- Introduction
- Guidance note
- Common analysis
- General remarks
- 1. Actors of persecution or serious harm
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2. Refugee status
- Preliminary remarks
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Analysis of particular profiles
- 2.1. Persons affiliated with the former Afghan government
- 2.2. Individuals who have worked for foreign military troops or perceived as supporting them
- 2.3. Religious leaders
- 2.4. Persons fearing forced recruitment by armed groups
- 2.5. Educational personnel
- 2.6. Healthcare professionals and humanitarian workers, including individuals working for national and international NGOs
- 2.7. Journalists, media workers and human rights defenders
- 2.8. Children
- 2.9. Women
- 2.10. Individuals perceived to have transgressed moral codes
- 2.11. Individuals perceived as ‘Westernised’
- 2.12. LGBTIQ persons
- 2.13. Persons living with disabilities and persons with severe medical issues
- 2.14. Individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy
- 2.15. Ethnic and religious minorities
- 2.16. Individuals involved in blood feuds and land disputes
- 2.17. Individuals accused of ordinary crimes
- 2.18. Individuals who were born in Iran or Pakistan and/or who lived there for a long period of time
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3. Subsidiary protection
- 3.1. Article 15(a) QD
- 3.2. Article 15(b) QD
- 3.3. Article 15(c) QD
- 4. Actors of protection
- 5. Internal protection alternative
- 6. Exclusion
- Abbreviations and glossary
- Country of origin information references
- Relevant case law
At the time of writing, the situation in Afghanistan remains volatile, rendering any conclusive assessment of international protection needs particularly difficult. The following elements can be highlighted: |
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Due to the short time since the Taliban takeover, information is in general limited and/or conflicting. Limitations with regard to reliable reporting should also be taken into account, as underreporting from Afghanistan or certain parts of the country is likely. |
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While the future behaviour of the Taliban lacks certain predictability, profiles targeted by the Taliban may be at an increased risk, taking into account this actor’s increased capabilities and territorial control. |
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While the frequency of security incidents and the number of civilian casualties have generally decreased since the Taliban takeover, the future risk of indiscriminate violence in any part of the country should be assessed with caution and based on the most recent information concerning the dynamics in the particular area as well as the country as a whole. |