- Introduction
- Guidance note
- Common analysis
- General remarks
- 1. Actors of persecution or serious harm
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2. Refugee status
- Preliminary remarks
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Analysis of particular profiles
- 2.1. Persons perceived to be associated with ISIL
- 2.2. Sunni Arabs
- 2.3. Political opposition activists and protesters
- 2.4. Journalists, media workers and human rights activists
- 2.5. Deserters from armed forces
- 2.6. Individuals approached for recruitment by armed groups
- 2.7. Former Baath party members
- 2.8. Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), Peshmerga and local police
- 2.9. Individuals perceived to oppose ISIL
- 2.10. (Perceived) collaborators of Western armed forces, organisations, or companies
- 2.11. Humanitarian workers
- 2.12. LGBTIQ persons
- 2.13. Individuals perceived to transgress moral codes
- 2.14. Individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy
- 2.15. Religious and ethnic minorities, and stateless persons
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2.16. Women
- 2.16.1. Violence against women and girls: overview
- 2.16.2. Forced and child marriage
- 2.16.3. Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)
- 2.16.4. Women working in the public sphere
- 2.16.5. Women perceived to have transgressed moral codes
- 2.16.6. Women perceived to be associated with ISIL
- 2.16.7. Single women and female heads of households
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2.17. Children
- 2.17.1. Violence against children: overview
- 2.17.2. Child marriage
- 2.17.3. FGM/C
- 2.17.4. Child labour and child trafficking
- 2.17.5. Child recruitment
- 2.17.6. Education of children and girls in particular
- 2.17.7. Children born under ISIL who lack civil documentation
- 2.17.8. Children without a care-taker
- 2.18. Persons living with disabilities and persons with severe medical issues
- 2.19. Persons involved in and affected by blood feuds in the context of tribal conflict
- 2.20. Individuals accused of ordinary crimes
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3. Subsidiary protection
- 3.1. Article 15(a) QD
- 3.2. Article 15(b) QD
- 3.3. Article 15(c) QD
- 4. Actors of protection
- 5. Internal protection alternative
- 6. Exclusion
- Abbreviations and glossary
- Country of origin information references
- Relevant case law
COMMON ANALYSIS
Last updated: January 2021
[Security situation 2019, 1; Security situation 2020, 1.1., 1.2.3, 1.2.5]
In Iraq, a wide range of different groups and individuals can be considered as actors of persecution or serious harm. Moreover, agents and motivations are not always clear-cut and may change given the changing security context.
The following subsections highlight the main actors of persecution and serious harm in Iraq in a non-exhaustive manner. Their areas of control/activity are outlined below.
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The Iraqi Security Forces control most of Iraq, excluding the KRI. In some areas, ISF only holds nominal control, whereas in practice control is exercised by Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), e.g. areas in Salah al-Din.
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In certain areas in north/central Iraq PMU are dominant (e.g. areas in Salah al-Din). Southern governorates are considered areas of shared control between ISF and PMU.
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KRG upholds the sole responsibility for the protection of the KRI, however, gaps in KRG control have been reported. Peshmerga forces are the KRG armed forces.
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ISIL no longer holds territory in Iraq however, ISIL has been seeking to establish itself in places where conventional military operations have been challenging, such as valleys, mountains and deserts across northern and central Iraq. Active ISIL attack cells were still located in Anbar, Ninewa, Erbil, Baghdad Belts, Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din.
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