COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

This profile refers to persons who claim to be targeted by the Taliban or ISKP in order to be recruited by force and against their will.

For the topic of child recruitment, see the separate section 3.16.2 Child recruitment.

COI summary

Forced recruitment by the Taliban

During the conflict, the Taliban typically recruited unemployed Pashtun males from rural communities who were educated and trained in Afghans and Pakistanis madrassas, mosques and camps. It was reported that they had no shortage of volunteers and recruits. The Taliban only made use of forced recruitment in exceptional cases. Pressure and coercion to join the Taliban were not always violent and were often exercised through the family, clan or religious network, depending on the local circumstances. It can be said that the consequences of not obeying were generally serious, including reports of threats against the family of the approached recruits, severe bodily harm, and killings [Anti-government elements, 2.2, 2.4, p. 21; Recruitment by armed groups, 1.5, p. 22; 5.2.1.3, pp. 43-44; 5.2.1.4, p. 44; Society-based targeting, 8.2, p. 94].

During the spring and summer of 2021, the Taliban recruited an increased number of new fighters as well as mobilised thousands of fighters and supporters from Pakistan to enter Afghanistan and strengthen their ranks across the country. Following the takeover, the Taliban planned to build a ‘regular’ army of 300 000 to 350 000 personnel on a voluntary basis for the Taliban ministries of defence and of interior. No information on forced recruitment to the Taliban after the takeover had been found within the time constraints of the latest COI reports [Targeting 2022, 13.1.1, 13.1.2]. 

Forced recruitment by ISKP

The recruitment by ISKP increased in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of international forces.  As of May 2022, the terrorist group had an estimated 1 500 to 4 000 fighters settled in rural areas of Kunar and Nangarhar provinces, with smaller covert cells in Northern provinces. The worsening economic situation in the country was driving the ISKP’s recruitment, with the group reportedly promising a 35 000 Afghanis salary to its fighters [Targeting 2022, 13, p. 188; 13.2, p. 190; Security 2022, 2.3, pp. 53-54]. 

In terms of composition, half of the ISKP members were estimated to be foreigners. ISKP reportedly tried to recruit amongst Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek ethnic groups in northern Afghanistan, capitalising on the growing dissatisfaction among these communities with the Taliban rule. Furthermore, ISKP reportedly recruited individuals from influential political and warlord families as well as urban middle-class men and women who have joined the group for ideological reasons. Taking advantage of its significant support in Kabul, the group recruited in the capital, especially among university students and Salafis [Targeting 2022, 13.2, pp. 190-192; Security 2022, 2.3, pp. 50, 52-54].   

Before August 2021, in rural areas with firm ISKP presence and/or where fighting is taking place, there was pressure on communities to fully support and help the terrorist group [Anti-government elements, 3.4, p. 33; Recruitment by armed groups, 2.1.4, p. 30; 5.2, p. 41].

Risk analysis

Forced recruitment is of such severe nature that it would amount to persecution. The consequences of refusal of (forced) recruitment could also amount to persecution (e.g. severe bodily harm, killing).

The likelihood of being approached for forced recruitment by the Taliban or ISKP is generally low. Risk-impacting circumstances could include: age and gender (young men), area of origin (in relation to potential ISKP recruitment), military background.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

While the risk of forced recruitment as such may not generally imply a nexus to a reason for persecution, the consequences of refusal, could, depending on individual circumstances, substantiate such a nexus, among other reasons, to (imputed) political opinion.