COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

COI summary

Article 3 of the Afghan Law on the prohibition of child recruitment in the military institutions prohibited child recruitment in the military units. Article 4 of the same law envisaged a punishment for the perpetrators from six months to one-year imprisonment [State structure, 2.1.3, p. 35; Security 2020, 1.4.5, p. 49]. However, the applicable legal framework, including in relation to child recruitment is currently unclear [Security 2022, 1.2.3, p. 29].

In more than 20 years of armed conflict, the Taliban have reportedly used children as fighters, to plant and detonate IEDs, and as suicide bombers. There were reportedly thousands of children in their ranks, often trained in madrassas and recruited through force and threats, deception, promises of money or other incentives. The Taliban have denied that they use children in ‘jihadic operations’ and their code of conduct states that ‘boys without beards’ are not allowed in military centres. Moreover, in more recent years, the Taliban reportedly ‘expressed some sensitivity’ to the problematic issue of child recruitment. Nevertheless, hundreds of individual cases of child recruitment by Taliban forces have been documented, with a significant increase in 2020 [KSEI 2022, 8.2, p.61].

Recruitment of teenagers and youth is also part of ISKP’s recruitment strategies [Anti-government elements, 3.4, p. 33].

In an October 2021 report, UNHCR referred to information obtained from interlocutors in the field, according to which both the Taliban de facto authorities as well as the ISKP ‘recruit widely and use children in their ranks’ [KSEI 2022, 8.2, p. 60].

According to a UN Human Rights Council report, in 2021, there were at least 47 verified cases of child recruitment, including 24 by the Taliban, 16 by pro-government militias and 7 by the Afghan National Police. However, ‘recruitment and use of children remains under verified’ due to sensitivity and protection issues. The vast majority of these recruitments reportedly took place before 15 August 2021. At the same time, children in the ranks of Taliban have become more visible since its takeover, leading to perceptions that the recruitment of children has increased, despite much of the recruitment likely having occurred previously. The increasing poverty was reported to be a driving factor for the recruitment and use of children by armed groups [KSEI 2022, 8.2, p. 61].

See also 3.6 Persons fearing forced recruitment and 3.16.1. Violence against children.

Risk analysis

Child recruitment is of such severe nature that it would amount to persecution.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the child to face persecution in the form of child recruitment should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: gender, poor socio-economic situation, area of origin or residence, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

The individual circumstances of the child need to be taken into account to determine whether a nexus to a reason for persecution can be substantiated. For example, in the case of children who refuse to join the Taliban or ISKP, persecution may be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.