For analytical purposes, the main conflict dynamics in Somalia can be presented in different layers, which can be described as follows:
The Al-Shabaab/anti-Al-Shabaab conflict. According to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC) project,235 the Somali government is a party to a non-international armed conflict with Al-Shabaab.236 Al-Shabaab is designated as a terrorist group by the UK237 and the US.238 The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Federal Member States (FMS), clan militias, as well as other international actors, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, the US, and ATMIS/AUSSOM, are all engaged, although in various degrees and forms, in the conflict against the militant al-Qaeda affiliated organisation.239 During the reference period this was the main conflict driver in the country, with most of the security incidents either perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, or involving various security actors and forces against Al-Shabaab. Overall, more than 75 % of these security events, and more than 80 % of the estimated fatalities that were recorded by ACLED during the reference period of the report, are to be attributed to the (anti-)Al-Shabaab conflict.240 For main developments during the reference period about Al-Shabaab’s control areas and influence see section above 1.2.2 Al-Shabaab control areas, presence, and influence. For details about all other actors, and their armed forces, see main developments during the reference period in the chapter 1.2.3 Updated list of main actors as well as the previous EUAA COI report Somalia: Security Situation (February 2023),241 EASO COI Report Somalia: Security Situation (September 2021),242 and the EASO COI report Somalia: Actors (July 2021).243 For (anti) Al-Shabaab conflict dynamics and their reverberations at regional level, please see the remainder of this report, 2 Regional security situation and trends.
The inter- and intra-clan rivalries. Another major source of conflict that pervades Somali society is constituted by clan rivalries and competitions over political power and scarce resources.244 Various experts agree that the level of clan conflicts, rivalries, and animosity has substantially increased across the country during the past two years.245 According to ACLED data, inter- and intra-clan conflicts in the country caused more than 472 security incidents during the reporting period, resulting in 1 214 estimated fatalities and an unspecified number of casualties.246 The number of estimated fatalities has more than doubled compared to the two preceding years (April 2021 – March 2023), when there were 280 reported incidents resulting in 487 estimated fatalities.247 After the Al-Shabaab conflict, this is the second main conflict driver and source of insecurity in the country.248
For a mapping of the main clan conflicts across Federal Member States in Somalia see the EUAA COI Report Somalia: Country Focus (May 2025).249 For background information on the clan system in Somalia see the EUAA COI Report Somalia: Country Focus (May 2025),250 the EASO COI report Somalia: Actors (July 2021),251 and the EASO COI report Somalia: Targeted profiles (August 2021),252 as well as relevant information in the EUAA COI report Somalia: Security Situation (February 2023),253 and the EASO COI Report Somalia: Security Situation (September 2021).254 For clan conflict dynamics and their reverberations at regional level during the reference period (April 2023 – March 2025), please see the remainder of this report 2 Regional security situation and trends.
The ISIS/anti-ISIS Conflict. Somali security forces - notably Puntland Maritime Police Forces and Puntland Darwish – as well as US military forces, are engaged in armed confrontation with the Islamic State in Somalia. During the reference period, most confrontations and security incidents have taken place in the Bari region, in the Qandala (Al Miskaad), Bossaso, and Iskushuban districts. On various occasions ISIS has also clashed with Al-Shabaab, notably in the Bossaso and Qandala districts. Based on ACLED data, in the reference period ISIS-Somalia was involved in 126 reported security incidents,255 with a spike in the period January-March 2025 - almost 85 % of all events - which resulted in 769 estimated fatalities.256 For an overview about ISIS-Somalia see section 1.2.3 Updated list of main actors. For (anti) ISIS-Somalia conflict dynamics and their reverberation at regional level please see the remainder this report 2 Regional security situation and trends.
SSC-Khatumo versus Somaliland. Among other territorial disputes across Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland contend over control of the Sool and Sanaag regions, which border the two state administrations, as well as the area of Cayn, which basically correspond to the Buhodle district of the Togdheer region.257 Within this broader context, a major conflict erupted in February 2023 between the Somaliland National Army and the SSC-Khatumo forces – Sool, Sanaag and Cayn – mainly constituted by Dhulbahante clan militias,258 which belong to the same Harti/Darood clan family for which Puntland constitutes the core and institutional ‘home’.259 During the first few months, the conflict caused around 5 000 casualties from both sides, including armed forces and civilian fatalities,260 and more 200 000 displaced people.261 With the establishment of an autonomous regional SSC-Khatumo administration,262 later recognised by the FGS,263 the conflict has continued intermittently throughout the entire reference period in various locations in the disputed areas.264 For regional details about this conflict see the remainder of this report, notably section 2.7 Sool, Sanaag and SSC-Khatumo. For background information and additional details see the EUAA COI report Somalia: Security Situation (February 2023),265 and the EASO COI report Somalia: Actors (July 2021).266
Crime. According to the Africa Organised Crime Index, Somalia ranked 13th out of 54 African countries in terms of criminality - a combination of criminal market and criminal actor indicators - at the end of 2023,267 up from 18th in 2021.268 In particular, Somalia has the highest score in Africa and the world (9.50) for extortion and protection racketeering at the hands of non-state armed groups and militias.269 With arms trafficking (9.0) and trafficking in human beings (8.0) also prominent among criminal markets,270 as well as dysfunctional institutions characterised by the highest levels of corruption in the world (1.0),271 confidence in law enforcement institutions is lowest in Somalia (1.5).272 In terms of resilience, defined ‘as the ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activity’,273 the country’s performance remained unvaried during the reference period, exhibiting the lowest score across Africa after Libya,274 similarly to 2021.275 Within this context, Al-Shabaab is not the sole actor responsible for criminal and illicit activities, attacks, targeted killings and executions in Somalia. Such crimes can also be politically and economically motivated or related to other type of conflicts and activities.276 According to the organised crime index, next to mafia-style groups – such as Al-Shabaab –‘criminal networks’ and ‘state embedded actors’ are particularly relevant in Somalia.277 Against this backdrop, youth gangs engaged in violent criminality, notably in Mogadishu, where they are locally known as ciyaal weero,278 are a persistent and long-standing issue.279 For further information on Criminality see section 1.5 Criminality.
Other layers. Other confrontations which are more of a political nature and do not necessarily escalate into armed confrontations include: (1) Tensions between the FGS and the Federal Member States over the establishment of an effective federal system.280 These included, more recently, disputes over electoral issues,281 and related controversial constitutional amendments.282 Within this context, in March 2024, Puntland revoked its recognition of the federal government,283 while Jubbaland officially severed its ties with it in November 2024,284 in a move that escalated into open military confrontation.285 (2) The intra-regional tensions and governance dynamics at FMS level.286 (3) The FGS versus Somaliland tensions, over its political status and international recognition,287 and in the course of 2024, in relation to the signing of the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia.288 (4) External disputes and tensions, which often play out at regional level in Somalia, and which revolve around various external actors, such as Ethiopia and Kenya - historically engaged in Somalia - UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, home to Somali elites patrons, but also Türkiye and Egypt, with which Somalia has signed security pacts in the course of 2024.289 For a more detailed overview about these other layers and their implications at regional level see part 2 Regional security situation and trends, as well as previous EUAA COI reports.
- 235
RULAC is a project of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights that identifies and classifies situations of armed conflict, providing an independent and impartial analysis of conflicts and applicable international law. RULAC, About RULAC, n.d., url
- 236
RULAC, Non-international armed conflict in Somalia, 10 November 2022, url
- 237
UK, Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, [Updated] 23 April 2021, url
- 238
USDOS, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, n.d., url
- 239
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url
- 240
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url
- 241
EUAA, Country of Origin information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, February 2023, url
- 242
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, September 2021, url
- 243
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url
- 244
Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow, Somali Elite Political Culture: Conceptions, Structures, and Historical Evolution, 28 January 2021, url, pp. 59-70
- 245
Mohamed Abdullahi, Telephone interview with EUAA, 18 March 2025. Mohamed Abdullahi is the Director of programmes at Horncenter Dialogue for Peace, Governance, and Development (The Horncenter), an independent, not- for-profit Think-Do-Tank organization based in Dushamared, Galmudug State of Somalia. He is an expert in reconciliation, peace-building, and governance; Farhia Mohamud, Telephone interview with EUAA, 19 March 2025. Farhia Mohamud is a researcher and Hirshabelle political and security analyst at Somali Public Agenda, a leading research organisation based in Mogadishu; Independent political and security analyst/researcher based in Jubbaland, Telephone interview with EUAA, 18 March 2025. The independent political and security analyst based in Jubbaland works as a consultant and has long-standing experience with conflict analysis; see also ACAPS, Somalia – Impact of clan conflicts, 19 March 2025, url, p. 2
- 246
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url, with clan militias as Actor 1 vs clan militias as Actor 2
- 247
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, April 2021 – March 2023, url
- 248
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url
- 249
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Country Focus, May 2025, url, sections 1.5. Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan disputes and other clan issues
- 250
EUAA, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Country Focus, May 2025, url, sections 1.4. Minorities
- 251
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 45-57
- 252
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Targeted profiles, September 2021, url, pp. 76-85
- 253
EUAA, Country of Origin information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, February 2023, url
- 254
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, September 2021, url
- 255
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url, with ISIS either as Actor 1 or as Actor 2
- 256
EUAA analysis based on ACLED data. Curated Data Files, Somalia, 21 March 2025, url
- 257
SSC-Khatumo, Needs assessment report, December 2023, url, p. 10; Mahmood O. S., Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland, November 2019, url, pp. 3-7; ISS, The various layers to the Somaliland-Puntland discord, 9 December 2019, url
- 258
Barnett, J., Inside the Newest Conflict in Somalia’s Long Civil War, 7 August 2023, url; Horn Observer, Somaliland deploys more forces to Oog, announces military action against SSC-Khaatumo, 6 September 2023, url
- 259
ISS, Overlapping claims by Somaliland and Puntland – The case of Sool and Sanaag, November 2019, East Africa Report No. 27, url, pp. 3-5; Hoehne, M. V., Between Somaliland and Puntland, 2015, url, pp. 19-21, 36
- 260
Hoehne, M. V., The conflict over Las Anod: Long-term and immediate factors, and prospects for settlements, June 2023, url, p. 2
- 261
SSC-Khatumo, Needs assessment report, December 2023, url, p. 10; Hoehne, M. V., The conflict over Las Anod: Long-term and immediate factors, and prospects for settlements, June 2023, url, p. 2
- 262
SSC-Khatumo, Needs assessment report, December 2023, url, pp. 12-14
- 263
Somali Digest, Somali government makes a strategic move by recognizing SSC-Khaatumo, 19 October 2023, url; Horseed Media, Somali Federal Government Recognizes New SSC-Khatumo Administration, 19 October 2023, url
- 264
Hiiraan Online, Somaliland and SSC Khaatumo forces clash in Buqdharkayn as territorial dispute escalates, 7 March 2025, url; Hiiraan Online, SSC Khaatumo forces claim victory over Somaliland in Shangeed clashes, 31 January 2025, url; SMN, Fighting in Ceerigaabo as SSC-Khaatumo, Somaliland Troops Clash; Both Claim Victory, 15 December 2024, url; Somali Digest, Somaliland: Secessionist Rhetoric Amidst Territorial and Diplomatic Setbacks, 18 May 2024, url; Somali Digest, Tensions flare: Clashes erupted in Ayn region and Erigavo, 8 October 2023, url
- 265
EUAA, Country of Origin information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, February 2023, url, p. 22
- 266
EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, pp. 101-116
- 267
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, pp. 106-110, 115
- 268
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2021, Evolution of crime in a Covid world, 2021, url, p. 141
- 269
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, p. 30
- 270
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, pp. 35-36
- 271
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, p. 85
- 272
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, p. 86
- 273
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, p. 110
- 274
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, pp. 83-84, 123-124
- 275
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2021, Evolution of crime in a Covid world, 2021, url, pp. 150-151
- 276
Belgium, CGRS-CEDOCA, SOMALIË Veiligheidssituatiein Mogadishu [Somalia Security Situation in Mogadishu], 29 June 2021, url, p. 19
- 277
ENACT, Africa Organised Crime Index 2023, Increasing criminality, growing vulnerabilities, 2024, url, pp. 35-38, 120
- 278
Afyare A. Elmi, Mogadishu City Report, August 2024, url, pp. 29-30; Chonka P., et al., Safety and security in Mogadishu, 2023, url, pp. 10-11, 15-17; see also SPA, Governance Brief 19, The Rise of Youth Gangs (Ciyaal Weero) in Mogadishu, October 2022, url
- 279
Shafie Sharif Mohamed, Why Youth Join Gangs and Somalis’ Approach to Gang Prevention and Intervention, July 2023, url
- 280
Guled Salah Barre, Weaknesses of Federalism in Somalia and Required Reforms, 28 August 2024, url, pp. 5-7; Somali Dialogue Platform, Options for allocating powers in Somalia’s federal system, 9 September 2022, url, pp. 1-3; Abdinor Dahir, and Ali Yassin Sheikh Ali, Federalism in post-conflict Somalia: A critical review of its reception and governance challenges, 8 November 2021, url, pp. 1, 6-7, 10; Daily Sabah, Is there an antidote for Somalia's Federalism?, 23 August 2022, url
- 281
HIPS, Unpacking the NCC decision: Political ramifications for Somalia’s future, November 2024, url, pp. 3-4; Somali Dialogue Platform and SPA, Addressing contentious issues on elections in the constitutional review process, March 2024, url, pp. 7-11
- 282
Somali Dialogue Platform and SPA, Addressing contentious issues on elections in the constitutional review process, March 2024, url, pp. 4, 18; VOA, Somalia's Parliament Approves Historic Constitutional Amendments, 30 March 2024, url; Africa Report (The), Somalia: Constitutional amendments meet controversy, 10 April 2024, url; SPA, Governance Brief No. 28, February 2024, url, p. 3
- 283
DW, Somalia: Puntland pulls recognition of federal government, 31 March 2024, url; The Guardian, Somalia accused of ‘threatening national unity’ with new constitution, 5 April 2024, url
- 284
Addis Standard, News: Jubaland suspends ties with Somalia's federal government, 28 November 2024, url
- 285
Horn Observer, Battle for Jubbaland: Deadly Conflict Push Region to the Brink of Chaos, 24 December 2024, url
- 286
EUAA, Country of Origin information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, February 2023, url, regional chapters; EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Security Situation, September 2021, url, regional chapters; EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Actors, July 2021, url, Chapter 7 Federal members States and Somaliland; EASO, Country of Origin Information Report on Somalia: Targeted profiles, September 2021, url, Chapter 5 Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan disputes and other clan issues
- 287
CFR, Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State, 21 January 2025, url
- 288
International Crisis Group, The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal, 6 March 2024, url; DW, Somaliland unfazed by Somalia-Ethiopia compromise, 16 December 2024, url
- 289
African Arguments, Somalia in the Red Sea Arena: Tensions and Domestic Implications, 23 October 2024, url