In case the criterion of ‘safety’ is satisfied, as a next step, it has to be established whether an applicant can:

Figure 16. IPA: assessment of the travel and admittance requirement.

The general situation and the individual circumstances of the applicant should be taken into account when assessing whether they can safely and legally travel and gain admittance to Damascus City.

It should be noted that in the context of Syria and in particular the security measures related to State actors, the three requirements should be read in conjunction.

Damascus International Airport is located 30 kilometres southeast of downtown Damascus (about 30 minutes by car from the city centre). Damascus International Airport is controlled by Air Force Intelligence services. While the airport is identified as operational, the precautionary measures taken by the Syrian government to counter the spread of COVID-19 in late March 2020 impacted Syria’s border crossings and Damascus International Airport as international flights were suspended. It was reported on 23 March 2020 that the airport was closed to commercial flights, and repatriation flights were organised by Syrian Airlines. This closure lasted for several months and ended on 1 October 2020 when the airport was officially reopened [Damascus 2021, 2.1].

The airport region witnessed several security incidents during the reporting period. Sites inside and around Damascus International Airport were targeted by Israeli airstrikes on different occasions in 2020 and 2021, for example in February 2021, when airstrikes targeted weapons being smuggled into Syria from Iran. Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military and ammunition sites are located in the vicinity of the airport [Damascus 2021, 2.1].

While the number of checkpoints in Damascus governorate is reported to be significantly reduced (by 90 %), checkpoints continue to operate on the road between the airport and Damascus City. As of February 2021, most of the checkpoints were located in the southern neighbourhoods of Damascus city and in Damascus countryside, as well as on highways that connect the city to the countryside. There were checkpoints situated on the roads leading to areas and neighbourhoods where Syrian government and military officials and forces as well as pro-regime Palestinian groups are located. Furthermore, two checkpoints controlled by the security forces are located on the highways connecting Damascus and Dar’a. In the north, there are three checkpoints: one on the road to Harasta, and two on the Homs-Damascus highway. In some Shia-majority neighbourhoods in Old Damascus, Iran-backed militias established checkpoints to guard the area. In addition to the fixed checkpoints, it was reported in December 2020 that the military intelligence branch established ‘dozens of mobile checkpoints’ in various neighbourhoods of the city [Damascus 2021, 2.3.1].

Sources further reported that thorough checks were conducted at checkpoints situated on main roads and entrances of Damascus with the most scrutiny being observed at checkpoints between Damascus city and Eastern Ghouta [Damascus 2021, 2.3.1]. Treatment at checkpoints was reported to include extortion, arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial detention, harassment, torture and forced disappearance [Damascus 2020, 2.3].

It was reported that between eight and 12 fixed and mobile checkpoints existed on the road between Damascus and the airport, manned mainly by intelligence branches, the Republican Guard and Iranian forces. There were reportedly two or three checkpoints on the Damascus International Airport road, but the number could vary. One of the checkpoints was run by the SAA and the others by intelligence forces. Regular screening of people is conducted by the checkpoint located at the entrance of Damascus, which is manned by an intelligence branch. Sources noted that there have been no attacks by armed groups on checkpoints on the Airport road. The most common type of security incidents reported was when cars pass by a checkpoint without noticing it and are shot at. The source added that arrests mainly took place at the airport, but not much at the checkpoints on the road to the airport, reiterating that people coming from opposition areas risked more scrutiny and searches than people coming from loyalist areas [Damascus 2021, 2.3.5].

‘Wanted lists’ were reported to include between 1.5 and 3 million names. Sources stated that each branch of Syria’s security services had its own ‘wanted lists’ and they did not coordinate for clearing names. It was generally difficult for people to know their status with the GoS. While sources noted that those with financial means and connections could find out if their name was on ‘wanted lists’, this potentially exposed them. It was also not a guarantee against difficulties, including the risk of arrest [Damascus 2020, 2.3].

Profiles at particular risk of arrest at checkpoints tend to be those who return to Syria without security permission or reconciliation in place prior to traveling, individuals who work or carry out activities believed to oppose the government, such as journalism, aid work, local councils, rescue workers, as well as men of military age, and those with family members who were forcibly displaced to Idlib or Aleppo [Damascus 2020, 2.4]. Syrians and Palestinians who were on wanted lists for reasons related to military service, political or anti-government activities, and criminal charges were subjected to arrests at checkpoints. Relatives of prominent political or armed activists may also encounter harassment, be interrogated or even arrested at checkpoints. [Damascus 2021, 2.3.4]

Passing through checkpoints requires identification documents. Almost all checkpoints have the capacity to check a person’s background and military service status [Damascus 2020, 2.4].

Insecurity is reported to have disproportionately affected women and intensified restrictions on them. They faced greater risks in access to livelihoods and security as their restricted mobility was further impacted by security and honour concerns in the conflict environment [Damascus 2020, 2.4].

The Syrian Constitution provides for freedom of movement of citizens unless ‘prevented by a decision from the competent court or the public prosecution office or in accordance with the laws of public health and safety’. However, in practice, freedom of movement in Syria in 2019 was ‘severely restricted’ due to ongoing combat and ‘proliferation of regime and militia checkpoints’. Syrian citizens are also allowed to travel internationally, but the government denied access to passports and civil documentation based on political views, association with the opposition, or geographical location associated with the opposition. The GoS imposed exit visa requirements and was reported to closely monitor Damascus Airport and border crossings. [Damascus 2021, 2.2]

Sources have indicated that exit visas were not generally required for Syrians who intended to leave the country, but that ‘certain profiles’ needed to obtain permission from one or more agencies to be allowed to cross the borders. Such profiles included government officials, who were required to obtain a permission from their employer and a security clearance; as well as men aged 18-42 who needed to obtain written permission from the military conscription branch if their military booklet did not indicate that they were permanently exempted from the service or had paid the exemption fee [Damascus 2021, 2.2].

The Syrian Ministry of Interior issued a circular in March 2019 waiving the punishment of illegal exit by means of imprisonment and/or fines which used to be in effect previously [Returnees from abroad, 2.1, 3.1]. Between January and September 2020, SNHR documented 38 cases of arrests of Syrian returnees from abroad, either through Damascus Airport or from Lebanon. In 2020, SNHR documented 89 cases of arrests of returnees from abroad, without specifying the areas of return. [Damascus 2021, 2.2.1].

Sources interviewed in August and September 2020, stated that people who want to move from one area of Damascus and settle in another ‘will have to obtain a security approval in order to rent or buy a property in the new area’. It was noted that in order to settle, change residence, and/or rent property in Damascus, one needs to get a security clearance issued by the security services regardless of where the person comes from (abroad, other GoS-controlled governorates or areas outside GoS control) and the rental or purchase contract need to be certified by the mukhtar of the area to which the person intends to move, who then sends the contract information to the security branches for approval.  Moreover, both the person renting/purchasing the property and the owner of the property should have no security issues for the approval to be granted. The rental agreement must be registered at the municipality, and registering an address is key for returns or moving houses. It was observed that sometimes a person is denied such an authorisation based on objections from residents of the neighbourhood, the applicant’s questionable loyalty to the government or merely for corruption (in some cases when the applicant paid USD 100, they received the authorisation). Additionally, when moving houses or furniture, the local authorisation has to be presented at checkpoints. Without the authorisation of the security branch, one also could not obtain a Smart Card, which gives purchasing access to government-rationed subsidised goods such as food and fuel [Damascus 2021, 2.3.7].

The returnees need to obtain an approval from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e. Tabu to prove that they are returning to their own properties, in addition to a clearance from the security agencies. However, returnees living abroad whose record affiliates them with the opposition would face more difficulties to register or obtain an authorisation and may even face risk of detention. In order to rent or rehabilitate an accommodation in areas of Damascus that were previously held by the opposition, an authorisation is required, and can be obtained from local security branches instead of the central security as of 2020 [Damascus 2021, 2.3.7].

Access to some areas of Damascus, such as Al-Qaboun, Al-Yarmouk, Jobar, and Al-Qadam, is almost completely prohibited due to significant destruction and security permission is required for entering those areas [Damascus 2021, 2.3.6].

For those applicants who meet the ‘safety’ criterion, the assessment of the availability of IPA in Damascus City should proceed with an assessment of the requirements of safety and legality of travel and of gaining admittance. The profile and individual circumstances of the applicant should be taken into account in this regard. For individuals who would return to Syria without identity documents or without security clearance or status settlement in place prior to traveling, these requirements would not be satisfied.

Continue reading the common analysis on:  Preliminary remarks 5.1. Part of the country 5.2. Safety 5.3. Travel and admittance 5.4. Reasonableness to settle 5.4.1. General situation 5.4.2. Individual circumstances 5.4.3. Conclusions on reasonableness