COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023
This profile refers to individuals who are associated with the foreign troops which were present in Afghanistan, such as interpreters, security guards, civilian contractors, administrators and logistics personnel.
COI summary
During the years of conflict, personnel working for foreign military troops, in particular interpreters, were a top priority target by the Taliban. Article 11 of Taliban’s Layeha (code of conduct) orders the execution of individuals working for Kofaar (foreign infidels), including Tarjoman (interpreters). Members of forces collaborating with foreign troops, contractors and ‘spies’ were seen by the Taliban as responsible for killing Afghan civilians. They were publicly defined as criminals and targeted. Individuals not on the payroll of the foreign forces but doing general maintenance jobs, have not been as systematically targeted, although attacks occurred [Anti-government elements, 2.6.2.3, pp. 26-27; Conflict targeting, 1.2.3, pp. 35-36].
After the Taliban takeover, thousands of interpreters who worked for international and US forces applied for special visa arrangements to leave the country [Security September 2021, 1.1.4, p. 16]. It was reported that the US managed to evacuate most of its Afghan spies and informants and their relatives. However, tens of thousands of interpreters and other foreign forces collaborators reportedly remained in Afghanistan [Security 2022, 3.1, p. 74].
During their first press conference after the takeover, the Taliban announced a general amnesty, saying that they have pardoned ‘all of those who had fought against [them]’ [Security September 2021, 1.1.2, p. 13]. Despite this amnesty, retaliatory acts by Taliban members against persons under this profile were reported [Country Focus 2022, 2.5, pp. 45-48; Targeting 2022, 3, pp. 74-76] and several reports claimed that the amnesty was not fully respected by Taliban members [Targeting 2022, 2.1, p. 56; COI Update 2022, 3, pp. 4-5].
A source reported that in the period immediately following their takeover the Taliban rounded up Afghans on a blacklist and targeted people with suspected links to the previous administration or US-led forces. House-to-house searches to find blacklisted individuals were also reported. [Security September 2021, 1.1.4, p. 16]. Individuals who were working for foreign military troops, e.g. interpreters, were reportedly living in hiding and being searched for [Targeting 2022, 3.1, p. 75; 3.2, pp. 76-77]. The Taliban also have reportedly summoned some interpreters to appear in court, with their families being informed that they might be held responsible if the interpreters failed to appear in court [Country Focus 2022, 2.5, p. 75].
Incidents of summary executions, detentions, torture, abuses and forced disappearances of persons affiliated with foreign forces have been reported [Targeting 2022, 2.1, p. 56; 3, pp. 74-76; Country Focus 2022, 2.5, pp. 45-48].
Efforts were made by the Taliban to track down persons under this profile through local informants, the use of existing databases and intimidation [Security 2022, 1.2.4, p. 33; Targeting 2022, 2.2, pp. 63-64; 3, pp. 74-76]. Border forces were reportedly ordered to prevent American and NATO collaborators from leaving the country [Targeting 2022, 2.2; 3.1, p. 76].
Relatives of individuals who worked with foreign troops also faced threats. Family members of interpreters were in particular reported to be in hiding due to fear of reprisals. [Targeting 2022, 2.2, p. 64; 3, pp. 75-77].
Risk analysis
Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing).
For individuals affiliated with foreign forces well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.
Family members of such individuals may also have a well-founded fear of persecution.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion.
Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile (see the chapter 7. Exclusion).