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Security situation in Afghanistan: recent events

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

Situation in Afghanistan

After the United States in April 2021 announced the withdrawal of its remaining troops by September 2021, the Taliban started an advance across rural and later urban Afghanistan, often encountering only minimal resistance from the ANDSF, and ultimately resulting in the capture of control of almost the whole Afghan territory, including Kabul, by 15 August 2021. On 6 September 2021, the Taliban also claimed the capture of the Panjshir Valley, ‘the last remaining enclave of resistance’ [Security 2022, 1.1, p. 21].

Presence, methods and tactics of actors

After the end of the conflict with the former government and the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate, the Taliban are reported to be in control of all Afghan districts and provinces [Security 2022, 1.2.1, p. 23; 2.1, p. 36].

Soon after their takeover of power, the Taliban started to establish a military structure, although the exact structure of these forces remains unclear. Taliban concentrated their troops mainly in the cities, some border areas and in Panjshir Province. The presence of Taliban and their troops in rural areas is reported to be relatively limited [Security 2022, 2.1.1. a, p. 37; 2.1.1 b, 38-39].

Some internal divisions among the Taliban were reported. In the first seven months after the takeover ACLED documented 33 incidents in which Taliban forces clashed with each other [Security 2022, 2.1.3, pp. 41-43].

Although the Taliban control all of Afghan territory, two main conflicts related to other actors remain active in the country:

Anti-Taliban resistance movements

[Main COI reference: Security 2022, 2.2, pp. 44-49; COI Update 2022, 3, p. 6]

A number of different groups are opposing the Taliban, of which the NRF is the most prominent. NRF and affiliated groups have mainly been operating in Panjshir Province and adjacent northern areas, including Andarab District of Baghlan Province, It is reported that the size and capabilities of the various resistance groups, as well as coordination and cooperation between them, are limited.

NRF resorts mainly to tactics of guerrilla warfare and to hit-and-run attacks targeting Taliban checkpoints and outposts.

Incidents related to NRF are mainly reported in Badakhshan, Baghlan, Balkh, Kapisa, Panjshir, Parwan, Takhar.

According to sources, none of the other anti-Taliban resistance groups have the capability to carry out significant attacks against Taliban positions.

ISKP

[Main COI reference: Security 2022, 2.3, pp. 50-54; 3.1, pp. 59-62; COI Update 2022, 3, pp. 7-9]

After the takeover of power by the Taliban, ISKP fighters have been involved in attacks against Taliban members as well as against civilians, such as Shia Hazara.

It is reported that ISKP holds no or only limited territory in Afghanistan [Security 2022, 1.1, p. 22]. Its activities are traditionally concentrated in Kabul and in some rural areas in eastern provinces like Kunar and Nangarhar. ISKP fighters appeared to have presence in nearly all provinces and attacks claimed by ISKP were also reported beyond the above-mentioned areas. It was reported that Taliban attempted to maintain pressure on ISKP, fighting it in its main area of activity in rural Nangarhar as well as in urban centres. A crackdown by the Taliban on ISKP hideouts in Nangarhar in Autumn 2021 diminished the group’s fighting capacities there.

In its activities against the Taliban, ISKP resorts to attacks on security convoys, checkpoints and personnel, often making use of IEDs. Taliban activities against ISKP include setting up checkpoints, conducting house-to-house searches as well as killings and forced disappearances of suspected ISKP members, including members of Salafist communities [Security 2022, 2.3, p. 50; Targeting 2022, 1.4, pp. 49-50].

ISKP is also responsible for several attacks targeting individuals with various profiles (former ANDSF, activists, etc.) and attacks against the Shia-minority in urban areas. Attacks against Shia individuals and their modes of transport are reported in Hazara-dominated areas in cities. Furthermore, ISKP conducted several large-scale attacks against Shia mosques, hospitals and schools [Security 2022, 2.3, p. 51; Targeting 2022, 6.4, p. 32].

Security incidents

[Main COI reference: Security 2022, 3, pp. 58-78, COI Update 2022, 3, p. 10]

Data concerning this indicator are primarily based on ACLED reporting from the period 15 August 2021 to 21 October 2022 6 . Relevant reporting from other sources, including the UN Secretary General and UCDP, is also noted.

Where ACLED data on fatalities is included, this refers to both combatants and non-combatants. Such data is included primarily to indicate the intensity of confrontations and other security incidents rather than their impact on the civilian population.

According to the UN’s Secretary General, in the months following the Taliban takeover (19 August – 31 December 2021) the number of armed clashes, airstrikes and attacks with IEDs all decreased with more than 91 % compared to the same period in 2020. This decrease continued in the first months of 2022 and is most noticeable in rural areas, where previously many of the confrontations between the Taliban and ANDSF took place.

ACLED documented 2 635 security incidents during the reference period of 15 August 2021 – 21 October 2022, of which 1 164 were coded as ‘battles,’ 994 as ‘violence against civilians,’ and 477 as ‘explosions/remote violence’.

Provinces where most security icidents were recorded in the reporting period included  Panjshir (322), Kabul (309), Baghlan (234), Nangarhar (214) Takhar (199), Kandahar (118), Badakhshan (113), Parwan (111), Kunar (110), Kapisa (97), and Balkh (76).

Of the 1 164 battles registered by ACLED, 225 took place in Panjshir, 152 in Baghlan, 103 in Takhar, 80 in Nangarhar, 74 in Parwan, 70 in Kapisa, 66 in Badakhshan and 61 in Kabul. From Spring 2022 onwards, an increase in armed clashes between Taliban and NRF was reported, most notably in northern provinces.

Explosions and remote violence mostly affected the provinces of Kabul (102), Kunar (48), Nangarhar (45), Helmand (30) and Panjshir (29).

In the period between 16 August 2021 and 22 October 2022, UCDP documented 925 security incidents in which at least one fatality was recorded.

  • 6ACLED identified in its 2021 Codebook three codes for the geo-precision of events. For the purposes of assessing the level of indiscriminate violence under Article 15(c) QD at provincial level all three geo-precision codes for security incidents are taken into account. Where a focus on specific provincial capitals is included, only security incidents with the geo-precision at level 1 and 2 were taken into account. For more information on ACLED data, see COI Update 2022 at https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2022_11_Q35_EUAA_CO….

Civilian casualties

[Main COI reference: Security 2022, 3.3, pp. 71-78; COI Update 2022, p. 12]

Information concerning this indicator is mostly based on UNAMA and UCDP reporting. There are certain distinctions between the two sources, in particular in terms of period and scope of reporting.

The UNAMA report covers the period from 15 August 2021 to 15 June 2022 and provides information on civilian casualties (including both civilian fatalities and injured civilians) at a country level.

UCDP provides province-segregated information for the period from 16 August 2021 to 22 October 2022. Its reporting is limited to the number of civilian deaths (fatalities)7 .

In the period between 15 August 2021 and 15 June 2022, UNAMA recorded 2 106 civilian casualties (700 killed and 1 406 injured), which is a significant decrease compared to previous years.

UCDP recorded 1 270  civilian deaths in the period between 16 August 2021 and 22 October 2022, the majority of which occurred in Kabul (459), followed by Kunduz (179), Balkh (92), Herat (92), Kandahar (89) and Panjshir (79).

The main cause of civilian fatalities recorded by UCDP were ISKP-attributed IED attacks on non-military targets. Attacks resulting in civilian deaths included the bombing at the Hamid Karzai Kabul Airport on 26 August 2021 (180 civilian fatalities), suicide bomb attacks against Shia mosques in Kunduz (50) and Kandahar (40) in October 2021, the attack on the Military Hospital in Kabul on 2 November 2021 (25), IED attacks on a Shia Mosque in Mazar (31) and on Sufi mosques in Kunduz (33) and Kabul (10) in April 2022, and the attack against the Kaaj education centre in Kabul (52) on 30 September 2022.

The second cause of civilian casualties were unexploded ordnances. UNAMA documented 51 deaths and 76 injuries due to explosive remnants of war between 1 January and the end of April 2022. UNOCHA listed Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Ghor, Nangarhar, Faryab and Kunduz as the provinces with the highest priority for UN Mine Action Service. In April 2022, UNICEF reported that, since the Taliban takeover, 301 children had either been killed or injured by explosive remnants of war and landmines. The organisation expected a further rise of such incidents as civilians, due to the improved security situation, ventured into areas that were previously inaccessible [Security 2022, 3.2, pp. 62, 70-71]. 

  • 7The UCDP data set distinguishes ‘unclear’ cases from ‘clear’ cases. The ’unclear’ category contains conflicts that likely fulfil the definition of a conflict used by UCDP, but where information on one criterion is missing. For the purposes of assessing the level of indiscriminate violence under Article 15(c) QD, civilian deaths (fatalities) from both 'clear' and 'unclear’ events are taken into account. For more information on UCDP data, see COI Update 2022.

Conflict-related displacement

[Main COI reference: Security 2022, 3.3.2, pp. 74-78]

 Information concerning this indicator is mostly based on IOM and UNOCHA reporting. There are certain distinctions between the two sources in terms of period and scope of reporting.

In particular, IOM report covers the period between August 2021 and December 2021 and provides information on four population categories: arrival IDPs, returned IDPs, persons who moved abroad, and returnees from abroad.

UNOCHA provides province-segregated information on conflict induced displacement, for the periods from 15 August 2021 to 30 November 2021 and 1 January to 21 May 2022. UNOCHA does not provide data for December 2021.

In 2021, IOM recorded 1 327 474 new IDPs, of whom around 62 % were displaced due to conflict. UNHCR recorded 789 590 conflict-induced IDPs between the start of 2021 and mid-April 2022.

It is reported that most conflict-induced displacement in 2021 occurred between May and August 2021. In the period between the takeover of power by the Taliban and 30 November 2021, UNOCHA recorded 107 402 conflict related displaced persons. In the first months of 2022 until mid-June 2022, a total of 1 155 IDPs were recorded, most of them originating from Baghlan (763) and Panjshir (392).

After the takeover of power by the Taliban many of the newly displaced persons returned to their place of origin. IOM reported that from August until the end of 2021 a total of 2 194 472 IDPs returned to their home communities.