b) Assessment of indiscriminate violence per region

• Actors and territorial control: in Khartoum, the most densely inhabited state in Sudan with a population of 9.4 million, the SAF and the RSF and their allies are the primary warring parties actively confronting to gain control of the areas. Also, international actors are active, notably the Egyptian air force supporting the SAF. Following the offensives, the SAF regained control over most of the three cities, while the RSF remained in control of western and southern parts of Omdurman. See 2. Actors of persecution or serious harm.

• Methods and tactics: explosive weapons and drone attacks have been used by both warring parties, but while the SAF is reported to conduct also air strikes and artillery shelling, the RSF uses asymmetric tactic relying on heavy artillery attacks, acting on the ground through its infantry. Reportedly, civilians continued to be injured and killed in heavy artillery crossfire and due to the use of drone-dropped munitions against persons wearing civilian clothes, airstrikes and shelling during the 2024 SAF’s offensive. The RSF targeted civilian infrastructures (such as markets, medical facilities, and other services) killing and injuring dozens of people in Omdurman. Reportedly, in April 2023, the RSF used the presence of detained civilians in streets and open areas close to buildings as ‘human shields’ to deter SAF airstrikes in Khartoum and Bahri. Additionally, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See 3.9. Women and girls.

• Incidents and fatalities: in the reference period, 52.8 security incidents per week and 103 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in Khartoum state. In 1 075 instances civilians were the primary or only target.

• Displacement: with around 3 500 400 IDPs, Khartoum represents the second most common area of origin for IDPs in Sudan accounting for 31 % of all IDPs in the country. It is reported that despite the ‘mass exodus’ triggered by the conflict, there was still a large number of persons who either could not afford to flee or were unable to do so due to vulnerabilities or insecurity.

• Further impact on civilians: the use of explosive weapons by both the SAF and the RSF with wide area effects in densely populated Khartoum has resulted in large-scale destruction of homes, schools, hospitals, and other vital infrastructure. Reportedly, many indirect cases of deaths resulting from war-factors are not recorded. The healthcare system has been ‘decimated’ due to the conflict with Khartoum being reported as the most affected by attacks to healthcare facilities. Severe food insecurity due to the conflict resulted in deaths for starvation, including among children. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section a) Security situation in Sudan: recent events. Finally, explosive remnants of war were reported in Omdurman and northern Bahri, in the latter the RSF was also accused of planting mines. See also 3.7. Humanitarian and healthcare workers under RS and 4.2.1. Healthcare, humanitarian assistance and socio-economic conditions under SP.

Khartoum state experiences exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence, characterised by intense urban warfare, shifting territorial control, heavy aerial bombardments, and widespread civilian targeting. Both the SAF and the RSF engage in large-scale military operations, including airstrikes, artillery shelling, and drone attacks, leading to severe civilian casualties, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and humanitarian collapse. Given the scale and intensity of the conflict, civilians in Khartoum face a real and immediate risk of serious harm solely due to their mere presence in the area. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: Country Focus 2024, 1.2.2.; Security 2025, 2.1.; COI Update, 2.2., 3.1.1.]

• Actors and territorial control: the Darfur region is mostly controlled by the RSF except for El Fasher state capital, some parts of North Darfur, and Jebel Marra. Nevertheless, territorial control in Darfur remains contested, with various armed actors exerting influence over different areas. The shifting alliances, defections and internal divisions among these actors contribute to the volatile security situation. The RSF, originating from Darfuri Arab groups, hold control over four of the five state capitals, with El Fasher in North Darfur remaining a key battleground where the SAF and allied factions retain a presence. The SLM maintains influence in different areas, with the SLM-AW controlling parts of Jebel Marra and claiming to protect civilians there, while the SLM-MM and the JEM have actively engaged in hostilities against the RSF in North Darfur where SLM-MM exert control over some areas. Some smaller groups composing the Joined Forces or JFASM, together with SLM-MM and JEM also abandoned their neutrality in April 2024.

• Methods and tactics: the ongoing conflict in Darfur is characterized by the use of protracted sieges, indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas and infrastructures (including healthcare facilities), the use of heavy artillery and airstrikes and targeted ethnic violence. Violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) have been documented, particularly concerning the protection of civilians and vulnerable populations. Despite an existing UN arms embargo prohibiting weapons supplies to Darfur, weaponry was transferred into the region and the active participation of other armed groups has heightened risks of serious harm for civilians caught in the crossfire. See 3.1.1. Non-Arabs/Africans from Darfur. Additionally, sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See 3.9. Women and girls.

  Reportedly, the SAF primarily relied on air superiority, employing indiscriminate airstrikes in urban and rural areas, resulting in civilian casualties, damage to infrastructures, and forced displacement. However, shelling against civilians and bombardments of civilian areas and infrastructures (including schools, healthcare facilities markets, IDPs camps) resulting in fatalities and casualties among the civilian population were also reported.

  The RSF employed siege warfare, notably in El Fasher where it trapped over 900 000 civilians under dire conditions, subjecting them  to daily artillery shelling targeting markets and other locations. Also, the RSF engaged in indiscriminate artillery shelling that targeted civilian infrastructures such as markets, hospitals and IDP camps, (notably Abou Shouk, Ardamata and Zamzam) causing the loss of civilian life and damage to infrastructures. The use of suicide drones has been reported as part of the RSF’s military strategy. The above-mentioned tactics have contributed to widespread human rights violations and a deterioration of the security situation.

• Incidents and fatalities: in the reference period, 22.7 security incidents per week and 223 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in Darfur region. In 1 017 07 instances civilians were the primary or only target.
• Displacement: most of the 5 293 048 internally displaced persons originated from Darfur region moved within the respective state. In October 2024, it was reported that about 2.8 million people in and around El Fasher had no option to escape or to access humanitarian assistance.
• Further impact on civilians: attacks against civilian infrastructures caused significant damages, including on health facilities, schools, markets, hospitals, houses and routes. Widespread destruction was reported in the region, where many villages were targeted by fires. The general situation is exacerbated by both the RSF and the SAF limiting the access of humanitarian aid. Children malnutrition and people dying from starvation and diseases were also reported. For example, in Zamzam IDP camp the severely limited humanitarian access is reported to be one of the primary causes of famine. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section a) Security situation in Sudan: recent events.

The Darfur region experiences an exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence characterised by ongoing fighting for territorial control with the use of indiscriminate attacks against civilian areas and infrastructures resulting in the highest number of fatalities and IDPs overall. Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that in the Darfur region, indiscriminate violence reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the region, would, solely on account of their mere presence on its territory, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: Country Focus 2024, 1.2.1.; Security 2025, 1.3., 2.2.; COI Update, 2.2., 3.1.1.]

• Actors and territorial control: territorial control in the region is contested and subjected to rapid developments. As of October 2024, the RSF controlled most areas of the Kordofan region while the SAF remained in control of it military garrisons and strategic cities. Although besieged by the RSF, El Obeid and Kadugli, the capitals of North and South Kordofan states, remained under the control of the SAF during the reference period while heavy fighting took place in and around the cities. The SPLM-N-al-Hilu controlled some territories mainly in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan. The SPLM-N-al-Hilu remained officially neutral until February 2025 when, together with RSF and 22 other smaller rebel movements, and political and civil society groups, they signed an alliance aiming to establish a parallel government in RSF-controlled areas. Before the alliance the SPLM-N-al-Hilu had occasional fights with both sides of the conflict while seeking to gain control of territories.

  Between July and October 2024, the RSF bolstered its hold in West Kordofan with the capture of the state’s capital Al-Fula as well as the towns of Al-Meiram and Wad Banda whereas the disputed cities of Al Nuhud, Babanusa and Lagawa remained under SAF control. In South Kordofan, the SAF benefited from the support of the SPLM-N-al-Hilu to repel RSF attacks on the populous town of Dilling, amid inter-ethnic violence targeting Nuba.

  In the Kordofans, the shifting alliances and internal divisions among the main actors contributed to the volatile security situation, including clashes erupting between the SAF or the RSF and their local allied forces.

• Methods and tactics: clashes and fighting were conducted by the three main actors in the state, each trying to expand their territorial control in the region. The SAF made large use of airstrikes, bombings and artilleries, including against civil areas and civilian infrastructures, such as a crowded markets and resulting in civilian casualties and fatalities. The RSF imposed sieges on entire cities, attacked villages, looting and burning down houses and entire villages, and reportedly perpetrated mass killings of civilians. Kidnapping, forced disappearance and sexual violence against civilians by RSF troops have also been reported, targeting especially Nuba localities and inhabitants in South Kordofan. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See 3.1.2. Nuba from the Kordofans and 3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations and 3.9. Women and girls.

• Incidents and fatalities: in the reference period, 9.8 security incidents per week and 67 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported across all states of the Kordofan region. In 364 instances, civilians were the primary or only target.

• Displacement: 820 379 IDPs were displaced from the Kordofan region as of the March 2025, mainly inside the region itself.

• Further impact on civilians: SAF airstrikes and bombings have damaged or destroyed public infrastructures such as schools, markets, state legislature and civil registries. RSF attacks damaged or destroyed houses and villages. Deaths have been reported as a result of starvation and lack of access to health services, particularly in the Nuba Mountains. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section a) Security situation in Sudan: recent events.

  In the disputed region of Abyei, the situation remained tense as intercommunal clashes continued and accounted for most of the security incidents reported in the region.

  In addition, the local security situation continued to be affected by the conflict in Sudan with an ongoing flow of weapons into the region, the arrival of persons displaced by the fighting and clashes between the SAF and the RSF in border areas. There were also reports of RSF incursions into Abyei territory, mainly in connection with looting incidents.

With regard to the high intensity of the conflict in the three states composing the region, illustrated by the methods employed by the actors, the numbers of security incidents and casualties reported as well as the general impact on civilians, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in the Kordofan region reaches such an exceptionally high level that mere presence on the territory would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: Country Focus 2024, 1.2.4.; Security 2025, 1.3.1., 2.3.; COI Update, 2.2., 3.2.1.]

• Actors and territorial control: the conflict expanded to the Central region in July 2023 with a large-scale offensive by the RSF. Since March 2024, the SAF received the support of the SLM-MM, the JEM, the SPLM-N-Agar. They also relied increasingly on Islamist militia.

  The recent SAF offensive to recapture Al Jazirah state where the RSF controlled 90 % of the state since December 2023 has notably increased the volatility of the security situation of the state. In retaliation to the defection of an RSF commander in October 2024, the RSF troops carried major attacks against more than 30 localities across Al Jazirah, committing mass killings, sexual violence, and looting of markets and homes.

  The RSF seized parts of northern White Nile state while the SAF pulled back into defensive positions further south. Although the frontlines have remained static, the RSF raids on villages have been reported in the state, with the use of hit-and-run tactics, the looting of localities and killing of civilians. Beyond some clashes between the SAF and the SPLM-N in July 2023, Blue Nile beneficiated of relative calm until August 2024, when the RSF began expanding its military attacks. As of November 2024, the RSF reported to have made some advances again in Blue Nile state. In 2024, Sennar state was affected by the offensive of both the RSF that took control of the area in July 2024, and then by the SAF and its allies that between October and December 2024, managed to retake control of most cities in Sennar state, including Sinja.

• Methods and tactics: SAF airstrikes reportedly targeted crowded spaces such as markets in RSF-controlled areas with the aim of disrupting commercial activities and targeting RSF members, as stationary targets are easier to hit than moving forces in the field. However, these attacks led to civilian casualties. The RSF is reported to attack areas and use hit-and-run tactics to raid and loot towns and villages. In addition, sieges by the RSF are also reported. Violence against civilians, including (mass) killings, food supplies poisoning, shootings, tortures, sexual violence and lootings, and shelling of civilian facilities (e.g. markets) were reported during RSF's offensives and in areas under its control. Reportedly, a reason behind the attack might have been retaliation for some village members having taken up arms against the RSF. Sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, particularly by the RSF and allied militias. See 3.4. Members of political parties, unions and civil society organisations and 3.9. Women and girls.

• Incidents and fatalities: in the reference period, 17.6 security incidents per week and 50 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants were reported in the Central region. In 1 070 instances civilians were the primary or only target.

• Displacement: furthermore, 1 570 760 of IDPs were displaced from the Central region, as of the start of March 2025, mainly outside the region.

• Geographical Scope: If security incidents and fatalities were recorded across all states composing the Central region, they have not been equally impacted. Al Jazirah was the most affected state in the region, with about 71 % recorded security incidents, while Sennar accounted for 14 %, White Nile for 11 % and Blue Nile for 3 %. Similarly, 77 % of the IDPs displaced from the region within the reference period originated from Al Jazirah state.

• Further impact on civilians: SAF airstrikes targeting crowded places, such as markets, destroyed public infrastructures. The RSF reportedly engaged in land grabbing and looted and/or damaged and/or attacked essential infrastructures, such as health, water and food facilities as well as irrigation and electrical systems. The damages caused to food production capacities in the region, including through attacks targeting farming infrastructures, is likely to exacerbate food insecurity in other parts of the country. Theft of humanitarian assets, including the looting of essential food supplies from the WFP warehouse were also reported. See the use of food as a weapon of war in Presence, methods and tactics of actors under section a) Security situation in Sudan: recent events.

Al Jazirah state experiences an exceptionally high level of indiscriminate violence due to an ongoing offensive by the SAF.  The volatile situation there resulted in the concentration of most of the security incidents, fatalities and IDPs overall recorded in the Central region. Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that indiscriminate violence in Al Jazirah state reaches such an exceptionally high level that the mere presence on the territory would be considered sufficient in order to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. Accordingly, additional individual elements are not required in order to substantiate subsidiary protection needs under Article 15(c) QD/QR.

[COI reference: Country Focus 2024, 1.2.4.; Security 2025, 1.3.1., 2.3.; COI Update, 2.2., 3.1.1.]