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COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: November 2021

[Main COI reference: Security 2021, 2.10]

General information

Damascus governorate, which covers Syria’s capital, is located in the south-western part of Syria and is completely surrounded by the Rural Damascus (Rif Damashq) governorate. The governorate is divided into 16 municipal districts: Barzeh, Qaboun, Jobar, Al-Shaghour, Al-Midan, Al-Qadam, Kafr Sousa, Dummar, Al-Mazzeh, Rukn Al-Din, Al-Salihiyah, Al-Mouhajrin, Saroujah, Al-Qanawat, Old Damascus, and Yarmouk camp. In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Damascus governorate to be of 1 827 501 inhabitants.

Sunni communities in former opposition-held areas in Damascus have been subject to mass displacement to other parts of the country. Conversely, Shias from other parts of the country have become displaced to Damascus.

Background of the conflict

During the conflict, which in this governorate lasted from November 2012 until the government regained control in May 2018, opposition groups infiltrated the Jobar district of Damascus city itself, gaining partial control of this district (spring 2013) and reportedly those of Barzeh and Qabun northeast of the city centre (summer 2013), and in the southern districts of Al-Qadam and Yarmouk. Still, nearly all of Damascus governorate remained under GoS control throughout the conflict and through 2016-2018, the government gradually regained control of the suburbs. According to the Carter Center, the conflict inside Damascus city mainly played out in opposition-held areas, including the Jobar, Qaboun, Tishreen, and Barzeh neighbourhoods, areas that were connected to Eastern Ghouta, the opposition’s stronghold. In May 2018, ISIL surrendered in Yarmouk and Tadamoun. As the government regained all of Damascus and Rural Damascus in May 2018, the SAA’s Fourth Division eventually came in control of the whole of southern Damascus.

Actors: control and presence

Sources noted in August 2020 that ISIL and other opposition groups no longer had presence in Damascus. As of March 2021, the governorate was under the control of the GoS.

Nature of violence and examples of incidents

Since 2018, when the GoS retook all areas in Damascus and Rural Damascus from opposition groups, there have been no major security incidents such as battles or military operations in the two governorates, the DIS reported in October 2020. The government’s control of security in the former opposition-held areas in Damascus was reported as ‘calm’ and ‘firm’. In some places in Damascus armed clashes between pro-GoS militias were reported.

There have been six explosions in Damascus City in February 2020, in comparison to the 17 explosions the previous year. In October 2020, a few security incidents were reported in Yarmouk camp and in February 2021 occasional Israeli air raids took place against Iranian-backed militia bases in the capital and its countryside, targeting militia bases areas or buildings but damaging collaterally civilian houses by air defence system activated by the GoS. No civilian casualties were recorded.

In October 2020, there were reports that kidnappings of civilians for ransom, including kidnappings of children by gangs, had been increasing in Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates through the previous months. These attacks were reportedly committed for ransom, for organ trade and for forced recruitment to mercenaries. By December 2020, the SOHR had recorded 39 kidnappings in Damascus and Rural Damascus.

It was also reported that in 2020 explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines were exploding and causing civilian casualties in Damascus and Rural Damascus on a weekly basis. Such incidents were, however, limited to areas where major military confrontations had taken place before the summer of 2018, such as Jobar. To some extent, ERW also remained a risk in Yarmouk.

Incidents: data

ACLED recorded 41 security incidents (average of 0.6 security incident per week) in Damascus governorate in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 March 2021. Of the reported incidents, 25 were coded as ‘violence against civilians’, 13 as ‘explosions/remote violence’, and 3 as ‘battles’. Nearly all of the incidents recorded by ACLED as ‘violence against civilians’ (24 out of the 25), referred to violent attacks on unarmed civilians such as sexual violence, attacks, abduction/forced disappearance.

Geographical scope

ACLED data does not provide details on the incidents desegregated by districts in Damascus. It can be noted that security incidents were recorded in Mezzeh area, Bab Musallah and Barjeh areas in Damascus city in February 2020. A car bombing was reported near the Tishreen Stadium in central Damascus the same period, while two explosions took place near Anis Bin Malik mosque in the Nahr Aisha area of Damascus in July 2020. An explosion also took place near the bus terminal in the al-Sumariya area in December 2020.

Civilian fatalities: data

VDC recorded 100 civilian fatalities in 2020 and 13 civilian fatalities in the first three months of 2021. SNHR recorded 9 civilian fatalities in 2020 and 1 civilian fatality in January 2021. For the full reporting period, this represented 113 civilian fatalities in total or approximately 6 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants according to VDC data; and 10 civilian fatalities in total or less than 1 civilian fatality per 100 000 inhabitants according to SNHR.

Displacement

UNOCHA data on displacement showed that in 2020, around 4 000 IDP movements were recorded from Damascus, including around 1 000 within the governorate. Less than 500 IDP movements from Damascus, including within the governorate, were reported in the first three months of 2021.

In 2020, UNOCHA recorded 930 IDP return movements to Damascus, including from districts within the governorate. Few return movements to Damascus were reported in the first three months of 2021.

Further impact on civilians

Significant damage to infrastructure has been reported in several areas including in Jobar, Barza (Barzeh), Al-Balad, MIdan Wastani, Bab Touma, Yarmouk, central Tadamoun. Little or no reconstruction effort has been made by the GoS in most of those areas. In the most damaged areas of the city, the GoS had not started reconstruction and had not even allowed houses to be rebuilt. The GoS attempted to gain control of land and property to forcibly reorganise neighbourhoods such as Yarmouk, Qadam, Hajar al-Aswad and Jobar. In other areas of the city, administrative and financial obstacles were preventing owners from starting repairs.

 

Looking at the indicators it can be concluded that in the governorate of Damascus, there is, in general, no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.