dominated by ethnic Arabs chiefly stemming from the semi-nomadic Rizeigat tribe. The RSF are further supported by a non-Rizeigat<sup>241</sup> core alliance of Arab tribal militias from Darfur and the Kordofans,<sup>242</sup> as well as by formerly SAF-aligned Darfuri splinter groups<sup>243</sup> (GSLF and SLM-TC).<sup>244</sup> Other RSF-aligned non-Arab groups, such as the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North faction led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu (SPLM-N-Al-Hilu), operate in Blue Nile and South Kordofan as part of the RSF's Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis).<sup>245</sup> Moreover, the RSF draw on significant numbers of foreign combatants,<sup>246</sup> including Colombian mercenaries<sup>247</sup> and fighters from South Sudan, Chad, Niger, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Libya.<sup>248</sup>

Since the start of the war, the RSF has operated across multiple regions, including Darfur, Khartoum, Al Jazirah state, and Kordofan.<sup>249</sup> As of beginning of August 2026, the RSF controlled most of the Darfur region,<sup>250</sup> where it has consolidated control following its capture of El Fasher,<sup>251</sup> and parts of the Kordofan region (West Kordofan and parts of North and South Kordofan).<sup>252</sup>

The RSF have used small and light arms along with heavy weaponry, armoured vehicles, artillery (including rockets, mortars, and anti-tank guided missiles),<sup>253</sup> as well as Chinese-manufactured GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers.<sup>254</sup> While lacking an air force,<sup>255</sup> the group has made extensive use of drones,<sup>256</sup> including surveillance drones, large-

<sup>238</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#); Sudan Now, Who are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)?, last updated July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>239</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>240</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 14

<sup>241</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>242</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>243</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>244</sup> NL, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 26

<sup>245</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#); Ayin Network, RSF's military alliances reshape the map of Sudan's war, 21 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>246</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 15

<sup>247</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Why Colombian Mercenaries Are Fighting in Sudan, 16 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>248</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>249</sup> Sudan Now, Who are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)?, last updated July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>250</sup> BBC News, Sudan army drone strike on court session kills 35, rights group says, 3 August 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>251</sup> Tounsel, C., Sudan's civil war: A visual guide to the brutal conflict, The Conversation, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>252</sup> PolGeoNow, Sudan Approximate Territorial Control, as of 31 August 2026, n.a.; Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026), 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>253</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 16

<sup>254</sup> Amnesty International, Sudan: Advanced Chinese weaponry provided by UAE identified in breach of arms embargo – new investigation, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>255</sup> Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>256</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); Reuters, Sudan's RSF steps up deadly drone attacks on frontline cities, 24 September 2026, [url](#)

scale armed fixed-wing drones, suicide drones, and drones for dropping explosives. These have included Chinese-made CH-95 long-range drones supplied by the UAE,<sup>257</sup> Chinese FH-95 drones and Wing Loong II drones, Serbian-made Yugoimport VTOL drones,<sup>258</sup> and domestically produced Safrouq drones.<sup>259</sup>

The RSF further operate equipment for electronic warfare such as jamming systems and Starlink-based command terminals.<sup>260</sup> It reportedly receive substantial funding and arms from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).<sup>261</sup> Apart from the UAE, countries like Ethiopia, Chad, Kenya, and Uganda have been involved to various degrees in facilitating supplies for the RSF, providing diplomatic cover,<sup>262</sup> and, in the case of Ethiopia, hosting a camp for the training of RSF fighters.<sup>263</sup> In July 2026, a Sudanese court convicted Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and 15 senior RSF members *in absentia* of having committed genocide and crimes against humanity in El Geneina (West Darfur), including for the June 2023 killing of a regional governor.<sup>264</sup>

As of June 2026, there were signs of fracture and infighting both within the RSF's core<sup>265</sup> (including defections of several senior commanders<sup>266</sup> and a senior RSF political figure)<sup>267</sup> and within the RSF's Taasis alliance with non-Arab groups in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.<sup>268</sup>

## b) Nature of methods and tactics used

Since the start of the current conflict in April 2023, the tactics of warfare have shifted significantly. The initial stages were marked by artillery and infantry operations<sup>269</sup> and the SAF's reliance on its air power.<sup>270</sup> However, as the war progressed, drones came to play an increasingly crucial role in operations of both the SAF and RSF, expanding conventional battlefields<sup>271</sup> as they allowed strikes on targets located far from the base. By late 2025, an

<sup>257</sup> New York Times (The), The Secret Egyptian Air Base Behind Sudan's Drone War, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>258</sup> Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>259</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's army, RSF escalate conflict with advanced drone warfare, 15 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>260</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 16

<sup>261</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#); FT, Sudan civil war atrocities cast spotlight on UAE, 4 November 2025, [url](#); WSJ, How U.A.E. Arms Bolstered a Sudanese Militia Accused of Genocide: Gulf Arab state has funneled weapons, including Chinese-made drones, to rebel forces, 28 October 2025

<sup>262</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Turkey is winning in Sudan. But for how long?, 10 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>263</sup> Reuters, Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>264</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica, Rapid Support Forces, last updated 8 September 2026, [url](#); BBC News, Sudan's paramilitary RSF chief sentenced to death over war crimes, 13 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>265</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan's RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>266</sup> Elhag, A., RSF Defections: A Turning Point in Sudan's War?, TWI, 21 May 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Hit Sudan's RSF ... Has the Breakup Phase Begun?, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>267</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, Defections Shake Sudan's RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance, 18 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>268</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>269</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>270</sup> Ali, H. and Kurtz, G., Stopping the War in Sudan, SWP, 22 May 2023, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>271</sup> LWJ, Sudanese Armed Forces gains in civil war force strategic adjustment from paramilitia rival, 6 August 2026, [url](#); ACLED, Drone warfare reaches deeper into Sudan as peace talks stall - August 2024, 23 August 2024, [url](#)

airfield in Nyala (South Darfur) served as the RSF's main launch site for UAE-supplied long-range drones.<sup>272</sup>

Apart from drone strikes, the RSF have conducted large-scale ground offensives in North Darfur<sup>273</sup> and used civilian housing to shield from SAF attacks and launch their own attacks.<sup>274</sup> Since April 2023, RSF operations across the Darfur region have been reportedly marked by 'pervasive' and 'consistent' patterns of violence against civilians, ethnic targeting of non-Arab communities, such as ethnic Masalit in West Darfur's El Geneina area, and tactics of siege in and around the city of El Fasher. Acts of violence attributed to the RSF include indiscriminate killing, torture, sexual violence, looting, and the destruction of civilian housing and infrastructure.<sup>275</sup> Indiscriminate attacks in densely populated zones were also attributed to the SAF and aligned forces.<sup>276</sup> The SAF and its aligned forces have also carried out reprisal killings of people suspected of having sided with the RSF in areas formerly held by the paramilitary group,<sup>277</sup> including members of the Kanabi community<sup>278</sup> and South Sudanese nationals.<sup>279</sup>

Both sides of the conflict have conducted systematic attacks on civilians.<sup>280</sup> During their over 500-day siege of El Fasher,<sup>281</sup> RSF elements burned nearby villages, towns and IDP camps, bombed populated areas on a near-daily basis<sup>282</sup> using drones and heavy weaponry, and employed tactics of starvation and physical elimination of the city's population, attacking IDP camps, medical facilities, food distribution systems, and water and electricity infrastructure.<sup>283</sup> By maintaining its prolonged siege of El Fasher, the RSF and their allies used starvation as a means of war that led to multiple reports of civilian deaths.<sup>284</sup> As the siege tightened, there were reports of widespread killings, including through indiscriminate gunfire and executions of

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<sup>272</sup> Le Monde, Sudan's two warring sides continue to upgrade weaponry despite arms embargo, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>273</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 28

<sup>274</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Domicide: Mass destruction of housing and civilian infrastructure in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine – Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, A/HRC/61/43/Add.3, 26 February 2026, [url](#), para. 76

<sup>275</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 19-20

<sup>276</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Domicide: Mass destruction of housing and civilian infrastructure in Gaza, Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine – Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, A/HRC/61/43/Add.3, 26 February 2026, [url](#), para. 75

<sup>277</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 36-39

<sup>278</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 36; CIR, Kanabi settlements burn as violence spreads across Gezira, 31 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>279</sup> Sudans Post, 27 South Sudanese nationals killed by SAF-allied militias in Sudan's Al Jazirah State, 16 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>280</sup> Amnesty International, Sudan: Three years on, warring parties intensify brutal war on civilians, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>281</sup> MEE, Sudan's Rapid Support Forces: What to know about the paramilitary group, 5 November 2025, [url](#); New Arab (The), Who are Sudan's Rapid Support Forces, accused of atrocities in Darfur?, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>282</sup> Amnesty International, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur [AFR 54/1116/2026], July 2026, [url](#), pp. 6, 10

<sup>283</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 20, 25, 27

<sup>284</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 85



civilians in homes and public areas,<sup>285</sup> among them civilians who attempted to escape from the city.<sup>286</sup> The conflict also saw the RSF employing long-term siege tactics around the Kordofan towns of Dilling,<sup>287</sup> Kadugli,<sup>288</sup> and imposing prolonged siege-like conditions on El Obeid,<sup>289</sup> creating critical shortages in food<sup>290</sup> and water.<sup>291</sup>

The war has seen sexual violence – including rape, gang rape and attempted rape, forced nudity, forced prostitution, sexual slavery and sexualised torture – used in a coordinated, recurrent, and systematic manner as a means of war.<sup>292</sup> The RSF deliberately used sexual violence to subjugate women, girls, and communities<sup>293</sup> as a tactic aimed at weakening anti-RSF forces, especially the Joint Forces.<sup>294</sup> Such acts mostly targeted non-Arab women and girls and were reported across all zones that have been affected by the current conflict, including the Khartoum area, Al Jazirah, Kordofan, Zamzam, and El Fasher.<sup>295</sup> While the RSF were identified as the main perpetrator of sexual violence, acts like rape and sexualised torture of female and male detainees were also attributed to members of the SAF, including in Blue Nile, White Nile, Khartoum, and Northern states.<sup>296</sup>

In July 2026, following the SAF's advances in North Kordofan, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo reportedly ordered a shift in military tactics, urging his fighters to adhere to rules of combat and protect civilians.<sup>297</sup> No information could be found on whether and to what degree these changes have been implemented.

<sup>285</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 44

<sup>286</sup> Al, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur, July 2026, [url](#), p. 6; UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 44, 47

<sup>287</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudan army says two-year RSF siege of key town broken, 27 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan army breaks Dilling siege for third time, enabling aid delivery, 19 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>288</sup> ASA, Sudan at the Threshold of Irreversibility, 5 February 2026, [url](#); Humanitarian Action, Kadugli Operational Response Planning, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>289</sup> United Nations in Sudan, Media Statement - Türk calls for strong action at the highest level to prevent atrocity crimes in Sudan, 3 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>290</sup> WFP, WFP warns El Obeid is becoming the new epicentre of Sudan's displacement and hunger crisis, 17 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan army breaks Dilling siege for third time, enabling aid delivery, 19 May 2026, [url](#); UN News, Famine declared in two Sudanese cities cut off by war, fragile gains elsewhere, 4 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>291</sup> United Nations in Sudan, Media Statement - Türk calls for strong action at the highest level to prevent atrocity crimes in Sudan, 3 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>292</sup> OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>293</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 59

<sup>294</sup> OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), para. 24

<sup>295</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 59-60, 64

<sup>296</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 58, 66

<sup>297</sup> AA, RSF commander orders tactics shift after Sudanese army advances in North Kordofan, 28 July 2026, [url](#)



### c) Recruitment

After Al-Burhan's call for general mobilisation in June 2023,<sup>298</sup> the SAF used a variety of mobilisation techniques. According to confidential sources cited by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in certain areas, these included instilling fear in civilians by telling them that they would be killed by the RSF if they chose to not take up arms. In other cases, authorities used explicit coercion to recruit civilians, at times ordering community leaders and clan chiefs to supply a certain number of recruits.<sup>299</sup> The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade continued to recruit minors, taking children from schools and transporting them to military training facilities.<sup>300</sup>

Though their ranks are dominated by ethnic Arab combatants, as the conflict progressed, the RSF came to recruit growing numbers of fighters from non-Arab militias in Darfur and the Nuba Mountains in Kordofan.<sup>301</sup> The UN noted eyewitness reports that the RSF and aligned groups recruited significant numbers of children in the El Fasher area, deploying them as fighters, guards and for the purpose of intelligence gathering.<sup>302</sup> The RSF have further recruited mercenaries from abroad.<sup>303</sup>

At the same time, the reference period saw increased mobilisation of civilians along tribal lines.<sup>304</sup> Following losses resulting from military defeats in North Kordofan in mid-2026, RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, in what seemed a shift away from foreign mercenary recruitment, turned to calling for direct mobilisation of tribes in Darfur. A number of tribes heeded his call, including a Fur tribe pledging four combat brigades and a group of Arab tribes committing an 11-battalion force. The administration of Central Darfur state also announced a mobilisation, pledging 10 000 fighters to the RSF leadership.<sup>305</sup>

## 1.2.2. International actors

Despite the domestic roots of Sudan's current war,<sup>306</sup> the conflict has seen the involvement of multiple countries as providers of support in the form of arms, funds, or diplomatic backing,<sup>307</sup> including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Türkiye, Qatar, Iran, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Russia, Chad, and South Sudan.<sup>308</sup> This section provides information on the conflict-related role of the key actors: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye.

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<sup>298</sup> Noon Post, Sudan's War: Mapping the Influential Military Forces, 28 October 2025, [url](#); MEE, Sudanese in Kordofan's Bara the latest civilians to be forced into battle, 30 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>299</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), pp. 87-88

<sup>300</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Sudan's army-linked Islamist brigade accused of child recruitment, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>301</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>302</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 17

<sup>303</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>304</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 8

<sup>305</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>306</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>307</sup> Wilson Center, Conflict in Sudan: A Map of Regional and International Actors, 19 December 2024, [url](#); Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan's civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>308</sup> Wilson Center, Conflict in Sudan: A Map of Regional and International Actors, 19 December 2024, [url](#);



### *United Arab Emirates (UAE)*

The UAE has been assessed to be the RSF's primary foreign backer<sup>309</sup> although Abu Dhabi has consistently rejected such claims.<sup>310</sup> According to US intelligence sources, quoted by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the UAE provided the group with advanced Chinese-manufactured drones, small arms, heavy machine guns, artillery, mortars, and vehicles.<sup>311</sup> Amnesty International (AI) found that the UAE also retransferred imported Chinese GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers to the RSF.<sup>312</sup> In addition, since 2024, a UAE-based security company with links to Abu Dhabi's political leadership<sup>313</sup> has reportedly facilitated the transfer of Colombian mercenaries to Sudan to assist the RSF.<sup>314</sup> In return for backing the RSF, the UAE has allegedly sought the RSF's cooperation in protecting UAE interests in Sudan.<sup>315</sup> These include maintaining the UAE's access to Sudan's gold,<sup>316</sup> safeguarding investments in agriculture,<sup>317</sup> and securing influence along the Red Sea coast.<sup>318</sup> The UAE's support for the RSF was also reportedly driven by concerns about a perceived threat from Islamist currents aligned with the SAF.<sup>319</sup>

To transfer military supplies to the RSF, the UAE reportedly relied on logistical supply routes through eastern Chad, southeastern Libya, northeastern Somalia, amongst others.<sup>320</sup> From late 2025, there were signs that the UAE was rerouting its lines of support for the RSF, as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Somalia began to deny the UAE overflight rights, while authorities in eastern Libya imposed a temporary closure of Kufra airport.<sup>321</sup> In early 2026, Reuters pointed to sources indicating that the UAE had funded the construction of a camp in Ethiopia near the border with Blue Nile state to train RSF fighters, also sending military instructors to the site. As of January 2026, Ethiopian security services noted that 4 300 RSF fighters were receiving military training at the location.<sup>322</sup> The UAE did not appear to have reduced its support for the RSF since the start of the 2026 Iran war.<sup>323</sup> In March 2026, the UAE was reportedly seeking

<sup>309</sup> Sudan Times (The), Guide to Sudanese Civil War: The who, what, where and why, 14 November 2025, [url](#); DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>310</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#); DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, [url](#); Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan's war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>311</sup> WSJ, How U.A.E. Arms Bolstered a Sudanese Militia Accused of Genocide: Gulf Arab state has funneled weapons, including Chinese-made drones, to rebel forces, 28 October 2025

<sup>312</sup> Amnesty International, Sudan: Advanced Chinese weaponry provided by UAE identified in breach of arms embargo – new investigation, 8 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>313</sup> The company is the called the Global Security Services Group (GSSG). CIG, Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher, April 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>314</sup> HRW, From Bogotá to El Fasher, 25 May 2026, [url](#), p. 2; CIG, Blood Money: How UAE Support and Foreign Mercenaries Enabled the Fall of El Fasher, April 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>315</sup> WSJ, How U.A.E. Arms Bolstered a Sudanese Militia Accused of Genocide: Gulf Arab state has funneled weapons, including Chinese-made drones, to rebel forces, 28 October 2025

<sup>316</sup> DW, Sudan war: Could involved foreign powers stop the war there?, 31 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>317</sup> Atlas Institute for International Affairs, Abu Dhabi's Strategic Footprint in Sudan's Civil Conflict, 3 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>318</sup> Deng, D.J., The Rapid Support Forces and Sudan's War of Visions, KAS, 10 June 2025, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>319</sup> Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan's civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#); Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan's war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>320</sup> Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>321</sup> Badri, L., Paused, Not Resolved: The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and the War in Sudan, ARI, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>322</sup> Reuters, Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say, last updated 11 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>323</sup> Badri, L., Paused, Not Resolved: The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and the War in Sudan, ARI, 13 May 2026, [url](#)



new aerial transport routes to support the RSF, running via countries such as Ethiopia and the Central African Republic (CAR).<sup>324</sup>

### *Saudi Arabia*

Saudi Arabia, which seeks to safeguard its security<sup>325</sup> and economic interests in the Red Sea region,<sup>326</sup> has supported the SAF through economic aid<sup>327</sup> while making repeated efforts at diplomatic mediation.<sup>328</sup> Riyadh adopted an outwardly neutral stance despite its preference for the institutional continuity granted by the SAF and the Al-Burhan-led de facto government.<sup>329</sup> Saudi Arabia has thus decried violence by the RSF and directed veiled criticism at the UAE for its ‘foreign interference’ in the Sudan conflict.<sup>330</sup> In January 2026, in what was seen as a response to the UAE’s alleged logistical support to the RSF, Saudi Arabia was reported to have played a key role in facilitating a significant arms deal between Sudan and Pakistan<sup>331</sup> that encompassed the provision of Karakoram-8 aircraft, over 200 drones, and air defence systems to the SAF.<sup>332</sup> While in the first months of the 2026 Iran war, there were signs that Saudi Arabia was showing heightened caution in its backing of the SAF due to the latter’s links to Iran,<sup>333</sup> subsequent months saw Riyadh reinforcing its support for the SAF. A Sudan-Saudi Arabia cooperation agreement was signed in August 2026.<sup>334</sup>

### *Egypt*

Egypt has been seeking the preservation of Sudan’s territorial integrity<sup>335</sup> and a centralised Sudanese state led by the military.<sup>336</sup> Its support for the SAF is underpinned by historical ties between the two countries’ armed forces<sup>337</sup> and its interest in maintaining stability along the Egyptian-Sudanese border.<sup>338</sup> Following the outbreak of the Sudan war, Egypt initially sought to maintain an official stance of neutrality. However, tensions between Egypt and the RSF erupted almost instantly when the RSF captured Egyptian soldiers<sup>339</sup> stationed at Merowe

<sup>324</sup> Le Monde, The UAE reorganizes its arms supply network for Sudanese paramilitaries, 22 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>325</sup> Horn Review, Saudi Arabia’s Recalibrated Engagement in Sudan and the Red Sea, 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>326</sup> Ardemagni, E., Saudi Arabia Has a Red Sea Vision, Not Yet a Strategy, 17 May 2024, [url](#); Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan’s civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>327</sup> Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan’s civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>328</sup> Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan’s civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#); Arab Weekly (The), Saudi Arabia pushes for political settlement as Sudan war intensifies pressure, 16 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>329</sup> Horner, J., The falcons and the secretary bird: Arab Gulf states in Sudan’s war, ECFR, 30 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>330</sup> Al Jazeera, Saudi Arabia denounces ‘foreign interference’ in Sudan after RSF attacks, 8 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>331</sup> MBN/Al-Hurra, After Yemen, Is Saudi Arabia Poised to Act in Sudan?, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>332</sup> Elhag, A., Pakistan Steps In: Sudan and the Transformation of Regional Security, TWI, 22 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>333</sup> Badri, L., Paused, Not Resolved: The Saudi-UAE Rivalry and the War in Sudan, ARI, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>334</sup> Le Monde, La guerre au Soudan, premier terrain du « pacte de La Mecque » entre l’Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et le Pakistan [The Sudan war, the primary terrain of the “Mecca Agreement” between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan], 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>335</sup> Kinkoh, H., The flow of arms and money feeding the war in Sudan can be cut. What is missing is the will [Commentary], Chatham House, 20 May 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War, 20 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>336</sup> Deng, D.J., The Rapid Support Forces and Sudan’s War of Visions, KAS, 10 June 2025, [url](#), p. 13

<sup>337</sup> Mbaku, J.M., Ending Sudan’s civil war: A roadmap to peace and reconciliation [Commentary], Brookings, 20 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>338</sup> Horn Review, How Deep Is Egypt in Sudan’s War? The Shift from Support to Battlefield Involvement, 9 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>339</sup> Maher, M. and Farid, M., Reconsidering Cairo’s Approach to the Sudanese Civil War, TWI, 30 January 2025, [url](#)



Airport in April 2023. As the war unfolded, Egypt's military involvement evolved from covert provision of military gear, logistics and intelligence to a significantly more overt and consequential form of military engagement.<sup>340</sup> These included alleged Egyptian air operations against RSF positions,<sup>341</sup> joint operational coordination with the SAF (since October 2025),<sup>342</sup> deployment of Egyptian military personnel near front lines,<sup>343</sup> and the encirclement of a large Egyptian military unit by Taasis/RSF forces in Blue Nile state in March 2026.<sup>344</sup> Advanced military drones based at an airfield in Egypt have been carrying out strikes against the RSF.<sup>345</sup> Since the capture of El Fasher by the RSF, Egypt both reinforced its diplomatic efforts to end the war<sup>346</sup> and stepped up its military support for the SAF.<sup>347</sup>

### *Türkiye*

Since the start of the war, Türkiye has supported the SAF by providing military gear<sup>348</sup> such as Bayraktar Akıncı<sup>349</sup> and Bayraktar TB2 drones and large numbers of warheads.<sup>350</sup> In the earlier stages of the conflict, Turkish defence firms also maintained contacts with the RSF to hedge potential risks arising from the conflict. However, as the war progressed, Türkiye came to perceive the RSF's decentralised, mercenary-style model of territorial control as a threat to its interest in the Red Sea region. By late 2025, this reassessment had led to a more outright defence alignment with the SAF, resulting in increased volumes of military aid, shipments of Bayraktar drones and technical assistance.<sup>351</sup> In the diplomatic sphere, Türkiye has persistently sought a role as a future mediator between Sudan's warring parties<sup>352</sup> and between Sudan and the UAE.<sup>353</sup>

<sup>340</sup> Horn Review, How Deep Is Egypt in Sudan's War? The Shift from Support to Battlefield Involvement, 9 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>341</sup> Horn Review, How Deep Is Egypt in Sudan's War? The Shift from Support to Battlefield Involvement, 9 April 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, What Egypt's Red Lines Mean for Sudan's War, 20 December 2025, [url](#); Maher, M. and Farid, M., Reconsidering Cairo's Approach to the Sudanese Civil War, TWI, 30 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>342</sup> New Arab (The), Echoes of El-Fasher: How El-Obeid could be Sudan's next humanitarian catastrophe, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>343</sup> Horn Review, How Deep Is Egypt in Sudan's War? The Shift from Support to Battlefield Involvement, 9 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>344</sup> Sudan Times (The), TASIS encircles Egyptian battalion near GERD, 30 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>345</sup> New York Times (The), The Secret Egyptian Air Base Behind Sudan's Drone War, 5 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>346</sup> New Arab (The), After El-Fasher's fall, Egypt is desperately trying to end Sudan's civil war, 7 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>347</sup> Africa Intelligence, Cairo increasingly drawn into the Sudan conflict, 13 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>348</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Turkey is winning in Sudan. But for how long?, 10 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>349</sup> Daily Sabah, Turkish defense industry reshapes Sudan's battlefield, 23 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>350</sup> Washington Post (The), A Turkish arms firm helped fuel Sudan's brutal civil war, records show, 9 March 2025

<sup>351</sup> Horn Review, How a Turkish-Saudi Axis Turned Sudan into a High-Tech Proxy War, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>352</sup> New Arab (The), Sudan's army chief welcomes Turkish offer to resolve conflict, 5 January 2025, [url](#);


<sup>353</sup> Arab Weekly (The), Turkey is winning in Sudan. But for how long?, 10 June 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Türkiye's Erdogan offers to mediate in Sudan-UAE disputes, 13 December 2024, [url](#)



## 1.3. Impact of the security situation on civilian population

### 1.3.1. Humanitarian situation

In 2025, the humanitarian crisis reached ‘catastrophic proportions’,<sup>354</sup> with reports of starvation and famine in parts of Sudan.<sup>355</sup> Meanwhile, experts have described the crisis as ‘the world’s largest humanitarian emergency’.<sup>356</sup> Across the country, humanitarian access has been systematically obstructed by both parties,<sup>357</sup> and starving civilians served the purposes of the conflicting parties<sup>358</sup> – the best reported example being the deliberate starving of the population in El Fasher by the RSF.<sup>359</sup> An Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis drawing on data available up to 10 April 2026 showed that about 19.5 million people (41 % of the total population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity, while 14 areas faced a risk of famine.<sup>360</sup>



### Map 3. Sudan Acute Food Insecurity: June 2026 assessed outcomes<sup>361</sup>

Throughout the reference period, Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan were the regions where conflicts triggered the highest number of displacements, both within the states and out of

<sup>354</sup> UNOCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2026 - Sudan, 8 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>355</sup> NRC, Sudan Annual Report 2025, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>356</sup> Reuters, Sudan's cholera outbreak may get worse due to conflict and rains, WHO warns, 10 July 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, UN Human Rights expert on Sudan renews calls for dialogue, accountability as conflicts enters fourth year, 14 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>357</sup> ACAPS, HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW, JULY 2025, 20 August 2025, [url](#), p.14

<sup>358</sup> Gérard, A., Sudan's aid crisis is also a crisis of accountability, TNH, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>359</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), pp. 40, 98

<sup>360</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>361</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan acute food insecurity area-level classifications: June 2026 assessed outcomes, June 2026, [url](#)



them.<sup>362</sup> According to IOM, as a consequence of the conflict and displacement, psychological distress was reported in 24 % of households nationwide. Moreover, people in Sudan faced critical insecurity of tenure. Particularly, IDP households in both rural and urban displacement sites, relied on makeshift shelters and lived under conditions of overcrowding and poor infrastructure.<sup>363</sup>

Indiscriminate attacks by warring parties continuously targeted medical personnel, healthcare facilities, critical civilian infrastructure, and humanitarian aid.<sup>364</sup> Humanitarian access remained highly restricted, particularly in North Darfur and the Kordofans.<sup>365</sup> As reported in June 2026, drone strikes hit areas beyond active frontlines, including IDP sites. These strikes limited chances for return or improved humanitarian access, destroyed critical and health infrastructure essential for the survival of civilians, such as markets, hospitals, airports, and fuel depots.<sup>366</sup> Schools<sup>367</sup> and residential areas were targeted, humanitarian personnel and volunteers were tortured and killed,<sup>368</sup> drinking water and sewage systems damaged.<sup>369</sup>

#### **a) IDPs and refugees on the move**

According to IOM, as of 30 July 2026, there were an estimated 8.6 million IDPs recorded across all 18 states in Sudan,<sup>370</sup> which represents a decrease of about 2.6 million IDPs since March 2025.<sup>371</sup> According to UNHCR, as of 6 July 2026, the total number of persons displaced by the conflict amounted to 11.4 million people. Of these, 4.6 million were displaced into neighbouring countries, while 6.6 million were internally displaced.<sup>372</sup> As of 28 July 2026, IOM recorded about 4.9 million returnees across 9 states, of whom 82 % (4 million) were IDP returnees and 18 % (900 000) returnees from abroad.<sup>373</sup> About 50 % of returnees and 55 % of IDPs were children under the age of 18.<sup>374</sup>

As of August 2025, IDPs were the most vulnerable group in terms of shelter in Sudan as even after years of conflict, many remained in temporary or inadequate housing. More precisely, 30 % of IDPs lived in makeshift shelters, 10 % in tents, and only 24 % in solid houses.<sup>375</sup> The international humanitarian organisation Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reported, in April 2026, that displaced families within and outside Sudan had experienced major losses,

<sup>362</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot DTM (6), Sudan, 15 June 2026, [url](#), pp. 4-6

<sup>363</sup> IOM, Sudan Multisector Needs Assessment (MSNA), August 2025, 23 October 2025, [url](#), pp. 18, 20

<sup>364</sup> MSF, "There is something I want to tell you..." Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#), Foreword; Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), pp. 72-75

<sup>365</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>366</sup> ASA, Monthly Forecast: Sudan – Drone Warfare Escalation, Eid Violence, Kordofan and Darfur Atrocities, Famine Progression, and Sanctions Dynamics, 6 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>367</sup> Al Jazeera, Students among 17 dead in RSF drone attack in Sudan's White Nile State, 12 March 2026, [url](#); Sudan Protection Cluster, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, January 2026, [url](#), p. 4; Kurtz, G., Protecting Civilians in Sudan, SWP Comment, No. 31, July 2025, 8 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>368</sup> Kurtz, G., Protecting Civilians in Sudan, SWP Comment, No. 31, July 2025, 8 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>369</sup> BBC News, Fears of a massacre in this city on the front line of Sudan's war, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>370</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>371</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Countrywide Mobility Update 16 (Bi-Weekly), 25 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>372</sup> UNHCR, Sudan Emergency: Population Movements from Sudan, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>373</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>374</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 18 August 2026, [url](#), pp. 1, 7, 11

<sup>375</sup> IOM, Sudan Multisector Needs Assessment (MSNA), August 2025, 23 October 2025, [url](#), p. 17



including lost personal belongings, homes and livelihoods. Moreover, 66 % of respondents displaced to Chad, South Sudan and within Sudan had lost contact with family members entirely, without knowledge about their conditions or whereabouts.<sup>376</sup> The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated in February 2026 that many IDPs had been extorted, affected by sexual violence, kidnapped, and trafficked while fleeing. Moreover, older persons and persons with disabilities were often unable to leave in time and were therefore left behind in conflict-affected areas.<sup>377</sup> Large numbers of IDPs, especially in East and North Darfur, reportedly lived under conditions that ‘significantly increase health and protection risks’, as shelters were partly unsafe or collapsed, overcrowded, inadequate regarding privacy, or poorly ventilated.<sup>378</sup>

As of July 2026, 47 % of IDPs originated from North and South Darfur, particularly El Fasher (15 %). 19 % of IDPs had their origins in Khartoum state. The main destinations for IDPs were North, South and Central Darfur. 91 % of IDPs from Khartoum left their state, whereas most IDPs from across the Darfur region were primarily displaced within the broader Darfur region.<sup>379</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> NRC, Exhausted: Three years of displacement and the collapse of survival systems in Sudan and the region, 9 April 2026, [url](#), p. 10

<sup>377</sup> UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 1 February 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>378</sup> UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 1 February 2026, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>379</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 18 August 2026, [url](#), p. 5




**Figure 4: Sudan, IDPs' States of Origin and Displacement, as of 30 July 2026. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data<sup>380</sup>**

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, North Darfur was the primary state of origin of IDPs (2 063 450), followed by South Darfur (1 985 088) and Khartoum (1 668 122). South Darfur was the state hosting the most IDPs (1 765 738), followed by North Darfur (1 672 222) and Central Darfur (993 352).<sup>381</sup>

<sup>380</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>381</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 5: Sudan, IDPs' movement by state, as of 30 July 2026. EUAA elaboration based on IOM DTM Data<sup>382</sup>**

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, of the 2 063 450 IDPs from North Darfur, 1 579 288 were internally displaced within North Darfur, and 484 162 to other states. Of the 1 985 088 IDPs from South Darfur, 1 656 578 were internally displaced within South Darfur, and 328 510 to other states. 683 528 IDPs originating from Central Darfur were internally displaced within the state, and 73 576 to other states. Of the 1 668 122 IDPs from Khartoum, 150 591 were internally displaced within Khartoum, and 1 517 531 to other states.<sup>383</sup>

<sup>382</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>383</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

According to IOM estimates, about 4.6 million people were displaced from Sudan to neighbouring countries since April 2023.<sup>384</sup> About 1.5 million (33 %) crossed into Egypt, 1.4 million (30 %) into South Sudan, 1.3 million (29 %) into Chad, 184 100 (4 %) into Ethiopia, 158 700 (3 %) into Libya, and 44 500 (1 %) into the CAR.<sup>385</sup> African Security Analysis (ASA)<sup>386</sup> reported in June 2026 that intercommunal violence was a driver of displacement for families from Central and South Darfur, who crossed the border into Chad.<sup>387</sup>

As of July 2026, IOM reported return movements to areas of Sudan involving about 4 032 500 IDP returnees and 896 500 returnees from abroad.<sup>388</sup> Between January 2024 and June 2026, IOM monitored inflows from neighbouring countries amounting to about 954 000 individuals. Of these, 464 400 returned from Egypt at Argeen border crossing and 305 200 at Ashkeet; 125 900 from Chad at Um Dukhun border crossing, 54 200 at Adekonk, and 900 at Al-Tina; 2 000 from Ethiopia at Gallabat/Metema border crossing; and 1 300 from Eritrea at Al-Laffa border crossing.<sup>389</sup> The principal state of origin of IDPs who returned to areas of Sudan was Khartoum, followed by Al Jazirah, River Nile, Central Darfur, Northern, and West Darfur.<sup>390</sup>

**Table 1. Individuals crossing from and to Sudan from neighbouring countries (January 2024 - June 2026)<sup>391</sup>**

| Neighbouring Country | Individuals who crossed from Sudan | Individuals who crossed Into Sudan | Data collection period |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| <b>Chad</b>          | 1 336 784                          | 181 038                            | Aug 2025 - Jun 2026    |
| <b>Egypt</b>         | 1 514 824                          | 769 602                            | Jan 2024 - Jun 2026    |
| <b>Ethiopia</b>      | 184 055                            | 2 013                              | Aug 2025 - Jun 2026    |
| <b>Eritrea</b>       | 1 311                              | 1 311                              | Apr 2026 - Jun 2026    |
| <b>Total</b>         | <b>3 036 377</b>                   | <b>953 964</b>                     |                        |

The source indicates that data on cross-border movement from Sudan to neighbouring countries is collected from various sources: Chad (IOM, UNHCR); Egypt (Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Ethiopia (IOM). Data on cross-border movement valid as of: Chad (6 July 2026); Egypt (14 July 2026), and Ethiopia (31 December 2025). Due to high mobility and the fluidity of the situation, these estimates may not capture all movements and could be subject to underreporting. These estimates represent cumulative movements from Sudan to neighbouring countries since 15 April 2023.<sup>392</sup>

<sup>384</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Cross-Border Monitoring Report (5), 13 August 2026, [url](#), pp. 1-2

<sup>385</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 18 August 2026, [url](#), p. 30

<sup>386</sup> African Security Analysis (ASA) is an independent Swedish company that provides information on political developments and the security situation in African countries.

<sup>387</sup> ASA, Monthly Forecast: Sudan – Drone Warfare Escalation, Eid Violence, Kordofan and Darfur Atrocities, Famine Progression, and Sanctions Dynamics, 6 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>388</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>389</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Cross-Border Monitoring Report (5), 13 August 2026, [url](#), pp. 1-2

<sup>390</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Cross-Border Monitoring Report (5), 13 August 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>391</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Cross-Border Monitoring Report (5), 13 August 2026, [url](#), p.4

<sup>392</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Cross-Border Monitoring Report (5), 13 August 2026, [url](#), p.4

## **b) Food and water security**

Food insecurity in Sudan was among the most critical worldwide,<sup>393</sup> as farms were contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW)<sup>394</sup> or devastated by the conflict, and markets and infrastructure were damaged across multiple areas,<sup>395</sup> and supply chains interrupted.<sup>396</sup> The destruction of agricultural equipment and robbing of warehouses by RSF further constrained food supply.<sup>397</sup> The conflict in the Middle East is intensifying the hunger crisis further, as it has disrupted supply chains<sup>398</sup> such as global oil and fertilizer supplies. Consequently, prices of food have risen sharply in Sudan.<sup>399</sup>

According to UN Women, food insecurity in Sudan affected women and girls disproportionately.<sup>400</sup> National hunger totals were alarming and female-headed households (FHHs) were three times more at risk of extreme hunger than male-headed households. In 2025, extreme hunger in FHHs has reportedly nearly doubled. Less than 2 % of FHHs could sustain themselves with sufficient food.<sup>401</sup>

In the first half of 2026, ‘severe’ food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) remained high – affecting nearly 19.5 million people in Sudan – even though the harvest had only just taken place.<sup>402</sup> IPC described the food security situation as ‘extremely fragile and volatile’, although, with regard to areas previously classified as IPC Phase 5, data available did not allow for disaggregation for the February to May 2026 IPC reporting period. Between May and September 2025, the number of highly food insecure people had decreased by 3.4 million people due to improved conditions in Khartoum, Al Jazirah and Sennar states, whereas active conflict and restricted access exacerbated food insecurity in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan. As of September 2025, 98 % of the nationwide total facing food insecurity classified as IPC Phase 5 lived in these areas.<sup>403</sup>

From 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, an officially declared famine has been reported for parts of Darfur (including El Fasher)<sup>404</sup> and Kordofan (including the Western Nuba Mountains<sup>405</sup> and Kadugli)<sup>406</sup>. A risk of famine has been reported for areas in the Greater Darfur and Greater

<sup>393</sup> UN Women, Sudan Country Office, ‘Last and least’: Gender dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Gender alert No 3), November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>394</sup> UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 1 February 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>395</sup> UN Women, Sudan Country Office, ‘Last and least’: Gender dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Gender alert No 3), November 2025, [url](#), p. 1; UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 23, 71-75, 78

<sup>396</sup> Islamic Relief, 2026 update: Takaaya - Sudan’s community kitchens running on fumes, April 2026, [url](#), p. 1; UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 1 February 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>397</sup> Kurtz, G., Protecting Civilians in Sudan, SWP Comment, No. 31, July 2025, 8 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>398</sup> Islamic Relief, 2026 update: Takaaya - Sudan’s community kitchens running on fumes, April 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>399</sup> Khair, K., Gulfs Apart: Can Sudan and the Red Sea Survive the Iran War?, TIMEP, 11 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>400</sup> UN Women, Sudan Country Office, ‘Last and least’: Gender dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Gender alert No 3), November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>401</sup> UN Women, Sudan Country Office, ‘Last and least’: Gender dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Gender alert No 3), November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>402</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 1; IPC, Sudan: Major food and nutrition crisis persists as conflict enters fourth year and risk of Famine looms, 14 May 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>403</sup> IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>404</sup> IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>405</sup> IPC, IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan, 11 July 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>406</sup> IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1



Kordofan regions (including the Nuba Mountains, Nyala, and Dilling)<sup>407</sup> as well as for Al Jazirah, and Khartoum states.<sup>408</sup> According to the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC)<sup>409</sup> and Insecurity Insight, in mid-2025, famine was declared in 10 areas and 17 areas were at risk of famine.<sup>410</sup> Reportedly, famine conditions were particularly severe in El Fasher<sup>411</sup> in North Darfur, and Kadugli<sup>412</sup> and probably Dilling (lack of data prevents IPC classification of this area)<sup>413</sup> in South Kordofan, due to sieges imposed.<sup>414</sup> According to IPC, as of June 2026, food insecurity was reaching critical levels in Al-Tina and Kadugli in North Darfur, Al-Sunut in West Kordofan, and Al-Buram in South Darfur, with a heightened risk of death among children under the age of five.<sup>415</sup>

In a UNICEF assessment in North Darfur's Um Baru in December 2025, 18 % of children assessed suffered from life-threatening Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), 35 % from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM). These were among the highest recorded malnutrition rates in the world.<sup>416</sup>

Water systems were destroyed in the conflict, resulting, as of May 2026, in an estimated 17 million people without access to safe drinking water.<sup>417</sup> As reported in April 2026, the conflict exacerbated the already 'severe and compounding challenges' of Sudan's water systems. Damaged and poorly maintained water delivery systems have become inoperable, and water pumping stations suffered from fuel shortages<sup>418</sup> or weak and unstable electricity supplies<sup>419</sup>. By contrast, for most rural communities, water supply came from hand pumps and protected

<sup>407</sup> IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), pp. 1-2

<sup>408</sup> IPC, IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan, 11 July 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>409</sup> The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC), based at the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights, is a group of international organizations working to protect health workers, services, and infrastructure.

<sup>410</sup> SHCC and Insecurity Insight, Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict, 2025 - Sudan, May 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>411</sup> Amnesty International, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur [AFR 54/1116/2026], July 2026, [url](#), p. 71; NRC, Sudan Annual Report 2025, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 6; Reuters, Hunger monitor confirms famine in Darfur's al-Fashir and one other city, last updated 4 November 2025, [url](#); Gouja, A., An atrocity foretold: How the RSF siege of El Fasher turned into genocidal slaughter, TNH, 30 October 2025, [url](#); IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>412</sup> Reuters, Sudanese army says it has broken siege of famine-stricken Kadugli, last updated 4 February 2026, [url](#); Reuters, Hunger monitor confirms famine in Darfur's al-Fashir and one other city, last updated 4 November 2025, [url](#); NRC, Sudan Annual Report 2025, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 6; IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>413</sup> NRC, Sudan Annual Report 2025, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 6; IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>414</sup> NRC, Sudan Annual Report 2025, 23 April 2026, [url](#), p. 6; Sudan Protection Cluster, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, January 2026, [url](#), p. 5; IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>415</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>416</sup> UNICEF, Nutrition survey finds unprecedented level of child malnutrition in part of Sudan's North Darfur, 29 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>417</sup> IPC, Sudan: Major food and nutrition crisis persists as conflict enters fourth year and risk of Famine looms, 14 May 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>418</sup> Aikins, E. R., Beyond the Conflict: Charting a Path to Sustainable Growth and Development in Sudan, ISS, updated 13 April 2026, [url](#), p. 31

<sup>419</sup> LCC, Al-Kamileen Emergency Response Rooms carry out a project to improve water supply for 5,000 beneficiaries in Jaraewa Al-Sanaat village, Echoes of Solidarity, Issue 19, June 2026, [url](#), p. 5



wells.<sup>420</sup> UNOCHA reported in February 2026 that lack of clean water and basic hygiene was among the biggest challenges for the communities consulted. More than 27 million people in Sudan needed WASH assistance, and FFHs had a 40 % higher risk of extreme water deprivation. Existing water services came under ‘immense strain’ especially in areas hosting large numbers of IDPs. People were exposed to unsafe water and high risks of related outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, dengue and malaria, in return, conflict, and urban areas.<sup>421</sup>

### c) Healthcare

The WHO reported in January 2026 that more than 20 million people in Sudan required health assistance, but ongoing fighting, mass displacement, increasingly deadly attacks on health care, lack of medical supplies, and shortages of funding and health personnel have severely damaged the country’s health system.<sup>422</sup>

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 94 attacks on health care facilities and their vicinity in Sudan, 66 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and 14 by the SAF. These attacks resulted in the destruction of 10 health facilities and damaged 55 more.<sup>423</sup> 12 aerial attacks on health care were recorded between January and March 2026.<sup>424</sup> As of January 2026, about 37 % of all health facilities were non-functional<sup>425</sup> due to damage sustained since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, and millions of people lacked access to essential and life-saving health services.<sup>426</sup>

According to SHCC and Insecurity Insight, the conflict had a severe impact on the availability of medical supplies and contributed to critical shortages or non-availability of essential commodities, medicines, and vaccines.<sup>427</sup> Domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing had effectively halted,<sup>428</sup> manufacturers had supplies confiscated, damaged or seized, and transportation challenges delayed the arrival of medicines and equipment. Estimates suggested that 60 % of required medical supplies were lacking.<sup>429</sup> According to MSF president Javid Abdelmoneim, medicines for HIV, tuberculosis and malaria are scarcely available in many places.<sup>430</sup> The Iran war has further obstructed supply of essential goods, such as

<sup>420</sup> Aikins, E. R., Beyond the Conflict: Charting a Path to Sustainable Growth and Development in Sudan, ISS, updated 13 April 2026, [url](#), p. 31

<sup>421</sup> UNOCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 1 February 2026, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>422</sup> WHO, Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world’s worst health and humanitarian crisis, 9 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>423</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>424</sup> OHCHR, Statement by UN experts deploring widespread attacks on healthcare in Sudan, 10 years after Security Council Resolution 2286, 4 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>425</sup> OHCHR, Statement by UN experts deploring widespread attacks on healthcare in Sudan, 10 years after Security Council Resolution 2286, 4 May 2026, [url](#); WHO, Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world’s worst health and humanitarian crisis, 9 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>426</sup> WHO, Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world’s worst health and humanitarian crisis, 9 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>427</sup> SHCC and Insecurity Insight, Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict, 2025 - Sudan, May 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>428</sup> Al Jazeera, ‘Spoiled insulin’: Sudan war disrupts drug supplies, fuelling smuggling, 1 June 2026, [url](#); SHCC and Insecurity Insight, Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict, 2025 - Sudan, May 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>429</sup> SHCC and Insecurity Insight, Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict, 2025 - Sudan, May 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>430</sup> Der Standard, MSF-Präsident über Sudan: "Wir erleben den Zusammenbruch eines Landes" [MSF President on Sudan: 'We are witnessing the collapse of a country'], 9 June 2026, [url](#)



therapeutic food, intravenous solutions, medicines, and malaria nets from MSF's stock in Dubai.<sup>431</sup>

Access to healthcare was reportedly particularly challenging for displaced women and girls. Many pregnant IDP women and girls could not access antenatal care and safe delivery support. Some were forced to give birth at home<sup>432</sup> or on the road,<sup>433</sup> had no or untrained help, no sterile equipment and no medical supervision. When unable to provide documents necessary for free treatment, these women and girls often avoid medical follow-ups to avoid high fees. Without birth certificates, many newborns in displacement cannot access medical services and vaccination programmes.<sup>434</sup>

According to OHCHR, adequate medical services were inaccessible for most victims of sexual violence within the critical 72- to 120-hour window for post-exposure medical interventions.<sup>435</sup> Reported reasons were non-functioning or absent health facilities, the security situation, restrictions on movement,<sup>436</sup> fear that medical settings could be controlled by perpetrators,<sup>437</sup> lack of medical supplies, and unaffordable cost of transport.<sup>438</sup> Gang rape reportedly caused the most severe of medical complications. Injuries and infections resulting from rape remained mostly untreated even in hospitals in displacement settings, due to the lack of capacities.<sup>439</sup> Moreover, survivors of sexual violence were often stigmatised by their families and communities.<sup>440</sup>

In Darfur, remoteness, difficult terrain, vast distances, and costs for transport made access to MSF healthcare facilities reportedly 'extremely challenging'.<sup>441</sup> During the takeover of El Fasher in October 2025, when only one hospital was operational in the town and medical supplies diminished, wounds had reportedly to be cleaned with water and salt, and rape survivors

<sup>431</sup> Der Standard, MSF-Präsident über Sudan: "Wir erleben den Zusammenbruch eines Landes" [MSF President on Sudan: 'We are witnessing the collapse of a country'], 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>432</sup> Ibrahim, R., Denied by the system: How lack of documentation blocks health access for the most vulnerable, Sudanese Perspectives [Blog], CMI, May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>433</sup> PanaPress, Sudanese Refugee Mothers Give Birth on the Road as Aid Cuts Bite, 8 June 2026, [url](#); AP, Africa is the deadliest place in the world to have a baby, while its population booms, 2 June 2026 [url](#)

<sup>434</sup> Ibrahim, R., Denied by the system: How lack of documentation blocks health access for the most vulnerable, Sudanese Perspectives [Blog], CMI, May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>435</sup> OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>436</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), paras. 66-67; OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>437</sup> OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), para. 42

<sup>438</sup> MSF, "There is something I want to tell you..." Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#), p. 15

<sup>439</sup> OHCHR, Trend Analysis Report – Three Years Too Long: Analysis of Trends and the Devastating Human Rights Impacts of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Sudan from 15 April 2023 to 15 April 2026, 23 June 2026, [url](#), paras. 43, 45

<sup>440</sup> MSF, "There is something I want to tell you..." Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#), pp. 11, 15-16

<sup>441</sup> MSF, Crisis in Darfur: "This is a war against civilians", 13 May 2026, [url](#)



could not be treated timely and adequately.<sup>442</sup> Also in Tawila, where people from El Fasher and Zamzam were displaced to, health services buckled,<sup>443</sup> leaving more than 70 % of households without healthcare, as of September 2026.<sup>444</sup>

As of January 2026, outbreaks of cholera were reported in all 18 states, malaria in 16, and dengue in 14 states. Disease outbreaks were fuelled by poor living conditions, overcrowded displacement sites, disrupted water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health services, and a breakdown of routine immunisation.<sup>445</sup> Responses to disease outbreaks were reportedly further constrained by armed attacks on hospitals and medical staff<sup>446</sup> – such as during a cholera outbreak in Central Darfur in August 2025<sup>447</sup> – as well as by drone attacks – such as in El Obeid in July 2026.<sup>448</sup> As reported on 8 August 2025, limited access to healthcare and medical supplies during a deadly cholera outbreak in Darfur resulted in over 4 300 cases and 113 deaths.<sup>449</sup> The Sudanese Ministry of Health reportedly withheld information on accurate numbers of infections from local NGOs during the cholera outbreak in summer 2025.<sup>450</sup>

#### **d) Aid delivery and humanitarian access**

According to SHCC and Insecurity Insight, in 2025, over half the population (about 25 million) depended on humanitarian assistance. However, humanitarian aid delivery was almost completely obstructed by fragmented authority of the two rival governments established by the SAF and the RSF, who reportedly interrupted aid delivery and services by attacking humanitarian agencies and their staff.<sup>451</sup> Bureaucratic restrictions, checkpoints, blockades, and damaged infrastructure impeded aid deliveries.<sup>452</sup>

Access through the humanitarian El Obeid–Darfur and El Obeid–southern corridors were reportedly challenging.<sup>453</sup> In 2026, the Al-Tina border crossing in North Darfur on the border with Chad remained closed,<sup>454</sup> with no access activities reported there already since 2025.<sup>455</sup> Therefore, humanitarian agencies had to rely on the intermittently closed Adré border

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<sup>442</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report “Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher”, A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 28

<sup>443</sup> Gérard, A., Sudan’s aid crisis is also a crisis of accountability, TNH, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>444</sup> Al Jazeera, Over 665,000 displaced people face shelter crisis in Sudan’s Tawila, 10 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>445</sup> WHO, Sudan: 1000 days of war deepen the world’s worst health and humanitarian crisis, 9 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>446</sup> MSF, Sudan: “Health services strained by huge needs are themselves under attack,” says MSF international president, 15 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>447</sup> MSF, Sudan: MSF suspends activities at Zalingei hospital following armed attack, 19 August 2025, [url](#); HRW, World Report 2026: Sudan, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>448</sup> UN News, New cholera outbreak alert for Sudan’s war-weary communities, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>449</sup> UNHCR, Cholera outbreak among refugees from Sudan’s Darfur, urgent funding needed, 8 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>450</sup> CDAC Network, Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response, 18 September 2025, [url](#), p. 25

<sup>451</sup> HRW, World Report 2026: Sudan, 4 February 2026, [url](#); CDAC Network, Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response, 18 September 2025, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>452</sup> SHCC and Insecurity Insight, Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict, 2025 - Sudan, May 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>453</sup> Sudan Protection Cluster, Protection cluster note - North Kordofan, Sudan, 8 May 2026, [url](#), pp. 2, 4; ACAPS, SUDAN: Analysis of humanitarian access in the Darfur and Kordofan regions - Briefing note, 22 March 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>454</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>455</sup> IPC, IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan, 11 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2



crossing for accessing the Darfur and southern regions from Chad.<sup>456</sup> Moreover, during rainy season, the routes from Chad and South Sudan were reportedly impassable.<sup>457</sup> Administrative constraints further restricted humanitarian aid.<sup>458</sup> For the first time since April 2023, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) accessed Sudan with humanitarian aid via flight connections from Jeddah in May 2026.<sup>459</sup> In June 2026, the first inland flight from Port Sudan to Khartoum was operated by the ICRC.<sup>460</sup>

National NGOs and civil society organisations have suffered from limited resources, material and personnel losses, as well as a militarised environment. Mental health and psychosocial support services have been particularly limited. MSF concluded that humanitarian aid did not meet the level of needs.<sup>461</sup> According to IOM, humanitarian operations in Sudan were ‘massively’ underfunded.<sup>462</sup> Moreover, ‘significant funding shortfalls’ restrained the humanitarian response along the corridor from southwestern Sudan into eastern Chad.<sup>463</sup>

Warring parties have obstructed aid delivery and interrupted aid services by attacking humanitarian agencies and their staff.<sup>464</sup> Obstructions to humanitarian aid included blocked convoys, checkpoint fees, armed interference at distribution sites, demands for beneficiary data, as well as delayed or<sup>465</sup> pending visas.<sup>466</sup> Accusations that humanitarian convoys were smuggling weapons, delayed aid approvals and heightened risks to humanitarian staff.<sup>467</sup> Furthermore, aid convoys were attacked<sup>468</sup> or looted<sup>469</sup>.

Particularly, RSF-held El Fasher had remained ‘largely inaccessible’ to humanitarian actors until January 2026, and reportedly locals trying to bring in food faced life-threatening risks.<sup>470</sup> In SAF-controlled areas, including Khartoum,<sup>471</sup> bureaucratic constraints hindered humanitarian

<sup>456</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>457</sup> IPC, IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan, 11 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>458</sup> IPC, Sudan – IPC Special Report: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis February 2026 - January 2027, 3 June 2026, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>459</sup> ICRC, ICRC RED aircraft to operate from Jeddah to strengthen humanitarian access to Sudan, 14 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>460</sup> ICRC, Sudan: ICRC RED aircraft makes first Port Sudan–Khartoum flight since war began, 8 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>461</sup> MSF, “There is something I want to tell you...” Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>462</sup> IOM, Urgent Support Needed as Over 1.3 Million War-displaced Sudanese Begin to Return Home, 25 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>463</sup> Refugees International, Aid and Accountability for Sudanese Refugees in Chad, 13 February 2026, [url](#), p. 9

<sup>464</sup> HRW, World Report 2026: Sudan, 4 February 2026, [url](#); CDAC Network, Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response, 18 September 2025, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>465</sup> Gérard, A., Sudan’s aid crisis is also a crisis of accountability, TNH, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>466</sup> HRW, World Report 2026: Sudan, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>467</sup> CDAC Network, Sudan’s information war: How weaponised online narratives shape the humanitarian crisis and response, 18 September 2025, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>468</sup> Dabanga, At least 7 dead, UNHCR aid vehicle destroyed in Kordofan and North Darfur drone strikes, 27 April 2026, [url](#); UNHCR, Flash Update #6, Darfur and Kordofan Situation, 15 - 31 January 2026, 16 February 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudan war: 25 civilians die, aid convoy destroyed in renewed North Kordofan drone strikes, 8 February 2026, [url](#); Gérard, A., Sudan’s aid crisis is also a crisis of accountability, TNH, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>469</sup> UNHCR, Joint UN convoy brings vital aid to besieged communities in Sudan’s South Kordofan, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>470</sup> Al, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces’ Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur, July 2026, [url](#), pp. 72-73

<sup>471</sup> IPC, IPC Alert: Famine-Affected Areas in Sudan, 11 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2



access and timely response to humanitarian emergencies.<sup>472</sup> As reported in June 2026, humanitarian operations had to be suspended in Central Darfur due to armed clashes.<sup>473</sup>

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) – a decentralised local humanitarian initiative – were set up in all 18 states in response to the lack of international aid. As of June 2026, more than 700 ERRs were operating, involving more than 26 000 volunteers, mostly doctors, teachers, and community organisers from a variety of social and political backgrounds.<sup>474</sup> Their activities include meal distribution, the provision of healthcare, education, psychological support, and evacuation assistance, among others.<sup>475</sup> Moreover, they run women's response rooms and community kitchens (*takaaya*).<sup>476</sup> Such community kitchens are organised voluntarily within communities across Sudan, and often operate alongside ERRs.<sup>477</sup> Islamic Relief reported in April 2026 that almost 42 % of community kitchens in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, North Kordofan, North Darfur, Sennar, and Gedaref had closed in the previous six months due to underfunding and increased meal costs.<sup>478</sup> Such local aid efforts rely on food sharing and contributions from host communities and diaspora networks.<sup>479</sup>

#### e) Road security

As stated by UNHCR in November 2025, escape routes became longer and more dangerous as IDPs tried to circumnavigate armed checkpoints in the Darfur and Kordofan regions.<sup>480</sup> Refugees International interviewed newly arrived people displaced from Sudan, who reportedly described RSF checkpoints and roadblocks as 'sites of terror' and 'extraction points' where fighters extorted cash and other valuables from them. When unable to pay, people were reportedly stripped, beaten, humiliated, prevented from leaving, or even killed. As a consequence, families split up, left family members behind, or took riskier routes around the worst checkpoints.<sup>481</sup> Checkpoints have also restricted movement of pastoralists in Eastern Sudan.<sup>482</sup> Women in South Darfur reported to MSF they felt constrained to their homes as the risk of rape had become almost inevitable on roads, in markets, and across farmlands.<sup>483</sup> Also

<sup>472</sup> Der Standard, MSF-Präsident über Sudan: "Wir erleben den Zusammenbruch eines Landes" [MSF President on Sudan: 'We are witnessing the collapse of a country'], 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>473</sup> ASA, Monthly Forecast: Sudan – Drone Warfare Escalation, Eid Violence, Kordofan and Darfur Atrocities, Famine Progression, and Sanctions Dynamics, 6 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>474</sup> Alsanosi, A., Emergency Response Rooms work in Sudan – we could change aid models in other warzones, Chatham House, 15 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>475</sup> Otim, R., Sudan's Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs): Living through Civil War and Leading the Humanitarian Response, Activism Influence and Change [Blog], LSE, 19 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>476</sup> Cordaid, 'We're Already There': Sudan's Community-Led Response to the World's Largest Humanitarian Crisis, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>477</sup> Islamic Relief, Takaaya: How community kitchens offer a local lifeline to Sudan's hunger crisis, November 2025, [url](#), p. 10

<sup>478</sup> Islamic Relief, 2026 update: Takaaya - Sudan's community kitchens running on fumes, April 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>479</sup> NRC, What it takes to eat: Conflict and Sudan's fragile food system, updated 14 April 2026, [url](#), p. 21

<sup>480</sup> UNHCR, UNHCR: Displaced civilians fleeing Sudan's Darfur, Kordofan regions navigate serious violations, deadly routes, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>481</sup> Refugees International, Aid and Accountability for Sudanese Refugees in Chad, 13 February 2026, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>482</sup> Sulieman, H. M. et al., Consequences of the Ongoing War on Pastoralist Mobility in Eastern Sudan, CMI, April 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>483</sup> MSF, "There is something I want to tell you..." Surviving the Sexual Violence Crisis in Darfur, 31 March 2026, [url](#), p. 12



in Kordofan's territories under RSF's and affiliated groups' control, people reportedly had to pay multiple times at checkpoints along the roads to South Sudan.<sup>484</sup>

According to the UN Human Rights Council, survivors reported extreme danger as well as executions and continued killings on the road when leaving El Fasher after it had come under RSF control.<sup>485</sup> The New Humanitarian (TNH) reported that RSF and affiliated groups' fighters had looted, abducted, and killed people on the way.<sup>486</sup> Evidence of numerous bodies of children, women, and men lying along the roads to Garni and Tawila was documented.<sup>487</sup> El-Fasher was reportedly encircled by barriers, including checkpoints on roads leading out, making it 'extraordinarily difficult' for civilians to leave. According to Amnesty International, those who failed to escape were killed by RSF fighters.<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>484</sup> BBC News, A pregnant woman's diary of escape from war zone: 'I prayed the baby wouldn't come', 27 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>485</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 38

<sup>486</sup> Gouja, A., An atrocity foretold: How the RSF siege of El Fasher turned into genocidal slaughter, TNH, 30 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>487</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Information Supplementing the Report "Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher", A/HRC/62/CRP.4, 8 July 2026, [url](#), para. 38

<sup>488</sup> AI, City Under Siege, Children Under Fire: Rapid Support Forces' Crimes Against Humanity in North Darfur, July 2026, [url](#), p. 101



## 2. Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by state

### 2.1. Khartoum

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the SAF retained isolated military positions after losing much of Khartoum state to the RSF in April 2023. In March 2024, however, the SAF captured the National TV and Radio Station in Omdurman.<sup>489</sup> By December 2024, an offensive that had been launched by the SAF and allied forces in mid-September 2024 led to the recapture of key sites, including the Al-Jaili refinery, Qarri Free Zone, and parts of Bahri. The SAF also advanced in Al-Mogran and central Khartoum and reconnected the Bahri Signal Corps with the General Command headquarters.<sup>490</sup>

#### 2.1.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF gained control of the entire Khartoum state by late May 2025 and retained it thereafter.<sup>491</sup>

The SAF offensive on Khartoum<sup>492</sup> involved the SAF and aligned forces, including Popular Resistance,<sup>493</sup> the Darfur Joint Forces, the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), and other militias.<sup>494</sup> Another significant SAF-aligned force was the Islamist-linked Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade. The militia played a key role in the battle for Khartoum,<sup>495</sup> but has repeatedly resisted integration into SAF command structures.<sup>496</sup> As of July 2026, an article by AFP mentions the presence of Darfur Joint Forces and Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade fighters in Khartoum state.<sup>497</sup> Neighbourhood defence units have also emerged across Khartoum and were reportedly operating increasingly outside SAF oversight.<sup>498</sup> The SAF reportedly sought to restore order in

<sup>489</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 17, 23 December 2024, [url](#), pp. 2-3

<sup>490</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 18, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>491</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 10; AP, Sudan's military says it took full control of Greater Khartoum region that includes the capital, 20 May 2025, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>492</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), pp. 38-39; ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>493</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>494</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 3; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>495</sup> Eureporter, Khartoum: A ruined capital controlled by Sudan's Islamists, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>496</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>497</sup> AFP, Surrounded by militias, Sudanese fear endless cycle of war, 23 July 2026

<sup>498</sup> Eureporter, Khartoum: A ruined capital controlled by Sudan's Islamists, 4 September 2025, [url](#)



Khartoum since retaking the capital; however, sporadic shootings have continued amid the widespread presence of arms and armed groups.<sup>499</sup>

## 2.1.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

On 21 March 2025, the SAF achieved a landmark victory by capturing the heavily defended Presidential Palace in downtown Khartoum. The rest of Khartoum city, including neighbourhoods in the east of the city, fell soon afterward.<sup>500</sup> At the end of March 2025, the SAF captured the Souk Libya market in Omdurman,<sup>501</sup> an RSF logistics hub,<sup>502</sup> and RSF admitted retreating from Khartoum city.<sup>503</sup> By mid-May 2025, the SAF reportedly had driven the RSF from its remaining positions in Khartoum state,<sup>504</sup> including Salha,<sup>505</sup> south of Omdurman, and Ombada, west of Omdurman.<sup>506</sup> In January 2026, Prime Minister Kamil Idris announced the return of the government to Khartoum.<sup>507</sup> Following a period of relative calm,<sup>508</sup> RSF drone strikes hit the international airport in Khartoum<sup>509</sup> and military installations across the Greater Khartoum area in early May 2026<sup>510</sup> and early July 2026.<sup>511</sup> In June 2026<sup>512</sup> and August 2026,<sup>513</sup> RSF drones were intercepted by SAF over Khartoum.<sup>514</sup> In connection with the May 2026 attack, Khartoum authorities accused Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of orchestrating drone strikes on the airport.<sup>515</sup>

In April 2026, Human Rights Watch mentioned abuses against men and women detained by the SAF, including in Khartoum.<sup>516</sup> In July 2026, authorities launched a security operation in response to growing public concern over neighbourhood insecurity, theft, and illicit drug activity in several areas.<sup>517</sup>

## 2.1.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 372 security events in Khartoum state. Of these, 137 were coded as battles, 119 as explosions/remote violence and

<sup>499</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Security Council orders crackdown on armed presence in cities amid recurring incidents, 19 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>500</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>501</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army recaptures key Omdurman market from RSF, 30 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>502</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>503</sup> France 24, Sudan's RSF paramilitary chief admits forces withdrew from Khartoum, 30 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>504</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 10; AP, Sudan's military says it took full control of Greater Khartoum region that includes the capital, 20 May 2025, [url](#); RFI, Sudan army says Khartoum state 'completely free' of paramilitaries, 21 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>505</sup> Sudans Post, Sudanese military closes to breaking two-year siege of Dilling, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>506</sup> RFI, Sudan army says Khartoum state 'completely free' of paramilitaries, 21 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>507</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan government returns to Khartoum after nearly three-year absence, 11 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>508</sup> BBC News, Sudan accuses Ethiopia and UAE of orchestrating drone attacks on airport, 6 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>509</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>510</sup> BBC News, Sudan accuses Ethiopia and UAE of orchestrating drone attacks on airport, 6 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>511</sup> AP, Drone strikes on civilian vehicles kill at least 20 in Sudan, rights groups say, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>512</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army air defences intercept RSF drones over Khartoum, 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>513</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF drone attacks on Khartoum for second day, 13 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>514</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army air defences intercept RSF drones over Khartoum, 9 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF drone attacks on Khartoum for second day, 13 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>515</sup> BBC News, Sudan accuses Ethiopia and UAE of orchestrating drone attacks on airport, 6 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>516</sup> HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>517</sup> Sudan Tribune, Khartoum security crackdown nets thousands of suspects, 25 July 2026, [url](#)



116 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in March 2025 with 143 recorded events, followed by 74 and 41 incidents in April and May 2025 respectively. From June 2025 through August 2026 between 2 and 19 monthly incidents were recorded. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all districts<sup>518</sup> of Khartoum. The highest number was documented in Khartoum district (96 incidents), followed by Omdurman district (89 incidents). Of the 116 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 379 recorded fatalities, 45 involved the RSF and 34 involved SAF forces.<sup>519</sup>




**Figure 6: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Khartoum, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>520</sup>**

## 2.1.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 691 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Khartoum.<sup>521</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented the unlawful killing of at least 332 civilians outside active hostilities in Khartoum State.<sup>522</sup> Unlawful killings in Sudan increased in March and April 2025. Many involved summary executions in Khartoum after SAF territorial advances and targeted civilians accused of collaborating with the RSF, particularly members of ethnic communities originating from Darfur and Kordofan.<sup>523</sup> In April 2025, the RSF reportedly executed at least 31 people in Salha area of Omdurman.<sup>524</sup> AOAV recorded 136 casualties caused by explosive weapons in Khartoum between March 2025 and April 2026 (all occurring in March, May and October

<sup>518</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Khartoum State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>519</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>520</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>521</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>522</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 1, 44

<sup>523</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 46

<sup>524</sup> Dabanga, Outcry as RSF accused of executing 31 civilians in Omdurman, 28 April 2025, [url](#)

2025),<sup>525</sup> peaking at 129 deaths and injuries in March 2025.<sup>526</sup> During the reference period, civilians were reportedly killed in drone strikes.<sup>527</sup> ACLED recorded 791 fatalities resulting from security incidents in Khartoum state between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026.




**Figure 7: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Khartoum, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>528</sup>**

### 2.1.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

As of May 2025, a returning The New Humanitarian (TNH) reporter described conflict-related destruction in his hometown Khartoum, including damaged buildings, wrecked vehicles, unexploded ordnance and destroyed markets. Returnees reportedly faced shortages of electricity, internet, food and functioning markets, prompting some to return to their places of displacement or relocate to comparatively better-served Omdurman. Al-Amarat was less severely affected than other parts of Khartoum, but basic services had not yet been restored.<sup>529</sup>

As of March 2026, lack of modern water, sewage and other infrastructure continued to impede recovery following conflict-related destruction.<sup>530</sup> Despite official commitments to restore normal conditions in Khartoum, basic services and infrastructure remained severely disrupted, as of July 2026. Electricity was available at approximately one-third of pre-war capacity. Recovery was more visible in Omdurman, while Khartoum city and Bahri remained largely without reliable electricity and other essential services. Continued RSF drone attacks

<sup>525</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>526</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2025, 10 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>527</sup> AP, Drone strikes on civilian vehicles kill at least 20 in Sudan, rights groups say, 8 July 2026; Al Jazeera, Khartoum drone strike kills five in Sudan, NGO reports, 2 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>528</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>529</sup> TNH, Two years after leaving, I returned to a Khartoum I barely recognised, 27 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>530</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's displaced return to a 'capital of ruins' as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

further impeded reconstruction. Students and businesses were urged to return despite damaged facilities, landmine contamination and limited access to electricity and other essential services.<sup>531</sup>

In May 2026, UNMAS reported that new minefields were identified in central Khartoum, including near a bridge rehabilitation site linking Omdurman and Bahri.<sup>532</sup> Khartoum remained contaminated by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnance.<sup>533</sup>

As of August 2025, landmines were confirmed at several locations in Khartoum, including anti-personnel mines in Mogran and anti-vehicle mines in Omdurman and Bahri. The state was previously considered contaminated mainly by unexploded ordnance; the discovery of landmines indicated a more complex explosive-ordnance threat requiring specialised techniques and equipment.<sup>534</sup> At Al-Mugran Park, deminers removed more than 12 000 explosive items from a 4.5-square-kilometre minefield discovered in July 2025. Despite wider clearance efforts, only a limited part of the capital has been inspected. Six additional minefields have been identified, and large areas remain unsafe.<sup>535</sup>

In September 2025, an RSF drone strike damaged critical energy infrastructure in Khartoum, including control systems, fuel lines and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) tanks at the Qarry 3 power station, as well as the Al-Merkhiyat power station north of Khartoum.<sup>536</sup> In June 2026, the Soba and Bant electricity substations in Khartoum state were reportedly restored and reconnected to the national grid as part of ongoing reconstruction efforts.<sup>537</sup>

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 19 attacks on health care in Khartoum, eight of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and four by the SAF. The attacks resulted in the destruction of one health facility and damaged three more.<sup>538</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, the organisation documented four attacks on a school and two on universities, five of which resulted in damage to or destruction of the infrastructure.<sup>539</sup>

## 2.1.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Khartoum state was hosting 414 252 IDPs, most of them displaced within the state (150 591), followed by North Kordofan (113 255) and North Darfur (65 730). Of the total number of IDPs in Khartoum, 153 878 IDPs were located in the Um Bada district, followed by Karrari district with 95 526

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<sup>531</sup> Reuters, Sudanese return home to a capital unready to welcome them, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>532</sup> UNMAS, UNMAS Sudan Factsheet for Q1 2026, 3 May 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>533</sup> ADF, Explosive Remnants of War Litter Sudan's Capital, 26 May 2026, [url](#); AP, Sudan's war leaves Khartoum with unexploded mines and other weapons, 29 April 2026, [url](#); SARI Global, Sudan Bi-Weekly Sitrep, Security & Operational Assessment, April 1 - 15, 2026, 16 April 2026, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>534</sup> UNMAS, Khartoum: Explosive Ordnance Threat - Flash Update No 2 (August 2025), 1 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>535</sup> ADF, Explosive Remnants of War Litter Sudan's Capital, 26 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>536</sup> Sudans Post, Khartoum refinery damaged as RSF escalates drone war, SAF government confirms, 10 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>537</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan restores two Khartoum power substations in post-war grid recovery effort, 5 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>538</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>539</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)



IDPs. At the same time, 1 517 531 displaced persons from Khartoum were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, Khartoum state recorded 2 513 328 returned IDPs, the highest returnee number countrywide.<sup>540</sup> A March 2026 article by Sudan Tribune mentioned that although some residents have returned to parts of Omdurman and Khartoum North (Bahri), areas like Jabra, Al-Amarat, and Al-Taif remained largely deserted. Disease outbreaks and high prices may prompt ‘reverse migration’, while severely damaged water, sewage and other infrastructure continued to impede recovery.<sup>541</sup>

## 2.2. North Darfur

During the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF began its siege of the city El Fasher.<sup>542</sup> In April 2024, the Darfur Joint Force had abandoned its former neutrality and declared war on the RSF,<sup>543</sup> and, among other operations, seized an area from the RSF north of Kutum, in October 2024.<sup>544</sup>

### 2.2.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the RSF controlled the northwestern edges of North Darfur bordering Libya as well as El Fasher (since late October 2025)<sup>545</sup> and nearly all areas outside the city, including Zamzam, Melit, Maliha, Koma,<sup>546</sup> and Al-Zuruq.<sup>547</sup> Southwest of El Fasher, bordering South and Central Darfur states, the Sudan Liberation Movement–Abdel Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW) held territory around Jebel Mara mountain,<sup>548</sup> including the Tawila area.<sup>549</sup> The SAF controlled smaller territories around Al-Atrun airbase<sup>550</sup> and on the border to Chad,<sup>551</sup> including around Al-Tina border crossing.<sup>552</sup> As of late July 2026, Al-Tina reportedly remained the last major stronghold of the SAF and the Joint Force in Darfur, following the RSF’s capture of most major towns and cities across the region.<sup>553</sup>

In North and West Darfur, the main SAF-aligned non-Arab armed groups were SLM-Minnawi<sup>554</sup> and JEM-Ibrahim,<sup>555</sup> which initially operated under the banner of the Darfur Joint Forces

<sup>540</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>541</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s displaced return to a ‘capital of ruins’ as savings dry up, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>542</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: Türk sounds alarm over hostilities in El Fasher, warns of serious human rights violations, 26 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>543</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Darfur Joint Force declares war on Rapid Support Forces, 12 April 2024, [url](#)

<sup>544</sup> ADF, Darfur’s Joint Force Helps Sudan’s Army Retake Key Areas, 22 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>545</sup> Insights SD, The Fall of Al-Fashir and the Beginning of a New Phase in Darfur, 11 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>546</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025, 12 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>547</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>548</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 1], 12 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>549</sup> Sudan Tribune, SLM-AW adopts own flag and anthem in controlled areas, 4 January 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, Tribal Clash Near Nyala Leaves More Than 17 Dead, Injured, 12 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>550</sup> Sudans Post, MAP I Territorial Control in Sudan’s Conflict – March 2026, 2 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>551</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>552</sup> Sudan Watch, Al-Tina in Danger Zone: Widespread Threats Amid Military Escalation and Humanitarian Collapse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>553</sup> Darfur 24, Army, RSF reinforce positions near Chad border, 22 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>554</sup> Sudan Tribune, SLM’s Minawi says not notified of Sudanese army plan to clear Khartoum, 20 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>555</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan’s JEM defends appointments to Al Jazirah project committee, 9 March 2025, [url](#)



before most joined the SAF, as RSF advances in the region intensified. However, some factions sided with the RSF, while SAF-aligned Darfuri forces were redeployed elsewhere after the fall of El Fasher in October 2025. The Zaghawa Council was among the SAF coalition's most prominent tribal armed groups and helped preserve its early stronghold in North Darfur. Such groups mainly acted as community militias defending their home areas while supporting the SAF.<sup>556</sup> Although predominantly composed of Arab militias, the RSF expanded recruitment among non-Arab militias in Darfur formerly affiliated with the SAF.<sup>557</sup> These groups include SAF breakaway factions such as JEM-Sandal<sup>558</sup> and SLM-TC-Idris.<sup>559</sup> SLM-AW reportedly remained unaligned.<sup>560</sup>

### 2.2.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Initially, the RSF attempted to capture El Fasher through direct ground assaults that were repulsed by the SAF and its allied forces. By mid-2025, the RSF shifted to a war of attrition, completely encircling the city and cutting off supply lines,<sup>561</sup> while reportedly building an earthen wall around the city.<sup>562</sup> The RSF included fighters from allied groups into its ranks<sup>563</sup> and used foreign mercenaries<sup>564</sup> operating drones to intensify bombardments.<sup>565</sup> In April 2025, the RSF took control of Zamzam camp,<sup>566</sup> after three days of fighting, fires, and 'extreme violence'.<sup>567</sup> Further attacks were reported in Abu Shouk camp<sup>568</sup> and Um Kadada.<sup>569</sup> On 26 October 2025, the RSF seized control of the capital El Fasher following a siege that had lasted 533 days.<sup>570</sup> The RSF subsequently advanced westward, attacking Joint Forces-held areas controlled by predominantly Zaghawa army-aligned groups.<sup>571</sup> In December 2025, following brief armed clashes, the RSF established near-complete control of Um Baru and Kornoy.<sup>572</sup>

Regarding the SAF and allied forces, in May 2025, the SAF reportedly gained control over Al-Atrun airbase.<sup>573</sup> As of April 2026, Al-Tina area was reportedly controlled by Joint Forces and

<sup>556</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>557</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>558</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's JEM accuses former official of buying looted vehicles from RSF, 3 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>559</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan

Tribune, SLM-TC leader announces plan to evacuate over 100,000 families from El Fasher, 19 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>560</sup> Egemi, O. and McLean, C., Political Economy Of Cash And Markets In Sudan, RVI, October 2025, [url](#), p. 7; Sudan

Tribune, SLM-AW adopts own flag and anthem in controlled areas, 4 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>561</sup> Insights SD, The Fall of Al-Fashir and the Beginning of a New Phase in Darfur, 11 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>562</sup> Al Jazeera, In besieged Sudan city, civilians face death if they try to escape, 4 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>563</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>564</sup> HRW, From Bogotá to El Fasher, May 2026, [url](#), pp.1-6

<sup>565</sup> Insights SD, The Fall of Al-Fashir and the Beginning of a New Phase in Darfur, 11 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>566</sup> DW, Sudan: 400,000 forced to flee Zamzam camp in Darfur, 14 April 2025, [url](#); Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 43

<sup>567</sup> CIR, Fires, extreme violence, and mass displacement following RSF attack on Zamzam camp, North Darfur, 17 April 2025, [url](#); Guardian (The), They slaughtered us like animals': the inside story of how one of the biggest atrocities of the Sudan war unfolded in Zamzam, 7 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>568</sup> OHCHR, Hundreds killed in RSF attacks in Sudan's North Darfur, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>569</sup> Darfur 24, RSF announces Capture of three locations in three different states, 11 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>570</sup> Insights SD, The Fall of Al-Fashir and the Beginning of a New Phase in Darfur, 11 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>571</sup> Arab News, Sudan paramilitary razes Darfur villages, displaces thousands, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>572</sup> Insights SD, Relative Calm and a Shift in Operational Patterns, 17 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>573</sup> MEMO, Sudan army's strategic gains in Darfur, West Kordofan raise hope of ending El Fasher siege and the war, 20 May 2025, [url](#)



the SAF, but intermittent clashes and repeated RSF attacks continued,<sup>574</sup> including in July 2026.<sup>575</sup> There was growing concern that the conflict could develop into a tribal war amid rising ethnic tensions, as the area lies within the Zaghawa tribal sultanate.<sup>576</sup> In late June 2026, Joint Forces reportedly recaptured the town of Abu Qamra after heavy fighting with the RSF.<sup>577</sup>

Allegations of abuses against Zaghawa civilians had been reported following the RSF's capture of Abu Qamra in late 2025, after the Joint Forces' withdrawal to Al-Tina.<sup>578</sup> In July 2026, RSF troops reportedly carried out ethnically motivated attacks on six villages near Al-Tina, resulting in several civilians being killed and dozens injured.<sup>579</sup>

Clashes between herders and farmers occurred across Darfur from October to December 2025, during the harvest period, with Kutum, Kabkabiya, and Dar es Salaam among the particularly affected areas. Reportedly, four people were killed in an incident in Al-Sayyah area in December 2025.<sup>580</sup>

### 2.2.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 876 security events in North Darfur state. Of these, 273 were coded as battles, 385 as explosions/remote violence and 218 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in March 2025 with 112 recorded events, before dropping to between 21 and 36 monthly incidents from November 2025 through August 2026. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all districts<sup>581</sup> of North Darfur. The highest numbers were documented in El Fasher (Al Fasher) district (491 incidents), followed by Kutum district (58 incidents). Of the 218 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 1 955 recorded fatalities, 179 involved the RSF, 28 involved Darfur Communal Militia (ACLED designation for generally unidentified armed groups in Darfur<sup>582</sup>).<sup>583</sup>

<sup>574</sup> Sudan Watch, Al-Tina in Danger Zone: Widespread Threats Amid Military Escalation and Humanitarian Collapse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>575</sup> Borkena, RSF Reportedly Attacks in North Darfur Villages Kill Civilians and Force Thousands to Flee to Chad, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>576</sup> Sudan Watch, Al-Tina in Danger Zone: Widespread Threats Amid Military Escalation and Humanitarian Collapse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>577</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF attacks on Darfur villages kill civilians, spark mass flight to Chad, 5 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>578</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese joint forces recapture Abu Qamra from RSF in North Darfur, 27 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>579</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF attacks on Darfur villages kill civilians, spark mass flight to Chad, 5 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>580</sup> Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>581</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: North Darfur State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>582</sup> Global Weekly, Sexual violence in Sudan, 19 May 2025, [url](#), pp. 7-8

<sup>583</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)






**Figure 8: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in North Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>584</sup>**

## 2.2.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 1 380 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in North Darfur, accounting for almost 90 % of the 1 535 deaths documented across the whole Darfur region.<sup>585</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 2 208 civilian casualties in North Darfur.<sup>586</sup> Between March 2025 and March 2026, AOAV recorded the highest civilian casualty figures of all states regarding casualties caused by explosive weapons in North Darfur. The organisation recorded 2 705 casualties for North Darfur during this period,<sup>587</sup> with peaks in April (676 deaths and injuries),<sup>588</sup> September (459),<sup>589</sup> and October 2025 (359).<sup>590</sup>

According to OHCHR, RSF attacks in April 2025 killed hundreds of civilians, including at least nine humanitarian workers, in the Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps, El Fasher, and Um Kadada.<sup>591</sup> According to an Amnesty International report on the RSF attack on Zamzam IDP camp in April 2025, RSF fighters deliberately killed 47 civilians in homes, a clinic, a mosque and a school, or while they were fleeing. Regarding possible indiscriminate attacks, no verified death toll was available according to Amnesty International, although estimates indicated that between 210 and 1 500 civilians were killed in the Zamzam IDP camp.<sup>592</sup>

<sup>584</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>585</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>586</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 1, 9

<sup>587</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>588</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2025, 10 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>589</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in September 2025, 10 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>590</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in October 2025, 10 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>591</sup> OHCHR, Hundreds killed in RSF attacks in Sudan's North Darfur, 14 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>592</sup> AI, "A Refuge Destroyed": RSF Violations in Darfur's Zamzam Camp for Internally Displaced Persons, December 2025, [url](#), p. 22



SAF air strikes caused civilian deaths in markets across North Darfur.<sup>593</sup> On 24 March 2025, the SAF bombed Tora market, north of El Fasher, reportedly killing or injuring hundreds of civilians, mainly women and children.<sup>594</sup> On 1 June 2025, Koma market was struck, reportedly killing dozens of civilians.<sup>595</sup> Before capturing El Fasher, RSF assaulted or killed people attempting to flee the city, and shelling and drone attacks caused civilian casualties.<sup>596</sup> During the reference period drone strikes reportedly resulting in civilian casualties were recorded in El Fasher,<sup>597</sup> Al-Tina,<sup>598</sup> Karnoi,<sup>599</sup> Kutum,<sup>600</sup> Al-Kuma,<sup>601</sup> and Al-Zawiya<sup>602</sup> areas.

According to a March 2026 UN Human Rights Council report, survivors reported that, from 26 October 2025, RSF troops carried out widespread killings in El Fasher through indiscriminate shootings and executions in residential areas, streets and open areas, particularly in neighbourhoods such as Daraja Oula, Abu Shouk, the Grand Market area and around the airport.<sup>603</sup> Men attempting to flee were reportedly separated from women and children at exit points, beaten, detained and executed in groups on suspicion of supporting the SAF or Joint Forces. Men were disproportionately targeted for execution, although women and children were also among those killed. Most bodies were reportedly left unburied along exit routes.<sup>604</sup> Witnesses described wounded civilians being executed at close range and bodies left unburied along escape routes, including around defensive berms where civilians were detained and killed.<sup>605</sup> Civilians were also attacked at sites of refuge, including El Fasher University and hospitals.<sup>606</sup> The RSF also reportedly pursued people fleeing towards Tawila, Garni and surrounding rural areas, among others firing on them with automatic weapons and causing hundreds of deaths.<sup>607</sup> Rape and sexual violence were also reported by the UN Human Rights Council following the takeover of El Fasher.<sup>608</sup> ACLED observed that the

<sup>593</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 81

<sup>594</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 83

<sup>595</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 81; Sudan Tribune, Air strike on North Darfur market kills dozens, 1 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>596</sup> CFR, Shelling, Drones, and Hunger in El Fasher, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>597</sup> ACJPS, ACJPS Quarterly Newsletter: April, May and June 2026, 21 July 2026, [url](#), p. 9

<sup>598</sup> ACJPS, The Human Rights Situation in Sudan, Reporting period July 2026, 4 August 2026, [url](#), p. 9

<sup>599</sup> ACJPS, ACJPS Quarterly Newsletter: April, May and June 2026, 21 July 2026, [url](#), p. 31

<sup>600</sup> Asharq Al Awsat, Drone Strike Kills 12, Including Children, in Sudan's Darfur, 9 April 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills over 40 at wedding in North Darfur's Kutum, 9 April 2026, [url](#); AP, Drone strike hits wedding in Darfur town, killing at least 30 people, 9 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>601</sup> ACJPS, The Human Rights Situation in Sudan, Reporting period July 2026, 4 August 2026, [url](#), p. 8

<sup>602</sup> RFI, Sudan army's drone attack on court building kills 35 in Darfur, NGO says, 3 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>603</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 44

<sup>604</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 48-50

<sup>605</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 50-51

<sup>606</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 55-56, 63-66

<sup>607</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 70-71

<sup>608</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), paras. 74-89



security incidents it recorded in North Darfur between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 7 623 fatalities.<sup>609</sup>




**Figure 9: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in North Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>610</sup>**

## 2.2.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

During the siege of El Fasher, markets and food supplies were repeatedly affected by attacks. The RSF shelled the market in Abu Shouk displacement camp in March, May and June 2025, killing and injuring civilians and damaging food stalls and supplies.<sup>611</sup> On 24 March 2025, the SAF reportedly bombed Tora market,<sup>612</sup> north of El Fasher, during its busiest hours. The attack set the market on fire and reportedly killed or injured hundreds of civilians, as well as livestock. The destruction had severe humanitarian consequences because Tora market was one of the area's last accessible food sources.<sup>613</sup> In its March 2026 report on El Fasher, UN Human Rights Council noted that markets were repeatedly attacked, looted or closed during the siege, while supply routes were cut and food deliveries were blocked or attacked.<sup>614</sup>

El Fasher's electricity grid was repeatedly attacked by RSF drone strikes resulting in prolonged disruptions to electricity and Internet access.<sup>615</sup> The RSF targeted water

<sup>609</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>610</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>611</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 74

<sup>612</sup> PBS, Sudanese aid groups say 54 killed in North Darfur military airstrike, 25 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>613</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 83

<sup>614</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 25

<sup>615</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 76



infrastructure around El Fasher. Its attacks on Abu Shouk and Zamzam displacement camps further restricted access to safe water.<sup>616</sup> By mid-2025, many water towers and pumps had been destroyed or were no longer functioning.<sup>617</sup> Survivors reported that water infrastructure, electricity networks and health facilities were damaged or destroyed. The destruction of water systems forced residents to rely on unsafe sources.<sup>618</sup>

As of 30 June 2025, more than half of the reported attacks on health facilities occurred during the siege of El Fasher.<sup>619</sup> Among other civilian infrastructure, hospitals were also damaged by shelling and drone attacks.<sup>620</sup> Repeated attacks caused many health facilities to stop operating. At the time El Fasher was taken over, the Saudi Hospital was reportedly the only functioning hospital, but shortages of medicines, equipment, electricity, and staff severely limited its capacity.<sup>621</sup> On 28 October 2025, 460 patients and accompanying persons were killed at the Saudi Maternity Hospital. By October 2025, 46 health workers had been killed and 48 injured in El Fasher since start of the conflict.<sup>622</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 40 attacks on health care in North Darfur, 28 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF. The attacks on health care resulted in the destruction of 3 health facilities and damaged 11 more.<sup>623</sup>

In June 2025, the RSF reportedly shelled three Christian churches in El Fasher,<sup>624</sup> and in September 2025, a drone strike hit a mosque.<sup>625</sup>

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight documented three attacks on schools, in one case resulting in damage to or destruction of the infrastructure.<sup>626</sup>

## 2.2.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, North Darfur state was hosting 1 672 222 IDPs, most of them displaced from North Darfur itself (1 579 288). Of the total number of IDPs in North Darfur, 706 459 IDPs were located in in Tawila district. At the same time, 484 162 displaced persons from North Darfur were hosted in

<sup>616</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 77

<sup>617</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 77; MSF, Besieged attacked, starved: Mass atrocities in El Fasher, 3 July 2025, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>618</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 27

<sup>619</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 89

<sup>620</sup> CFR, Shelling, Drones, and Hunger in El Fasher, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>621</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: hallmarks of genocide in El Fasher – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/61/77, 10 March 2026, [url](#), para. 28

<sup>622</sup> WHO, WHO condemns killings of patients and civilians amid escalating violence in El Fasher, Sudan, 29 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>623</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>624</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the independent international fact-finding mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/60/22, 22 September 2025, [url](#), para. 114; International Christian Concern, 5 Dead after RSF Bombs Churches in Sudan, 14 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>625</sup> BBC News, Drone strike on Sudan mosque kills 78, medic tells BBC, 19 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>626</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)



other states. As of 28 July 2026, North Darfur state recorded 267 761 returned IDPs, almost all of whom were previously displaced within the state.<sup>627</sup>

The takeover of El Fasher by the RSF in October 2025 had reinforced movements of displacement, mainly to nearby areas such as Tawila.<sup>628</sup> Until its capture by the RSF in April 2025, Zamzam camp accommodated more than half a million people and was Sudan's largest IDP camp. During the takeover, approximately 400 000 people left the camp in just two days.<sup>629</sup> As of April 2026, renewed clashes between the SAF and the RSF reportedly displaced between 11 000 and 16 000 people in the Al-Tina area, representing most of the region's population. An estimated 60 to 70 % fled to Chad, while the remainder moved to other locations within Sudan.<sup>630</sup>

## 2.3. South Darfur

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF captured South Darfur capital city, Nyala, in October 2023, resulting in the control over South Darfur state.<sup>631</sup> Large-scale fighting in the state subsequently subsided, although air strikes and localised insecurity persisted.<sup>632</sup>

### 2.3.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the RSF controlled nearly all of South Darfur, except for a small area in the north around Jebel Marra that remained under the control of the Sudan Liberation Movement–Abdel Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW).<sup>633</sup> South of South Darfur lies Kafia Kingi, a disputed border region claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.<sup>634</sup>

The RSF reportedly recruited fighters through tribal and clan leaders, although these fighters frequently returned to tribal allegiances during intercommunal conflict.<sup>635</sup> The Salamat and Beni Halba, for example, were among the main tribal groups that declared allegiance to RSF during the early stages of the conflict.<sup>636</sup> A map by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, an academic institution within the US Department of Defense, lists militias of most of the above-mentioned tribes (Awlad Al Wadi Clan, Habbaniya, Salamat, Beni Halba militias) as active RSF-aligned groups in South Darfur and further mentions a Baggara militia and Libyan armed

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<sup>627</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>628</sup> IPC, SUDAN: IPC Acute Food Insecurity - September 2025 - May 2026, 3 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>629</sup> Kurtz, G., Protecting Civilians in Sudan, SWP Comment, No. 31, July 2025, 8 July 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>630</sup> Sudan Watch, Al-Tina in Danger Zone: Widespread Threats Amid Military Escalation and Humanitarian Collapse, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>631</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF take control of South Darfur's Nyala, vow to protect civilians, 27 October 2023, [url](#)

<sup>632</sup> MSF, MSF report reveals stark lack of protection and assistance in South Darfur, Sudan, 4 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>633</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 1], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>634</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#), p. 42

<sup>635</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>636</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone attack hits market and hospital in South Darfur as tribal war intensifies, 2 June 2026, [url](#)

groups.<sup>637</sup> Reportedly, Colombian mercenaries supporting RSF troops<sup>638</sup> were also present in South Darfur, especially in Nyala.<sup>639</sup> In August 2026, a prominent Fur traditional leader in South Darfur reportedly pledged four combat brigades in support of the RSF.<sup>640</sup>

### 2.3.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Early May and mid-June 2025, the SAF carried out several drone strikes on Nyala,<sup>641</sup> a strategic RSF stronghold.<sup>642</sup> In May 2026, the SAF reportedly carried out 17 drone strikes in Nyala, the highest monthly number recorded in the city since the beginning of the conflict.<sup>643</sup> During the reference period, drone strikes were also reported in other areas of the state,<sup>644</sup> for example in the Sengo Gold mining area, in April 2026.<sup>645</sup>

During the reference period, South Darfur was affected by communal violence between tribes. Media reported on clashes involving members of different groups, including Habbaniya,<sup>646</sup> Salamat, Beni Halba,<sup>647</sup> Sa'ada, and Ta'aliba.<sup>648</sup> An article also mentioned the Awlad Al Wadi,<sup>649</sup> and Fiyarin who are reportedly Beni Halba clans.<sup>650</sup> Clashes were reported, for example, in Buram<sup>651</sup> and Buba area in October 2025,<sup>652</sup> in Al-Qardoud area in December 2025,<sup>653</sup> in the town of Markandi in February 2026,<sup>654</sup> and around Kubum in May 2026.<sup>655</sup> As of June 2026, clashes between Salamat and Beni Halba tribes continued in Kubum and Markundi.<sup>656</sup> Clashes between herders and farmers particularly affected Labado and Marla areas.<sup>657</sup>

The conflict sometimes involved RSF-infighting driven by increasing competition among local commanders over power and resources.<sup>658</sup> In October 2025, RSF personnel reportedly

<sup>637</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>638</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>639</sup> BBC News, UAE-backed Colombian mercenaries provided support to Sudan paramilitary, report says, 22 April 2026, [url](#); Africa Report (The), Sudan: How Colombian mercenaries were duped into fighting in a brutal civil war, 8 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>640</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>641</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 21, 1 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>642</sup> MEE, Sudan's army and RSF militia enter bone-breaking phase in Nyala and Port Sudan, 16 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>643</sup> ACLED, How has Sudan's drone war adapted to shifting supply lines?, 4 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>644</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 6; Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 26, 15 May 2026, [url](#), p. 7; UNSG, Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan, 12 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>645</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 26, 15 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>646</sup> Darfur 24, Nine Dead, 18 Injured in Tribal Clashes in South Darfur, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>647</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, Tribal Clash Near Nyala Leaves More Than 17 Dead, Injured, 12 February 2026, [url](#);

Sudan Tribune, Expanding tribal conflict in South Darfur leaves 50 dead, 3 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>648</sup> Darfur 24, Tribal Clashes in South Darfur Kill 10, Injure More Than 20, 15 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>649</sup> Darfur 24, Tribal Clash Near Nyala Leaves More Than 17 Dead, Injured, 12 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>650</sup> Darfur 24, Two Killed, 18 Injured in Tribal Clashes in South Darfur, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>651</sup> Darfur 24, Nine Dead, 18 Injured in Tribal Clashes in South Darfur, 3 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>652</sup> Darfur 24, Two Killed, 18 Injured in Tribal Clashes in South Darfur, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>653</sup> Darfur 24, Tribal Clashes in South Darfur Kill 10, Injure More Than 20, 15 December 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>654</sup> Darfur 24, Tribal Clash Near Nyala Leaves More Than 17 Dead, Injured, 12 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>655</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#); Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>656</sup> Sudan Tribune, Expanding tribal conflict in South Darfur leaves 50 dead, 3 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Drone attack hits market and hospital in South Darfur as tribal war intensifies, 2 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>657</sup> Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>658</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#)

supported their relatives involved in the clashes between two Beni Halba clans,<sup>659</sup> and in March 2026, an RSF Salamat commander killed an RSF Habbaniya commander over a displacement dispute in Nyala.<sup>660</sup> In May 2026, RSF vehicles were used in tribal clashes,<sup>661</sup> while in June 2026, the reported use of heavy weaponry suggested senior RSF involvement in clashes between Salamat and Beni Halba.<sup>662</sup>

### 2.3.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 517 security events in South Darfur state. Of these, 89 were coded as battles, 160 as explosions/remote violence and 268 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in May 2026 with 47 incidents and in June 2025 with 44 recorded events, while remaining between 16 and 39 incidents for the remaining months. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in 20 of the 21 districts<sup>663</sup> of South Darfur. The highest number was documented in Nyala Janoub district (270 incidents), followed by Beliel district (80 incidents). Of the 268 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 189 recorded fatalities, 149 involved the RSF and 106 involved Darfur Communal Militia.<sup>664</sup>




**Figure 10: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in South Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>665</sup>**

<sup>659</sup> Darfur 24, Two Killed, 18 Injured in Tribal Clashes in South Darfur, 21 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>660</sup> ACLED, How is RSF infighting reshaping the war in Sudan?, 18 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>661</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>662</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>663</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: South Darfur State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>664</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>665</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### 2.3.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 124 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in South Darfur.<sup>666</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 229 civilian casualties in the whole Darfur region, excluding North Darfur.<sup>667</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 213 casualties caused by explosive weapons in South Darfur,<sup>668</sup> peaking at 152 deaths and injuries in December 2025.<sup>669</sup>

Drone attacks resulting in civilian casualties were reported, for example, in Nyala in August 2025,<sup>670</sup> in Katila in December 2025,<sup>671</sup> in Sengo area in April 2026,<sup>672</sup> and in Kubum town in May 2026.<sup>673</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in South Darfur between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 1 073 fatalities.<sup>674</sup>




**Figure 11: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in South Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>675</sup>**

### 2.3.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 12 attacks on health care in South Darfur, 5 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF. The attacks resulted

<sup>666</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>667</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9

<sup>668</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>669</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in December 2025, 10 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>670</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 29

<sup>671</sup> UNSG, Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General - on Sudan, 12 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>672</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 26, 15 May 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>673</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>674</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>675</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

in the damaging of 3 facilities.<sup>676</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, the organisation documented one attack on a school and two attacks on universities, in one case resulting in damage of or destruction to the infrastructure.<sup>677</sup>

In May 2025, SAF drones reportedly hit Nyala airport<sup>678</sup> and, in June 2025, further drone attacks were reported in the city, including on the Al-Daman Hotel, the airport, and a residential neighbourhood.<sup>679</sup> In July 2025, student dormitories used by RSF troops in Nyala were hit in SAF drone attacks.<sup>680</sup> On 30 August 2025, a SAF drone strike reportedly hit the Yashfeen medical facility in Nyala.<sup>681</sup> In April 2026, an SAF drone strike hit the Sengo gold mining area, likely targeting infrastructure tied to the RSF-linked Al-Junaid Company.<sup>682</sup>

In communal violence in May 2026, villages were burnt near Kubum town,<sup>683</sup> while early June 2026, a marketplace and rural hospital were hit by drones in the town.<sup>684</sup>

### 2.3.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, South Darfur state was hosting 1 765 738 IDPs, most of them displaced from South Darfur itself (1 656 578). Of the total IDPs in South Darfur, 464 783 IDPs were located in Beliel district, followed by 335 158 IDPs in Nyala Shimal. At the same time, 328 510 displaced persons from South Darfur were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, South Darfur recorded 102 911 returned IDPs, almost all of whom (100 667) were previously displaced within the state.<sup>685</sup> Communal violence starting end of May 2026, resulted in displacement from Kubum,<sup>686</sup> Mirkindi, and Damba toward Ad Al-Fursan.<sup>687</sup>

## 2.4. West Darfur

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the Darfur Joint Forces made territorial gains in the northern areas bordering Chad, briefly gaining control of Jabal Umm in late September 2024<sup>688</sup> and Kulbus town in early

<sup>676</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>677</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>678</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 21, 1 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>679</sup> Darfur 24, Attack on Nyala, South Darfur, targets foreigners, 14 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>680</sup> Insights SD, New Frontlines and the Rising Role of Emerging Actors, 9 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>681</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 29

<sup>682</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 26, 15 May 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>683</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>684</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone attack hits market and hospital in South Darfur as tribal war intensifies, 2 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>685</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>686</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan Key Message Update: Emergency and risk of Famine persist in North Darfur and South Kordofan, May - September 2026, 8 June 2026, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>687</sup> Sudan Tribune, Villages burned and civilians flee as tribal clashes erupt in South Darfur using RSF vehicles, 31 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>688</sup> ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF retakes control of key town near Chad border in Sudan's West Darfur, 21 October 2024, [url](#)

October 2024.<sup>689</sup> Control of the area shifted to the RSF later that month,<sup>690</sup> while tensions in the area persisted.<sup>691</sup>

### 2.4.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the RSF controlled nearly all areas of West Darfur,<sup>692</sup> while fighting over Bir Saliba area was reported in August 2026.<sup>693</sup> In North and West Darfur, the main SAF-aligned armed groups were SLM-Minnawi and JEM-Ibrahim, which initially operated under the banner of the Darfur Joint Forces before most joined the SAF.<sup>694</sup> Other SAF-aligned actors active in West Darfur were Masalit fighters<sup>695</sup> and the Popular Resistance,<sup>696</sup> while Darfur Arab Militias were aligned with RSF forces.<sup>697</sup>

### 2.4.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

On 29 June 2026, SAF and the Joint Forces reportedly regained control of Kulbus town, which had been under the control of the RSF since October 2024.<sup>698</sup> However, on 10 July 2026, the Joint Forces withdrew<sup>699</sup> to positions outside the town.<sup>700</sup> The Jebel Moon and Kulbus areas have experienced intermittent clashes since the beginning of 2026.<sup>701</sup> In early August 2026, clashes between Darfur Joint Forces and RSF were reported in Bir Saliba and Hajar Marfa'in areas.<sup>702</sup> Bir Saliba is strategically located on the Sudan-Chad border, and the area serves as a key supply corridor and access point to SAF military bases in Gargira and Tina in North Darfur. Control of the area has shifted repeatedly since the conflict began. The SAF retook the area on 11 July 2026, bringing its forces and allies closer to the state capital El

<sup>689</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF retakes control of key town near Chad border in Sudan's West Darfur, 21 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>690</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese joint forces recapture Kulbus in West Darfur, 30 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF retakes control of key town near Chad border in Sudan's West Darfur, 21 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>691</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 17, 23 December 2024, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>692</sup> AA, Sudanese group accuses RSF of killings, abuses after entering town in West Darfur, 10 July 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 3], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>693</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army allies repel RSF attack in West Darfur, 8 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>694</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>695</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 17, 23 December 2024, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>696</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); AA, More than 6,000 fled Sudan's West Darfur following RSF threats: UN agency, 2 July 2026, [url](#);

<sup>697</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>698</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese joint forces recapture Kulbus in West Darfur, 30 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>699</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF regains control of strategic West Darfur town after army pullback, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>700</sup> AA, Sudanese group accuses RSF of killings, abuses after entering town in West Darfur, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>701</sup> Al-Estiklal, After Bir Saliba: Will the Rapid Support Forces' Last Stronghold in West Darfur Collapse?, 20 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>702</sup> MEMO, Sudanese official says army pushes back RSF in two areas of North Darfur, 5 August 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, RSF claims capture of Bir Saliba in West Darfur, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

Geneina,<sup>703</sup> while the RSF sought to maintain the area as a defensive line protecting El Geneina.<sup>704</sup>

During the reference period, drone strikes were reported in El Geneia in October<sup>705</sup> and December 2025,<sup>706</sup> as well as in April,<sup>707</sup> May,<sup>708</sup> and June 2026.<sup>709</sup> SAF drone strikes were also reported at the Adukong border crossing with Chad,<sup>710</sup> near the town of Forbaranga,<sup>711</sup> in the Abu Jadad area of Sirba district,<sup>712</sup> and in the Habayil area and Sisi town.<sup>713</sup>

### 2.4.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 134 security events in West Darfur state. Of these, 32 were coded as battles, 56 as explosions/remote violence and 46 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in July and January 2026, with 25 and 18 recorded events, respectively, while remaining at or below 11 monthly events throughout the rest of the period. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all districts<sup>714</sup> of West Darfur. The highest number was documented in El Geneina district (62 incidents), followed by Kulbus district (26 incidents). Of the 46 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 118 recorded fatalities, 27 involved the RSF and 16 involved Darfur Communal Militia.<sup>715</sup>

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<sup>703</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military builds on North Kordofan gains, prepares push into West Kordofan, repels RSF attempt to recapture West Darfur position along Chadian border | SPLM-N clashes with Otoro tribe inside Kauda | Third nationwide blackout in a week as financing impasse stalls electricity sector recovery | Stalled grid repairs put planting season at risk | Ethiopia fighting threatens Sudan’s largest rain-fed farming state, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>704</sup> Al-Estiklal, After Bir Saliba: Will the Rapid Support Forces’ Last Stronghold in West Darfur Collapse?, 20 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>705</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strikes kill 7 in Darfur market, hit RSF sites, 19 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>706</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills 17 in West Darfur capital, 27 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>707</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strikes kill 20 in Darfur, officials say, 13 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>708</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strike kills two in West Darfur, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>709</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF’s administration says Sudanese army drone destroyed key Darfur bridge, 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>710</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strike kills three at Chad border crossing, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>711</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strike kills senior RSF commander in West Darfur, 13 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>712</sup> Darfur 24, Drone strike kills chief and family in West Darfur, 20 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>713</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drones strike RSF training centre in Nyala, 29 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>714</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: West Darfur State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>715</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Security events in West Darfur: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




Figure 12: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in West Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>716</sup>

#### 2.4.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 11 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in West Darfur.<sup>717</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 229 civilian casualties in the whole Darfur region, excluding North Darfur.<sup>718</sup> AOA V recorded 152 casualties caused by explosive weapons in West Darfur between March 2025 and April 2026, including 113 recorded between February and April 2026.<sup>719</sup> In December 2025, two drone strikes in El Geneina reportedly killed 17 people, including women and children.<sup>720</sup> In April 2026, a strike on Al-Jumruk market killed five people and injured 20, while another strike on a civilian vehicle near Sisi killed five civilians.<sup>721</sup> Days later, a strike on the Adukong border crossing killed three porters and injured dozens of workers, most of them reportedly Chadian nationals.<sup>722</sup> In May 2026, another drone strike in El Geneina reportedly killed two people and injured three.<sup>723</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in West Darfur between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 463 fatalities.<sup>724</sup>

<sup>716</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>717</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>718</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9

<sup>719</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOA V data. AOA V, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>720</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills 17 in West Darfur capital, 27 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>721</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strikes kill 20 in Darfur, officials say, 13 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>722</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strike kills three at Chad border crossing, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>723</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strike kills two in West Darfur, 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>724</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 13: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in West Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>725</sup>**

## 2.4.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded three attacks on health care in West Darfur, two of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and the remaining one by the SAF. The attacks resulted in the damaging of one health facility.<sup>726</sup> According to the RSF administration, in December 2025 two drone strikes in El Geneina targeted a water station and a vehicle transporting a patient to El Geneina hospital.<sup>727</sup> In March 2026, SAF drone strikes on the fuel market in Adikong and the weekly market in Sileia were reported.<sup>728</sup> In April 2026, a drone strike reportedly hit Al-Jumruk market and damaged the facility.<sup>729</sup> In April 2026, a drone strike reportedly hit the Sultan Medical Complex in El Geneina, causing significant damage.<sup>730</sup> In June 2026, the RSF-aligned administration accused the SAF of destroying the Ardamata Bridge in El Geneina in a drone strike, disrupting a key route for humanitarian supplies from Chad to Darfur and Kordofan.<sup>731</sup>

## 2.4.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, West Darfur state was hosting 374 907 IDPs, most of them displaced from within West Darfur (258 402), followed by Khartoum (48 175). Of the total number of IDPs in West Darfur, 127 415 IDPs were

<sup>725</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>726</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>727</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills 17 in West Darfur capital, 27 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>728</sup> Dabanga, Drone strikes hit West Darfur fuel market, shelling resumes in South Kordofan as Sudan fighting intensifies, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>729</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strikes kill 20 in Darfur, officials say, 13 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>730</sup> Dabanga, Rising civilian toll in South Kordofan as fighting intensifies, drone strike kills three at West Darfur hospital, 20 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>731</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF's administration says Sudanese army drone destroyed key Darfur bridge, 9 June 2026, [url](#)

located in the El Geneina district, followed by Kereneik district with 68 465 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 103 744 displaced persons from West Darfur were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, West Darfur state recorded 22 585 returned IDPs, mostly returning from outside Sudan (21 750).<sup>732</sup> In early August 2026, fighting in Sirba district reportedly displaced an estimated 18 000 people from more than 20 villages, most of whom fled across the border into Chad.<sup>733</sup>

## 2.5. East Darfur

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF seized control of El Daein in November 2023.<sup>734</sup> The city was also reportedly subjected to SAF airstrikes that resulted in civilian casualties.<sup>735</sup>

### 2.5.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the RSF maintained control over all of East Darfur,<sup>736</sup> where it was frequently accused of unlawful killings, looting and arbitrarily detaining civilians suspected of collaborating with the SAF.<sup>737</sup> In August 2025, for instance, the RSF conducted a large-scale arrest campaign in the town of Adila.<sup>738</sup> Along the border with South Sudan, RSF forces reportedly were present north of the Kiir River, while South Sudanese security forces were deployed along the southern bank.<sup>739</sup> RSF-aligned militias reportedly active in East Darfur included armed groups associated with the Barqit (Bergid) and Fur communities,<sup>740</sup> as well as the Darfur Communal Militia, Habbaniyah Militia, and Al-Fayaren Clan Militia.<sup>741</sup> Following a May 2025 campaign by RSF to recruit new fighters that reportedly involved the forced recruitment of civilians,<sup>742</sup> the RSF-aligned civilian administration launched a state-wide mobilisation drive in August 2026 to recruit volunteers from localities across East Darfur for deployment to North Kordofan.<sup>743</sup>

<sup>732</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>733</sup> UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, 10 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>734</sup> Dabanga, Sudan war: East Darfur SAF base 'falls to RSF', 22 November 2023, [url](#)

<sup>735</sup> UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 9

<sup>736</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Six killed in army drone strike on East Darfur fuel market, 8 March 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 3], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>737</sup> Sudan Tribune, Senior RSF officer and tribal leader killed in East Darfur internal clashes, 2 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>738</sup> Darfur 24, RSF apprehends prominent NCP figures in East Darfur, 11 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>739</sup> Atar, Markets And Mobility For Survival Along the Sudan–South Sudan Borderland: A Trip To Riqebat Border Market In East Darfur, 20 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>740</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, "خزان جديد" تدفع نازحين إلى الفرار مجددًا نحو جبل مرة, 10 February 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, RSF Deploys Reinforcements to Khazan Jadid After Deadly Internal Clashes, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>741</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>742</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF detains civilians, offers fight-or-pay ultimatum – doctors group, 28 May 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network, Rapid Support Forces resort to forced recruitment campaigns, 26 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>743</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF launches recruitment drive in East Darfur, 4 August 2026, [url](#)

## 2.5.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

During the reference period, drone strikes were reported in El Daein, for example, in March<sup>744</sup> and August<sup>745</sup> 2025, as well as in March,<sup>746</sup> April,<sup>747</sup> and May<sup>748</sup> 2026. Reportedly, as of April 2026, East Darfur had recorded more than 250 drone attacks over the preceding six months, the highest number among Sudan's states.<sup>749</sup> El Daein was repeatedly attacked by the SAF as part of efforts to push the RSF out of Sudan's central corridor.<sup>750</sup>

In June 2025, media sources reported that the RSF detained local officials in El-Daein and military personnel following changes in its local leadership.<sup>751</sup> In January 2026, the RSF reportedly carried out an arrest campaign, targeting politicians, former military personnel, and civil servants.<sup>752</sup> The head of the civil administration in the state was arrested in August 2026.<sup>753</sup> Arrests of tribal leaders were also reported.<sup>754</sup> In February 2026, clashes erupted between two RSF-affiliated groups in Khazan Jedeed, Shia'ria (Sha'iriya) district, following the arrest of individuals wanted in connection with both factions, leading to armed confrontations within the town.<sup>755</sup>

Clashes between herders and farmers occurred across Darfur from October to December 2025, during the harvest period, with Yassin and Shia'ria (Sha'iriya) in East Darfur among the particularly affected areas. Reportedly, four people (two farmers<sup>756</sup> and two pastoralists) were killed in such disputes in the state during the 2025 agricultural season.<sup>757</sup> In June 2026, community leaders and livestock owners in East Darfur warned that delays in making livestock migration corridors, grazing land and water sources accessible risked renewed confrontation between pastoralists and farmers with the onset of the rainy season.<sup>758</sup>

## 2.5.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 109 security events in East Darfur state. Of these, 16 were coded as battles, 25 as explosions/remote violence, and 68 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in June 2025 and March 2026, with 10 recorded events each, while remaining below 10 monthly events throughout the rest of the period.

<sup>744</sup> Sudan Tribune, Missile strikes hit government buildings in Sudan's El Daein and Nyala, 17 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>745</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army airstrike hits RSF-held building in Darfur, dozens injured, officials say, 13 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>746</sup> Darfur 24, Drone Strike on Fuel Depot in Al-Daein Kills Six Civilians, 9 March 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Six killed in army drone strike on East Darfur fuel market, 8 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>747</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strikes kill 20 in Darfur, officials say, 13 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>748</sup> Darfur 24, Drone Strikes Escalate Across Darfur, Hitting RSF Sites and Civilian Infrastructure, 12 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>749</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan drone strikes kill hundreds as warring parties target civilian sites, 8 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>750</sup> Al Jazeera, WHO says attack on Sudan hospital killed 64, including 13 children, 21 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>751</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF detains local officials in East Darfur, citing government ties – sources, 11 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>752</sup> Darfur 24, RSF Releases East Darfur Mayor After Mediation, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>753</sup> Darfur 24, RSF arrests East Darfur civil administration chief, 8 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>754</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF detains tribal leader, 16 others in Sudan's East Darfur, 22 January 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, RSF Releases East Darfur Mayor After Mediation, 13 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>755</sup> Darfur 24, RSF Deploys Reinforcements to Khazan Jadid After Deadly Internal Clashes, 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>756</sup> Darfur 24, Spike in deadly attacks on farmers in Central and East Darfur, 29 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>757</sup> Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>758</sup> Darfur 24, East Darfur Herders Warn of Farmer-Herder Clashes Over Delayed Opening of Livestock Routes, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in eight of the nine districts<sup>759</sup> of East Darfur. The highest number was documented in El Daein district (57 incidents), followed by Bahr Al Arab district (19 incidents). Of the 68 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 28 recorded fatalities, 37 involved the RSF, and 29 involved Darfur Communal Militia.<sup>760</sup>




**Figure 14: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in East Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>761</sup>**

## 2.5.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 12 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in East Darfur.<sup>762</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 229 civilian casualties in the whole Darfur region, excluding North Darfur.<sup>763</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 217 casualties from explosive weapons in East Darfur,<sup>764</sup> including 196 people killed or injured in March 2026 alone.<sup>765</sup> The 20 March 2026 attack on El Daein Teaching Hospital reportedly resulted in 153 casualties.<sup>766</sup> During the reference period, civilian casualties as a result of drone strikes were reported.<sup>767</sup>

<sup>759</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: East Darfur State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>760</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>761</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>762</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>763</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9

<sup>764</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>765</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>766</sup> Guardian (The), Strike on Sudan hospital kills at least 64 and wounds 89 more, WHO reports, 22 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>767</sup> Darfur 24, Drone Strikes Escalate Across Darfur, Hitting RSF Sites and Civilian Infrastructure, 12 May 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, Statement by UN experts deploring widespread attacks on healthcare in Sudan, 10 years after Security Council Resolution 2286, 4 May 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan army drone strikes kill 20 in Darfur, officials say, 13 April 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Six killed in army drone strike on East Darfur fuel market, 8 March 2026, [url](#)

ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in East Darfur between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 255 fatalities.<sup>768</sup>




**Figure 15: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in East Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>769</sup>**

### 2.5.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

In March 2025, missile strikes destroyed the government headquarters in El Daein, which served as the RSF's civilian administration centre, and also targeted the health insurance headquarters.<sup>770</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded five attacks on health care in East Darfur, two of which were reportedly perpetrated by the SAF and one by the RSF. The attacks resulted in the damaging of two health facilities.<sup>771</sup> In March 2026, air strikes rendered Al-Daein Teaching Hospital out of service.<sup>772</sup> In April 2026, the RSF were accused of raiding Al-Usra Hospital in the Al-Nazir neighbourhood of El Daein and assaulting medical personnel. The attack reportedly caused damage to the facility and destroyed medical equipment.<sup>773</sup> Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities during the reference period.<sup>774</sup>

Sudan Tribune, Sudan army airstrike hits RSF-held building in Darfur, dozens injured, officials say, 13 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>768</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>769</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>770</sup> Sudan Tribune, Missile strikes hit government buildings in Sudan's El Daein and Nyala, 17 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>771</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>772</sup> OHCHR, Statement by UN experts deploring widespread attacks on healthcare in Sudan, 10 years after Security Council Resolution 2286, 4 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>773</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese medical group says RSF forces stormed East Darfur hospital, 3 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>774</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)



### 2.5.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, East Darfur state was hosting 809 995 IDPs, most of them displaced from Khartoum (353 043), followed by South Darfur (213 967). Of the total number of IDPs in East Darfur, 236 330 IDPs were located in the Ad Du'ayn district, followed by Shia'ria district with 210 838 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 45 912 displaced persons from East Darfur were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, no returnees were recorded in East Darfur.<sup>775</sup> Since late 2024, Shia'ria, particularly Khazan Jedeed area, has faced a severe humanitarian and security crisis. The district has become a major displacement hub following fighting in North Darfur in April 2025 and the capture of El Fasher in October 2025. Most displaced families face 'extremely precarious conditions', with inadequate shelter, acute food shortages, limited access to clean water and almost no sustained humanitarian assistance.<sup>776</sup>

## 2.6. Central Darfur

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF seized control of the state capital Zalingei (October 2023).<sup>777</sup> Late in 2023, clashes between RSF and Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) were reported around the Jebel Marra area.<sup>778</sup>

### 2.6.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the RSF controlled most of Central Darfur, including the state capital Zalingei, while SLM-AW retained control of parts of the Jebel Marra region.<sup>779</sup> The RSF reportedly controlled six districts,<sup>780</sup> while SLM-AW controlled three: Nertiti, Golo, and Rokero. SLM-AW,<sup>781</sup> whose fighters are predominantly drawn from the Fur ethnic group,<sup>782</sup> remained neutral in the conflict between the SAF and the RSF.<sup>783</sup> RSF-aligned militias active in Central Darfur reportedly included Beni Halba and Salamat militias.<sup>784</sup> In August 2024, Arab tribal leaders from West and Central Darfur announced the mobilisation of 11 battalions in support of the RSF, while the Central Darfur administration pledged an additional 10 000 fighters.<sup>785</sup>

<sup>775</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>776</sup> Solidarités International, Assessment Report – Khazan Jedeed, Sha'ria Locality, East Darfur State | 05/05/2026, 10 June 2026, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>777</sup> Sudan Tribune, Rapid Support Forces seize Sudanese army base in Central Darfur, 31 October 2023, [url](#)

<sup>778</sup> Dabanga, Sudan conflict: RSF clash with SLM-AW in western Jebel Marra, 26 December 2023, [url](#)

<sup>779</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 3], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>780</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF-led administration accuses Sudanese army of drone strike in Central Darfur, 28 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>781</sup> Sudan Tribune, SLM-AW adopts own flag and anthem in controlled areas, 4 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>782</sup> Sudan Tribune, SLM-AW adopts own flag and anthem in controlled areas, 4 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>783</sup> Sudan Tribune, Neutral Darfur rebel group proposes ceasefire, civilian government to end Sudan war, 23 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>784</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>785</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF turns to tribal leaders to stem losses after Kordofan defeats, 4 August 2026, [url](#)



## 2.6.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

During the reference period drone strikes were reported in or near Zalingei in August<sup>786</sup> and in November 2025,<sup>787</sup> and January<sup>788</sup> and April<sup>789</sup> 2026. Further Drone strikes were reported in Umm Dukhun in April 2026.<sup>790</sup>

Clashes between herders and farmers occurred across Darfur from October to December 2025, during the harvest period.<sup>791</sup> In November 2025, two farmers were reportedly killed in Mukjar. The area reportedly faced increased violence during the agricultural season, with over 10 people killed or injured.<sup>792</sup>

In July 2026, clashes between tribal groups were reported in Al-Murain market and Al-Hamidiya IDP camp in Zalingei.<sup>793</sup> In June 2026, clashes between the Beni Halba and Salamat tribes in South Darfur prompted mobilisation campaigns in Central Darfur's Um Dukhun area amid concerns that the conflict could spread.<sup>794</sup>

## 2.6.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 104 security events in Central Darfur state. Of these, 15 were coded as battles, 14 as explosions/remote violence and 75 as violence against civilians. Incidents peaked in June 2025 and January and April 2026, with nine recorded events each, while remaining at or below eight monthly events throughout the rest of the period. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in seven of the nine districts<sup>795</sup> of Central Darfur. The highest number was documented in Zalingei district (56 incidents), followed by Wadi Salih district (10 incidents). Of the 75 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 70 recorded fatalities, 41 involved the RSF and 29 involved Darfur Communal Militia.<sup>796</sup>

<sup>786</sup> Darfur 24, Zalingei Main Market Shuts Down For Fear of Drone Attacks, 20 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>787</sup> Darfur 24, Casualties Reported in Airstrike on Zalingei, Central Darfur, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>788</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF Darfur security advisor killed in drone strike near Zalingei, 1 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>789</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army accused of drone strike on Zalingei displaced camp, 27 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>790</sup> Darfur 24, Drone Strike Kills Over 10 Civilians in Central Darfur, UN Warns of Rising Insecurity, 24 April 2026, [url](#); UN News, World News in Brief: Insecurity in the Darfurs, 100 million live with landmine threats, Singapore execution moratorium, 22 April 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Drone attacks kill at least 44 civilians in Darfur and Kordofan, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>791</sup> Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>792</sup> Darfur 24, Spike in deadly attacks on farmers in Central and East Darfur, 29 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>793</sup> Darfur 24, Mediation Ends Tribal Clashes in Central Darfur, 15 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>794</sup> Sudan Tribune, Expanding tribal conflict in South Darfur leaves 50 dead, 3 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>795</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Central Darfur State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>796</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 16: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Central Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>797</sup>**

## 2.6.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented eight civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Central Darfur.<sup>798</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 229 civilian casualties in the whole Darfur region, excluding North Darfur.<sup>799</sup> AOAV recorded 98 casualties caused by explosive weapons in Central Darfur between March 2025 and April 2026,<sup>800</sup> including 75 recorded in April 2026.<sup>801</sup> Drone strikes resulted in civilian casualties,<sup>802</sup> for example in Um Dukhun in April 2026.<sup>803</sup> Patients were treated by MSF following drone strikes near Zalingei in September 2025<sup>804</sup> and February 2026,<sup>805</sup> and also in April 2026, when MSF treated 28 people at Zalingei Teaching Hospital wounded in four drone strikes. Two deaths were also reported in April 2026.<sup>806</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in Central Darfur between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 232 fatalities.<sup>807</sup>

<sup>797</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>798</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>799</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9

<sup>800</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>801</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2026, 10 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>802</sup> MSF, Sudan: MSF treats around 170 people for drone injuries in two weeks after strikes hit civilian areas, 19 February 2026, [url](#); ACJPS, ACJPS Quarterly Newsletter: April, May and June 2026, 21 July 2026, [url](#), p. 9

<sup>803</sup> UNOCHA, Today's top news: Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Sudan, Haiti, 22 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>804</sup> MSF, Deadly attacks across Darfur leave nearly 100 wounded in MSF-supported facilities, 11 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>805</sup> MSF, Sudan: MSF treats around 170 people for drone injuries in two weeks after strikes hit civilian areas, 19 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>806</sup> MSF, Sudan: Drone attacks in Darfur, 16 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>807</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 17: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Central Darfur, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>808</sup>**

## 2.6.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Insecurity Insight between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 recorded four attacks on health care in Central Darfur, one of which was reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and the remaining three by unidentified armed actors. The attacks resulted in the damaging of one health facility.<sup>809</sup>

In June 2025, armed actors held five humanitarian workers and two vehicles for 48 hours along the key Zalingei–Nertiti humanitarian corridor.<sup>810</sup> In Zalingei, attacks on health facilities led MSF to suspend or scale back operations in August<sup>811</sup> and November 2025,<sup>812</sup> while a specialised health centre temporarily closed following an attack by relatives of a patient in July 2026.<sup>813</sup> The RSF-aligned civil administration reported damage to residential areas and parts of the Khamsa Daqaiq IDP camp following drone strikes in March 2026.<sup>814</sup>

In the Mukjar area, more than 30 farms were reportedly destroyed amid violence between herders and farmers in the 2025 harvest season,<sup>815</sup> while the burning of a settlement was

<sup>808</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>809</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>810</sup> Sudan INGO Forum, Sudan INGO Forum Statement On the Security Incident Affecting Humanitarian Staff in Central Darfur, 27 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>811</sup> Darfur 24, MSF Suspends its Activities in Zalingei, Central Darfur, 20 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>812</sup> Dabanga, MSF ops scaled back in Central Darfur after fatal Zalingei hospital attack, 26 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>813</sup> Darfur 24, Health centre reopens after attack in Zalingei, 28 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>814</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF-led administration accuses Sudanese army of drone strike in Central Darfur, 28 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>815</sup> Darfur 24, Spike in deadly attacks on farmers in Central and East Darfur, 29 November 2025, [url](#)



reported in December 2025.<sup>816</sup> Destruction of farmland by armed herders was also reported in Bindisi, Mukjar, Garsila, and in areas north and east of Zalingei.<sup>817</sup>

### 2.6.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Central Darfur state was hosting 993 352 IDPs, most of them displaced from within Central Darfur (683 528), followed by North Darfur (193 254). Of the total number of IDPs in Central Darfur, 223 890 IDPs were located in the Wasat Jabal Marrah district, followed by Zalingi district with 220 017 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 73 576 displaced persons from Central Darfur were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, no returnees were recorded in Central Darfur.<sup>818</sup>

## 2.7. North Kordofan

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), repeated clashes were reported between SAF and RSF in North Kordofan, especially around El Obeid.<sup>819</sup> Frontlines shifted, as both sides battled for control over the area along the strategic road linking Kosti to El Obeid.<sup>820</sup>

### 2.7.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF controlled the eastern edges of North Kordofan bordering White Nile and Khartoum states as well as the area stretching along the southern road connecting Kosti in White Nile state to the North Kordofan's capital El Obeid.<sup>821</sup> Towns along this stretch of road towards Kosti like Umm Ruwaba, Rahad Abu Dakna and Wad Ashana were under SAF control.<sup>822</sup> El Obeid served as a stronghold for the SAF, with their 5<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division ('Camel Corps') stationed there.<sup>823</sup> In its areas of control in North Kordofan, the SAF were supported in its offensives by the allied Joint Forces,<sup>824</sup> having formed a joint

<sup>816</sup> Ayin Network, Herders vs. farmers: No harvests possible in hunger-stricken Darfur, 30 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>817</sup> Darfur 24, Farmers in Central Darfur Decry Widespread Farm Destruction by Armed Herders, 15 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>818</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>819</sup> UNSG, Recommendations for the protection of civilians in the Sudan, S/2024/759, 21 October 2024, [url](#), para. 11; Darfur 24, Humanitarian Situation Deteriorates in El Obeid, North Kordofan, 30 October 2024, [url](#); Darfur 24, 10 killed as RSF attacked Haraz village, west of Al-Obeid, 14 May 2024, [url](#); Dabanga, Both Sudan army and RSF claim control of Mount Kordofan, 9 May 2024, [url](#)

<sup>820</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 18, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 4; Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army retakes key city in North Kordofan state, 30 January 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, RSF recaptures North Kordofan town, 20 May 2024, [url](#)

<sup>821</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>822</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>823</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Fears of Looming Attack on El Obeid as RSF Build-Up Continues, 21 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>824</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army retakes strategic town in North Kordofan, 5 March 2026, [url](#)



battalion named Al-Sayyad (Hunter<sup>825</sup>) Forces.<sup>826</sup> Further support was reportedly provided by the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) under their commander Abu Aqla Keikel,<sup>827</sup> who had previously fought with the RSF in Al Jazirah before switching sides to join the SAF.<sup>828</sup> As of July 2026, the SAF-allied groups Sudanese Popular Resistance Forces (Mustanfareen) and the Islamist Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade also reportedly had a presence in the state.<sup>829</sup>

Meanwhile, the RSF controlled vast areas of the state,<sup>830</sup> namely north and west of El Obeid.<sup>831</sup> In June 2026, the RSF closed in on El Obeid, a major commercial hub serving as a gateway to Darfur, Kordofan, and central Sudan, which has remained under SAF control since the start of the war in April 2023.<sup>832</sup> On account of the reported RSF military reinforcements around El Obeid, the UN Security Council in June 2026 warned of a potential ground offensive on the city.<sup>833</sup>

## 2.7.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

After the SAF had driven the RSF out of Khartoum in March 2025<sup>834</sup> and the RSF had taken control of El Fasher in Darfur in October of that same year, the focus of the fighting shifted to Kordofan,<sup>835</sup> the region being a strategic crossroads for both conflict parties<sup>836</sup> linking Darfur and central Sudan.<sup>837</sup> From June 2025 onwards, the RSF moved to encircle the state capital El Obeid,<sup>838</sup> mobilising troops in the vicinity in October 2025 indicating preparations for a siege. The RSF had previously imposed a siege on the city between May 2023 and February 2025.<sup>839</sup>

Clashes between the two warring parties were reported around El Obeid, for example to the west in Umm Sumaima in July<sup>840</sup> and August 2025,<sup>841</sup> to the south around Kazgil between September 2025<sup>842</sup> and November 2025,<sup>843</sup> and to the north around the town Bara, which

<sup>825</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan joint force says it retook West Kordofan town from RSF after fierce battle, 14 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>826</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 6; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 18, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>827</sup> Dabanga, Battles rage in Sudan's North Kordofan with both sides claiming victory, 19 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>828</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 22, 21 August 2025, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>829</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>830</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese paramilitary forces mass near El Obeid ahead of expected assault, 15 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>831</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>832</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Fears of Looming Attack on El Obeid as RSF Build-Up Continues, 21 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>833</sup> UN News, Sudan: Security Council warns of mass atrocity risk in El Obeid, 20 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>834</sup> New York Times (The), 'Bad Things Happen in Darkness': Sudan's Civil War Shifts West, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>835</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 23, 9 January 2026, [url](#); Reuters, Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan's war, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>836</sup> New York Times (The), 'Bad Things Happen in Darkness': Sudan's Civil War Shifts West, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>837</sup> Reuters, Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan's war, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>838</sup> Ayin Network, "They came on motorbikes and started killing": RSF siege grips North Kordofan, 22 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>839</sup> ACAPS, Sudan: Risk Analysis [2026], 13 May 2026, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>840</sup> Dabanga, RSF and SAF both claim control of key North Kordofan town amid widespread displacement, 31 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>841</sup> ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies, The Course of the War in Sudan – August 2025 [Infographic], 11 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>842</sup> Sudan Tribune, Senior RSF commander killed in North Kordofan clashes, 8 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>843</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudan's army captures two areas in North Kordofan as RSF burns more bodies, 15 November 2025, [url](#)



changed control several times<sup>844</sup> until the SAF recaptured the locality at the end of July 2026.<sup>845</sup> The RSF employed drones to strike areas under SAF control, repeatedly targeting El Obeid,<sup>846</sup> killing civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure.<sup>847</sup> Meanwhile, there were reports of SAF airstrikes on RSF positions in the state<sup>848</sup>, some of which reportedly caused civilian fatalities.<sup>849</sup> As of July 2026, the region around El Obeid remained fiercely contested and was characterised by shifting frontlines, while RSF tactics mirrored their previous methods employed in El Fasher in North Darfur, including siege warfare and pressure on the local civilian population through constant bombardment and destruction of civilian infrastructure.<sup>850</sup> At the end of July 2026, in a major offensive, the SAF and allied groups such as the SSF managed to recapture towns and villages along the highway connecting El Obeid and Khartoum, managing to retake Jabra El Sheikh, Umm Girfa, and Bara.<sup>851</sup> The offensive reopened the SAF supply corridor linking El Obeid and Omdurman.<sup>852</sup>

### 2.7.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 910 security events in North Kordofan state. Of these, 266 were coded as battles, 480 as explosions/remote violence and 164 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in July 2026 (114 incidents), followed by September 2025 (80 incidents) and June 2026 (68 incidents). During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all eight districts<sup>853</sup> of North Kordofan. The highest number was documented in Sheikan district (362 incidents) in which El Obeid is located, followed by Bara district (196 incidents). Of the 164 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 850 recorded fatalities, 137 involved the RSF, and 12 involved Sudanese military forces.<sup>854</sup>

<sup>844</sup> UN News, Sudan: Kordofan cannot become 'another El Fasher,' Türk warns, 4 December 2025, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, RSF captures army base in North Darfur capital, 26 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>845</sup> ACLED, Does the capture of Bara signal a turning point for the SAF?, 27 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>846</sup> Dabanga, Drone attacks deepen humanitarian crisis in El Obeid, Joint Forces claims gains in North Darfur, 28 June 2026, [url](#); BBC News, Deadly Sudan drone strike targets funeral procession, 11 June 2026, [url](#); Radio Tamazuj, North Kordofan: At least 20 killed in suspected drone strike on prison, 10 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>847</sup> International Rescue Committee, Sudan: An imminent RSF offensive is pushing North Kordofan toward humanitarian catastrophe, warns IRC, 29 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>848</sup> Darfur 24, SAF Launches Airstrikes on Kazgil, North Kordofan, 9 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>849</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: UN Human Rights Chief deplores killing of dozens of civilians in Kordofan, 17 July 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, Seven civilians die as SAF and RSF clash in North Kordofan, 3 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>850</sup> GCR2P, Atrocity Alert No. 490: Sudan, Lebanon and Venezuela, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>851</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Videos | Sudanese Army Restores Khartoum–El Obeid Road Link, 27 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>852</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military's largest offensive since Khartoum brings major RSF logistics corridor in North Kordofan under its control | Military, RSF prepare detainee records in response to UN exchange initiative | IGAD reopens Khartoum office | Kiir invites Burhan to Juba summit over outstanding disputes, 1 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>853</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: North Kordofan State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>854</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)



### Security events in North Kordofan: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 18: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in North Kordofan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>855</sup>**

## 2.7.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 346 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in North Kordofan.<sup>856</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 1 253 civilian casualties in the whole Kordofan region.<sup>857</sup> Among the civilian casualties were cases of summary executions, such as in April 2025, when the SAF and its allied Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade reportedly executed 36 civilians in two villages in North Kordofan because of their alleged collaboration with the RSF.<sup>858</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 600 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in North Kordofan,<sup>859</sup> with peaks in March 2025 (75 deaths and injuries),<sup>860</sup> in May 2025 (189 deaths and injuries)<sup>861</sup> and in February 2026 (113 deaths and injuries).<sup>862</sup>

Among the most significant security incidents affecting civilians were RSF attacks around El Obeid,<sup>863</sup> among them an attack on Shaq Al-Nom village and several other villages in the Bara locality in July 2025, reportedly involving arson, looting and shootings.<sup>864</sup> The UN Human Rights Office documented the killing of at least 60 civilians in Bara locality between 10 and

<sup>855</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>856</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>857</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1; 9

<sup>858</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 46

<sup>859</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>860</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2025, 10 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>861</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in May 2025, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>862</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in February 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>863</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudan's RSF kills about 300 people in North Kordofan, rights group says, 15 July 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, UN says at least 300 killed in 'brutal' attacks in Sudan's Kordofan, 16 July 2025, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, RSF rampages through North Kordofan villages, killing hundreds, 17 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>864</sup> CIR, Attack on Shaq Al Noum, North Kordofan, 7 August 2025, [url](#)

17 July 2025, while civil society groups reported a death count of up to 300 people.<sup>865</sup> Following the RSF takeover of Bara in October 2025, the UN documented at least 269 civilian deaths resulting from air strikes, shelling and summary executions, with the actual casualty count presumed to be higher.<sup>866</sup> By June 2026, ACLED reported that the fight for control of the state capital had switched from ground fighting to drone warfare, with 50 drone strikes resulting in over 110 fatalities, a 70 % increase of reported fatalities resulting from drones strikes compared to the previous month.<sup>867</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in North Kordofan between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 4 180 fatalities.<sup>868</sup>




**Figure 19: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in North Kordofan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>869</sup>**

## 2.7.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Sudan INGO Forum, an umbrella organisation of international NGOs active in Sudan, reported that for the first half of 2026, hospitals, schools, markets and other civilian infrastructure across North Kordofan had been damaged or destroyed in drone strikes.<sup>870</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 26 attacks on health care in North Kordofan, 21 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF. The attacks resulted in the destruction of two health facilities and damaged twelve more.<sup>871</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and

<sup>865</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: UN Human Rights Chief deplores killing of dozens of civilians in Kordofan, 17 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>866</sup> UN News, Sudan: Kordofan cannot become 'another El Fasher,' Türk warns, 4 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>867</sup> ACLED, Africa Overview: July 2026, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>868</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>869</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>870</sup> Sudan INGO Forum, Sudan: INGOs Warn of Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences for Civilians in El Obeid, 20 June 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>871</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

31 May 2026, the organisation documented three attacks on schools and three on universities, with five of these incidents causing damage or destruction to the infrastructure.<sup>872</sup>

In their offensive against El Obeid, the RSF in June 2026 specifically targeted fuel stations and electrical generators, rendering life in the city ‘unbearable’ for civilians.<sup>873</sup> Further drone strikes on El Obeid reportedly hit water stations, leading residents to face acute water shortages.<sup>874</sup> Road infrastructure was also a target of drone strikes, for example in June 2026 two bridges south of Umm Ruwaba, and a major highway near Ar Rahad.<sup>875</sup>

Throughout the first half of 2026, the US-funded and globally operating Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) continuously warned of the risk of famine among displaced populations around El Obeid, as the continued insecurity caused disruptions in access to food.<sup>876</sup>

### 2.7.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, North Kordofan state was hosting 218 664 IDPs, the largest share of them displaced within the state (89 576), followed by Khartoum (58 745) and South Kordofan (49 641). About half of the total number of IDPs in North Kordofan were located in Sheikan district (108 467) in which El Obeid is located, followed by Um Rawaba with 34 445 and Ar Rahad district with 29 637. At the same time, an additional 224 732 displaced persons from North Kordofan were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in North Kordofan.<sup>877</sup> Despite ongoing insecurity in the area of El Obeid, as of August 2026, people from surrounding areas were still seeking refuge in the city. While IOM estimated around 100 000 IDPs to be sheltering in El Obeid, estimations given by the local Humanitarian Aid Commission reached over one million.<sup>878</sup>

## 2.8. South Kordofan

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the three main armed groups in the state were the SAF, the RSF, and the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu, each trying to expand their areas of control.<sup>879</sup> The SPLM-N-AI-Hilu in its areas of control in the Nuba mountains engaged in clashes with both the RSF and the SAF,<sup>880</sup> while

<sup>872</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>873</sup> Ayin Network, Life under siege, life in El Obeid, 28 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>874</sup> International Rescue Committee, Sudan: An imminent RSF offensive is pushing North Kordofan toward humanitarian catastrophe, warns IRC, 29 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>875</sup> Radio Tamazuj, Sudan: Drone strike hits civilian facilities in Kosti, one killed, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>876</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook April – September 2026, 11 May 2026, [url](#), p. 1; FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook January – May 2026, 5 February 2026, [url](#), p. 2; FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, 14 January 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>877</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>878</sup> Ayin Network, A city within a city: How displacement is reshaping El Obeid, 25 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>879</sup> ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>880</sup> RVI, ‘The Fuel Is Us’: Water, Oil And Debt On The Sudan-South Sudan Borderlands, February 2025, [url](#), p. 15

not officially aligning itself with either of the two conflict parties.<sup>881</sup> However, the group temporarily cooperated with the SAF in their pushback against the RSF in Dilling.<sup>882</sup>

### 2.8.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF controlled the eastern part of South Kordofan as well as a small corridor in the western part of the state connecting Kadugli and Dilling.<sup>883</sup> In its operations against the RSF, the SAF were supported by Joint Forces elements and paramilitary volunteers.<sup>884</sup> Both Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan, and Dilling, the state's second largest city,<sup>885</sup> were controlled by the SAF but surrounded by RSF and SPLM-N-AI-Hilu troops.<sup>886</sup> As of November 2025, all local government headquarters and major cities in the state were located in SAF-controlled territory with the exception of Habila town,<sup>887</sup> which was later seized by the SAF in January 2026.<sup>888</sup>

The RSF controlled a smaller area in the northwest of the state.<sup>889</sup> The SPLM-N-AI-Hilu controlled the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan<sup>890</sup> and maintained its command headquarters in Kaoda (Kauda).<sup>891</sup> Following the formation of the Taasis alliance in February 2025 (see section [1.1.1. Political developments](#)), the RSF and SPLM-N-AI-Hilu carried out joint military operations in the state.<sup>892</sup>

### 2.8.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

After the SAF had driven the RSF out of Khartoum in May 2025<sup>893</sup> and the RSF had taken control of El Fasher in Darfur in October of that same year, the focus of the fighting shifted to Kordofan,<sup>894</sup> being the region a strategic crossroads for both conflict parties<sup>895</sup> linking Darfur

<sup>881</sup> RVI, 'The Fuel Is Us': Water, Oil And Debt On The Sudan-South Sudan Borderlands, February 2025, [url](#), p. 9

<sup>882</sup> ACLED, February 2024 | Sudan: The SAF Breaks the Siege, 16 February 2024, [url](#); Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, May 2024, [url](#); p. 40

<sup>883</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>884</sup> Sudan Tribune, Army reaches Kadugli, ending two-year siege, 3 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>885</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>886</sup> Reuters, Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan's war, 14 November 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network, South Kordofan: Thousands face starvation in Kadugli and Dilling with access routes cut off, 17 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>887</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>888</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army captures strategic Habila town, regains Blue Nile areas, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>889</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>890</sup> DW, Nuba Mountains, a fragile refuge on Sudan's front line, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>891</sup> Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N says Sudan army drone strike kills 45 civilians in South Kordofan, 29 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>892</sup> CTP, Red Sea Showdown Brewing in Northern Somalia, New Fronts in Sudan: Africa File, January 29, 2026, 29 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N says Sudan army drone strike kills 45 civilians in South Kordofan, 29 November 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>893</sup> BBC News, Sudan rebels entirely pushed out of Khartoum state, army says, 20 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>894</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 23, 9 January 2026, [url](#), p. 2; Reuters, Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan's war, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>895</sup> New York Times (The), 'Bad Things Happen in Darkness': Sudan's Civil War Shifts West, 6 August 2025, [url](#)

and central Sudan.<sup>896</sup> As of February 2026, the NRC described South Kordofan as the ‘epicentre of the war in Sudan’ featuring the country’s ‘most dangerous and neglected frontline’.<sup>897</sup>

In May 2025, clashes were reported in the Al-Qouz locality on the northwestern edge of the state,<sup>898</sup> with the RSF advancing into the ‘Taiba Triangle’,<sup>899</sup> a strategic crossroads linking all three Kordofan states.<sup>900</sup> In December 2025, RSF together with SPLM-N-AI-Hilu troops cut the road between Dilling and the state capital Kadugli, imposing sieges on both SAF-controlled towns<sup>901</sup> and intensifying artillery and drones strikes on both.<sup>902</sup> In late January 2026, the SAF, in a counter-offensive from the east, managed to break the siege of Dilling and advance further south towards Kadugli.<sup>903</sup> The SAF and allied forces reached Kadugli at the beginning of February 2026, breaking a siege that had lasted for over two years,<sup>904</sup> similarly to Dilling.<sup>905</sup> However, fighting in the area continued,<sup>906</sup> as the RSF cut off the main supply lines for relief operations into Dilling at the beginning of March 2026.<sup>907</sup>

Conflict dynamics involved clashes between the SAF and the RSF.<sup>908</sup> In the wake of the formation of an alliance between the RSF and SPLM-N-AI-Hilu,<sup>909</sup> the SAF further engaged in fighting against SPLM-N-AI-Hilu troops along the road between Dilling and Kadugli<sup>910</sup> and in areas under SPLM-N-AI-Hilu control.<sup>911</sup> They further launched airstrikes on the SPLM-N-controlled Nuba mountains.<sup>912</sup> According to ACLED, between December 2025 and January 2026 air and drone strikes in South Kordofan quadrupled.<sup>913</sup> The SAF resumed airstrikes in April 2026 after halting air operations for several months due to the loss of several fighter

<sup>896</sup> Reuters, Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan's war, 14 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>897</sup> NRC, Sudan: Countdown to catastrophe in Kordofan, as world once again looks away, 2 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>898</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Flash Alert: Conflict in Al Quoz (Dibebat town), South Kordofan, 2 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>899</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 21, 1 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3; Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strikes kill at least 10 civilians in Sudan's Kordofan – sources, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>900</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strikes kill at least 10 civilians in Sudan's Kordofan – sources, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>901</sup> CTP, Red Sea Showdown Brewing in Northern Somalia, New Fronts in Sudan: Africa File, January 29, 2026, 29 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>902</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook January – May 2026, 5 February 2026, [url](#), p. 2; CTP, Red Sea Showdown Brewing in Northern Somalia, New Fronts in Sudan: Africa File, January 29, 2026, 29 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N, RSF pound South Kordofan cities with artillery, drones, 14 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>903</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook January – May 2026, 5 February 2026, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>904</sup> Sudan Tribune, Army reaches Kadugli, ending two-year siege, 3 February 2026, [url](#); Reuters, Sudanese army says it has broken siege of famine-stricken Kadugli, last updated 4 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>905</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 24, 16 February 2026

[url](#), p. 4

<sup>906</sup> Mashaweer News, Kadugli Residents Struggle Under the Weight of Hunger and Disease, 22 July 2026, [url](#);

Darfur 24, Fierce Clashes Erupt in Dilling as SPLM-N Claims Control of Key Routes, 8 May 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels joint RSF-rebel attack on South Kordofan's Dilling, 1 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>907</sup> Sudan War Monitor, RSF Cuts South Kordofan Relief Routes After Heavy Fighting, 4 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>908</sup> Dabanga, Fierce clashes in South Kordofan as ‘RSF seizes key town’, 3 March 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudan army says repels RSF attack in South Kordofan, 14 January 2026, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 23, 9 January 2026, [url](#), p. 2; Dabanga, Ongoing clashes cause mass displacement in South Kordofan, 25 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>909</sup> DW, Nuba Mountains, a fragile refuge on Sudan's front line, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>910</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 18, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 5

<sup>911</sup> Darfur 24, معارك عنيفة بين الجيش السوداني والحركة الشعبية في جنوب كردفان [Violent battles between Sudanese army and SPLM-N in South Kordofan], 27 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>912</sup> Neiman, S., Drones Are Reshaping Sudan's Civil War, New Lines Magazine, 13 May 2026, [url](#); DW, Nuba Mountains, a fragile refuge on Sudan's front line, 17 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>913</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

planes.<sup>914</sup> Drone strikes were reported throughout the reference period, targeting contested areas and hitting civilian targets and infrastructure.<sup>915</sup>

Furthermore, there were reports of tribal clashes within the area controlled by the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu in May and June 2026,<sup>916</sup> even leading to a rival group from the Otoro tribe seizing parts of SPLM-N-AI-Hilu stronghold Kaoda at the end of June 2026.<sup>917</sup> Renewed clashes in Kaoda between SPLM-N-AI-Hilu and members of the Otoro tribe were reported in August 2026.<sup>918</sup>

### 2.8.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 606 security events in South Kordofan state. Of these, 202 were coded as battles, 288 as explosions/remote violence and 116 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in January 2026 (77 incidents) followed by December 2025 (64 incidents) and April 2025 (56 incidents). During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all 17 districts<sup>919</sup> of South Kordofan. The highest number was documented in Dilling district (191 incidents), followed by Al-Qoz district (94 incidents) and Kadugli district (63 incidents). Of the 116 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 496 recorded fatalities, 33 involved the RSF, 32 involved the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu, 18 involved the SAF and 14 involved the Sudan Founding Alliance (Taasis), the alliance formed among others by the RSF and SPLM-N-AI-Hilu.<sup>920</sup>

<sup>914</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army resumes heavy air strikes in South Kordofan, 22 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>915</sup> UN News, Armed drones leading cause of civilian death in Sudan war: UN rights chief, 11 May 2026, [url](#); UN News, Airstrike on funeral underscores rising civilian toll in Sudan, 30 March 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Dozens killed in RSF drone attack in war-torn Sudan's South Kordofan, 29 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Christmas Celebration Bombed in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 3 January 2026, [url](#); UN News, UN warns Sudan war entering deadlier phase as fighting spreads in Kordofan, 22 December 2025, [url](#); UN News, Sudan: UN chief condemns deadly strikes on children's nursery, hospital, 8 December 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Seven killed in RSF drone strike on South Kordofan shelter, doctors say, 1 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>916</sup> Sudan Tribune, Rival faction seizes control of SPLM-N stronghold Kaoda in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Doctors Network, [Facebook], posted on: 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>917</sup> Sudan Tribune, Rival faction seizes control of SPLM-N stronghold Kaoda in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>918</sup> Radio Tamazuj, Nuba Mountains: Otoro accuses SPLM-N of violating cessation of hostilities, 24 August 2026, [url](#); Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military builds on North Kordofan gains, prepares push into West Kordofan, repels RSF attempt to recapture West Darfur position along Chadian border | SPLM-N clashes with Otoro tribe inside Kaoda | Third nationwide blackout in a week as financing impasse stalls electricity sector recovery | Stalled grid repairs put planting season at risk | Ethiopia fighting threatens Sudan's largest rain-fed farming state, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>919</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: South Kordofan State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>920</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Security events in South Kordofan: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 20: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in South Kordofan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>921</sup>**

#### 2.8.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 154 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in South Kordofan.<sup>922</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 1 253 civilian casualties in the whole Kordofan region.<sup>923</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 910 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in South Kordofan,<sup>924</sup> with between zero and ten casualties between March and September 2025, and then a steep increase with peaks in December 2025 (342 deaths and injuries)<sup>925</sup>, in January 2026 (127 deaths and injuries)<sup>926</sup> and in March 2026 (184 deaths and injuries).<sup>927</sup>

Among the most significant security incidents affecting civilians were air and drone strikes hitting civilian targets,<sup>928</sup> many of them in Kadugli and Dilling.<sup>929</sup> The WHO reported more than 100 fatalities following a suspected RSF drone attack on a kindergarten and hospital in Kalogi.<sup>930</sup> In May 2026, the Sudan Doctors Network reported the killing of more than 60 people in Kaoda within two weeks of tribal clashes between forces allied with the SPLM-N-AI-

<sup>921</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>922</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>923</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 1, 9

<sup>924</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>925</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in December 2025, 10 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>926</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in January 2026, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>927</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>928</sup> BBC News, Deadly attack on kindergarten reported in Sudan, 6 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>929</sup> Al Jazeera, As Sudanese city returns to life after two-year siege, drone threat lingers, 15 February 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, One killed in drone attack on Kadugli hospital, 4 February 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills two in Sudan's Dilling, medical group says, 25 January 2026, [url](#); Ayin Network, South Kordofan: Civilians are the target of fighting in Kadugli and Dilling, 6 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>930</sup> BBC News, More than 100 people killed in attack on hospital in Sudan, WHO chief says, 8 December 2025, [url](#)

Hilu and members of the Otoro tribe.<sup>931</sup> In August 2026, renewed clashes between the same two groups reportedly killed another 27 people.<sup>932</sup> Throughout the reference period, sources reported that the precarious security situation in and around the cities Kadugli and Dilling resulted in supply routes being cut off,<sup>933</sup> leading in turn to severe food shortages<sup>934</sup> and risk of famine.<sup>935</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in South Kordofan between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, caused an estimated 2 511 fatalities.<sup>936</sup>




**Figure 21: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in South Kordofan, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>937</sup>**

## 2.8.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 18 attacks on health care in South Kordofan, 6 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and another 9 were attributed to the RSF together with SPLM-N. The attacks resulted in the destruction of one health facility and damaged twelve more.<sup>938</sup> For example, in May 2026, the rocket shelling of Dilling by RSF and SPLM-N caused the destruction of a warehouse for medical supplies.<sup>939</sup>

<sup>931</sup> Sudan Doctors Network, [Facebook], posted on: 13 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>932</sup> New Arab (The), Sudanese medical group accuses rebel group of killing 27 people, 26 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>933</sup> WFP, Sudan Country Brief April 2026, 28 May 2026, [url](#), p. 2; NRC, What it takes to eat: Conflict and Sudan's fragile food system, updated 14 April 2026, [url](#), pp. 13-14; NRC, Sudan: Countdown to catastrophe in Kordofan, as world once again looks away, 2 February 2026, [url](#); Ayin Network, South Kordofan: Thousands face starvation in Kadugli and Dilling with access routes cut off, 17 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>934</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 22, 21 August 2025, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>935</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook April – September 2026, 11 May 2026, [url](#), p. 1; FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook January – May 2026, 5 February 2026, [url](#), pp. 1-2; FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, 14 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 1, 3; Ayin Network, South Kordofan: Thousands face starvation in Kadugli and Dilling with access routes cut off, 17 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>936</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>937</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>938</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>939</sup> Sudan Doctors Network, [Facebook], posted on: 21 May 2026, [url](#)

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight documented nine attacks on schools and one attack on a university, with ten of these incidents causing damage or destruction to the infrastructure.<sup>940</sup> In June 2026, two key bridges along the road between Kadugli and Dilling were destroyed, disrupting the movement of civilians and aid operations.<sup>941</sup>

### 2.8.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, South Kordofan state was hosting 330 379 IDPs, 84% of them displaced within the state (276 410), followed by Khartoum (33 831). Of the total number of IDPs in South Kordofan, 77 110 IDPs were located in the state capital Kadugli, followed by Abu Jubayhah district with 57 990 IDPs and Dilling district with 35 877 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 132 080 displaced persons from South Kordofan were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in South Kordofan.<sup>942</sup>

## 2.9. West Kordofan (including disputed Abyei area<sup>943</sup>)

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), repeated clashes were reported in the area of Babanusa city,<sup>944</sup> with RSF fighters positioned around the town imposing a ground siege.<sup>945</sup> The group expanded its area of control in the state by capturing SAF positions in the state capital Al-Fula<sup>946</sup> and Lagawa district bordering South Kordofan.<sup>947</sup>

### 2.9.1. Actors involved and territorial control

At the beginning of the reference period, the SAF only had limited presence in West Kordofan in the garrison towns of Al Nuhud and Babanusa<sup>948</sup> as well as in Heglig oil field.<sup>949</sup> As of November 2025, Babanusa was the headquarters of the SAF 22<sup>nd</sup> Division while the SAF 90<sup>th</sup> Brigade was stationed in Heglig.<sup>950</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies showed West Kordofan state almost entirely under control of the RSF together with an array of regional and tribal militias as of the start of July 2026.<sup>951</sup> The RSF had a reported advantage in

<sup>940</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>941</sup> UN News, Sudan war: Drone attacks damage key aid routes, 9 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>942</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>943</sup> TNH, "We don't have protection": The worsening crisis in disputed Abyei, 3 March 2025, [url](#); Enoughproject, Enough 101: What is the Abyei Area and Why is it Disputed?, 15 January 2013, [url](#)

<sup>944</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 15, 1 August 2024, [url](#), p. 5; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 12, 19 April 2024, [url](#), p. 7; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 11, 12 March 2024, [url](#), p. 4; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 10, 16 February 2024, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>945</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army, RSF clash in fierce battles in Babanusa, 16 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>946</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF seizes El Fula, capital of West Kordofan, amidst reports of looting and displacement, 20 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>947</sup> Darfur 24, RSF Capture Lagawa, West Kordofan After Army Withdrawal, 23 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>948</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 6; Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 18, 7 March 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>949</sup> Ayin Network, Shifting frontlines: Army and RSF clash over strategic West Kordofan towns, 14 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>950</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>951</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

the state, as it drew most of its fighters there from the local ethnic group Misseriya,<sup>952</sup> the largest tribe in the state.<sup>953</sup> In the eastern parts of West Kordofan, the RSF were reportedly cooperating with the SPLM-N-Al-Hilu.<sup>954</sup>

The oil-rich Abyei region is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan.<sup>955</sup> The region continued to have a presence of armed actors, despite a commitment by both governments to maintain Abyei as a demilitarised area.<sup>956</sup> Between 16 April and 1 October 2025, an increased presence of RSF in northern Abyei was reported,<sup>957</sup> which continued into the first half of 2026.<sup>958</sup> The RSF reportedly utilised its forces drawn from Misseriya nomads from West Kordofan with grazing rights in Abyei to infiltrate the Abyei area under the guise of nomadic migration.<sup>959</sup> In the southern part of Abyei, there was a presence of South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and South Sudan National Police Service personnel.<sup>960</sup> The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) as of April 2026 had 2 762 military and 52 police personnel deployed in the region.<sup>961</sup>

## 2.9.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In May 2025, the RSF first seized Al Nuhud city,<sup>962</sup> then Al Khuwai,<sup>963</sup> reducing the SAF presence in West Kordofan to their military bases in Babanusa city and Heglig.<sup>964</sup> The RSF besieged the town of Babanusa<sup>965</sup> which in late spring 2025 was reportedly subjected to repeated assaults by the RSF and witnessed intense clashes between the conflict parties.<sup>966</sup> The RSF finally captured the city in December 2025<sup>967</sup> and shortly afterwards also took control of Heglig oil field on the border with South Sudan,<sup>968</sup> resulting in the group's full control of West Kordofan state.<sup>969</sup> In mid-December, South Sudan deployed troops to Heglig oil field under a tripartite security arrangement with the RSF and SAF<sup>970</sup> aiming to insulate the facility from further armed confrontations.<sup>971</sup>

<sup>952</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 22, 21 August 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>953</sup> Sudan Tribune, Misseriya tribe divided over Sudan army's West Kordofan advance, 29 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>954</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 19, 28 April 2025, [url](#), p. 6

<sup>955</sup> Radio Tamazuj, France urges withdrawal of RSF from Abyei, 10 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>956</sup> UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2026/378, 4 May 2026, [url](#), para. 2-3

<sup>957</sup> UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2025/649, 15 October 2025, [url](#), paras. 5-6

<sup>958</sup> Radio Tamazuj, France urges withdrawal of RSF from Abyei, 10 May 2026, [url](#); UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2026/378, 4 May 2026, [url](#), para. 12

<sup>959</sup> Sudans Post, Who really controls Abyei?, 25 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>960</sup> UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2025/649, 15 October 2025, [url](#), para. 11

<sup>961</sup> UN Peacekeeping, UNISFA Fact Sheet, n.d., [url](#)

<sup>962</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan's RSF paramilitaries seize strategic West Kordofan city Al-Nuhud, 2 May 2025, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, RSF seizes control of Al Nahud in latest blow to SAF, 1 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>963</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 21, 1 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>964</sup> Ayin Network, Shifting frontlines: Army and RSF clash over strategic West Kordofan towns, 14 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>965</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Sudanese Army Base in Babanusa Overrun After Protracted Siege, 1 December 2025, [url](#); Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 20, 26 May 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>966</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 21, 1 July 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>967</sup> CIR, RSF takeover of the 22nd Division base in Babanusa, West Kordofan, 21 January 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, Rapid Support Forces seize control of Babanusa garrison, 2 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>968</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF seizes strategic Heglig oilfield, local administration deploys protection force, 8 December 2025, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Rapid Support Forces Capture Heglig Oilfield, 8 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>969</sup> MEE, Sudan's Heglig: Why the oil field taken by the RSF matters, 9 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>970</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Heglig Oilfield placed under neutral South Sudan protection, 14 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>971</sup> Al Jazeera, South Sudan army to secure critical Heglig oilfield in Sudan war spillover, 11 December 2025, [url](#)

During the reference period, both RSF and SAF employed drone strikes targeting the other party's area of control, repeatedly impacting civilians or civilian infrastructure.<sup>972</sup> Dabanga reported the use of barrel bombs by the SAF in an airstrike on Al-Fula in July 2025.<sup>973</sup> There were reported incidents of violence perpetrated by RSF troops in recently seized areas such as around Al Nuhud, involving killings of local residents<sup>974</sup> and looting of houses and a market.<sup>975</sup> In the Abyei region, incidents of intercommunal clashes occurred between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka as well as other communities, resulting in casualties.<sup>976</sup>

### 2.9.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 632 security events in West Kordofan state. Of these, 116 were coded as battles, 294 as explosions/remote violence and 222 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in June and November 2025 (62 incidents respectively) and in May 2025 (50 incidents). During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents across all 14 districts<sup>977</sup> of West Kordofan. The highest number was documented in Al Nuhud district (130 incidents), followed by Al Khuwai district (115 incidents) and Abu Zabad district (108 incidents respectively). Of the 222 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 349 recorded fatalities, 207 involved the RSF. An additional 40 security events were recorded in Abyei, many of them involving local armed tribal groups.<sup>978</sup>

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<sup>972</sup> UN News, World News in Brief: Deadly drone attacks in Sudan, violence against women in the spotlight, more clashes in DR Congo, 12 March 2026, [url](#); UN News, Sudan: Rights chief alarmed after at least 57 killed in drone attacks in two days, 18 February 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strikes kill at least 10 civilians in Sudan's Kordofan – sources, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>973</sup> Dabanga, Civilians targeted in West and North Kordofan amid SAF airstrikes, RSF clashes, 14 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>974</sup> AP, Paramilitary group kills 32 in a rampage in southern Sudan, activist group says, 24 July 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudanese paramilitary RSF kills 19 after taking city of al-Nahud: Sources, 2 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>975</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese paramilitary RSF kills 19 after taking city of al-Nahud: Sources, 2 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>976</sup> UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2026/378, 4 May 2026, [url](#), para. 7; Radio Tamazuj, 5 killed, 1 injured in attack in Abyei, 12 April 2026, [url](#); UNSG, Situation in Abyei, S/2025/649, 15 October 2025, [url](#), para. 7-9

<sup>977</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: West Kordofan State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>978</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Security events in West Kordofan (including Abyei): 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 22: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in West Kordofan (including Abyei), 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>979</sup>**

#### 2.9.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 224 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in West Kordofan.<sup>980</sup> Between 16 November 2024 and 15 November 2025, the organisation documented 1 253 civilian casualties in the whole Kordofan region.<sup>981</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 475 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in West Kordofan,<sup>982</sup> with several months of no recorded casualties, several months of casualty figures ranging between 40 and 70 (June 2025 with 58,<sup>983</sup> November 2025 with 44<sup>984</sup> and February 2026 with 71 deaths and injuries<sup>985</sup>) and one notable peak in March 2026 (232 deaths and injuries).<sup>986</sup> Among the most significant security incidents affecting civilians were drone or airstrikes,<sup>987</sup> with the UN reporting that at least 152 civilians had been killed at the beginning of March 2026 alone in SAF drone strikes in the state.<sup>988</sup> ACLED observed that the

<sup>979</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>980</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>981</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 1, 9

<sup>982</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>983</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in June 2025, 10 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>984</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in November 2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>985</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in February 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>986</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>987</sup> Darfur 24, Deadly Drone Strike on Ghabish Market Sparks Condemnation in West Kordofan, 20 May 2026, [url](#); UN News, Airstrike on funeral underscores rising civilian toll in Sudan, 30 March 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Sudan war: 52 killed in West Kordofan drone convoy carnage, 11 March 2026, [url](#); UN News, Sudan: Rights chief alarmed after at least 57 killed in drone attacks in two days, 18 February 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strikes kill at least 10 civilians in Sudan's Kordofan – sources, 28 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>988</sup> UN News, World News in Brief: Deadly drone attacks in Sudan, violence against women in the spotlight, more clashes in DR Congo, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

security incidents it recorded in West Kordofan (including Abyei) between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 3 117 fatalities.<sup>989</sup>




**Figure 23: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in West Kordofan (including Abyei), 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>990</sup>**

## 2.9.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded 19 attacks on health care in South Kordofan, 11 of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and another 4 were attributed to the SAF. The attacks resulted in the destruction of two health facilities and damaged five more.<sup>991</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight documented six attacks on educational facilities, four of which caused damage or destruction to the facility.<sup>992</sup> Several drone strikes hit oil installations at Heglig oil field,<sup>993</sup> leading to a shutdown in September 2025.<sup>994</sup> SAF drone strikes in West Kordofan in March 2026 reportedly hit a market and a hospital<sup>995</sup> and another market in May 2026.<sup>996</sup>

<sup>989</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>990</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>991</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>992</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>993</sup> Sudan Tribune, One engineer killed in drone attack on Bashayer oil station, 15 November 2025, [url](#); Reuters, Sudan shuts down Heglig oil facilities after drone attacks, 1 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>994</sup> Reuters, Sudan shuts down Heglig oil facilities after drone attacks, 1 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>995</sup> UN News, World News in Brief: Deadly drone attacks in Sudan, violence against women in the spotlight, more clashes in DR Congo, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>996</sup> Sudan Tribune, At least 28 civilians killed in drone strike on busy market in West Kordofan, rights group says, 19 May 2026, [url](#)



## 2.9.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, West Kordofan state was hosting 421 578 IDPs, most of them displaced within the state (307 946), followed by Khartoum (66 363). Of the total number of IDPs in West Kordofan, 81 371 IDPs were located in Al Nuhud, followed by Al Idia district with 77 740 IDPs. At the same time, 67 369 displaced persons from West Kordofan were hosted in other states. As of 28 June 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in West Kordofan.<sup>997</sup>

## 2.10. Al Jazirah

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF captured the state capital Wad Madani in December 2023 and subsequently took control of most of Al Jazirah state.<sup>998</sup> The RSF's control over the state was marked by numerous reports of attacks on villages and looting,<sup>999</sup> as well as killings among the local population.<sup>1000</sup> In early 2025, the SAF and allied forces recaptured the state, leading to reprisal attacks especially against the Kanabi community whom they accused of collaboration with the RSF.<sup>1001</sup>

### 2.10.1. Actors involved and territorial control

The SAF claimed full control of the state by the end of March 2025.<sup>1002</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, showed Al Jazirah state under complete control of the SAF as of the start of July 2026 along with the presence of allied armed groups such as the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), the Sudanese Popular Resistance Force/Mustanfaren, the Darfur Joint Forces and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.<sup>1003</sup> The First Infantry Division of the SAF was stationed in the state capital Wad Madani together with a presence of the SSF.<sup>1004</sup> The SSF further reportedly operated in the Al-Butana plains bordering Gedaref state.<sup>1005</sup>

<sup>997</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>998</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 34

<sup>999</sup> Al Jazeera, Dozens killed by paramilitary RSF in Sudan's Gezira, aid groups say, 26 October 2024, [url](#); ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1000</sup> HRW, Sudan: Rapid Support Forces Target Civilians, 10 November 2024, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Dozens killed by paramilitary RSF in Sudan's Gezira, aid groups say, 26 October 2024, [url](#); New Arab (The), Sudan's Wad al-Noura families speak of RFP's carnage, intentional targeting children, 18 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1001</sup> Lighthouse Reports, Sudan's Armed Forces ethnically target farming communities amidst a famine, 16 December 2025, [url](#); UN Human Rights Council, Sudan: a war of atrocities – Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan – Advance unedited version, A/HRC/57/23, 5 September 2024, [url](#), para. 36-37

<sup>1002</sup> ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1003</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1004</sup> Al Taghyeer, درع السودان تكشف ملابسات حادثة ود مدني [Sudan Shield Forces reveal circumstances of incident in Wad Madani], 29 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1005</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills one at Sudan Shield camp in Al-Jazirah, 7 January 2026, [url](#)



## 2.10.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Shifting conflict dynamics in late 2024 reportedly led to a decline in armed clashes in Al Jazirah state in 2025.<sup>1006</sup> FEWS NET described the state as comparatively calm as of October 2025.<sup>1007</sup> The state reportedly witnessed ‘limited stabilisation’ as IDPs returned to their, in many cases, destroyed houses.<sup>1008</sup> The Egyptian independent online media outlet Mada Masr in its ongoing Sudan coverage described Al Jazirah state as of March 2026 as ‘relatively secure’, prompting the authorities there to rebuild the manufacturing sector.<sup>1009</sup>

In 2026, several drone strikes suspected to have been launched by the RSF, targeted a camp of the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) in Al-Butana region,<sup>1010</sup> and another drone struck the house of SSF commander Abu Aqla Keikel, killing six of his family members.<sup>1011</sup>

In November 2025, the Sudanese online news platform Al Taghyeer noted an increase in violations against civilians committed by the SSF and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade in the state: for example, storming the village of Um Duwana in Al Hasahisa district and intimidating the local population by firing into the air, entering homes and forcibly shaving young men’s heads.<sup>1012</sup> In September 2025, the governor of Al Jazirah state announced that 5 000 citizens would be tried for collaboration with the RSF, prompting criticism of human rights organisations fearing politically motivated mass trials.<sup>1013</sup>

## 2.10.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 75 security events in Al Jazirah state. Of these, 17 were coded as battles, 24 as explosions/remote violence and 34 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rate was recorded in March 2025 (30 incidents), while for the remaining months ACLED recorded between 1 and 7 incidents. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all eight districts<sup>1014</sup> of Al Jazirah, with the highest number recorded in Al Kamlin district (30 incidents), followed by Al Hasahisa and Madani Al-Kubra districts with 10 incidents each. Of the 34 incidents coded as ‘violence

<sup>1006</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1007</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, 14 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 3-4

<sup>1008</sup> Islamic Relief, 2026 update: Takaaya - Sudan’s community kitchens running on fumes, April 2026, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>1009</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Blue Nile’s Kurmuk falls to RSF | Around 100 civilians killed in drone attacks attributed to military in Darfur | 5 killed in Central Darfur by Chadian forces, eyewitnesses say | Repercussions of war on Iran a ‘crisis multiplier’ for Sudan’s medicine supply, acute drug scarcity on the horizon, sources say, 26 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1010</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills one at Sudan Shield camp in Al-Jazirah, 7 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1011</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Commander’s Relatives Killed in Assassination Attempt Using Long-Range Drone, 4 May 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills six members of Abu Aqla Keikel’s family in Central Sudan, 3 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1012</sup> Al Taghyeer, تنامي انتهاكات الميليشيات العسكرية بولاية الجزيرة وعودة ظاهرة حلاقة رؤوس الشباب بالقوة [Increase of violations of military militias in Al Jazirah and return of phenomenon of forcibly shaving young men’s heads], 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1013</sup> Al Taghyeer, جدل حول إعلان والي الجزيرة محاكمة الآلاف بتهمة التعاون [Controversy surrounds the governor of Al Jazirah’s announcement to put thousands on trial on charges of collaboration], 8 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1014</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Aj Jazirah State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

against civilians' with 52 recorded fatalities, 18 incidents involved the SAF or various allied armed groups and militia, and 15 involved the RSF.<sup>1015</sup>

### Security events in Al Jazirah: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 24: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Al Jazirah, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1016</sup>**

## 2.10.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 251 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Al Jazirah.<sup>1017</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded three casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Al Jazirah,<sup>1018</sup> all of them recorded in August 2025.<sup>1019</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in Al Jazirah between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 112 fatalities, 69 of them recorded in March 2025, with all subsequent months recording between zero and ten fatalities.<sup>1020</sup>

<sup>1015</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1016</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1017</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1018</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1019</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in August 2025, 10 September 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1020</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Estimated number of fatalities in Al Jazirah: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




Figure 25: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Al Jazirah, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1021</sup>

## 2.10.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded three attacks on health care in Al Jazirah, one attributed to the RSF, one to the SAF and one to an unidentified armed actor. No destruction or damages to health facilities resulting from these attacks were recorded.<sup>1022</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities in the state.<sup>1023</sup> The Sudan Doctors Network revealed increasing signs of recovery in the health sector in Al Jazirah state, stating in December 2025 that more than 88 hospitals had returned to service, compared to only 11 that were operating at the beginning of 2024.<sup>1024</sup> As of the beginning of 2026, the important agricultural sector in Al Jazirah state was still impacted by damaged irrigation systems and stolen machinery, likely contributing to below-average production.<sup>1025</sup>

## 2.10.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

The decline in armed clashes in Al Jazirah state reportedly led to significant return movements to the state in 2025.<sup>1026</sup> According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Al Jazirah state was hosting 49 350 IDPs, most of them displaced from Khartoum (24 825), followed by North Kordofan (8 430) and North Darfur (5 765 IDPs). Of the total number of IDPs in Al Jazirah, 15 150 IDPs were located in Madani Al-Kubra, followed by Al Manaquil district with 9 520 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 105 776 displaced persons

<sup>1021</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1022</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1023</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1024</sup> Al Taghyeer, شبكة أطباء السودان: عودة أكثر من 88 مستشفى للعمل بولاية الجزيرة [Sudan Doctors Network: more than 88 hospitals have returned to service in Al Jazirah], 29 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1025</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, 14 January 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1026</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 4

from Al Jazirah were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, Al Jazirah recorded over 1.2 million returning IDPs, the second highest returnee number country wide.<sup>1027</sup>

## 2.11. Sennar

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF made significant gains in Sennar state, capturing nearly the entire state by July 2024.<sup>1028</sup> In September and October 2024, the SAF led a counter-offensive in the state, recapturing strategic areas,<sup>1029</sup> until the state capital Sinja, the RSF's last major stronghold in the state,<sup>1030</sup> was captured by the SAF in late November 2024.<sup>1031</sup>

### 2.11.1. Actors involved and territorial control

Most of Sennar state fell under SAF control at the start of 2025,<sup>1032</sup> with SAF troops capturing the last RSF stronghold in Al-Dali and Al-Mazmoun locality in southern Sennar at the beginning of March 2025.<sup>1033</sup> The state subsequently remained under SAF control during the reference period.<sup>1034</sup> The headquarters of the SAF 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division was stationed in the state capital Sinja.<sup>1035</sup> ACLED assessed that the RSF's decision to open a frontline against the SAF in January 2026 in Blue Nile aimed at reopening the fight for control of central Sudan, including Sennar state.<sup>1036</sup>

### 2.11.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Shifting conflict dynamics in late 2024 reportedly led to a decline in armed clashes in Sennar state in 2025.<sup>1037</sup> FEWS NET described the state as comparatively calm as of October 2025.<sup>1038</sup> The state reportedly witnessed 'limited stabilisation' as IDPs returned to their in many cases destroyed houses.<sup>1039</sup> Several drone strikes were reported during the reference period, targeting civilian infrastructure such as a hydroelectric power station near Sennar dam

<sup>1027</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1028</sup> ACLED, Sudan: The RSF marches on Sennar and West Kordofan - July 2024, 12 July 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1029</sup> ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1030</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: RSF floods villages in Gezira | Clashes intensify in Fasher | Sudan split on Russian veto, 20 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1031</sup> Sudans Post, SAF recaptures Sennar State capital, Sinja, 23 November 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army recaptures capital of Sennar State, 23 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1032</sup> ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1033</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan army gains ground in Sennar, Blue Nile, White Nile states, 5 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1034</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 1], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1035</sup> Sudans Post, RSF drone strikes kill dozens at high-level Sudan military meeting, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1036</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1037</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1038</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, 14 January 2026, [url](#), pp. 3-4

<sup>1039</sup> Islamic Relief, 2026 update: Takaaya - Sudan's community kitchens running on fumes, April 2026, [url](#), p. 1

in October 2025<sup>1040</sup> and a hospital in Al-Mazmoun in February 2026.<sup>1041</sup> Another strike targeted military infrastructure, namely the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division headquarters in Sinja in January 2026,<sup>1042</sup> which reportedly also caused civilian deaths.<sup>1043</sup>

### 2.11.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 14 security events in Sennar state. Of these, 6 were coded as battles, 5 as explosions/remote violence and 3 as violence against civilians. Of these incidents, ACLED recorded 5 in Al Dali district, four in Sinja and 3 in Sennar districts.<sup>1044</sup> All three events coded as 'violence against civilians' with 45 recorded fatalities involved the SAF or allied forces.<sup>1045</sup>

### 2.11.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 38 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Sennar,<sup>1046</sup> all linked to an April 2025 incident, when SAF-affiliated fighters and Military Intelligence reportedly summarily killed at least 38 civilians whom they accused of being RSF collaborators in a village in Taiba Al-Lahween area.<sup>1047</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV did not record any casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Sennar state.<sup>1048</sup> The RSF drone strike on a military headquarters in Sinja in January 2026 reportedly caused at least 28 civilian deaths.<sup>1049</sup> Another drone strike in February 2026, attributed to the RSF on a hospital in Al-Mazmoun reportedly caused three fatalities and injured seven people.<sup>1050</sup> The Darfur Network for Human Rights (DNHR) in August 2025 reported four civilians killed in Al-Qirbin village by a member of a local militia.<sup>1051</sup>

<sup>1040</sup> Al Taghyeer, مسيرات تستهدف ولايتي سنار والنيل الأزرق وإطلام تام بالمنطقة [Drones target Sennar and Blue Nile states and a complete blackout in the region], 21 October 2025, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert alarmed by escalating drone attacks, urges protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1041</sup> Dabanga, Rising civilian toll in Sudan as drone strikes intensify in Blue Nile and Sennar, 19 February 2026, [url](#); Al Taghyeer, السودان: مقتل وإصابة 10 أشخاص في هجوم بمسيرة استهدفت مستشفى بولاية سنار [Sudan: 10 casualties in drone strike on hospital in Sennar state], 16 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1042</sup> Sudans Post, RSF drone strikes kill dozens at high-level Sudan military meeting, 14 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, High-Level Army Meeting Hit by RSF Drone Strike in Sinja, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1043</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 24, 16 February 2026, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>1044</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Sennar State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1045</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1046</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1047</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 35

<sup>1048</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1049</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 24, 16 February 2026, [url](#), p. 12; Sudan War Monitor, High-Level Army Meeting Hit by RSF Drone Strike in Sinja, 14 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1050</sup> Dabanga, Rising civilian toll in Sudan as drone strikes intensify in Blue Nile and Sennar, 19 February 2026, [url](#); Al Taghyeer, السودان: مقتل وإصابة 10 أشخاص في هجوم بمسيرة استهدفت مستشفى بولاية سنار [Sudan: 10 casualties in drone strike on hospital in Sennar state], 16 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1051</sup> DNHR, Four Civilians Killed in Sennar State Amidst Rising Militia Violence, 13 August 2025, [url](#)



### 2.11.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded one RSF drone strike on a health facility in Sennar state, causing damage to the building.<sup>1052</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities in the state.<sup>1053</sup> An RSF drone strike targeted electricity infrastructure in Sinja in October 2025.<sup>1054</sup> As of the beginning of 2026, the important agricultural sector in Sennar was still impacted by damaged irrigation systems and stolen machinery, likely contributing to below-average production.<sup>1055</sup> The RSF during their control over Sennar had reportedly looted crops, livestock and machinery and burned agricultural land.<sup>1056</sup>

### 2.11.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

The decline in armed clashes in Sennar state reportedly led to significant return movements to the state in 2025.<sup>1057</sup> According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Sennar state was hosting 22 756 IDPs, most of them displaced from Khartoum (12 919), followed by Blue Nile (5 280). Of the total number of IDPs in Sennar, 7 530 IDPs were located in the state capital Sinja, followed by As Suki district with 4 854 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 43 078 displaced persons from Sennar were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, Sennar state recorded 260 248 returned IDPs, mostly returning from neighbouring Gedaref and Kassala states with over 86 000 and 62 000 returnees respectively.<sup>1058</sup>

## 2.12. White Nile

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF captured Jebel Awliya south of Khartoum in November 2023<sup>1059</sup> and from there seized parts of northern White Nile, forcing the SAF to pull back into the state's urban areas further south.<sup>1060</sup> In February 2025, the SAF managed to recapture Al-Qutayna, a key city in northern White Nile on the road to Khartoum,<sup>1061</sup> while the RSF reportedly carried out reprisal attacks against civilians in villages near Al-Qutayna.<sup>1062</sup>

<sup>1052</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1053</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1054</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF expands drone attacks in Sudan, hits power station in Sinnar, 24 October 2025, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert alarmed by escalating drone attacks, urges protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, 24 October 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1055</sup> FEWS NET, Sudan - Food Security Outlook October 2025 - May 2026, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1056</sup> Emad, M., As Sudan army gains drive mass returns, mutual aid groups begin to rebuild, TNH, 30 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1057</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1058</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1059</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Rapid collapse of SAF defenses in Jebel Aulia, 20 November 2023, [url](#)

<sup>1060</sup> Sudan War Monitor, RSF attack market in White Nile, 25 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1061</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army retakes key city of Al-Qutayna in White Nile state, 24 February 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1062</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 36



### 2.12.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF regained full control over White Nile state, driving the RSF out from their areas of control along the state's northern border with North Kordofan and Khartoum states.<sup>1063</sup> While at the start of May 2025 the RSF were reported to still hold positions west of Al-Duwaym,<sup>1064</sup> later that same month the SAF reported to have gained control of the entire state.<sup>1065</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies showed White Nile state under complete control of the SAF as of the start of July 2026, with presence of SAF and allied Sudanese Popular Resistance/*Mustanfareen*.<sup>1066</sup> In November 2025, a troop build-up of SAF-allied groups such as the SSF and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade was reported in Al-Duwaym city and the Al-Alqa area.<sup>1067</sup>

### 2.12.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

A confidential source in August 2025 cited by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted a 'sharp decline in conflict-related violence' in White Nile state since May 2025.<sup>1068</sup> UNHCR described the state as 'relatively stable' as of August 2025<sup>1069</sup>, 'generally calm' as of January 2026<sup>1070</sup> and as remaining 'generally stable' as of March 2026, while also noting some spillover from hostilities in neighbouring Kordofan region, with increased drone activity and displacement movements into White Nile.<sup>1071</sup> At the beginning of March 2026, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed alarm at the uptick of RSF drone strikes in White Nile,<sup>1072</sup> with multiple drone strikes between March and June 2026 on the state capital Kosti,<sup>1073</sup> several on Rabak,<sup>1074</sup> and one on Al-Jabalain.<sup>1075</sup>

### 2.12.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 128 security events in White Nile state. Of these, 57 were coded as battles, 50 as explosions/remote violence and 21 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rate was recorded in May 2025 (26 incidents);

<sup>1063</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 1], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1064</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army retakes towns from RSF in White Nile state, Omdurman areas, 3 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1065</sup> Ayin Network et al., Sudan Conflict Monitor # 20, 26 May 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1066</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1067</sup> Ayin Network, Analysis: Sudan's Kordofan War, the fiercest front lines, 28 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1068</sup> Netherlands (The), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, December 2025, [url](#), p. 36

<sup>1069</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>1070</sup> UNHCR, External Update #115 Sudan Situation - January 2026, 7 April 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1071</sup> UNHCR, External Update #117 Sudan Situation - March 2026, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1072</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: Türk appalled by surge in deadly drone attacks on civilians in Kordofan and White Nile, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1073</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strike kills one at fuel station in Sudan's Kosti, 22 June 2026, [url](#); CFJ, Sudan: Committee for Justice Documents the Killing of a Doctor in a Drone Strike in Kosti and Calls for the Protection of Civilians and Medical Personnel, 13 May 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: Türk appalled by surge in deadly drone attacks on civilians in Kordofan and White Nile, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1074</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone attacks kill two in Rabak, army downs drone over El Obeid, 25 June 2026, [url](#); New Arab (The), Drone strike in southern Sudan kills 11: medical source, 28 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1075</sup> MSF, Strike on Al Jabalain hospital results in 10 fatalities, including seven medical staff, 2 April 2026, [url](#)

for the remaining months ACLED recorded between 1 and 15 incidents. During the reference period, it recorded security incidents in all nine districts<sup>1076</sup> of White Nile, with the highest number recorded in Kosti district (32 incidents), followed by Um Rimta district (20 incidents) and Al-Jabalain district (19 incidents). Of the 21 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 35 recorded fatalities, 15 incidents involved the RSF and 4 involved the SAF.<sup>1077</sup>




**Figure 26: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in White Nile, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1078</sup>**

## 2.12.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 114 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in White Nile.<sup>1079</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 50 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in White Nile.<sup>1080</sup> In 2025, casualties were recorded only in November (5 casualties).<sup>1081</sup> A surge in the number of casualties was recorded in March 2026 with 29 recorded casualties,<sup>1082</sup> followed by April with 15 recorded casualties.<sup>1083</sup> On 11 March 2026, several RSF drone strikes targeted Shukairi village in Um Rimta district,<sup>1084</sup> striking a secondary school and a primary healthcare centre and killing at least eight students and a health care worker and injuring many more.<sup>1085</sup> On 2 April 2026, a drone strike attributed to the RSF struck Al-Jabalain hospital, resulting in at least 10

<sup>1076</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: White Nile State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1077</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1078</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1079</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1080</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1081</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in November 2025, 10 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1082</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1083</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2026, 10 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1084</sup> Dabanga, Nine dead as drone strike targets hospital, school in Sudan's White Nile state, 11 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1085</sup> UNICEF, At least 8 students and a health worker reportedly killed in attack on a school compound in Sudan's White Nile State, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

fatalities.<sup>1086</sup> A drone strike on a fuel station in Rabak reportedly killed two civilians in June 2026.<sup>1087</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in White Nile between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 238 fatalities.<sup>1088</sup>




**Figure 27: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in White Nile, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1089</sup>**

## 2.12.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded four attacks on health care in White Nile state, three of which were drone strikes attributed to the RSF and the other an unattributed drone strike. The attacks resulted in the destruction of a warehouse and caused damage to two health facilities.<sup>1090</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight documented two RSF drone strikes on educational facilities, with one of these incidents causing damage or destruction to the facility.<sup>1091</sup> Drone attacks on civilian infrastructure were reported throughout the reference period, such as on an oil refinery in Al-Jabalain in November 2025,<sup>1092</sup> and increasingly in 2026, with attacks on medical facilities,<sup>1093</sup>

<sup>1086</sup> MSF, Strike on Al Jabalain hospital results in 10 fatalities, including seven medical staff, 2 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1087</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone attacks kill two in Rabak, army downs drone over El Obeid, 25 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1088</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1089</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1090</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1091</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1092</sup> Al Taghyeer, طائرة مسيرة تستهدف محطة لتكرير النفط في الجبلين بالنيل الأبيض [Drone targets oil refinery in Al-Jabalain in White Nile], 15 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1093</sup> MSF, Strike on Al Jabalain hospital results in 10 fatalities, including seven medical staff, 2 April 2026, [url](#); SUWRA, Sudan Crisis Update: Increasing Violence Targeting Civilians in Kordofan, Blue Nile, and White Nile States, 19 March 2026, [url](#)

a school,<sup>1094</sup> and electrical facilities causing power outages.<sup>1095</sup> Another two drone strikes hit fuel stations.<sup>1096</sup>

## 2.12.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, White Nile state was hosting 224 633 IDPs, 60 % of them displaced from Khartoum state (134 021), followed by North Kordofan (38 894). At the same time, an additional 6 117 displaced persons from White Nile were hosted in other states. Over 43 % of the total number of IDPs in White Nile were located in Kosti district (97 030), followed by Al-Jabalain district with 55 744. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had recorded 234 485 IDP returns in White Nile.<sup>1097</sup> White Nile state was confronted with displacement movements from neighbouring Kordofan region, such as in December 2025, when more than 1 800 displaced people arrived in Kosti following the RSF takeover of Heglig area in West Kordofan.<sup>1098</sup> Over 5 500 people reportedly arrived from Kordofan in White Nile between January and February 2026.<sup>1099</sup>

## 2.13. Blue Nile

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the SPLM-N-Agar, a faction that emerged following a struggle for leadership between SPLM-N commanders Malik Agar and Abdelaziz Al-Hilu in 2017,<sup>1100</sup> aligned its forces with the SAF<sup>1101</sup> and started to move its troops from Blue Nile towards Al Jazirah.<sup>1102</sup> The SPLM-N-Al-Hilu faction, which was not aligned with either conflict party<sup>1103</sup> held territories in southern Blue Nile,<sup>1104</sup> namely the New Funj area.<sup>1105</sup> In August 2024, the RSF advanced from Sennar into Blue Nile, leading to clashes with the SAF before being pushed back into Sennar in September 2024.<sup>1106</sup> Later in November 2024, the RSF reported to have made renewed

<sup>1094</sup> UNICEF, At least 8 students and a health worker reportedly killed in attack on a school compound in Sudan's White Nile State, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1095</sup> IPS, Sudanese Civil War Escalates as Drone Strikes Deepen Civilian Toll and Regional Risks, 20 March 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, Sudan: Türk appalled by surge in deadly drone attacks on civilians in Kordofan and White Nile, 12 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1096</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, Drone Strikes Continue to Claim Civilian Lives in Sudan, 25 June 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strike kills one at fuel station in Sudan's Kosti, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1097</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1098</sup> Al Taghyeer, [هجليج، نازحاً إلى كوستي بعد سيطرة الدعم السريع على هجليج](#) [1 850 flee to Kosti after RSF take control of Heglig], 16 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1099</sup> UNHCR, Flash Update #7, Darfur and Kordofan Situation, 1 – 28 February 2026, 18 March 2026, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>1100</sup> STPT and SCRN, Blue Nile, its conflict dynamics, and the potential implications for the wider war in Sudan 2017–2024, 24 March 2024, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>1101</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/57/23, 7 November 2024, [url](#), para. 26

<sup>1102</sup> ACLED, Sudan: Escalating Conflict in Khartoum and Attacks on Civilians in al-Jazirah and South Kordofan, 15 March 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1103</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, A/HRC/57/23, 7 November 2024, [url](#), para. 31

<sup>1104</sup> ACLED, Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan - September 2024, 16 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1105</sup> Dabanga, Number of people dying from hunger rapidly growing in Sudan's Nuba Mountains, 3 September 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1106</sup> ACLED, Artillery shelling and airstrikes surge in Sudan - September 2024, 16 September 2024, [url](#)

advances in the state, claiming to have established their presence around 70 km from the state capital Damazin.<sup>1107</sup>

### 2.13.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF controlled the larger northern part of Blue Nile state with its state capital Damazin. Meanwhile, the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu controlled the southern tip of the state,<sup>1108</sup> the Funj region with over a half million inhabitants.<sup>1109</sup> It was described as ‘one of the dominant forces’ in Blue Nile state<sup>1110</sup> with its stronghold in Yabousa (Yabous) in the Al-Kurmuk district.<sup>1111</sup> Following the formation of the Taasis alliance in February 2025 (see section [1.1.1. Political developments](#)), the RSF, having no historic presence in Blue Nile state, subsequently moved troops and equipment into territory held by the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu.<sup>1112</sup>

Starting in mid-December 2025, both SAF and RSF together with their respective allied forces started mobilising troops in Blue Nile, amid accusations by the SAF that neighbouring Ethiopia was supporting the RSF by allowing them to use its territory for training camps and as a military supply line.<sup>1113</sup> A Reuters investigation in February 2026 found evidence of a training camp in Ethiopia close to the border with Blue Nile state, reportedly housing over 4 000 RSF fighters. According to the investigation, this was the first evidence of direct involvement of Ethiopia in the war in Sudan, potentially providing the RSF with a supply base for fighting in the south of the country.<sup>1114</sup>

According to Sudan War Monitor, the RSF and SPLM-N-AI-Hilu maintained distinct command structures, but cooperated tactically in their offensive against the SAF.<sup>1115</sup> As of mid-August 2026, the Taasis alliance controlled the southern tip of the state, namely parts of Al-Kurmuk and Baw districts, reaching towards the southern edges of the towns Kurmuk and Sirkum, while simultaneously having opened a new front in Geisan district from across the border in Ethiopia.<sup>1116</sup>

### 2.13.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

Blue Nile state, described by ACLED as previously having been ‘peripheral’ to the trajectory of the war in Sudan, reportedly became a key battleground in January 2026, following the buildup of troops on both sides in the State in December 2025. On 11 January 2026, the SAF

<sup>1107</sup> Al Taghyeer, الدعم السريع يستعيد السيطرة على مناطق بولاية النيل الأزرق [RSF regain control of areas in Blue Nile state], 22 November 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1108</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 3], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1109</sup> Al Taghyeer, «كيف يعاني الفونج؟ .. حرب السودان تعمق أزمة «الإقليم المنسي» [How are the Funj suffering? – the war in Sudan deepens the crisis of the forgotten region], 21 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1110</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1111</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1112</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Map: Sudanese Rebels Overrun Army Garrison at Ethiopia Border, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1113</sup> Getachew Birru, J., Blue Nile State: How Gulf Rivalries Are Redrawing Sudan's War Map [Blog], PRIF, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1114</sup> Reuters, Ethiopia builds secret camp to train Sudan RSF fighters, sources say, last updated 11 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1115</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Map: Sudanese Rebels Overrun Army Garrison at Ethiopia Border, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1116</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Ta'sis Coalition Overruns Geisan in Fresh Blue Nile Offensive [Map], 13 August 2026, [url](#)



carried out airstrikes in Yabous on what it labelled a convoy carrying foreign mercenaries, while the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu claimed that they struck civilians.<sup>1117</sup> In late January 2026, the SPLM-N-AI-Hilu and the RSF reportedly launched a joint offensive on SAF positions in the state, while RSF troops advanced northward from Baw district towards Damazin.<sup>1118</sup> Clashes were reported in Baw district,<sup>1119</sup> where the SPLM-N briefly seized Silk (Silak, Salk).<sup>1120</sup> Further violent clashes between the warring parties happened in February and March 2026, as thousands of RSF fighters reportedly advanced from Ethiopian territory<sup>1121</sup> and the area around the southern town of Kurmuk on the border with Ethiopia became the focal point of the confrontations.<sup>1122</sup> The rebel alliance finally took over Kurmuk<sup>1123</sup> while the SPLM-N was mobilising forces in Geisan (Qaysan) district.<sup>1124</sup> By mid-April sources close to the RSF reported to have reached Al-Keili area about 145 kilometres south of Damazin, with clashes occurring around Sali town on a main highway towards Damazin.<sup>1125</sup>

The months from May to July 2026 saw a reversal of some of the gains made by the rebel alliance, as the SAF reported heavy fighting with the RSF in Al-Kaili,<sup>1126</sup> seized the border town Khor Hassan from the RSF,<sup>1127</sup> advanced south recapturing the strategic areas of Magia (Mugaja) and Surkum (Sirkum)<sup>1128</sup> and finally seized Kurmuk at the start of July 2026.<sup>1129</sup> The London-based Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) with its war monitoring project Sudan Witness identified Blue Nile state as the area with most conflict-related activity in 2026 together with North Kordofan and West Darfur.<sup>1130</sup> Both conflict sides in 2026 reportedly increased their reliance on drone strikes, also in Blue Nile,<sup>1131</sup> with ACLED recording an uptick in February with 19 strikes compared to just 3 in January, the majority of them conducted by the SAF.<sup>1132</sup>

<sup>1117</sup> ACLED, Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1118</sup> MEE, Sudan's RSF launches offensive in Blue Nile state, 26 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1119</sup> UNHCR, External Update #115 Sudan Situation - January 2026, 7 April 2026, [url](#), p. 3; Getachew Birru, J., Blue Nile State: How Gulf Rivalries Are Redrawing Sudan's War Map [Blog], PRIF, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1120</sup> CTP, Red Sea Showdown Brewing in Northern Somalia, New Fronts in Sudan: Africa File, January 29, 2026, 29 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1121</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Blue Nile's Kurmuk falls to RSF | Around 100 civilians killed in drone attacks attributed to military in Darfur | 5 killed in Central Darfur by Chadian forces, eyewitnesses say | Repercussions of war on Iran a 'crisis multiplier' for Sudan's medicine supply, acute drug scarcity on the horizon, sources say, 26 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1122</sup> Ayin Network, Blue Nile: Fierce battles, drone strikes, competing control and thousands displaced, 17 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1123</sup> Horn Review, Sudan's New Front in Blue Nile, 8 May 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Map: Sudanese Rebels Overrun Army Garrison at Ethiopia Border, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1124</sup> Sudan Tribune, SPLM-N rebels, RSF extend operations after seizing Sudan's Kurmuk, 26 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1125</sup> Horn Review, Sudan's New Front in Blue Nile, 8 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1126</sup> New Arab (The), Sudan army retakes area on Ethiopia border after RSF clashes, 10 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1127</sup> Al Jazeera, Sudanese army captures key town near Ethiopian border from RSF, 16 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1128</sup> Dabanga, Sudan army and allied forces claim gains in Blue Nile and Darfur, 30 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Sudanese military retakes Sirkum and Mugaja in Blue Nile, 29 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1129</sup> CIR, SAF movements in Blue Nile state, Sudan, 16 July 2026, [url](#); Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military retakes Blue Nile's Kurmuk | RSF amasses forces near West Darfur's Kulbus, residents flee | Debt crisis traps Sudanese in Egypt, embassy moves to free debtors in prison | Architect of Hemedti's Entebbe visit holds talks in Khartoum, 10 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Sudan Army Captures Kurmuk From Rebel Coalition, 8 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1130</sup> CIR, SAF movements in Blue Nile state, Sudan, 16 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1131</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army claims destruction of 224 RSF combat vehicles, 30 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1132</sup> Getachew Birru, J., Blue Nile State: How Gulf Rivalries Are Redrawing Sudan's War Map [Blog], PRIF, 24 March 2026, [url](#)



In mid-August 2026, the Taasis alliance in turn managed to reverse the recent gains made by the SAF by taking control of Kurmuk town once again<sup>1133</sup> while starting a fresh offensive from across the Ethiopian border capturing Geisan town in Geisan district.<sup>1134</sup> In September 2026, the RSF made further gains by capturing a SAF garrison in the Jebel Kadam area east of Kurmuk.<sup>1135</sup>

### 2.13.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 192 security events in Blue Nile state. Of these, 111 were coded as battles, 70 as explosions/remote violence and 11 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in the first half of 2026: March (33 incidents), May (25 incidents) and February and August (24 incidents each). During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in all seven districts<sup>1136</sup> of Blue Nile. The highest number was documented in Al-Kurmuk district (96 incidents), followed by Geisan district (35 incidents) and Baw district (25 incidents). Of the 11 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 18 recorded fatalities, 6 involved the SAF and 4 the Taasis alliance and the RSF.<sup>1137</sup>

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<sup>1133</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: In cross-border offensive, RSF seizes Blue Nile’s Geisan, recaptures Kurmuk | Military repels major RSF attack on North Kordofan’s Gabra al-Sheikh | After clashes inside Kauda, SPLM-N-Otoro fighting spreads to nearby villages | Kordofan governor in RSF-led govt defects | Back-to-back Sudanese visits to Juba in mutual push to contain border, Abyei tensions, 14 August 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF says it took control of Sudan’s strategic border town Kurmuk, 13 August 2026, [url](#); Al Jazeera, Sudan army says RSF advance on key town bordering Ethiopia, 13 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1134</sup> Sudan War Monitor, Ta’sis Coalition Overruns Geisan in Fresh Blue Nile Offensive, 13 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1135</sup> Sudan War Monitor, RSF seizes another strategic army garrison in Blue Nile, 17 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1136</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Blue Nile State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1137</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 28: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Blue Nile, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1138</sup>**

#### 2.13.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented six civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Blue Nile.<sup>1139</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOVAV recorded 168 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Blue Nile<sup>1140</sup> with the only recorded casualties for 2025 recorded in October (8 casualties)<sup>1141</sup> followed by a sharp uptick in January 2026 (125 casualties)<sup>1142</sup> and 35 casualties in February 2026.<sup>1143</sup> From the start of 2026, there were multiple reports of civilian casualties resulting from drone strikes.<sup>1144</sup> The UN reported more than 20 civilians killed in clashes in Geisan town in August 2026.<sup>1145</sup> Around the same time, Sudan Tribune reported the discovery of a mass grave containing the bodies of 25 civilians following the SAF takeover of Kurmuk town from the RSF.<sup>1146</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in Blue Nile between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 845 fatalities.<sup>1147</sup>

<sup>1138</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1139</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1140</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOVAV data. AOVAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1141</sup> AOVAV, Explosive Violence in October 2025, 10 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1142</sup> AOVAV, Explosive Violence in January 2026, 10 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1143</sup> AOVAV, Explosive Violence in February 2026, 10 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1144</sup> CFJ, Sudan: Committee for Justice Calls for the Protection of Civilians and an Investigation into Civilian Casualties Resulting from Shelling in Blue Nile and Darfur, 31 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army drone strike kills civilians in Blue Nile, rights group says, 24 July 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, Dozens killed or displaced as drone strikes, fighting escalate across Sudan's war zones, 4 May 2026, [url](#); SUWRA, Sudan Crisis Update: Increasing Violence Targeting Civilians in Kordofan, Blue Nile, and White Nile States [Blog], 19 March 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Civilian deaths reported in RSF drone strike on Blue Nile's locality, 14 February 2026, [url](#); Darfur 24, Civilians Hit by Drone Strike in Blue Nile, Casualties Reported, 12 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1145</sup> UN News, Sudan: Attacks and further displacement in Blue Nile and North Kordofan, 12 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1146</sup> Sudan Tribune, Mass graves found in Sudan's Kurmuk after town recaptured from RSF, 9 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1147</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)




**Figure 29: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Blue Nile, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1148</sup>**

### 2.13.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded five attacks on health care in Blue Nile state, three of which were reportedly perpetrated by the RSF and two were attributed to the SAF. The attacks caused damage to two health facilities.<sup>1149</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight documented four attacks on schools, with three incidents causing damage or destruction to the respective facility.<sup>1150</sup> In October 2025, a drone attack struck electrical infrastructure in the state capital Damazin causing power outages.<sup>1151</sup> Drone strikes in May 2026 reportedly hit villages, markets, displacement sites, and humanitarian infrastructure.<sup>1152</sup> According to a Blue Nile government official, the electricity and water infrastructure as well as health facilities in the city of Kurmuk were extensively damaged and its neighbourhoods were contaminated with explosive remnants of war.<sup>1153</sup>

### 2.13.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Blue Nile state was hosting 370 745 IDPs, over two thirds of them displaced within the state (263 446), followed by 78 029 IDPs displaced there from Khartoum. Of the total number of IDPs in Blue Nile, 145 030 IDPs were located in Damazin district, followed by Baw district with 106 694

<sup>1148</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1149</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1150</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1151</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 37

<sup>1152</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 27, 15 June 2026, [url](#), p. 7

<sup>1153</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military retakes Blue Nile's Kurmuk | RSF amasses forces near West Darfur's Kulbus, residents flee | Debt crisis traps Sudanese in Egypt, embassy moves to free debtors in prison | Architect of Hemedti's Entebbe visit holds talks in Khartoum, 10 July 2026, [url](#)



IDPs. At the same time, an additional 20 878 displaced persons from Blue Nile were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had recorded 230 572 IDP returns in Blue Nile state.<sup>1154</sup> As of March 2026, the escalation in fighting in Kurmuk had reportedly displaced 80 % of its residents.<sup>1155</sup> A Blue Nile government official put the number of displaced people between late March and the start of July 2026 at 100 000, most of them from Kurmuk locality.<sup>1156</sup>

## 2.14. Northern

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF briefly claimed to have captured Merowe airport at the start of the armed conflict in April 2023,<sup>1157</sup> a claim which was denied by the SAF.<sup>1158</sup> ACLED, as of December 2025, described Northern state as having remained uncontested since the start of the war and remaining under SAF control.<sup>1159</sup>

### 2.14.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF controlled the Nile valley in the eastern part of the state with the state capital Dongola.<sup>1160</sup> The SAF 19th Infantry Division was based in Merowe.<sup>1161</sup> In the vast desert areas outside the Nile valley, in June 2025, the RSF seized control of the border triangle between Sudan, Egypt and Libya in the state's northwest, allowing them access to supplies and reinforcements from Libya.<sup>1162</sup> In response, the SAF reportedly deployed reinforcements to the state in order to prevent potential RSF advances.<sup>1163</sup> Furthermore, curfews and a growing number of checkpoints were reportedly imposed near Dongola and west of Wadi Halfa.<sup>1164</sup>

A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as of the start of July 2026 depicted the SAF as having control of the Nile valley and all areas east of the Nile with support from the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, the tribal Kababeesh militia and Chadian Zaghawa foreign fighters.<sup>1165</sup> Sudanese media further reported on the presence of Darfur Joint Force elements in Halfa district in Northern state<sup>1166</sup> and Joint Force factions Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)

<sup>1154</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1155</sup> Ayin Network, Blue Nile: Fierce battles, drone strikes, competing control and thousands displaced, 17 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1156</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military retakes Blue Nile's Kurmuk | RSF amasses forces near West Darfur's Kulbus, residents flee | Debt crisis traps Sudanese in Egypt, embassy moves to free debtors in prison | Architect of Hemedti's Entebbe visit holds talks in Khartoum, 10 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1157</sup> Guardian (The), At least 25 killed amid clashes between rival military factions in Sudan, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

<sup>1158</sup> Dabanga, Deadly violence in Sudan capital as army and RSF militia tensions explode, 15 April 2023, [url](#)

<sup>1159</sup> ACLED, Fighting moves to Kordofan as Sudan's east-west divide solidifies, 11 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1160</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 3], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1161</sup> Sudans Post, SAF reinforce North after RSF threats, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1162</sup> International Crisis Group, Capture of Tri-border Area Marks Another Twist in Sudan's Civil War, 20 June 2025, [url](#); Arab Weekly (The), Sudan's RSF tighten grip on army supply lines, shifting military balance, 23 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1163</sup> Sudans Post, SAF reinforce North after RSF threats, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1164</sup> UNHCR, External Update #109 Sudan Situation - July 2025, 29 August 2025, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1165</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1166</sup> Sudans Post, Detention spree in Northern State targets activists, protesters, 10 October 2025, [url](#)



and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Delgo district.<sup>1167</sup> The Africa Center for Strategic Studies map showed the RSF in control of the border triangle with Egypt and Libya in the northwest with support from Libyan and Chadian armed groups as of July 2026.<sup>1168</sup>

### 2.14.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

At the start of June 2025, clashes erupted on the border with Libya, after troops from the Sabil Al-Salam battalion affiliated with Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) reportedly advanced into the El Uweinat border area.<sup>1169</sup> On 11 June 2025, the RSF reported having taken control of the El Uweinat area, the strategic border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt, while the SAF announced they had evacuated the area and accused the RSF of receiving direct support from Khalifa Haftar's LNA.<sup>1170</sup> In July 2025, the Sudans Post noted that Northern and River Nile states, previously considered relatively stable, faced an increased risk of being drawn into the armed conflict as the northern region faced RSF drone strikes, threats and military advances.<sup>1171</sup> In 2025, the RSF reportedly increased their drone capabilities, employing long-range drones capable of reaching infrastructure in previously safe areas, for example repeatedly targeting Merowe dam.<sup>1172</sup> In April 2026, UNHCR described the situation in Northern state as remaining 'relatively stable', albeit with increased drone activity reported in Al Dabbah, Merowe and Dongola.<sup>1173</sup>

### 2.14.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 76 security events in Northern state. Of these, 34 were coded as battles (21 of them RSF drone strikes that were met with SAF anti-aircraft fire), 33 as explosions/remote violence and 9 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in April and November 2025 (11 incidents each) and July 2025 (10 incidents). During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in five of the seven districts<sup>1174</sup> of Northern state. The highest number was documented in Halfa district (26 incidents), followed by Merowe district (25 incidents) and Al Dabbah district (15 incidents). Of the 9 incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with 19 recorded fatalities, 3 involved the Darfur Joint Forces and another 3 involved unidentified armed groups.<sup>1175</sup>

<sup>1167</sup> Al Taghyeer, *تحذير من تمدد حركات مسلحة تنشط في تجنيد المعدنيين التقليديين بالولاية الشمالية* [warning of expansion of armed movements active in recruiting artisanal miners in Northern state], 25 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1168</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1169</sup> Al-Monitor, Sudan army loses border control to RSF after clashes with Libya's Haftar, 11 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1170</sup> Dabanga, SAF evacuates 'strategic' Sudan-Libya-Egypt border triangle following RSF takeover, 12 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1171</sup> Sudans Post, SAF reinforce North after RSF threats, 1 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1172</sup> ACAPS, Sudan: Risk Analysis [2026], 13 May 2026, [url](#), p. 11; Sudan Tribune, Drone attacks reshape Sudan war, targeting infrastructure and civilians, 17 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1173</sup> UNHCR, External Update #115 Sudan Situation - January 2026, 7 April 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1174</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Northern State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1175</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Security events in Northern: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




Figure 30: Evolution of security events coded as battles, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians in Northern, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1176</sup>

#### 2.14.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented nine civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Northern state.<sup>1177</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 12 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Northern state:<sup>1178</sup> in April 2025 (6 casualties)<sup>1179</sup> and March 2026 (6 casualties).<sup>1180</sup> In July 2025, tribal clashes between the Kababeesh and the Hawaweer tribes in Al Dabbah resulted in four persons killed and several wounded.<sup>1181</sup> On 20 March 2026, drones struck an engineering college, reportedly killing six people.<sup>1182</sup> ACLED observed that the security incidents it recorded in Northern between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026 caused an estimated 138 fatalities.<sup>1183</sup>

<sup>1176</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1177</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1178</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1179</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2025, 10 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1180</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in March 2026, 10 April 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1181</sup> Al Taghyeer, [أمر طوارئ بتمديد ساعات حظر التجوال بمحلية الدبة في الولاية الشمالية](#) [Emergency order to extend curfew hours in Al Dabbah locality in Northern state], 6 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1182</sup> OHCHR, Sharp increase in civilian deaths as a result of growing drone warfare, 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1183</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

### Estimated number of fatalities in Northern: 1 March 2025 - 31 August 2026




**Figure 31: Fatalities as a result of armed conflict in Northern, 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026, based on ACLED data<sup>1184</sup>**

#### 2.14.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

RSF drone strikes targeted the electricity infrastructure,<sup>1185</sup> military sites,<sup>1186</sup> and a fuel depot.<sup>1187</sup> Repeated RSF drone attacks on Merowe dam and its power plant reportedly caused temporary disruptions rather than lasting structural damage.<sup>1188</sup> In July 2026, a drone strike caused damage to a power station in Al Dabbah.<sup>1189</sup>

#### 2.14.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Northern state was hosting 358 918 IDPs, 73 % of them displaced from Khartoum (263 512), followed by 50 715 IDPs displaced there from North Darfur. Of the total number of IDPs in Northern state, 96 109 IDPs were located in Al Dabbah district, followed by Merowe district with 67 083 IDPs and Dongola district with 64 441 IDPs. At the same time, an additional five displaced persons from Northern state were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded

<sup>1184</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1185</sup> Dabanga, [هجوم بمسيرة يستهدف محطة كهرباء الدبة بشمال السودان](#) [drone strike targets power station in Al Dabbah in northern Sudan], 16 July 2026, [url](#); Asharq Al-Awsat, [Burhan Rejects Ceasefire Before RSF Surrender as Drone Strike Hits Power Station in Northern Sudan](#), 21 March 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese army says it intercepted drone attack on key dam](#), 5 January 2026, [url](#); Al Taghyeer, [للمرة الثالثة الدعم السريع يستهدف محطة مروي بطائرات مسيرة](#) [RSF target power plant in Merowe with drones for the third time and electricity cuts in Northern state], 4 March 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1186</sup> Dabanga, [هجوم بمسيرة يستهدف محطة كهرباء الدبة بشمال السودان](#) [drone strike targets power station in Al Dabbah in northern Sudan], 16 July 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, [Sudanese army says it intercepted drone attack on key dam](#), 5 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1187</sup> Dabanga, [RSF drone attack hits airport fuel depot in Sudan's Northern State](#), 8 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1188</sup> ACAPS, [Sudan: Risk Analysis](#) [2026], 13 May 2026, [url](#), p. 11

<sup>1189</sup> Dabanga, [هجوم بمسيرة يستهدف محطة كهرباء الدبة بشمال السودان](#) [drone strike targets power station in Al Dabbah in northern Sudan], 16 July 2026, [url](#)

any IDP returns in Northern state.<sup>1190</sup> According to UNHCR, Northern state hosted over half a million IDPs as of November 2025 and was witnessing a growing influx of IDPs from Darfur.<sup>1191</sup>

## 2.15. River Nile

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the RSF made several attempts to seize areas in River Nile state.<sup>1192</sup> However, SAF troops recaptured the RSF-controlled areas on the border with Khartoum state in October 2024.<sup>1193</sup>

### 2.15.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, territorial control maps depicted River Nile state as continuously under SAF control.<sup>1194</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies as of the start of July 2026 showed the SAF in full control of the state with support from allied groups such as the Sudanese Popular Resistance Force/*Mustanfareen* and the Darfur Joint Forces.<sup>1195</sup>

### 2.15.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

According to the Sudans Post, as of July 2025, Northern and River Nile states, previously considered relatively stable, risked increasingly being drawn into the armed conflict as the northern region faced RSF drone strikes, threats and military advances. As of November 2025, UNHCR described River Nile state as ‘relatively calm’,<sup>1196</sup> albeit facing repeated drone attacks throughout the reference period, many of them targeting locations in Atbara city.<sup>1197</sup> In its Sudan coverage published in March 2026, the Egyptian independent online newspaper Mada

<sup>1190</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1191</sup> UNHCR, Sudan Situation - Sudanese Returns as of 22 November 2025, 27 November 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>1192</sup> Sudan Times, الدعم السريع تتوغل في ولاية نهر النيل ومقتل شخصين [Rapid Support Forces enter River Nile state, two people killed], 15 October 2024, [url](#); PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2024, 11 June 2024, [url](#); Sudan War Monitor, Map: Areas of Control in Central Sudan, 29 December 2023, [url](#)

<sup>1193</sup> ACLED, Turning the tide: The SAF's strategic offensive in Khartoum and the RSF's setbacks, 14 October 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1194</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1195</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1196</sup> UNHCR, External Update #113 Sudan Situation - November 2025, 9 February 2026, [url](#), p. 3

<sup>1197</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: In cross-border offensive, RSF seizes Blue Nile's Geisan, recaptures Kurmuk | Military repels major RSF attack on North Kordofan's Gabra al-Sheikh | After clashes inside Kauda, SPLM-N-Otoro fighting spreads to nearby villages | Kordofan governor in RSF-led govt defects | Back-to-back Sudanese visits to Juba in mutual push to contain border, Abyei tensions, 14 August 2026, [url](#); Dabanga, حرب المسيرات تتواصل .. قتلى وجرحى في نهر النيل والجزيرة وغرب كردفان [Drone war continues – Killed and injured persons in River Nile, Al Jazirah and West Kordofan], 7 January 2026, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Two civil defence members killed in drone attack on Atbara power station, 18 December 2025, [url](#); BBC News, Sudan capital hit by drone attacks a day after RSF agrees to truce – reports, 7 November 2025, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, RSF drone attacks cause blackout in north Sudan's Atbara, 15 April 2025, [url](#); Al Taghyeer, ولاية نهر النيل تصدر أمر طوارئ جديد بشأن حظر التجوال [River Nile issues new emergency order regarding curfews], 3 April 2025, [url](#)

Masri stated that the ‘relatively secure’ situation in River Nile state enabled the local authorities to rebuild the manufacturing sector.<sup>1198</sup>

### 2.15.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 36 security events in River Nile state. Of these, 18 were coded as battles (12 of them RSF drone strikes that were met with SAF anti-aircraft fire), 12 as explosions/remote violence and 6 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in April 2025 (seven incidents) while all other months recorded between zero and five incidents. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in four of the seven districts<sup>1199</sup> of River Nile. The highest number was documented in Atbara district (22 incidents), followed by Al Damar district (8 incidents). Of the 6 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 12 recorded fatalities, 3 involved the Darfur Joint Forces and 1 the SAF.<sup>1200</sup>

### 2.15.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented 12 civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in River Nile.<sup>1201</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded 38 casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in River Nile state<sup>1202</sup> with the only recorded casualties in the months of April 2025 (33 casualties)<sup>1203</sup> and December 2025 (5 casualties).<sup>1204</sup> In April 2025, a drone strike hit a displacement camp in Atbara, reportedly killing at least 11 people.<sup>1205</sup> In October 2025, residents of Atbara called for the removal of the Joint Forces and militias from the city, after a shooting incident involving Joint Force members and members of the Intelligence Services at a hospital led to one person killed and two others injured.<sup>1206</sup> In January 2026, a suicide drone attributed to the RSF exploded in a village near Atbara, killing at least one civilian and injuring several others.<sup>1207</sup> In June 2026, airstrikes on remote artisanal gold mining sites near the Egyptian border reportedly caused more than 30 deaths and over 50 casualties.<sup>1208</sup>

<sup>1198</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Blue Nile’s Kurmuk falls to RSF | Around 100 civilians killed in drone attacks attributed to military in Darfur | 5 killed in Central Darfur by Chadian forces, eyewitnesses say | Repercussions of war on Iran a ‘crisis multiplier’ for Sudan’s medicine supply, acute drug scarcity on the horizon, sources say, 26 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1199</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: River Nile State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1200</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1201</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1202</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1203</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in April 2025, 10 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1204</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in December 2025, 10 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1205</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strike kills 11, hits power facility in north Sudan, 26 April 2025, [url](#); Al Jazeera, باستخدام [url](#) [Using drones as weapons – dozens of IDPs killed and wounded in River Nile state in northern Sudan] [Online video], 29 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1206</sup> Dabanga, مطالبات بإبعاد الحركات المسلحة من عطبرة عقب مقتل شخصين جراء إطلاق نار [url](#) [Calls to remove armed groups from Atbara after two people were killed in a shooting], 14 Oktober 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1207</sup> Sudan Tribune, قتل وجرح في هجوم بالمسيرات على ولاية نهر النيل [url](#) [One killed and several wounded in drone attack in River Nile state], 7 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1208</sup> Darfur 24, Death Toll from Border Gold Mine Airstrikes Rises Above 30, 18 June 2026, [url](#)



### 2.15.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Insecurity Insight between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026 recorded one attack on health care in River Nile state.<sup>1209</sup> During the same period, Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities.<sup>1210</sup> In December 2025, a drone attack struck the electricity transformer station in Atbara, resulting in disruptions to the electricity supply for multiple states.<sup>1211</sup> The Atbara transformer station had already previously been targeted by drones four times in April 2025.<sup>1212</sup>

### 2.15.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, River Nile state was hosting 294 782 IDPs, 88 % of them displaced from Khartoum (258 306), followed by 10 745 IDPs displaced there from Al Jazirah. Of the total number of IDPs in River Nile state, 57 700 IDPs were located in Barbar district, followed by Atbara district with 57 060 IDPs and Shendi with 55 860 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 110 displaced persons from River Nile state were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, River Nile state recorded 45 793 returned IDPs, mostly returning from displacement within the state.<sup>1213</sup>

## 2.16. Gedaref

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the SAF maintained control of the state<sup>1214</sup> and established training camps for fighters from armed groups of the Darfur Joint Forces there.<sup>1215</sup> The RSF, meanwhile, only managed limited incursions from neighbouring Al Jazirah state into the area around El Faw (El Faw) in western Gedaref throughout 2024.<sup>1216</sup>

### 2.16.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, territorial control maps depicted Gedaref state as continuously under SAF control.<sup>1217</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies showed Gedaref state under the SAF's complete control as of the beginning of July 2026, along with the presence of allied armed groups such as the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), the Sudanese

<sup>1209</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1210</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1211</sup> Sudan Tribune, Two civil defence members killed in drone attack on Atbara power station, 18 December 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1212</sup> Sudan Tribune, RSF drone strike kills 11, hits power facility in north Sudan, 26 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1213</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1214</sup> HRW, Sudan: Arbitrary Detention by Army, Security Forces, 7 April 2026, [url](#); PolGeoNow, Sudan Control Map & Timeline: Former Rebels Join Fight - June 2024 [Map], 11 June 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1215</sup> ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1216</sup> Sudan Tribune, الدعم السريع تهاجم مناطق حدودية بين واليتي القضايف والجزييرة [RSF attack border areas between Gedaref and Al Jazirah states], 10 August 2024, [url](#); Sudan Tribune, Sudanese army repels RSF attack in Al-Faw, 19 March 2024, [url](#); Dabanga, El Faw standoff: Sudan army deploys reinforcements as RSF regroup, 14 January 2024, [url](#)

<sup>1217</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)



Popular Resistance/*Mustanfareen*, and the Darfur Joint Forces.<sup>1218</sup> The SSF reportedly operated in the Al-Butana plains bordering Al Jazirah state.<sup>1219</sup> Furthermore, several tribal militias mostly allied with the SAF, reportedly operated in Red Sea, Gedaref, and Kassala states.<sup>1220</sup>

## 2.16.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In July and August 2025, Dabanga reported incursions of Ethiopian militia into Gedaref territory, leading to incidents of looting.<sup>1221</sup> Tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia in the wake of a drone strike on Khartoum airport in which the SAF reportedly saw Ethiopian involvement led to additional SAF deployment in East Qalabat, Basunda and Al-Fashaga localities in May 2026.<sup>1222</sup> In August 2026, fighting between the Ethiopian military and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray near the border with Gedaref state reportedly prompted the SAF to raise their military readiness in the area among concerns about possible spillover across the border and disruptions to the vital agricultural sector.<sup>1223</sup>

## 2.16.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 16 security events in Gedaref state. Of these, three were coded as battles, four as explosions/remote violence and nine as violence against civilians. The overall incident level across the reference period was between one and four incidents per month. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in seven of the twelve districts<sup>1224</sup> of Gedaref. The highest number was documented in Al Fashaga (four incidents), followed by Madinat Al-Gedaref district (three incidents). Of the nine incidents coded as 'violence against civilians' with seven recorded fatalities, four involved Ethiopian Militias (Shifta) and three involved unidentified armed groups.<sup>1225</sup>

## 2.16.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR did not document any civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Gedaref state.<sup>1226</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV recorded only

<sup>1218</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1219</sup> Sudan Tribune, Drone strike kills one at Sudan Shield camp in Al-Jazirah, 7 January 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1220</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), pp. 23-24

<sup>1221</sup> Dabanga, *مقتل مواطن في سوق الماشية بالقلابات في توغل جديد لمليشيات إثيوبية* [Citizen killed at livestock market in Al-Qalabat caused by a new incursion of Ethiopian militia], 11 August 2025, [url](#); Dabanga, *مليشيات إثيوبية مسلحة تعود إلى الفشقة وأعمال نهب في القلابات بالقضارف* [Ethiopian militia return to Al-Fashaqa – lootings in Al-Qabalat in Gedaref], 2 July 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1222</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan reinforces Ethiopian border as tensions rise over drone strikes, 7 May 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1223</sup> Mada Masr, Sudan Nashra: Military builds on North Kordofan gains, prepares push into West Kordofan, repels RSF attempt to recapture West Darfur position along Chadian border | SPLM-N clashes with Otoro tribe inside Kauda | Third nationwide blackout in a week as financing impasse stalls electricity sector recovery | Stalled grid repairs put planting season at risk | Ethiopia fighting threatens Sudan's largest rain-fed farming state, 6 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1224</sup> A map depicting the state's districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Gedaref State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1225</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1226</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

two casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Gedaref state,<sup>1227</sup> namely in May 2025.<sup>1228</sup> In August 2025, a worker at a livestock market as well as several herders were killed in incursions in Basunda district carried out by Ethiopian militia crossing the border.<sup>1229</sup>

### 2.16.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

No information on conflict-related infrastructure damage or other war impacts could be found during the writing of this report.

### 2.16.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Gedaref state was hosting 167 326 IDPs, over 60 % of them displaced from Khartoum (101 318), followed by 31 854 IDPs displaced there from Al Jazirah. Of the total number of IDPs in Gedaref state, 94 061 IDPs were located in Madinat El-Gedaref district, followed by Galabat Al-Gharbiya-Kassab district with 23 482 IDPs and Al-Rahad with 15 015 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 693 displaced persons from Gedaref state were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in Gedaref state.<sup>1230</sup>

## 2.17. Kassala

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), clashes between RSF and SAF broke out in Kassala city in April 2023.<sup>1231</sup> While Kassala state remained relatively peaceful overall, it saw a proliferation of SAF-aligned militias, among them locally recruited groups as well as groups deployed there from western Sudan,<sup>1232</sup> as the SAF established training camps for fighters from armed groups of the Darfur Joint Forces.<sup>1233</sup>

### 2.17.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, territorial control maps depicted Kassala state as continuously under SAF control.<sup>1234</sup> A map provided by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies showed Kassala state under complete control of the SAF as of the start of July 2026 along with the presence of allied armed groups such as the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF), the Sudanese Popular Resistance/*Mustanfareen*, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Al-Baraa Bin

<sup>1227</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1228</sup> AOAV, Explosive Violence in May 2025, 10 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1229</sup> Dabanga, [مقتل مواطن في سوق الماشية بالقلابات في توغل جديد لميليشيات إثيوبية](#) [Citizen killed at livestock market in Al-Qalabat caused by a new incursion of Ethiopian militia], 11 August 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1230</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1231</sup> UNOCHA, Sudan: Clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces & and Rapid Support Forces (16 April 2023), 16 April 2023, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>1232</sup> ADF, Expanding Militias Threaten Security in Eastern Sudan, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1233</sup> ACLED, Two years of war in Sudan: How the SAF is gaining the upper hand, 15 April 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1234</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control in Sudan – October 2025 [Map 2], 12 October 2025, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

Malik Brigade.<sup>1235</sup> Furthermore, several tribal militias allied with the SAF reportedly operated in Red Sea, Gedaref and Kassala states.<sup>1236</sup> In February 2026, five SAF-allied armed groups, among them the Beja Congress, the East Sudan Liberation Movement and the National Movement for Justice and Development in East Sudan announced their alliance called Federal Alliance of Eastern Sudan Forces in Kassala city.<sup>1237</sup> Some of these groups reportedly returned from Eritrea where they had received military training.<sup>1238</sup>

## 2.17.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

As of August 2025, UNHCR described Kassala state as ‘relatively stable’.<sup>1239</sup> A drone attack, an incident which was described as ‘rare’ in the SAF-controlled east, was reported at the beginning of May 2025, targeting Kassala airport without causing casualties or damages.<sup>1240</sup> Further drone strikes around the same time reportedly targeted the SAF 11<sup>th</sup> Division in Khashm Al-Girba.<sup>1241</sup> According to Dabanga, the proliferation of weapons in Kassala state had led to a widespread security breakdown, such as in June 2025, when a soldier fired wildly into crowds in Khashm Al-Girba, killing seven people.<sup>1242</sup> In September 2026, the SAF reported to have shot down an RSF drone over Khashm Al-Girba.<sup>1243</sup>

## 2.17.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 22 security events in Kassala state. Of these, 8 were coded as battles, 3 as explosions/remote violence and 11 as violence against civilians. The highest incident rates were recorded in May 2025 (eight incidents), all other months recorded between one and four incidents. During the reference period, ACLED recorded security incidents in half of the ten districts<sup>1244</sup> of Kassala. The highest number was documented in Madinat Kassala district (15 incidents). Of the 11 incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with 12 recorded fatalities, 4 involved unidentified armed groups and 3 Kassala Communal Militia.<sup>1245</sup>

<sup>1235</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict [Map], 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1236</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), pp. 23-24

<sup>1237</sup> Dabanga, تحالف يضم خمس حركات مسلحة بدشن أنشطته في شرق السودان [Alliance including five armed movements launches its activities in eastern Sudan], 26 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1238</sup> Dabanga, عودة وشيكة لحركات شرق السودان من إرتريا وسط تنامي الاحتجاجات [Imminent return of Eastern Sudan movements from Eritrea amid growing protests], 16 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1239</sup> UNHCR, Protection Brief Sudan, August 2025, 20 November 2025, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>1240</sup> AFP, Paramilitary drone hits Sudan airport near Eritrea: pro-army source, 3 May 2025

<sup>1241</sup> ACJPS, Report on Human Rights Situation in Sudan – April to June 2025, 25 July 2025, [url](#), p. 22

<sup>1242</sup> Dabanga, مقتل سبعة أشخاص في إطلاق نار من قبل جندي في شرق السودان [Seven people killed in gunfire from a soldier in eastern Sudan], 9 June 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1243</sup> Al Jazeera, الجيش السوداني: إسقاط 3 مسيرات للدعم السريع في ولايتي القضارف وكسلا [SAF: Three RSF drones shot down in Gedaref and Kassala states] [Online video], 15 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1244</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Kassala State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1245</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)



#### 2.17.4. Civilian casualties

Between January and June 2025, OHCHR documented four civilian deaths in the context of the conflict in Kassala state.<sup>1246</sup> Between March 2025 and April 2026, AOAV did not record any casualties resulting from explosive weapons use in Kassala state.<sup>1247</sup>

#### 2.17.5. Conflict related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Insecurity Insight between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026 recorded four attacks on health care in Kassala state, two of them attributed to the RSF, one to the Sudanese Popular Resistance and another to an unnamed militia.<sup>1248</sup> During the reference period, Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities.<sup>1249</sup> Power outages related to attacks on infrastructure in May 2025 led to the debilitation of the irrigation systems in the state, causing harvest and income losses.<sup>1250</sup>

#### 2.17.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Kassala state was hosting 42 754 IDPs, over 50 % of them displaced from Khartoum (22 203), followed by 13 596 IDPs displaced there from Al Jazirah. Of the total number of IDPs in Kassala state, 11 188 IDPs were located in Halfa Al-Jadeeda district, followed by Madinat Kassala district with 9 464 IDPs and Reifi Aroma with 6 695 IDPs. At the same time, an additional 255 displaced persons from Kassala state were hosted in other states. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in Kassala state.<sup>1251</sup>

### 2.18. Red Sea

In the reference period covered by the previous [EUAA COI Report Sudan – Security Situation \(February 2025\)](#), the SAF maintained control over Red Sea state, including Port Sudan. Government institutions relocated to Port Sudan in 2023,<sup>1252</sup> where they remained under SAF control<sup>1253</sup> until their return to Khartoum in 2026.<sup>1254</sup> SAF-training camps were also reportedly

<sup>1246</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), p. 17

<sup>1247</sup> EUAA analysis based on AOAV data. AOAV, Explosive Violence Monthly Reports, as of 31 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1248</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1249</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1250</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), para. 85

<sup>1251</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1252</sup> SWP, Sudan's Transition to War and the Limits of the UN's Good Offices, October 2024, [url](#), p. 25; SWP, Power Relations in Sudan after the Fall of Bashir, 10 May 2024, [url](#), p. 27

<sup>1253</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report - Sudan, 2026, [url](#), p. 3; Security Council Report, Sudan, February 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 February 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1254</sup> Al Jazeera, البرهان يستأنف مهامه من القصر الجمهوري بالخرطوم [After more than three years, Burhan resumes his duties from the Presidential Palace in Khartoum], 14 August 2026, [url](#); AA, Sudan government returns to Khartoum after more than two years of war, 11 January 2026, [url](#)



established in the state.<sup>1255</sup> In addition, an armed tribal group from the Beja community, under the lead of Dirar Ahmed Dirar, also known as ‘Shaiba Dirar’, reportedly had its headquarters in Port Sudan.<sup>1256</sup>

### 2.18.1. Actors involved and territorial control

During the reference period, the SAF controlled Red Sea state<sup>1257</sup> together with national militias of the Sudanese Popular Resistance/Mustanfareen.<sup>1258</sup> The SAF have reportedly mobilised members of these militias from local communities.<sup>1259</sup> The largest ethnic group in Red Sea state are the Beja with its subgroups of the Hadendowa, Amrar, and Bishari,<sup>1260</sup> from which the local militias of the Beja Congress (BC) led by Shaiba Dirar, were formed.<sup>1261</sup>

There is a territorial dispute between Sudan and Egypt over the Hala’ib triangle border region<sup>1262</sup> – historically Sudanese territory currently under Egyptian control.<sup>1263</sup> The triangle reportedly offers rich natural resources and ideal conditions for smuggling and trafficking operations beyond Egypt and Sudan.<sup>1264</sup> Since the outbreak of the war, the mines in the adjacent area belonging to Sudan (Red Sea state), according to Sudanese administrative maps, have attracted thousands of Sudanese workers. Egypt reportedly carried out repeated military operations to clear the area of the miners, aiming at handing it to an Egyptian mining company.<sup>1265</sup> Further external actors’ involvement in Sudan, among them the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye (see section [1.2.2. International actors](#) in this report), is largely based on strategic interests in the Red Sea,<sup>1266</sup> including Port Sudan as a major hub.<sup>1267</sup>

<sup>1255</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Findings of the investigations conducted by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan into violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and related crimes, committed in the Sudan in the context of the conflict that erupted in mid-April 2023, A/HRC/57/CRP.6, 23 October 2024, [url](#), para. 224

<sup>1256</sup> MEE, The Sudanese armed leader gaining power in the vital Red Sea region, 2 February 2023, [url](#)

<sup>1257</sup> Sudans Post, Territorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of June 21, 2026) [Map 1], 22 June 2026, [url](#); Sudans Post, Territorial control map – Sudan Conflict (as of May 10, 2026) [Map], 10 May 2026, [url](#); Soliman, A. and Baldo, S., Gold and the war in Sudan [Map], Chatham House, updated 24 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1258</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict, 7 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1259</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), p. 10

<sup>1260</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), p. 12

<sup>1261</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), p. 23

<sup>1262</sup> Al-Saeed, S., The Question No One Asks About Halaib [Blog], 9 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1263</sup> Al-Saeed, S., The Question No One Asks About Halaib [Blog], 9 July 2026, [url](#); Horn Review, The Hala’ib Triangle: Egypt, Sudan and the Strategic Golden Coast, 21 November 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1264</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), pp. 26-27

<sup>1265</sup> Ayin Network, على حدود الذهب والنار... ماذا حدث في مناجم شمال الوادي؟ [On the border between gold and fire... what happened in the mines of the northern valley?], 21 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1266</sup> Mohammed, S., The Houthi’s and the Two Flank Campaign across the Red Sea, Horn Review, 22 July 2026, [url](#); CSIS, The Sudan War in 10 Charts, 17 April 2026, [url](#); Sudan Times (The), Over 12 Eritrea-backed militias fighting alongside SAF, 9 March 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1267</sup> Mohammed, S., The Houthi’s and the Two Flank Campaign across the Red Sea, Horn Review, 22 July 2026, [url](#); CFR, Conflict and Cooperation in the Red Sea, 3 June 2026, [url](#)



## 2.18.2. Conflict dynamics and tactics

In the reference period, military operations in the state involved mostly drone strikes, causing ‘significant’ material losses.<sup>1268</sup> RSF attacks included long-range drone strikes on civilian infrastructure,<sup>1269</sup> such as in May 2025 in Port Sudan.<sup>1270</sup> Traditional farmer-herder conflicts over limited resources were reportedly common in the state.<sup>1271</sup> In June 2026, tribal disputes between Al-Rashaida and Al-Bishariyin arose in the Ar-Ratj market area close to the border with Egypt.<sup>1272</sup>

Hostilities in the wider Red Sea and Gulf regions reportedly disrupted shipping through Port Sudan – a critical entry point to Sudan for food, medicines, fuel, and humanitarian supplies – and impacted Sudan’s war-economy logistics.<sup>1273</sup>

## 2.18.3. Security incidents

Between 1 March 2025 and 31 August 2026, ACLED recorded 34 security events in Red Sea state. Of these, 23 were coded as battles, 5 as explosions/remote violence, and 6 as violence against civilians. With 18, the highest number of incidents was recorded in May 2025. With regard to incidents per district,<sup>1274</sup> 24 of the 34 documented incidents were recorded in Port Sudan, 4 in Jubayt Elma’adin, 3 in Hala’ib, 1 in Al-Ganab, 1 in Agig, and 1 in Sawakin districts. Of the six incidents coded as ‘violence against civilians’ with three recorded fatalities, three incidents involved the Darfur Joint Forces, one involved Sudanese military forces, one involved unidentified armed groups, and one involved military forces of Egypt.<sup>1275</sup>

## 2.18.4. Civilian casualties

A series of drone strikes on Port Sudan in May 2025 reportedly resulted in 17 civilian casualties.<sup>1276</sup> According to local sources, in March 2026, nine miners were killed in an Egyptian infantry attack, in the north of Red Sea state on the border with Egypt.<sup>1277</sup> Furthermore, in June 2026, Egyptian airstrikes and a ground offensive against miners in Red

<sup>1268</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), p. 16

<sup>1269</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 37, 86

<sup>1270</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 28; Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, [url](#); ACAPS, Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan, 23 May 2025, [url](#), p. 1

<sup>1271</sup> Abdelrahman, E. E. and STPT, Regional and international dimensions of conflicts in eastern Sudan, 11 August 2025, [url](#), p. 13

<sup>1272</sup> Sudan Tribune, Sudan deploys troops to Red Sea state mining hub to defuse tribal tensions, 17 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1273</sup> Sudan Human Rights Hub and STPT, Sudan Conflict Monitor # 25: Persian Gulf escalation and its implications for Sudan, 30 March 2026, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>1274</sup> A map depicting the state’s districts can be found here: UNOCHA, Sudan: Red Sea State Reference Map, 7 January 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1275</sup> EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. ACLED, Curated Data Files, Africa, data covering 1 March 2025 to 31 August 2026, as of 8 September 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1276</sup> ACAPS, Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan, 23 May 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1277</sup> Guardian (The) Nigeria, Egypt attacks Sudanese mining sites in Red Sea State, records casualties, 22 June 2026, [url](#)



Sea state,<sup>1278</sup> close to the Hala'ib triangle,<sup>1279</sup> reportedly killed and injured dozens of workers.<sup>1280</sup>

### 2.18.5. Conflict-related infrastructure damage and other war impacts

Drone strikes on Port Sudan in May 2025 reportedly hit the international airport,<sup>1281</sup> damaged fuel depots,<sup>1282</sup> targeted the city's main electricity substation and gas storage facilities,<sup>1283</sup> and led to the displacement of about 3 350 people.<sup>1284</sup> The disruptions resulted in shortages of water and electricity supplies,<sup>1285</sup> which limited services and operating hours of hospitals and medical centres.<sup>1286</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 17 August 2026, Insecurity Insight recorded three attacks on health care in Red Sea, one attributed to the SAF, one attributed to the Joint Forces and one to the RSF. No destruction or damage to health facilities resulting from these attacks were recorded.<sup>1287</sup> Between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2026, Insecurity Insight did not record any attacks on educational facilities in the state.<sup>1288</sup> In Red Sea state, trade was disrupted by the conflict, limiting people's livelihoods and rising prices significantly, as reported by IPC in November 2025.<sup>1289</sup>

### 2.18.6. Conflict-induced displacement and return

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Data, as of 30 July 2026, Red Sea state was hosting 90 450 IDPs, most of them displaced from Khartoum (34 567), from within the state (20 826), and from North Darfur (10 222). About 80 % of the total number of IDPs in Red Sea (72 305 IDPs) were located in the state capital Port Sudan, followed by Tawkar district with 5 985 IDPs. At the same time, only 10 displaced persons from Red Sea were hosted outside the state in North Kordofan. As of 28 July 2026, IOM had not recorded any IDP returns in Red Sea state.<sup>1290</sup>

<sup>1278</sup> ACLED, Africa Overview: July 2026, 6 July 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1279</sup> Horn Review, SAF's Silence on Egypt's Bombing of Sudan, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1280</sup> Guardian (The) Nigeria, Egypt attacks Sudanese mining sites in Red Sea State, records casualties, 22 June 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1281</sup> ACAPS, Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan, 23 May 2025, [url](#), p. 4

<sup>1282</sup> Al Jazeera, The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023, 3 February 2026, [url](#); OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), para. 28; ACAPS, Sudan: Risk of continued drone strikes on Port Sudan, 23 May 2025, [url](#), p. 1; BBC News, No water, no power - Port Sudan reeling after week of attacks, 10 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1283</sup> OHCHR, Sudan: UN expert calls for end to attacks on critical civilian infrastructure amidst intensifying drone strikes, 19 May 2025, [url](#)

<sup>1284</sup> UNICEF, Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 31, 21 July 2025, [url](#), p. 2

<sup>1285</sup> OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in the Sudan (1 January to 30 June 2025), 19 September 2025, [url](#), paras. 28, 70

<sup>1286</sup> UN Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in the Sudan – Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/61/24, 13 January 2026, [url](#), paras. 37, 86

<sup>1287</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2016-2026 SDN Attacks on Health Care Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1288</sup> Insecurity Insight, 2017-2026 SDN Education in Danger Incident Data, as of 24 August 2026, [url](#)

<sup>1289</sup> IPC, IPC Global Initiative - Special Brief - Sudan, November 2025, [url](#), p. 27

<sup>1290</sup> IOM, DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (8), 24 August 2026, [url](#)



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## Annex 2: Terms of Reference

**Reference period:** 1 March 2025 – 31 August 2026

The purpose of this report is to provide information about the general security situation in Sudan with respect to conflict-related violence. It should provide data at country and state level. The report provides an update to the previous security situation report and query update, which covered up to March 2025.

**General description** of the security situation

### Overview of conflict

- Political developments
- Main conflict dynamics
- Territorial control
- Security trends and armed confrontations during the reference period

### Actors in conflict

- Major state and non-state armed groups (including presence and territorial control/influence of the different actors, nature of methods and tactics used and recruitment)
- International actors

### Impact of the security situation on civilian population

- Humanitarian situation

Security situation and conflict impact on civilians by state covering:

- Actors involved in conflict during the reference period and control/presence
- Recent security trends
- Security incidents and impact on populations
- Conflict-related infrastructure damage and explosive remnants of war
- Conflict-induced displacement and return





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