Since the killing of high-ranking members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Israeli strikes in Damascus in 2023 and 2024525 and the elimination of Hezbollah’s top leadership and the bulk of its infrastructure in Israel’s invasion and aerial strikes in Lebanon, the influence of Iran and its Lebanese Hezbollah allies in Syria has waned significantly.526 For more information regarding the involvement of Iran and pro-Iranian militias in Syria prior to November 2024, see section 1.3.1. of the EUAA COI Report Syria – Security Situation (October 2024).
Iran, like Russia, was reportedly caught off-guard by the advance of armed opposition forces that led to the collapse of Assad’s rule.527 Initially, Iran expressed firm support for Assad’s forces and government.528 Dozens of Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) crossed into Syria near Deir Ez-Zor’s Al-Bukamal in early December 2024 to reinforce beleaguered SAA troops at the frontlines in northern Syria.529 Iran-backed forces eventually gave up control of the strategic Qa’im border crossing in Al-Bukamal, with IRGC and Iran-backed Iraqi fighters pulling out of the Deir Ez-Zor before Kurdish forces captured the crossing.530 Most members of the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun Brigades, pro-Iranian Syria-based militias created to defend the Assad government, were reported to have abandoned their positions and fled. Some members were possibly evacuated to Iran along with IRGC personnel, while others may have crossed into Iraq or moved to Lebanon, alongside fleeing Lebanese Hezbollah.531 Thousands of Iranian troops and Iran-backed militia fighters were reported to have fled Syria after Assad’s downfall,532 with the US Department of Defense (USDOD) concluding that Iran had withdrawn all its forces from the country within ten days.533 On 14 December 2024, HTS leader Al-Sharaa declared the end of Iran’s presence in Syria.534
Sources noted that the demise of Assad’s rule represented a significant loss for Iran,535 which saw its ability to maintain military and logistical supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon and other groups of its so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ significantly compromised.536
- 525
Grajewski, N., Why Did Iran Allow Bashar al-Assad’s Downfall?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 December 2024, url
- 526
Shahbazov, F., What Turkey Hopes to Gain From the HTS Offensive in Syria, Stimson Center, 5 December 2024, url
- 527
Al Jazeera, Analysis: Russia, Iran strengthen alliance after Syria setback, 18 January 2025, url
- 528
NBC News, Iran throws its support behind Assad as rebels expand their shock offensive in Syria, 1 December 2024, url
- 529
Reuters, Pro-Iranian militias enter Syria from Iraq to aid beleaguered Syrian army, 2 December 2024, url
- 530
Grajewski, N., Why Did Iran Allow Bashar al-Assad’s Downfall?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 December 2024, url
- 531
VOA, What happened to Iranian proxies in Syria?, 13 December 2024, url
- 532
WSJ, Iran Pulls Most Forces From Syria, in Blow to Tehran’s Regional Ambitions, 7 January 2025, url
- 533
USDOD, Operation Inherent Resolve And Other U.S. Government Activities Related to Iraq & Syria: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress October 1, 2024 – December 31, 2024, 19 February 2025, url, p. 16
- 534
ISW and CTP, Iran Update, December 17, 2024, 17 December 2024, url, p. 9
- 535
Enab Baladi, Has Russia’s and Iran’s role in new Syria come to an end?, 7 January 2025, url; INSS, A New Era in Syria: Winners, Losers, and Implications for Israel, 12 January 2025, url
- 536
Abbas, S.A., The Fall of Syria and Iran’s Strategy of Relying on Allies, Manara Magazine, 13 January 2025, url