COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023
COI summary
a. Restrictions of rights and freedoms under the Taliban
Women’s active participation in political and economic life and their contribution to Afghan society have been largely curtailed in comparison to their situation under the former government. Since 15 August 2021, several regulations and instructions have been issued by the Taliban, impacting women’s and girl’s freedom of movement and expression, as well as their access to education, employment, healthcare and social protection. On 3 December 2021, the Taliban issued a decree on women’s rights. The decree bans forced marriage (although it did not address the minimum age of marriage), states that women should not be considered as ‘property’ and granted inheritance rights to widows. This decree did not, however, refer to wider women’s and girls’ rights [Targeting 2022, 5.2, p. 97].
Freedom of movement and gender segregation
At the end of December 2021, the MPVPV issued a new guideline for transport operators across the country, preventing women from travelling long distances (more than 72 kilometres), unless accompanied by a male relative. Further restrictions on women’s freedom of movement applied at provincial level were reported, with women moving around in public spaces without a mahram in some provinces being detained by the Taliban authorities. Gender segregation has reportedly also been implemented by local Taliban authorities in the different province’s regarding e.g. restaurants, public parks and public bathhouses [Targeting 2022, 5.2.3, pp. 112-113].
Since the takeover, sources reported on a reduction in the number of women seen in public. On the one hand, there were reports of women being stopped on the street, being intimidated and told to go home by Taliban guards when travelling alone in cities like Kabul and Herat. On the other hand, sources reported on women moving around in public spaces in both cities without a mahram. Sources noted that women’s freedom of movement varied on provincial level and was context-specific, depending on regional customs, with married women in Herat still able to visit restaurants and walk around in public, but most women in provinces such as Kandahar and Helmand confined to their homes. The need for a woman to be accompanied by a mahram had already been part of local customs in more conservative regions in Afghanistan, but was not common practice for many women in Kabul under the previous government [Targeting 2022, 5.2.3, p. 111-112].
Dress code
On 7 May 2022, the Taliban MPVPV announced a new decree instructing women that they should not leave the house without ‘real need’ and if they do to respect a strict dress code regulation. The ministry stated that women must cover themselves from head to toe, suggesting the burqa as ‘the good and complete hijab’ preferred for covering a woman’s hair, face and body. However, the burqa was not prescribed as mandatory, as long as women would cover themselves with a hijab or garment obscuring the outlines of their body. A woman’s male guardian was legally responsible for policing her clothing. Women’s compliance with the new decree was reportedly mixed in the streets of Kabul City and women with their faces uncovered were still a common sight. In city areas like Dasht-e Barchi, predominantly inhabited by the Hazara minority, few women reportedly covered their faces, while in the Pashtun neighbourhood of Kart-e Naw most women covered their faces with a hijab or a headscarf. In mid-May 2022, the Taliban Minister of Interior declared that ‘women are not forced but advised to wear the hijab’. The impact of the Taliban’s new regulation differed across the country. Taliban guards imposing the order at checkpoints were reported, mostly referring to the new guideline as an advice but sometimes shouting at women to obey it. According to one source, they did not receive reports of public punishments of women not complying with the order, nor of male relatives of women without a hijab being contacted or punished [Targeting 2022, 5.2.5, p. 120-123].
In March 2022, the Taliban Health Ministry reportedly issued instructions that female patients without a hijab should be denied healthcare. Vehicle drivers were also instructed not to pick up female passengers without a hijab covering their hair. [Targeting 2022, 1.3.2, pp. 43-44, 5.2.5, p. 122]. In Mazar-e Sharif shopkeepers were ordered not to sell to women without hijab [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 3].
Exclusion from work and public life
Already before the takeover, women who worked outside the home, in general, encountered frequent sexual harassment and abuse at the workplace and could be considered by society as transgressing moral codes, as bringing dishonour to the family (e.g. women in law enforcement), and as being non-Afghan or Western (e.g. women in journalism). Most women in public roles faced intimidation, threats, violence, or killings [Targeting 2022, 5.1.3, pp. 88-89].
Since 15 August 2021, Afghan women have been largely excluded from political life and the general workforce [Targeting 2022, 5.2.2, p. 105].
There were no women in the Taliban’s cabinet or in other key de facto government positions. Many of those women who had held public positions before the takeover were in hiding. Some of them not only received threats by the Taliban but also by other members of society [Targeting 2022, 5.1.3, p. 88].
No uniform policy related to women’s access to employment was announced by the Taliban and rights and working conditions for women remained uncertain. The de facto authorities repeatedly claimed their commitment to maintain women’s right to access employment, within the framework of sharia. However, since their takeover, they have announced several restrictions which hindered women’s access to the labour market. There were provincial differences, with women being discouraged to go to work by Taliban fighters on the roads in some provinces and women still active in de facto government jobs in other provinces. In March 2022, the Taliban MPVPV issued national guidelines instructing gender segregation in Taliban government ministry offices and prohibiting female employees from entering their office without wearing a hijab. Gender segregation between men and women was also imposed in educational and health facilities. Although many Afghan women who used to be part of the country’s workforce have been at home since 15 August 2021, some have resumed work within the public sector [Targeting 2022, 1.3.2, pp. 43-45; 5.2.1, pp. 99-100, 104-105; 5.2.2, pp. 105-106; 5.2.3, pp. 111-115].
The Taliban’s position and policy regarding women in the Afghan society has been ‘elusive and confusing’, with decisions often made at provincial level. This caused confusion among Taliban fighters on how orders should be enforced in practice, resulting in arbitrary implementation [Targeting 2022, 5.2, pp. 97-98].
Access to healthcare
In March 2022, the Taliban MPVPV ordered healthcare institutions to deny medical assistance to female patients without a hijab [Targeting 2022, 5.2.5, p. 120]. An article quoted health workers from Ghazni district describing an incident where two unaccompanied women were reportedly forced out of a clinic by the Taliban. In another incident, a midwife was reportedly detained, and medical staff of the clinic was facing prosecution for having attended to a single woman giving birth. Taliban reportedly denied that such incidents took place [Targeting 2022, 1.3.3, p. 48; 5.1.6, p. 95].
Access to education
At the end of August 2021, primary schools for both boys and girls re-opened. In February 2022, the Taliban’s Ministry of Education announced a new primary education plan. Boys and girls in grades 1 up to 6 were instructed to follow classes separately, with male teachers for boys and female teachers for girls, and at different times. In mid-September 2021, the Taliban authorities announced that secondary education (above grade 6) would resume for boys. Access to secondary education for girls was not mentioned in this announcement. Exceptions have been reported in several provinces where a number of secondary schools for girls were allowed to remain open, often with the support of local Taliban leaders or because of strong pressure from parents and teachers in the community. In mid-December 2021, the Taliban Foreign Minister declared that girls were attending secondary school classes in 10 provinces, without specifying which provinces. Some private secondary schools and universities kept running, even in places where public secondary schools for girls remained closed. However, many private schools closed due to lack of resources stemming from families affected by poverty and unemployment, and their resultant inability to pay school fees. The Taliban’s lack of a clear and uniform policy regarding education for girls, in combination with teachers not being paid their salaries, caused low enrolment rates even in areas where schools were open [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 4; Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 99-100].
In September 2022, five secondary schools in Paktia Province were reopened for a few days. Their reopening was based on a decision of local stakeholders. It was reported that the Taliban Ministry of Education had not approved the decision, hence it was revoked [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 4].
There was also a report that the Taliban in Kandahar Province conducted inspections of girls’ primary schools and expelled hundreds of secondary education aged girls but who attended primary level education [COI Update 2022, p. 4].
In February and March 2022, in the weeks and days leading up to the start of the new school year, the Taliban Ministry of Education insisted several times that all schools would reopen, for boys as well as girls. However, on 23 March 2022, the Taliban announced the abrupt decision to keep all secondary schools closed for girls, reportedly affecting an estimated 1.1 million Afghan girls across the country. The Taliban officially announced that secondary schools would remain provisionally closed for girls ‘until a comprehensive plan has been prepared according to sharia and Afghan culture’ [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 100-101].
In Balkh, a number of secondary schools for girls were reportedly still open at the end of April, in May and June 2022. However, some of these schools were threatened with closure if their female students did not comply with the strict dress code (hijab) rules. In April and May 2022, several prominent figures of the de facto authorities declared that secondary education for girls would resume soon, with a committee of clerics and scholars formed to address the issue. In June 2022, a Taliban spokesman declared that public secondary schools for girls were open in ‘about a dozen provinces’ and private schools from the first grade up to university level were open across the country [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 101-102].
The de facto authorities’ abrupt decision to keep secondary schools for girls closed may, according to a source, have had less to do with religion than with the unpredictable nature of Taliban policy, and the movement’s broader failure to create a clear mechanism for making national policy decisions. Some Taliban figures even criticised the decision and voiced their support for all girls returning to school on social media. Hundreds of girls and women are reportedly also continuing to learn through secret online schooling or in hidden makeshift classrooms [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 102-103].
In the beginning of September 2021, the Taliban Ministry of Education issued a decree stipulating rules for female university students. The order defined that classes had to be gender-segregated. Furthermore, male and female students had to enter university through separate entrances or during different times, and female students could only be taught by female teachers or elderly men known for being ‘trustworthy’. Lastly, female students, teachers and educational staff had to comply with the Islamic dress code according to sharia, specified as a black abaya robe and a niqab covering the hair, body and most of the face, as well as gloves covering the hands. These regulations came into effect as private universities reopened their doors for male and female students on 6 September 2021. Public universities remained closed, with the Taliban authorities referring to financial constraints and a lack of separate classrooms and safe transportation systems for female students. On 2 February 2022, public universities in warm climate provinces reopened. As reported by several media sources, only a limited number of female university students returned to their classrooms. A shortage of female university lecturers has been reported, since many educated professionals left the country after the Taliban takeover [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 104-105].
Ahead of the university entrance exams in October 2022, the Taliban announced that women will only be able to choose certain academic fields for public university studies. A spokesman for the Taliban Ministry of Higher Education stated that subjects ‘not necessary for women’ will not be introduced, but he did not specify the concerned fields. It was reported that women could take courses in medicine, nursing, teaching, and Islamic studies in all provinces, while veterinary science, engineering, economics, and agriculture appear not to be options of choice [COI Update 2022, 2, p. 3].
b. Violence against women and girls
Even before the Taliban takeover, violence against women and girls was a pervasive problem, regardless of the ethnic group and perpetrators of attacks against women enjoyed impunity [Targeting 2022, 5.1.1, p. 85; Criminal law and customary justice, 1.4, pp. 14-16]. Women’s access to justice, courts, and legal assistance for gender-based violence had also been generally limited and informal justice mechanisms were reported to frequently discriminate against women [Criminal law and customary justice, 2.3.2, p. 27].
Violence against women reportedly increased under Taliban rule. The Taliban also ended institutional and legal support for women facing such violence. This forced many women and girls to return to their abusers or remain in situations where they were at risk of experiencing gender-based violence [Targeting 2022, 5.2, p. 98]. Cases of domestic violence leading to death were also reported [Targeting 2022, 5.1.5, p. 91]. Although the monitoring the topic has stopped since the takeover, gender-based violence reportedly increased for reasons such as unemployment and drug abuse [Targeting 2022, 5.1.5, p. 91].
Sharia does not differentiate between consensual sexual relations outside marriage and rape. Both is defined as zina and punishable with stoning or lashing. Living alone is, furthermore, associated with inappropriate behaviour and could potentially lead to accusations of ‘moral crimes’ [KSEI 2020, 3.3, pp. 70-71; KSEI 2017, 5.5, pp. 130-131; Society-based targeting, 3.8.6, pp. 61-62]. See also 3.12 Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms.
Traditional marriage practices, such as betrothal as a child, polygamy, exchanging of unmarried daughters between families, baad, are common in Afghanistan and can often create or lead to situations of forced marriage and violence against women [Society-based targeting, 3.4, p. 39; Criminal law and customary justice, 3.2, pp. 31-32]. Refusal of marriage arrangements or proposals can lead to violence for the women and girls concerned and/or for their families and to blood feuds [Society-based targeting, 3.4, p. 41; 3.7, p. 52; Criminal law and customary justice, 3.3, p. 33].
Although no data is available, reports indicated that the bad security situation and the collapse of the economy after the takeover have contributed to an increase in forced marriages and especially child marriages. In other cases, women have been forced to marry due to the fact that living without a mahram has become impossible under Taliban rule [Targeting 2022, 5.1.4, p. 89].
The Taliban’s decree on women’s rights of 3 December 2021 stated that women should not be forced into marriage. However, the decree did not define any legal mechanisms to enforce this rule or to protect victims of forced marriage. Furthermore, the decree did not set a minimum age for marriage [Targeting 2022, 5.1.4, p. 89].
In relation to violence against women and girls, from 15 August 2021 to 15 June 2022, UNAMA received 87 reports of murder, rape, suicide, forced marriages, child marriages, assault and battery, and 2 cases of honour killings. None of the cases had undergone a formal judicial process [Targeting 2022, 5.3, p. 124].
Risk analysis
The accumulation of various measures introduced by the Taliban, which affect the rights and freedoms of women and girls in Afghanistan, amounts to persecution. Such measures affect their access to healthcare, work, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, girls' right to education, among others. Some women and girls in Afghanistan may also face other forms of ill-treatment amounting to persecution (e.g. forced marriage, such as child marriage, honour-based violence).
For women and girls in Afghanistan, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.
Links to persecution under other profiles may also be relevant, in particular 3.2. Public officials and servants of the former government, 3.8. Journalists and media workers, 3.10. Humanitarian workers, 3.12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms, and 3.13. Individuals perceived as ‘Westernised’.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Taking into account the close link between the restrictions enforced on women and girls and the religious norms imposed by the Taliban, the persecution of women and girls in the form of accumulation of various measures is likely to be for reasons of religion. Other grounds, such as membership of a particular social group and (imputed) political opinion may also be substantiated.