(b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per governorate

Aleppo governorate remains fragmented in terms of territorial control. As of late May 2025, the southwestern region bordering Idlib was under the control of the Transitional Government, while a small pocket west of Aleppo city remained under pro-Assad remnants. The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), now formally under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), controls parts of the northwestern and northern areas bordering Türkiye. The SDF holds the northeastern and eastern parts, although areas near the Khafsah Water Treatment Plant and west of Jirah Air Base are contested between the SDF and SNA, with both sides conducting operations without full control.

Following the 10 March 2025 agreement between the SDF and the Transitional Government, Kurdish forces reportedly reduced their presence in Aleppo city, and pro-Turkish groups scaled back in Afrin district. Non-state armed groups such as ISIL and Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah, a Sunni sectarian group targeting Alawites, were also active during the reference period.

Clashes between the SDF and SNA declined significantly after the March agreement, although Turkish aerial attacks continued until mid-March. Tensions and clashes between the SDF and the transitional government were reported, mostly in the countryside of Aleppo governorate. Sporadic violence persisted, including attacks by Saraya Ansar Al-Sunnah, killings by unidentified armed men, kidnappings, and raids.

ACLED recorded 1048 security incidents (average of 42.4 security incidents per week) in Aleppo governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of explosions/remote violence, that peaked in January and February 2025, following a downwards trend the following months. The number of battles that had been reported consistently in the previous months, followed a similar trend. The number of incidents of violence against civilians slightly declined in February and March, rising again in April and May. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025,187 security incidents were recorded in Aleppo representing an average of 10.8 security incident per week. The districts of Ain Al-Arab, Jebel Saman, and Manbij saw the highest incident rates. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 1235 security incidents, representing an average of 29.4 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 444 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 9 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 21 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented less than 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 465 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 9 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

UNHCR estimated 1 545 049 IDPs and 467 198 returnees from internal displacement as of June 2025. Additionally, 197 265 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, with most settling in Jebel Saman, Al-Bab, and Menbij. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 1 596 832 IDPs and 740 365 recent returns. Additionally, 159 450 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024. This makes Aleppo the governorate with the most IDPs returnees in Syria. 

Over 400 000 people in Menbij and Ain Al-Arab were affected by water and electricity shortages due to the Tishreen Dam failure. Unexploded ordnance (UXOs), explosive remnants of war (ERWs), mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are reportedly widespread and affect residential areas, farmland, infrastructure, and key access routes, particularly in Aleppo governorate.

Following the agreement between the Transitional Government and the SDF, the security situation in the governorate Aleppo has improved with security incidents steadily declining. While the total number of security incidents is the highest of all governorates, the average of civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants is comparatively low due to the large population of the governorate and the number of fatalities is sharply declining since March 2025. Also taking into consideration the high number of IDP returns and returns from abroad, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Aleppo, however not at a high level.

Dar’a governorate is largely under governmental control, with limited areas in the east held by unidentified opposition groups and a small southwestern stretch under the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), adjacent to the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. Despite the formal transfer of security responsibilities from the Eighth Brigade to governmental forces, effective control remains fragmented due to widespread armament and the continued presence of armed groups.

The reporting period saw revenge assassinations, sectarian killings, and attacks on General Security Service (GSS) personnel and civilians by unidentified gunmen. Tribal and familial disputes further contributed to instability. Israeli airstrikes and ground incursions were reported, causing casualties, including in Dar’a city. The roads linking Dar’a and Sweida governorates have seen a sharp increase in armed attacks, kidnappings, and robberies.

ACLED recorded 219 security incidents (average of 8.9 security incidents per week) in Dar’a governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of explosions/remote violence, that were almost steadily recorded throughout this period, with a decline in May. There was a reported increase in incidents of violence against civilians following March in comparison with the previous three months. Incidents of battles were reported throughout this period, and peaked in April, decreasing slightly in May.  In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 150 security incidents were recorded in Dar’a representing an average of 8.7 security incident per week.  From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED 369 security incidents, representing an average of 8.8 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 118 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 9 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June –September 2025, the SNHR recorded 50 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 4 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 168 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 13 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

UNHCR estimated 66 480 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 24 122 returnees from internal displacement as of June 2025. Additionally, 71 498 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, with most settling in Dar’a (42 422) and Izra’ (22 915) districts. Since December 2024, 43 822 individuals returned from abroad to the governorate. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 52 621 IDPs and 39 874 recent returns. Additionally, 93 339 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Civilians face ongoing risks from unexploded remnants of war, particularly in unsecured military sites and rural/agricultural areas. These hazards continue to cause casualties and restrict access to essential services and livelihoods. 

Given that the security situation in the governorate Dar’a has improved with security incidents steadily declining after a peak in March and April 2025, and the average of civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants declining and being comparatively low, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Dar’a, however not at a high level.

The northern and northeastern regions of Deir Ez-Zor are under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Euphrates River corridor, stretching from Raqqa’s western border to Iraq’s southeastern border, is largely held by the transitional government, though pro-Assad elements maintain a presence in pockets such as Al-Mayadin and Abu Kamal. Areas like Bushayrah and the vicinity of the Tanak/Omar oil fields remain contested between the SDF and transitional authorities. A central-western strip from Deir Ez-Zor city to Homs is also under transitional government control, while southern and western desert zones are classified as ‘Lost Regime Territory’. In August 2025, as political tensions escalated between the transitional government and the SDF, several Arab tribal leaders announced mobilisation efforts and publicly demanded armed action against the SDF. Nevertheless, these tribes remained fragmented, with certain tribal factions maintaining their cooperation with the SDF. From early September 2025 onward, confrontations between the SDF and Transitional Government forces have intensified.

The US-led International Coalition remains active but has scaled down operations since April 2025. The SDF reinforced its positions in May following partial US troop withdrawals and base closures, including Green Village and Euphrates. Intelligence on Iranian-linked armed groups near the Iraqi border reportedly delayed a full US exit.

ISIL cells continue to operate in the governorate. The SDF has conducted raids targeting transitional government sympathisers, defectors, and others. The General Security Service (GSS) has arrested remnants of the Assad regime and individuals linked to Iranian-backed groups. ISIL attacks persist against civilians, SDF, and transitional forces, prompting curfews and security operations. Unidentified armed groups have also targeted civilians and security personnel.

ACLED recorded 638 security incidents (average of 25.8 security incidents per week) in Deir-Ez-Zor governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. The incidents of violence against civilians were almost consistently recorded throughout this period, with a decline in December and a peak in January 2025. Battles were also almost consistently reported throughout this period. Incidents of explosions/remote violence were also steady throughout these months, with only some decline during May 2025. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 332 security incidents were recorded in Deir-Ez-Zor representing an average of 19.2 security incidents per week. According to ACLED data, most battles involved clashes between SDF and ISIL, SDF and unidentified armed groups, and SDF and tribal militias. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 970 security incidents, representing an average of 23.1 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 113 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 8 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June –  September 2025, the SNHR recorded 19 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 – September 2025, SNHR recorded 132 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 9 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Security incidents occurred across all districts, with Deir Ez-Zor being the most affected district. As of June 2025, UNHCR reported 192 946 IDPs and 46 557 recent returnees. Explosive ordnance contamination remains a major concern. Additionally, 40 105 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, mostly to Deir Ez-Zor and Al-Mayadin. The governorate faces widespread threats from UXOs, ERWs, mines, and IEDs impacting civilian infrastructure and mobility. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 119 399 IDPs and 82 245 recent returns. Additionally, 21 320 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Given these indicators, including the intensity and frequency of security incidents, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Deir Ez-Zor, however not at a high level. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the presence of multiple armed actors, tensions between the SDF and the Transitional Government, sectarian tensions, and ongoing violence—including targeted attacks and war remnants—contribute to a highly volatile security environment in Deir Ez-Zor governorate.

Hama governorate is largely under the control of the transitional government, though effective governance remains challenged by the presence of non-state armed groups. These include Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah, targeting former Assad affiliates, and pro-Assad factions such as the Coastal Shield Forces, involved in the March 2025 attacks. A small area bordering eastern Homs is designated as ‘Lost Regime Territory’. The Syrian Army’s 62nd Division, led by Abu Amsha, was also active in the governorate as of May 2025. Israeli airstrikes targeted military infrastructure, including the 47th Brigade headquarters and Hama’s military airport, causing civilian and military casualties. 

In early March, pro-Assad groups launched attacks against transitional forces, prompting retaliatory operations marked by sectarian violence. These included extrajudicial killings, mass arrests of adult males, and the burning of homes, particularly in Alawite communities. Despite the General Security Forces securing Hama city, rural areas remained unstable. Sporadic violent incidents such as killings, kidnappings and abductions, mainly targeting Alawites, continued and contributed to a sense of persecution and eroded public trust.

ACLED recorded 229 security incidents (average of 9.3 security incidents per week) in Hama governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of violence against civilians, that peaked in January and March; they persisted however throughout the whole period. Explosions/remote violence were also reported consistently, with only a slight decrease in March and May. Incidents of battles were also recorded almost steadily, with a slight peak in February and a decline in May. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 119 security incidents were recorded in Hama representing an average of 6.9 security incidents per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 348 security incidents, representing an average of 8.3 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 336 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 20 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 87 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 5 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 423 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 25 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Security incidents were recorded across all five districts, with Hama district most affected. UNHCR estimated 212 243 IDPs and 181 567 returnees from internal displacement as of June 2025. Additionally, 61 215 (15)  individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, with most settling in Hama and As-Salamiyeh districts. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 194 395 IDPs and 300 481 recent returns. Additionally, 84 566 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Land seizures in northeastern rural Hama displaced around 2 000 families, mostly Alawite. War remnants continue to cause civilian casualties, particularly in farming areas. The March violence also led to infrastructure damage and destruction of agricultural assets, affecting livelihoods of returning populations. 

Given that most civilian fatalities were recorded during the March 2025 events, with the number of civilian fatalities steadily declining afterwards, and the number of security incidents sharply declining after reaching a peak in December 2024, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Hama, however not at a high level.

Hasaka governorate is predominantly under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the exception of a northwestern area bordering Türkiye, where the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and affiliated factions under the transitional administration’s Ministry of Defence maintain control. Turkish military posts are also present in this zone. ISIL cells remain active, particularly within SDF-held detention facilities such as Al-Hol. Localised non-state armed groups reportedly aim to undermine SDF authority.

The US military maintains bases in the governorate, though some infrastructure has been withdrawn toward Iraq. A small Russian contingent remains stationed in Qamishli.

Security dynamics include SDF-led arrest campaigns, some targeting civilians for unclear reasons or alleged support for the transitional government. Despite the March 2025 ceasefire, Türkiye and the SNA resumed attacks on SDF positions. In August 2025, as political tensions escalated between the transitional government and the SDF, several Arab tribal leaders announced mobilisation efforts and publicly demanded armed action against the SDF. Nevertheless, these tribes remained fragmented, with certain tribal factions maintaining their cooperation with the SDF. From early September 2025 onward, confrontations between the SDF and Transitional Government forces have intensified. ISIL insurgent activity persists, prompting SDF and US-led coalition raids and detentions.

ACLED recorded 453 security incidents (average of 18.3 security incidents per week) in Hasaka governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of explosions/remote violence, that peaked in January 2025 and decreased almost steadily afterwards. Incidents of battles and violence against civilians peaked in January 2025, however, they were almost steadily reported during this period. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 110 security incidents were recorded in Hasaka representing an average of 6.4 security incidents per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 563 security incidents, representing an average of 13.4 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 9 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June –September2025, the SNHR recorded 3 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented less than one civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 12 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Security incidents occurred across all four districts, with Al-Hasaka district most affected (71 incidents), followed by Qamishli (19). Ras Al-Ain recorded the fewest (8).

UNHCR estimated 352 763 IDPs and 1 795 returnees from internal displacement as of June 2025. Additionally, 7 093 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, mostly to Hasaka and Qamishli districts. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 376 204 IDPs and 2 857 recent returns. Additionally, 11 022 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

The Alouk Water Station remains non-functional, affecting water access in Hasaka city. Unexploded ordnance (UXOs), explosive remnants of war (ERWs), mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are widespread and affect residential areas, infrastructure, and key access routes, and in particularly in agricultural areas during routine activities such as farming and grazing.

Even though there is a high contamination of remnants of war affecting residential areas and farmlands, the number of security incidents is steadily decreasing over several months and the number of civilian fatalities is low. Therefore, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Hasaka, however not at a high level.

Homs governorate remains affected by a complex and volatile security environment involving multiple armed actors. The western part of the governorate and the corridor linking it to Deir Ez-Zor are under the control of governmental forces. Adjacent to the Al Tanf Deconfliction Zone, areas are held by unidentified opposition groups. Pro-Assad insurgents maintain a presence near Homs city.

In early March 2025, hostilities originating in the coastal region between pro-Assad groups and security forces extended into Homs, prompting widespread raids and house burnings by transitional forces in rural areas. While the General Security Service (GSS) has consolidated control over central cities like Damascus, it faces persistent challenges in Homs city and its countryside. Sectarian violence, particularly targeting Alawites and other religious minorities, has undermined trust in the new authorities. These attacks—often carried out by unidentified gunmen on motorcycles—led to a surge in killings in April 2025, prompting the deployment of GSS forces and a reported decline in violence after mid-May 2025. However, sporadic violent incidents, such as killings, kidnappings, and infringements on individual liberties, have persisted.

Explosive remnants of war (ERWs), landmines, and other ordnance continue to pose significant risks, especially near Palmyra and eastern rural Homs. Between 27 November 2024 and 14 March 2025, Homs was among the governorates with the highest number of incidents involving war remnants.

ACLED recorded 379 security incidents (average of 15.3 security incidents per week) in Homs governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of violence against civilians, that were steadily reported throughout this period, even following March 2025. Incidents of explosions/remote violence were almost steadily reported, with a peak in March. Incidents of battles were reported throughout this period, with a peak in February and declining afterwards. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 134security incidents were recorded in Homs representing an average of 7.7 security incidents per week. Most security incidents recorded by ACLED during 1 June – 26 September 2025 were coded ‘violence against civilians’ and were mainly attributed to unidentified actors who were involved in killings and abductions of Alawites and of persons perceived to be associated with the Assad regime.  From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 513 security incidents, representing an average of 12.2 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 203 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 14 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 75 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 5 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 278 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 19 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

As of 12 June 2025, UNHCR estimated 283 779 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Homs, with 65 843 individuals returning from abroad since December 2024, many to areas still affected by insecurity and contamination. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 221 895 IDPs and 260 710 recent returns. Additionally, 128 531 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024. 

The governorate of Homs has seen a steady and clear decline in the number of security incidents. The number of fatalities has also gone down, although the numbers are still relatively high in comparison to other governorates. As most of the violence against civilians appears to be of targeted nature, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Homs, however not at a high level.

Idlib governorate is almost entirely under the control of the Transitional Government, though its forces remain fragmented. Dominant actors include Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and armed factions within the Syrian National Army (SNA). Reports also indicate the presence of foreign jihadists. Pockets in the southern and western border areas are marked by a ‘Pro-Regime Insurgent Presence’.

In March 2025, Transitional Government forces launched security operations and established checkpoints to reinforce control. The Harmoon Center described Idlib as “relatively stable” compared to other governorates, with new security forces maintaining firm control despite occasional external threats. Pro-Assad insurgents carried out attacks against governmental forces, prompting retaliatory operations targeting regime loyalists and collaborators. By mid-April, authorities reportedly improved relations with the local population and initiated local recruitment.

ACLED recorded 136 security incidents (average of 5.5 security incidents per week) in Idlib governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of explosions/ remote violence, which were steadily reported throughout this period. They peaked in January 2025, slightly declining the following months. After a peak in February, the number of recorded battles followed a similar trend. The number of incidents of violence against civilians remained steady throughout this period, with a decrease recorded in December and March compared to other months. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 52 security incidents were recorded in Idlib representing an average of 3 security incident per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 188 security incidents, representing an average of 4.5 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 170 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 6 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 33 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 203 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 7 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Security incidents were recorded across all five districts, with Al Ma’ra district most affected (33 incidents), followed by Idlib district (16). Ariha and Harim districts saw the fewest incidents.

UNHCR estimated 1 208 927 IDPs living in camps and 753 696 outside camps as of June 2025. Additionally, 175 161 individuals returned from internal displacement since November 2024, and 87 646 from abroad since early 2024—most to Idlib and Harim districts. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 2 132 759 IDPs and 732 359 recent returns. Additionally, 134 436 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Unexploded ordnance (UXOs), explosive remnants of war (ERWs), mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are reportedly widespread and affect residential areas, farmland, infrastructure, and key access routes, particularly in Idlib governorate.

Landmines and war remnants continue to pose serious risks. A single clinic treated 500 victims between December and May. Rural areas and former frontlines are particularly affected, with incidents involving children and farmers. A March 2025 survey found that 95% of IDPs planning to return to frontline districts in Idlib and Hama reported their homes were severely damaged or destroyed.

Given the control of the Transitional Government over the whole governorate, the steady decline of both the number of security incidents and the number of civilian fatalities, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Idlib, however not at a high level.

Latakia governorate is formally under the control of the Transitional Government, though pro-Assad remnants maintain a presence in several pockets. The governorate hosts multiple armed formations, including the 400th Division (ex-HTS), the Coastal Division (ex- National Liberation Front (NLF)), and the newly formed 56th Reserve Division. Following the March 2025 uprising, additional forces—including MOA, General Security, HTS, SNA, and non-official fighters—were deployed to Latakia city and Jablah. Assad loyalist insurgents and a Sunni sectarian group targeting Alawites also operate in the region.

During the March 2025 uprising, pro-Assad fighters launched coordinated attacks across Latakia, Jablah, Al-Qardaha, and rural areas. Although governmental forces regained control of urban centres by early April, targeted raids and sporadic attacks persisted into late May. Sectarian violence, including execution-style killings and retaliatory attacks, was reported in Latakia city, Saqoubin, and Masaytara. Civilians were also affected by kidnappings, disappearances, and violence attributed to factions nominally affiliated with security forces. Israeli airstrikes targeted security infrastructure throughout the governorate.

ACLED recorded 246 security incidents (average of 10 security incidents per week) in Latakia governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of violence against civilians, with a sharp increase noted in March 2025. Incidents of violence against civilians persisted throughout this period. Incidents of explosions/remote violence were almost steadily reported, with only a slight decrease in March and May. Incidents of battles were also recorded, with a peak noted in March and a declining trend afterwards. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 41 security incidents were recorded in Latakia representing an average of 2.4 security incidents per week. Most security incidents recorded by ACLED during 1 June – 26 September 2025 were coded ‘violence against civilians’ and involved unidentified armed groups and civilians, and Transitional Government forces and civilians, the latter particularly in the context of security operations against Assad remnants. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 287 security incidents, representing an average of 6.8 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 631 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 43 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 21 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 652 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 45 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Latakia accounted for 36% of all civilian fatalities recorded across Syria in that month.

Security incidents occurred in all four districts, with Latakia district most affected. UNHCR estimated 447 179 IDPs and 25 005 recent returnees as of June 2025. The March 2025 hostilities displaced 51 000 people across Latakia and Tartous, including 6 000 to Lebanon. An additional 18 544 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 449 619 IDPs and 41 283 recent returns. Additionally, 21 198 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

The conflict caused extensive damage to homes, schools, and hospitals, particularly in Alawite-majority areas. Fires—some reportedly set by MoD-affiliated individuals and insurgents—affected civilian properties and forested areas. Latakia was among the governorates most impacted by war remnants, with UXO detonations causing civilian casualties in Latakia city and countryside. 

Given the significant decline of both the number of security incidents and the number of civilian fatalities after their peak in March 2025 due to sectarian violence and considering the number of civilian fatalities in unspecified locations on the coast, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Latakia, however not at a high level.

Quneitra governorate, with a population estimated between 111 706 and 149 374, remains divided in terms of territorial control. The Israeli-controlled Golan Heights covers approximately two-thirds of the governorate. As of May 2025, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) controlled additional stretches east of this zone, including the area around Quneitra city. The remaining eastern territory is under the control of the Transitional Government.

Israeli forces conducted aerial and mortar strikes targeting military sites and units across the governorate, alongside regular ground incursions into southwestern Syria. According to UNOCHA, in Quneitra, Israeli actions including targeting civilians, killing livestock, and bulldozing farms, posed significant risks to civilian lives and agricultural land, and have raised concerns among the population.

ACLED recorded 34 security incidents (average of 1.4 security incidents per week) in Quneitra governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. The majority of these incidents were explosions, that were recorded throughout this period and peaked in May. Cases of violence against civilians also followed an almost steady pattern, slightly rising in May. Two incidents of battles were reported throughout this period, one in January and one in April respectively. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 50 security incidents were recorded in Quneitra representing an average of 2.9 security incidents per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 84 security incidents, representing an average of 2 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 2 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 2 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September2025, the SNHR recorded 0 civilian fatality. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 0 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 2 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 2 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

All recorded incidents occurred in Quneitra district; no incidents were reported in Al-Fiq district.
UNHCR reported 794 individuals had returned from internal displacement and 2 880 from abroad as of June 2025. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 3 124 IDPs and 1 278 recent returns. Additionally, 12 039 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Despite the risks to civilian lives posed by the Israel Defense Forces actions, both the number of the security incidents and the number of the civilian fatalities are low. Therefore, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Quneitra, however not at a high level.

Raqqa governorate is divided among three main actors: the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the central areas, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)—formally integrated into the Ministry of Defence—holds most of the north, and the transitional government controls the south. ISIL cells remain active in the governorate.

From December 2024 to mid-March 2025, Türkiye conducted near-daily airstrikes on SDF positions, including in Raqqa. These attacks declined following the 10 March agreement between the transitional government and the SDF, which also led to reduced confrontations between the SDF and SNA. Despite this, the SDF continued raids and detention campaigns, including targeting relatives of defectors. Joint operations with US-led coalition forces were carried out against ISIL cells.

ACLED recorded 426 security incidents (average of 17.2 security incidents per week) in Raqqa governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of explosions/remote violence, that peaked in January 2025 and sharply decreased following March. Incidents of violence against civilians were almost steadily reported throughout this period. Battles were also reported throughout this period, with a decrease noted after March. Α higher number of battles was recorded in May in comparison to the two previous months. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 127 security incidents were recorded in Raqqa representing an average of 7.3 security incidents per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 553 security incidents, representing an average of 13.2 incidents per week.

In Raqqa and Hasaka governorates, most incidents coded ‘battles’ by ACLED during 1 June –26 September 2025 involved clashes between SDF and ISIL and between SDF and unidentified armed groups, whereas most incidents coded ‘violence against civilians’ involved SDF and civilians, usually suspected of being ISIL affiliates. 

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 42 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 5 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 11 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 53 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 6 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Security incidents were most frequent in Raqqa district. UNHCR reported 4 616 returnees from internal displacement and 16 565 from abroad as of June 2025. In March, 20 000 people were displaced due to clashes near the Tishreen Dam in Aleppo governorate. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 280 505 IDPs and 6 860 recent returns. Additionally, 18 724 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

The Tishreen Dam has remained inoperable since December 2024 due to fighting, severely affecting water access for thousands of families in Raqqa. Additionally, unexploded ordnance (UXOs), explosive remnants of war (ERWs), mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are reportedly widespread and affect residential areas, farmland, infrastructure, and key access routes, particularly in Raqqa governorate.

Given the impact of the March 2025 agreement on the security situation reflected in the low number of civilian fatalities in comparison with the number prior to the said agreement, the pattern of violence that appears to be mostly targeted, the decline of the number of security incidents after a peak in January and February 2025, and the number of returnees, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Raqqa, however not at a high level.

As of March 2025, population estimates for Rural Damascus governorate ranged between 3.4 and 5.1 million. The security landscape remains complex, with active non-state armed groups including Druze militias such as the Men of Dignity Movement, remnants of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Syrian Popular Resistance, and a radical Salafist group hostile to the transitional government. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also conducted airstrikes in the governorate.

Security incidents frequently involved explosions caused by remnants of war, often planted by unidentified perpetrators. Key actors responsible for incidents included unidentified armed groups, Transitional Government forces, and the Israel Defence Forces. Acts of revenge targeting individuals suspected of ties to the former government persisted, including several killings.

ACLED recorded 173 security incidents (average of 7 security incidents per week) in Rural Damascus governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Incidents of violence against civilians, followed an almost steady pattern throughout this period, with a small decline in December 2024 and April 2025. Explosions/remote violence peaked in December 2024 and were reported almost with a steady pattern for the rest of this period. There was a steady pattern of incidents recorded as battles, with a slight peak in March, and declining the following months.  In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 92 security incidents were recorded in Rural Damascus representing an average of 5.3 security incidents per week. Clashes between Sunni and Druze militias in Jaramana and Sahnaya led to both civilian and militia casualties. April saw kidnappings and armed attacks, and in May, several ISIL suspects were arrested in Western Ghouta.

In Rural Damascus, most security incidents recorded by ACLED during 1 June – 26 September 2025 were coded ‘violence against civilians’ and were mainly attributed to unidentified actors involved in killings of civilians for unknown reasons. This violence appears to be mainly of a targeted nature. Most incidents coded ‘explosions/remote violence’ were attributed to Israeli airstrikes. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 265 security incidents, representing an average of 6.3 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 37 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 16 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented less than one civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 53 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

UNHCR reported 109 779 returnees from internal displacement and 60 135 from abroad as of June 2025. Clashes in early May displaced approximately 15 000 individuals from the governorate. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 932 816 IDPs and 102 301 recent returns. Additionally, 120 889 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Unexploded ordnance (UXOs), explosive remnants of war (ERWs), mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are reportedly widespread and affect residential areas, farmland, infrastructure, and key access routes, particularly in Rural Damascus governorate.

Despite the presence of multiple actors and the complex security situation, both the numbers of security incidents and civilian fatalities are low, the majority of the incidents classified as explosions/remote violence were explosions of remnants of war, and returns are numerous. Therefore, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Rural Damascus, however not at a high level.

Sweida governorate, with a population estimated between 446 048 and 482 982 as of March 2025, presents a highly complex security landscape. Approximately 160 armed groups operate in the governorate, some organised into four distinct operations rooms. These include pro-government factions such as Men of Dignity and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab, as well as groups aligned with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who oppose integration with the transitional administration. While some Druze factions agreed in March to form locally-led security forces under transitional government control, full integration remains limited. A deployment of General Security forces was reported in early May.

Between March and May 2025, armed disputes among residents and sporadic clashes between Druze and Bedouin groups resulted in civilian casualties, particularly in Sweida city and the western countryside. Tensions, though low in intensity, carried sectarian overtones. A series of violent incidents in late April and early May caused both civilian and non-civilian casualties. An Israeli airstrike in Kanaker killed four individuals, while ISIL claimed two IED attacks targeting Ministry of Defence vehicles in the desert zone. Another IED injured six civilians in an ambulance.

In July 2025, violence sharply escalated in Sweida governorate, following intense clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin tribal fighters. Hundreds of casualties were reported among security forces, Druze fighters, and civilians. There were reports of extrajudicial killings, mass displacement and damage to critical infrastructure. Sources assessed that over 1 000 people were killed in the violence including Druze and Bedouin civilians, members of the transitional government’s security forces, local and tribal armed groups.

ACLED recorded 92 security incidents (average of 3.7 security incidents per week) in Sweida in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. The majority of these incidents were cases of explosions/remote violence, that saw a decline in February to April, before peaking in May. Incidents of violence against civilians were reported with an almost consistent pattern throughout this period, with an increase during January and April. Incidents of battles were reported throughout this period, peaking in May.  In the period 1 June – 26  September 2025, 206 security incidents were recorded in Sweida representing an average of 11.9 security incidents per week. Most security incidents were recorded by ACLED in July 2025 and attributed to clashes between Transitional Government forces and Druze militias, as well as between Bedouin and Druze militias. Incidents coded ‘violence against civilians’ mainly involved unidentified armed groups and civilians, and Druze militias and civilians. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 298 security incidents, representing an average of 7.1 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 41 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 8 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 1 020 fatalities, which included armed men as well as civilians, while no further fatalities were registered in August and September. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 211 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 – September 2025, SNHR recorded 1 061 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 220 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

UNHCR reported 792 returnees from internal displacement and 2 246 from abroad as of June 2025. At least one civilian was killed by explosive remnants of war. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 7 184 IDPs and 1 261 recent returns. Additionally, 4 023 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

Despite a peak in the number of security incidents and civilian fatalities in July 2025 in Sweida governorate, the level of violence has diminished in the subsequent months, therefore, it can be concluded, at the time of writing that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Sweida, however not at a high level. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the presence of multiple armed actors, sectarian tensions, and ongoing violence—including targeted attacks and war remnants—contribute to a highly volatile security environment in Sweida governorate.

Tartous governorate is formally under the control of the Transitional Government. However, multiple pockets of pro-Assad armed groups remain active, alongside the Sunni sectarian group Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah. Israeli aerial operations have also been reported during the reference period.

In early March 2025, coordinated attacks by well-armed pro-Assad fighters targeted military and security forces across the coastal region, including Tartous. The resulting security operations were marked by retaliatory and sectarian violence, particularly affecting civilians in Alawite-majority areas. Throughout the reporting period, there were continued reports of sectarian attacks, killings, and other violations by factions nominally affiliated with the military and security forces, as well as kidnappings and killings by unidentified gunmen.

ACLED recorded 140 security incidents (average of 5.7 security incidents per week) in Tartous governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of violence against civilians, with a sharp increase noted in March 2025. Incidents of violence against civilians persisted throughout this period. Incidents of explosions/remote violence were almost steadily reported, although to a more limited extent following December. Incidents of battles were reported throughout this period, with a peak in March and declined afterwards. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 24 security incidents were recorded in Tartous representing an average of 1.4 security incident per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 164 security incidents, representing an average of 3.9 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 363 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately 30 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June –September 2025, the SNHR recorded 8 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 to September 2025, SNHR recorded 371 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 30 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

The districts of Tartous and Banyas recorded the highest number of incidents.

UNHCR estimated 171 273 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 4 286 returnees from internal displacement as of June 2025. Additionally, 7 931 individuals returned from abroad since early 2024, with most settling in Tartous and Banyas districts. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 139 919 IDPs and 5 339 recent returns. Additionally, 7 973 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024.

The escalation of hostilities in March 2025 led to the burning of homes in Alawite villages and damage to civilian infrastructure. These developments, combined with the presence of multiple armed actors and ongoing violations, contribute to a volatile security environment relevant for assessing risk under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

Given the decline of both the number of security incidents and the number of civilian fatalities after their peak in March 2025 due to sectarian violence, and considering the number of civilian fatalities in unspecified locations on the coast, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence takes place in the governorate of Tartous, however not at a high level.

Damascus governorate remains under the control of the Transitional Government and is considered the most stable area in Syria. The strong presence of security forces has contributed to a generally secure environment, with a reduction in checkpoint arrests and a noticeable decline in overall security incidents. However, isolated incidents continue to occur, including kidnappings, armed attacks, and targeted violence. Notably, a suicide bombing at a Greek Orthodox Church on the outskirts of Damascus on 22 June 2025 highlighted ongoing risks. Israeli forces also conducted airstrikes on targets within Damascus city, resulting in civilian casualties, during the reference period.

ACLED recorded 58 security incidents (average of 2.3 security incidents per week) in Damascus governorate in the period from 9 December 2024 to 31 May 2025. Most of these incidents were cases of violence against civilians, which followed a steady pattern throughout this period. The battles, whose number was already low in the previous months, were totally absent in May. Explosions/remote violence peaked in December 2024, declined in the following months, and rose slightly to three incidents in May 2025. In the period 1 June – 26 September 2025, 41 security incidents were recorded in Damascus representing an average of 2.4 security incidents per week. From 9 December 2024 to 26 September 2025, ACLED recorded 99 security incidents, representing an average of 2.4 incidents per week.

Between December 2024 and 31 May 2025, SNHR documented 6 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented approximately less than 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. In June – September 2025, the SNHR recorded 38 civilian fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 2 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for this reference period. For the period December 2024 – September 2025, SNHR recorded 44 fatalities. Compared to the figures for the population as from March 2025, this represented 2 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

UNHCR estimates indicate that, as of 15 May 2025, 589 271 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were residing in Damascus, alongside 5 935 individuals who had returned from internal displacement since 27 November 2024. As of 18 September 2025, UNHCR reported 588 781 IDPs and 11 569 recent returns. Additionally, 170 624 individuals returned from abroad since 8 December 2024. Reports also noted forced evictions of predominantly Alawite families, often linked to the loss of government employment and housing.

Damascus is among the governorates most affected by incidents involving unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war. The destruction of public infrastructure, particularly in areas such as Yarmouk camp, has led to disruptions in electricity, water supply, and essential services.

However, Damascus maintains a relatively secure environment compared to other governorates, even though there are isolated incidents of violence, forced evictions, and the presence of war remnants.

Considering the strong presence of the Transitional Government forces, the continued stability in the area, and the stable low number of security incidents with minimal impact on civilians, it can be concluded that in the governorate of Damascus there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence.