2.1. Perceived political opponents

For background information, see Section 2.3.2. of the EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus ( April 2024). 

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that community leaders, lawyers, and human rights activists continued to be targeted by warring parties.218 It documented 'multiple incidents of threats, intimidation, harassment, attacks and reprisals against human rights defenders, lawyers and activists documenting human rights violations, and members of civil society, by both the SAF and RSF'.219 The same source provided the examples of a human rights activist who was arrested and tortured in El Geneina for documenting human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by the RSF and its allies, and another who was abducted and tortured by the RSF in Omdurman in early 2024 accused of being a SAF spy due to his activism.220
 
The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that female human rights defenders and activists have been targeted with sexual violence, arbitrary detention, and torture, and although they did not know the perpetrators, the perpetrators reportedly knew the activities of their victims and they were looking for them specifically.221 

Regarding the situation of lawyers, the UN FFM for the Sudan provided the following: 

For background information, see Section 2.3.3. of the EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus (April 2024).

Sources reported that members of Resistance Committees (RCs) and Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs)223 continued to be detained and/or attacked on suspicion of collaborating with rival parties.224 Reuters reported that both the SAF and the RSF suspect members of RCs and EERs for having led the pro-democracy protests that toppled the al-Bashir regime in 2019.225  The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that SAF's military intelligence routinely targets these individuals and subjects them to arbitrary detention due to their perceived association with the Forces for Freedom and Change and for allegedly being RSF collaborators.226 A human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA indicated that, despite the barriers to operate, RCs have 'managed to function' but that they also become the target of rival groups.227 When they operate in RSF areas, for example, they become the target of the SAF.228 

The UN FFM for the Sudan indicated that ERR volunteers have been subjected to sexual violence while performing their duties, as well as torture and arbitrary detention.229 Al Jazeera similarly reported that, in areas controlled by the RSF, ERR volunteers are exposed to arbitrary detention and physical and sexual violence due to lawlessness, and in areas controlled by the SAF, volunteers have been targeted by military intelligence and the 'Kizan', members of Sudan's political Islamic movement that ruled alongside al-Bashir and now support the SAF and target civil society organisations 'in revenge' for overthrowing them in 2019.230 Al Jazeera reported that, according to an ERR spokesperson, after the SAF recaptured neighbourhoods in Omdurman from the RSF in March 2024, several ERR volunteers had to flee as the SAF and SAF-affiliated militias reportedly started to search for people who were part of pro-democracy protests in the past.231 

Instances of targeting of RCs and EER volunteers, as reported by sources, include:

•    In November 2024, The New Humanitarian reported that, according to the coordinator of a women's ERR in Khartoum, '21 women from a cooperative were recently detained, beaten, sexually harassed, and had their money stolen by members of the RSF'.232 
•    On 13 May 2024, Sudan War Monitor reported that, according to a local political activist, since April 2024, security forces arrested more than 50 people in En-Nahud, North Kordofan, with some of them being released while others still in detention; most of the detainees are political activists from the RCs who were calling to stop the war.233 
•    On 7 April 2024, Sudan Tribune reported that SAF's military intelligence was conducting an arrest campaign across Sennar state for several weeks, targeting members of political parties, RCs, and humanitarian workers, and that on that day, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the General Intelligence Service (GIS) arrested a 'prominent' member of the Communist Party and a member of the RC. Both detainees had been arrested and released the month prior after spending three months in detention.234 

Additional information on these and other events could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

For background information, see Section 2.3.4. of the EUAA Sudan report – Country Focus (April 2024).

In October 2023, the Coordination Body of Civilian Democratic Forces (Taqaddum) was established as a large coalition of Sudanese civil society organisations and political actors,235 including the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), with the objective of 'finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Sudan'.236 In late 2023, Taqaddum reached out to both SAF and RSF; only the RSF accepted Taqaddum's invitation and a 'declaration of principles' was signed between Taqaddum and RSF in December 2023.237 The SAF and its supporters rejected the declaration and started to consider members of Taqaddum as RSF 'allies' and its 'political wing'.238 According to Chatham House, 'Taqaddum has also been relentlessly demonized by Islamist propagandists and Bashir regime supporters who regard them as the main threat to their ambition to return to power. These accusations have gained traction among many Sudanese in the context of heinous atrocities committed by the RSF and growing social polarisation between supporters of SAF, RSF and the anti-war campaign'.239 The SAF also accuse the FFC of not condemning the human rights violations and war crimes committed by the RSF.240 

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) indicated that political parties and personalities in Sudan are 'irrelevant'241  because they do not have the power to mediate between the two main warring forces, the SAF and the RSF,242 and do not have the popular appeal they once had.243 ACLED added that the only political party that stands somehow neutral is the Sudanese Communist Party, which, despite not having influence in Sudan, continues to be popular with unions, students and state employees.244

Freedom House indicated that since the onset of the conflict in April 2023, 'civilian political parties have effectively been unable to operate in Sudan'.245 The same source added that despite the call to establish anti-war coalitions, the 'significant' fragmentation of political parties, their lack of coordination, and military interference have prevented them from establishing such coalitions.246  Radio Tamazuj reported that, according to the Sudanese Congress Party, government authorities in Port Sudan have been confiscating identity cards of its members, which prevents holders from renewing their passports among others.247 Radio Dabanga also reported that the National Umma Party (NUP) indicated that three of its members were detained on 6 September 2024 by the RSF.248 Additional information on the three members of the NUP could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.

According to a human rights analyst interviewed by EUAA, the role of Islamists is 'exaggerated' and rather 'limited'; they use the opportunity of global mobilisation and try to influence the army, but the army continues to be independent.249 Additional information on Islamists within the reference period could not be found among the sources consulted by EUAA within the time constraints of this report.