5.8.7. Hasaka governorate

Hasaka governorate is divided into four administrative districts, namely Al-Hasaka (or Al-Hasakeh), Al-Malikeyyeh, Qamishli and Ras Al-Ain, which are further divided into a total of 16 sub-districts.1221 Its capital is the city of Hasaka.1222 As of March 2025, IOM estimated the governorate’s population at 1 329 876, including residents, IDPs, and returnees from abroad,  and the WHO estimated it at 1 447 069 as of March 2025.  For further background information on Hasaka governorate, see section 2.7.1. of the EUAA COI Report Syria – Security Situation (October 2024).

As of late May 2025, Hasaka governorate was mapped by the ISW and CTP as being almost entirely under the control of the SDF. However, there was one area in the north-west of the governorate, bordering Türkiye, where the SNA, which together with other armed factions has formally come under the control of the MoD1225 (see section 1.3.2 (a) of this report for information on the integration process of the SNA into the new Syrian army), appeared to be in control1226 and where several Turkish military posts were present.1227 In March 2025, the GPC reported that the transitional government and SNA groups dominated most of northern Syria, while the SDF retained parts of the country’s northeast.1228 On 10 March 2025, the SDF and the transitional government signed an agreement regarding the integration of the SDF forces into the new Syrian army (see section 5.1.1).1229 However, as of early June the integration of SDF into the Syrian state military was still unresolved.1230 Depending on the source consulted, the US military, also maintained from four1231 to seven bases in the governorate in the reference period.1232 Sources reported that US forces moved military vehicles and troops from other governorates towards Hasaka governorate in April 2025.1233 Furthermore, in late April, the U.S. began withdrawing infrastructure and equipment from Al-Shaddadi base in Hasaka governorate.1234 According to an Enab Baladi article, in late April, US military vehicles and equipment were moved from Hasaka governorate towards Iraq.1235

The existence of ISIL cells was reported during the reference period in the governorate,1236 including in SDF-held prison camps in the governorate, such as Al-Hol,1237 where thousands of families of ISIL fighters live.1238 Other non-state armed groups whose emergence was reported in the reference period in the governorate include the Free Hasaka Force and the Ahrar Al-Jazeera Brigade. Such emerging localised groups reportedly appeared to aim to undermine the SDF in Hasaka governorate.1239

With reference to Syrian media, ISW and CTP reported in mid-April 2025 that Russian forces remained stationed at three Syrian military bases, including ‘a likely small contingent’ which remained at a base in Qamishli.1240 For further information on territorial control and main armed actors in the period between November 2024 and February 2025, see section 4. of the EUAA COI Report Syria – Country Focus (March 2025).

Sources reported SDF arrest campaigns in Hasaka governorate against civilians in the reference period.1241 While the reason for arrest campaigns in the first days of March 20251242 and in mid-May 2025 reportedly remained unclear,1243 another arrest campaign in mid-March took place amid escalating tensions in eastern Syria after the signing of the March 2025 agreement. This campaign reportedly targeted individuals who showed support for the transitional government.1244

SOHR1245 reported incidents of civilians being shot and killed by unidentified armed men in the reference period.1246

Sources further reported that Türkiye and the Turkish-backed SNA resumed attacks on SDF positions in north-eastern Syria despite the above-mentioned March 2025 ceasefire agreement, including in Hasaka governorate.1247 As of mid-March 2025, Türkiye had conducted aerial attacks on SDF positions in several Syrian governorates, including in Hasaka, on an almost daily basis since December 2024.1248 In a March 2025 report, GPC noted that active conflict risk in north-eastern Syria, including in Hasaka governorate, continued ‘more than elsewhere’ in the country due to clashes between the SDF and the HTS/SNA.1249 Please see section 1.3.2 (a) of this report for information on the integration process of the SNA into the new Syrian army.

Sources reported that Hasaka governorate was affected by ISIL insurgent activity in the reference period,1250 including attacks on SDF targets in April 2025.1251 In early April 2025, SDF had warned of a possible ISIL resurgence in the camps Al-Hol and Roj holding family members of ISIL fighters.1252 According to an article by Hawar News, intelligence information confirmed ISIL movements and sleeper cell activity inside Al-Hol camp and in its surroundings.1253 In response to ISIL activity, the SDF, supported by US-led International Coalition forces, carried out raids against ISIL cells and detentions of alleged ISIL members in the reference period in north-eastern Syria, including in Hasaka governorate.1254 During a raid on the camp Roj in early April, 16 ISIL members, who were tasked with recruitment and smuggling of families from the camp, were reportedly arrested.1255 For further information on security trends in the period between November 2024 and February 2025, see section 4. of the EUAA COI Report Syria – Country Focus (March 2025).

Between 9 December 2024 and 31 May 2025, ACLED recorded 453 security incidents in Hasaka governorate (see Figure 21). For the period between 1 March 2025 and 31 May 2025, ACLED recorded 113 security incidents (defined as battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians) in Hasaka governorate. Of these, 69 were coded as incidents of violence against civilians, 28 as explosions/remote violence and 16 as battles. Most of these incidents occurred in March 2025.1256

Figure 21: Evolution of security events coded ‘battles’, ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘violence against civilians’ in Hasaka governorate between 9 December 2024 and 31 May 2025, based on ACLED data.1257

During the reference period, security incidents were recorded by ACLED in all four districts of the governorate, with the highest number documented in the district of Al-Hasaka (71 incidents), followed by Qamishli (19 incidents). By comparison, the fewest incidents were recorded in Ras Al-Ain district (8 incidents). According to ACLED data, the SDF were the main actor involved in around 55 % of all recorded security incidents (coded as either ‘Actor1’ or ‘Actor2’) during the reference period, particularly in incidents coded as violence against civilians involving detentions of civilians. Unidentified armed groups were involved in 18 % of all security incidents, particularly in incidents coded as explosions/remote violence caused by landmines or IEDs affecting civilians, or as violence against civilians involving shootings leading to casualties. Military Forces of Türkiye were involved in around 13 % of all security incidents, particularly in incidents coded as explosions/remote violence involving shelling, artillery strikes or missile attacks. The majority of these incidents occurred on 17 March 2025. Military forces of Syria were involved in 7 % of all security incidents coded either as explosions/remote violence or as battles, while ISIL was involved in around four percent of all security incidents, all of which (five incidents) were coded as battles involving the SDF.1258

In March 2025, the SNHR recorded no civilian fatalities in Hasaka governorate.1259 In April1260 and May 2025, SNHR recorded one civilian fatality in each month.1261 For the period between March and May 2025, UCDP recorded 12 civilian fatalities in Hasaka governorate.1262

After being impacted by conflict, the Alouk Water Station, located east of Ras Al-Ain city and the only source of drinking water for Hasaka city and its surroundings, which had been out of function since June 2023,1263 reportedly remained out of function as of May 2025.1264

According to a March 2025 GPC report, IDPs returning to north-eastern Syrian governorates, including Hasaka, faced extensive explosive ordnance contamination.1265 UNOCHA reported in May 2025 that UXOs, ERWs, mines and IEDs are ‘reportedly widespread and affect residential areas, farmland, infrastructure, and key access routes’ particularly in a handful of Syrian governorates, including in Hasaka.1266 Detonations of unexploded ordnance caused civilian deaths and injuries in north-eastern Hasaka,1267 in northern Hasaka,1268 in central Hasaka1269 and in southern rural Hasaka.1270 GPC noted that the majority of unexploded ordnance accidents since December 2024 in several governorates, including in Hasaka, had occurred ‘in agricultural settings as people were trying to cultivate land or graze animals’.1271

According to UNHCR estimates, as of 12 June 2025, there were 352 763 IDPs living in the governorate and 1 795 individuals who had returned to areas of the governorate from internal displacement since 27 November 2024.1272

UNHCR further estimated that a total 7 093 returnees who had returned from abroad since the beginning of 2024 were living in the governorate by 15 May 2025, with the vast majority (5 160) returning to Hasaka district, followed by Qamishli (1 520). Since 8 December 2024, 5 206 individuals had returned to Hasaka governorate from abroad.1273