COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023
This profile refers to persons who are perceived as ‘Westernised’ due, for example, to their activities, behaviour, appearance and expressed opinions, which may be seen as non-Afghan or non-Muslim. It may also include those who return to Afghanistan after having spent time in Western countries.
This profile may largely overlap with the profile 3.12 Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms, for example in relation to norms associated with dress code.
COI summary
Although Taliban officials repeatedly called on Afghans to return to Afghanistan, their views on persons leaving Afghanistan for Western countries remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the Taliban said that people flee due to poverty and that it has nothing to do with any fear of the Taliban, adding they were attracted by the economically better life in West. The other narrative was about the elites that left, they were not seen as ‘Afghans’, but as corrupt ‘puppets’ of the ‘occupation’, who lacked ‘roots’ in Afghanistan. This narrative could also include, for example, activists, media workers and intellectuals, and not only former government officials. According to the source that described this, these narratives also existed among the general population, as there was an anger towards the previous government and elites due to corruption and failures [Targeting 2022, 1.5, p. 50].
An anonymous organisation with presence in Afghanistan stated that sometimes people were targeted when they returned to Afghanistan, but the source did not see any clear connections simply to the fact that these individuals had left the country. Rather, the targeting seemed to be connected to the reason for their initial departure from Afghanistan. Similarly, another source noted that it was not his impression that Afghans returning from the West would be subject to targeting by the Taliban, unless it was a result of a personal dispute or vendetta [Targeting 2022, 1.5.2, p. 55].
On the other hand, the Taliban have openly criticized individuals leaving for Western countries. On 8 December 2021, the Taliban supreme leader issued a statement in which he addressed difficulties facing persons who left Afghanistan and added that these persons’ ‘beliefs ethics, and ways of thinking’, were jeopardised ‘based on some biased programs’ and that they were obliged ‘to create scandals against Islam and the Islamic System’ to receive asylum. On 27 February 2022, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stated that persons leaving Afghanistan had ‘no excuse’ and that the Taliban were preventing them from leaving. On 1 March 2022, Mujahid clarified on social media that he had meant that persons with legal documents and invitations could travel from and return to Afghanistan. The Taliban deputy Minister for Refugees and Repatriations also stated that it was not ‘appropriate’ for Western nations to facilitate Afghans’ departure by inviting them and promising asylum. Although the Taliban did not systematically restrict migration at overland crossing, the Taliban appeared to stop Afghans trying to leave the country by road, while the case of 40 individuals arrested when trying to leave Afghanistan by air from Mazar-e Sharif has also been reported [Targeting 2022, 1.5.1, p. 52].
Already before the Taliban takeover in 2021, several accounts of a stigma of being returned were reported, and a common perception that a person must have committed a crime to be deported, or that people returning from Europe were ‘loaded with money’. Out of fear of being harassed or robbed, some did not disclose that they were returnees [Targeting 2022, 1.5.1, p. 51].
Sources noted that individuals seen as ‘Westernised” may be threatened by the Taliban, relatives or neighbours. In some cases, men were reportedly harassed by Taliban fighters for wearing Western style clothes or attacked in public because they were seen as ’traitors’ or ’unbelievers’ [Security 2022, 1.2.3, p. 31; Targeting 2022, 1.5.1, pp. 50-53].
Women could be seen as ‘Westernised’ when they worked outside the home, took part in public life, or had higher education [COI query on westernisation, 1.2, p. 8; Society-based targeting, 8.10, p. 106; Country Focus 2022, 2.1, p. 33]
Other links to the Western countries, such as the teaching and learning of English language could also lead to violence by the de facto authorities. On 18 August 2021, two students were reportedly beaten by the Taliban while attempting to go to English classes, as it was considered ‘infidels language’. In January 2022, Afghan teachers employed at the British Council in Helmand Province were reportedly hiding from the Taliban out of fear of reprisals [Targeting 2022, 12.3, p. 187].
See also sub-section a. Restrictions of rights and freedoms under the Taliban under the profile 3.15. Women and girls and profile 3.11. Individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy.
Risk analysis
Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. violence by family members, conservative elements in society, Taliban). When the acts in question are restrictions on the exercise of certain rights of less severe nature or (solely) discriminatory measures, the individual assessment of whether they could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures.
The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: the behaviour adopted by the applicant, visibility of the applicant, area of origin and conservative environment, gender (the risk is higher for women), age (it may be difficult for children of certain age to (re-)adjust to Afghanistan’s social restrictions), duration of stay in a western country, etc.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Available information indicates that persecution of this profile may be for reasons of religion and/or (imputed) political opinion or membership of a particular social group. The latter could be based on shared characteristic, such as a common background which cannot be changed (perceived past behaviour) and a distinct identity in the context of Afghanistan, linked to their stigmatisation by the surrounding society, or a belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that they should not be forced to renounce it (opposition to cultural, social or religious norms and the unwillingness to comply with them).