COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

This profile includes people who belong to the Hazara ethnicity and others belonging to the Shia religion. Mostly, persons of Hazara ethnicity are of Shia religion [Targeting 2022, 6.1., p. 126]. There are two main Shia communities in Afghanistan: the main Shia branch Ithna Ashariya (‘the Twelvers’) and the smaller Ismaili branch (‘the Seveners’). M

The majority of the Hazara population inhabits the Hazarajat. There are also major Hazara populations in the cities of Kabul, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif [Targeting 2022, 6.4.1, p. 130].

The Hazara ethnicity can usually be recognised by their physical appearance.

COI summary

During the Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001, several massacres were perpetrated on the Hazaras [Targeting 2022, 6.4.1, p. 132]. Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the Hazaras had improved their position in society. However, new security threats emerged for the Shia Muslim (Hazara) community from 2016 and onwards as the ISKP was established as a new conflict actor in Afghanistan carrying out attacks targeting, inter alia, Hazaras [COI query on Hazaras, Shias, 1.1, p. 3; 1.2, p. 4; Country Focus 2022, 2.4, p. 41, Targeting 2022, 6.4.1, p. 132].

After the Taliban took over Afghanistan, there seemed to be no Taliban policies in place against the Hazara minority [Targeting 2022, 6.4.2, p. 133]. Shia Muslims were allowed to perform their religious ceremonies, such as annual celebrations of the Ashura. Furthermore, the Taliban vowed to protect the Hazara community and Taliban fighters reportedly guarded Shia mosques. However, Hazaras were appointed to posts in the new Taliban administration at central and provincial level at a very limited extent, and it was debated whether these people were regarded as true representatives of the Hazara minority since they had already been part of the Taliban insurgency [Targeting 2022, 6.4.2, p. 135]. One example was Taliban commander Mawlawi Mehdi, who later, in June 2022, defected and fought the Taliban [COI Update 2022, 3, p. 12].

The Taliban were also reported to have confirmed that their governance would be based solely on Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence [Country Focus 2022, 2.4, p. 42].

In 2021, it was reported that Hazaras continued to face violations in the form of extortion of money through illegal taxation, forced recruitment and forced labour, physical abuse, and detention [Targeting 2022, 6.4.2, p. 133]. Forced evictions of Hazaras also reportedly took place. In some cases, these evictions have been ordered by Taliban local leaders while in other cases Hazara residents were reportedly evicted by Kuchi nomads or by ‘the Taliban and associated militias’. In some instances, the Taliban at local level vowed to investigate and/or address the issue. On other occasions local Taliban leaders claimed that the evictions took place in accordance with relevant court decisions. Taliban officials in Kabul had also reportedly retracted some eviction orders in Daykundi [Country Focus 2022, 2.4, p. 44; Targeting 2022, 6.4.3, p. 136].

In spring 2022, there were reports on conflicts between the Hazaras and Kuchi nomads, as the Kuchis brought their livestock to pastures in the Hazara-claimed lands [Targeting 2022, 6.4.3, pp. 137-138].

There is also prejudice and negative attitude against Hazaras on the part of the Taliban fighters, due the Hazara community’s engagement in the former government and because they were perceived as more supportive of the West than other groups in Afghanistan [Country Focus 2022, 2.4, p. 43]. In May 2022, it was stated that people in the Hazara-dominated provinces of Bamyan and Daykundi were harassed and arrested due to accusations of having worked for the former government [Targeting 2022, 6.4.2, p. 134].

There is also the perception within conservative parts of the Afghan society that the Hazara minority has embraced a culture not in line with the Taliban’s definition of Islam. There was an ‘anti-Hazara’ language among the general population even before the takeover [Country Focus 2022, 2.4, p. 43]. In September 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur noted reports of an increase in ‘inflammatory speech’ against Hazaras, both online and in some mosques, including calls for Hazaras to be killed [COI Update 2022, 3, p. 9].

Over recent years attacks by insurgent groups have mainly been attributed to ISKP. Their intention to target Shias from ‘Baghdad to Khorasan’ has been stated in Telegram channels run by the Islamic State. ISKP consider Shia Muslims to be apostates and, hence, a legitimate target for killing [Targeting 2022, 6.4.5, pp. 143-144]. In September 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur stated that the recent years’ attacks on Hazaras and non-Muslim Afghans, often claimed by ISKP, appeared to be ‘systematic in nature and reflect elements of an organisational policy, thus bearing hallmarks of international crimes including crimes against humanity’ [COI Update 2022, 3, p. 9].

It was described that there have been two patterns of attacks targeting Shia Hazaras after the Taliban takeover. The first pattern was attacks mainly targeting civilian passenger vehicles, particularly public transport minivans favoured by ‘young, educated and professional Hazaras’ such as government employees, journalists, and NGO staff. Furthermore, it was mentioned that ‘Hazaras have been stopped and singled out when travelling on the highways’. The second pattern was large-scale complex attacks, which have targeted Shia mosques, and hospitals and schools in Hazara dominated areas. These large-scale attacks targeting places where the Hazara gathered, such as religious commemorations, weddings, and sites, including hospitals and schools  have mainly taken place in the cities of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar, and Kunduz [Targeting 2022, 6.4.3, p. 138].

It was reported that ‘a second wave’ of attacks (such as explosions, bomb blasts) after the Taliban takeover started in April 2022. The reported incidents either took place in Shi-a and Hazara-dominated areas and neighbourhoods or were targeting Hazaras and Shias. On 25 May 2022 another series of attacks targeting three minibuses in Mazar-e Sharif was claimed by ISKP. According to a Taliban spokesman all the victims were Shias [Targeting 2022, 6.4.3, p. 140].

A string of ISKP attacks targeting the Shia Hazara group occurred in Kabul City during three consecutive days (5–7 August 2022) before the Ashura’ commemoration on 8 August 2022. These attacks included bombing targeting a Shia religious mourning ceremony, another blast in a busy shopping street in a Shia-dominated area, and an attack on a minibus. On 30 September 2022, a suicide bombing was carried out against the Kaaj educational centre. UNAMA reported that at least 53 people had been killed and over 110 injured. Most victims were reported to be teenage girls [COI Update 2022, 3, pp. 8-9; Targeting 2022, 12.3, p. 187].

Attacks against the Hazaras by the ISKP could be related to their Shia religion. Among other reasons, the ISKP also reportedly targets the Hazaras due to their perceived closeness and support for Iran and the fight against the Islamic State in Syria [COI query on Hazaras, Shias, 1.1, p. 3; 1.3, p. 6; 1.4, p. 7; Anti-government elements, 3.3, p. 32; 3.6.1, p. 34].

Human Rights Watch stated that ISKP had carried out 13 attacks against Hazaras since the Taliban takeover, and that the group could be linked to 3 additional attacks, resulting in the death of at least 700 people [COI Update 2022, 3, p. 9].

As a majority of the Shia Muslims in Afghanistan belong to the Hazara ethnic group, the Hazaras have been the main victims of sectarian targeting against Shias. However, other Shia groups have also become victims of targeted attacks, both before and after the Taliban takeover. For instance, some of the sectarian attacks against Shia Muslims have been carried out in areas that are not Hazara dominated. AA source also noted that the victims of the attack on a Shia mosque in Kandahar in October 2021 were not primarily Hazaras  [Targeting 2022, 6.4.5, p. 143].

Risk analysis

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing, abduction, sectarian attacks). When the acts in question are restrictions on the exercise of certain rights of less severe nature or (solely) discriminatory measures, the individual assessment of whether they could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a Hazara and/or Shia applicant to face persecution should take into account their area of origin and whether ISKP has operational capacity there, with those from Hazara-dominated areas in larger cities being particularly at risk.

Being a Hazara may also be a risk-impacting circumstance in relation to other profiles, such as: 3.1. Members of the security institutions of the former government, 3.2. Public officials and servants of the former government, 3.10. Humanitarian workers, 3.12. Individuals perceived to have transgressed religious, moral and/or societal norms, 3.13. Individuals perceived as ‘Westernised’, 3.15. Women and girls.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile may be for reasons of religion, (imputed) political opinion (e.g. links to the former government, perceived support for Iran), and/or race (ethnicity).