2.4.2. Alawites

Between 6 and 10 March, sectarian violence between the interim authorities and their affiliates on one side, and Alawite militias loyal to Assad, reportedly resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians mainly in Syria’s coastal governorates of Latakia, Tartous306 and to a lesser extent Hama and Homs.307 These events involved extrajudicial killings, including field executions and mass killings, reportedly driven by retaliatory and sectarian motives.308 According to sources, most of the civilians killed were members of the Alawite community particularly from Latakia and Tartous governorates.309 According to SNHR, 1 334 individuals were killed in the violence. Out of these, 887 civilians and disarmed combatants of pro-Assad remnants were killed by security forces nominally affiliated with the MoD but operating with relative independence as well as local groups of armed civilians. Around 445 individuals (231 civilians and 214 members of security forces) were killed by pro-Assad remnants.310

Sources noted that the majority of civilian deaths inflicted by government security forces were carried out by SNA factions311 including the Hamza and Suleiman Shah/Amshat divisions,312 as well as by foreign jihadist fighters313 and irregular civilians.314 According to U.S. intelligence, SNA factions involved in the operations ‘probably operated outside the direct control of the authorities during the fighting’.315 According to information received by Amnesty International, militias affiliated with the government killed more than 100 people in the coastal city of Baniyas on 8 and 9 March 2025. The organisation investigated 32 of the killings and concluded that they were deliberate, targeted against members of the Alawite minority, and unlawful.316

By contrast, the involvement of GSS forces in extrajudicial killings was reportedly limited.316 SJAC stated that GSS forces involved in the operation appeared to be the most disciplined and the least likely to have committed violations against civilians.317 Sources reported that members of the GSS forces attempted to rescue or protect civilians on the coast from being killed by members of other armed groups.319

The violence led to the displacement of around 51 000 people, including 6 000 who fled to Lebanon. Widespread curfews and movement restrictions were imposed, including the closure of the Homs – Latakia highway, leading to the suspension of humanitarian operations.320

President al-Sharaa issued a decision to form an independent national committee to investigate the events321 and authorities reportedly begun prosecuting individuals accused of committing crimes during the insurgent activity in western Syria between 6 and 10 March.322 On 11 April, Al-Sharaa extended by three months the mandate of the independent fact-finding committee tasked with investigating and reporting on the coastal violence.323

In the aftermath of the violence between 6 and 10 March, sporadic reports of attacks against Alawites attributed to government forces and affiliated armed groups continued to emerge.324

Since early 2025, weekly reports have emerged of civilians, often Alawites, being killed by ‘unknown gunmen’ or ‘masked men’.325 Between January and the end of April 2025, at least 361 civilians were victims of extrajudicial killings in Homs and Hama governorates, according to SNHR, cited by Syria Direct. The majority of these killings occurred in areas predominantly inhabited by Alawites.326 Following the March violence in the coastal areas, assassinations of Alawites mostly carried out by unidentified gunmen continued, with incidents reported in Latakia, Tartous and Homs governorates.327 Between 23 and 25 April, SNHR documented the killing of at least 20 civilians in predominantly Alawite-inhabited areas of Homs city. These killings were reportedly carried out by unidentified armed groups operating outside state control following security operations by the GSS targeting individuals linked to the former Assad government, operations that were met with resistance from local groups. The attacks included targeted assassinations of individuals previously affiliated with the Assad government, some of whom had entered into reconciliation agreements, as well as random killings believed to be motivated by sectarian and retaliatory intent.328

According to SJAC, unlike ongoing revenge killings targeting individuals linked to the former Assad regime’s security apparatus, the killings of Alawites in Homs appear to be based on sectarian identity, driven by the perception that all Alawites were complicit in the Assad regime’s actions.329 SJAC noted that these incidents appear to be geographically concentrated. While similar attacks have been reported in Latakia and Hama, they are most prevalent in certain neighbourhoods of Homs city and nearby areas in Homs governorate. According to SJAC, the perception that Alawites are inherently complicit in the Assad regime’s atrocities seems particularly pronounced in Homs, likely due to the city’s distinct conflict history during which thousands of Sunni civilians were displaced from Homs following human rights violations, including several massacres, some of which were reportedly carried out by Alawite neighbours.330

Despite the presence of security forces in Homs city, including GSS checkpoints at the city's entrances, the attacks on civilians continued according to SJAC. Some civilians have accused the authorities of condoning or even facilitating the murders.331

Since early 2025, dozens of Alawite men and women particularly from Homs have reportedly been abducted near their homes or workplaces by unidentified perpetrators, with their bodies discovered days later bearing gunshot wounds.332 SOHR documented the kidnapping of 50 Alawite women by unidentified actors between the beginning of January and April 2025. Most incidents occurred in Homs, Tartous, Latakia, and Hama governorates.333 An investigation by Le Monde reported that some of the abducted women who were released had been beaten, insulted and may have suffered sexual violence at the hands of their captors. Some members of the Alawite community claimed that the women were kidnapped for marriage by Islamist factions and foreigners located in Idlib governorate.334 In April, the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir O. Pedersen, ‘raised concerns over reports of women and girls being abducted’ in Syria without providing additional details.335

Under the Assad government, more than 80 % of Alawites worked for the state.336 They received preferential military and security positions,337 constituted the bulk of the army and intelligence officer corps and occupied most senior government posts as well as the top and executive roles in state-owned industries.338 During the civil war, wives and children of killed Alawite soldiers received public jobs as compensation for their losses.339 Many had been hired as ‘relatives of martyrs’, part of a practice of the Assad government that offered state jobs as compensation to families of fallen soldiers and security personnel, often without actual administrative need.340 According to a STJ report, in 2024 there were around 2 800 contracts for spouses and children of ‘martyrs’. By the end of 2021, around 18 000 demobilised members of the army and security forces were appointed to public sector jobs following special recruitment competitions.341

While widespread public-sector layoffs have impacted the broader population, the dismissal of around half a million security sector employees342 has disproportionately affected the Alawite community,343 reflecting according to sources both targeted sectarian measures and their overrepresentation in government employment under Assad.344

The interim government reportedly dismissed an unspecified number of public-sector workers mainly women in teaching roles, particularly Alawites due to their marriages to security personnel associated with the Assad government. Alawites were overrepresented in teaching jobs.345 According to International Crisis Group, the spouses were perceived by the authorities as guilty or unreliable by association.346

Sources interviewed by Reuters assessed that security forces affiliated with the interim government have evicted hundreds to potentially thousands of people, mostly Alawites, from their homes. While many evictions targeted former public sector workers who lost their right to government housing after dismissal, hundreds of Alawite families were reportedly forced out of privately owned homes solely due to their sectarian identity.347 According to an investigation by the Economist, Alawites who were evicted from their houses in Damascus lived in accommodation reserved by the Assad government through the MoD for families of members of the armed forces.348

STJ documented the eviction and property seizure of at least 16 families, mostly Alawite, in a residential complex originally designated for army and police officers of the former Assad government in Rural Damascus. Armed groups affiliated with the interim government reportedly carried out arbitrary arrests and forcibly evicted the residents. In some cases, members of these armed groups and their families were allegedly installed in the vacated homes.349 In May, UNHCR stated that the authorities have reportedly confiscated land belonging to mostly Alawite population in 12 villages in rural Hama governorate despite them having ownership. This has led to the displacement of approximately 2 000 families.350

According to senior GSS officials cited by Reuters, the new authorities established two committees to manage properties linked to individuals perceived as affiliated with the former regime, one overseeing confiscations and the other handling complaints.351

For detailed information on the situation of Alawites before March 2025, see section 1.3.2. of the EUAA COI Report Syria: Country Focus (March 2025).