The Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a civil uprising against the government of President Bashar al-Assad, inspired by the Arab Spring protests. Since 2012, the conflict became increasingly violent and developed in a full-scale civil war, as armed opposition groups confronted Syrian government forces and began seizing key territories. The rise of Islamist groups and subsequent infighting marked another phase in the conflict that culminated in 2014, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) conquering large areas in the eastern part of the country and further into Iraq and establishing the so-called ‘Islamic State caliphate’. The creation of the ‘caliphate’ prompted the military intervention of an international US-led coalition against ISIL. Since late 2015, military interventions of other external actors in support of Assad marked the comeback of the Syrian government, which gradually recaptured most territories and consolidated its control. By the end of 2018, the conflict was viewed as having shifted decisively in Assad’s favour. Assad was re-elected for a fourth term as President of Syria in the May 2021 elections, which were found to lack any form of credibility. [Actors, 1.1; Security 2021, 1.2]

During the course of the war, Syria became the scene for a series of intersecting conflicts involving many internal and international actors [Actors, 1.1]. Three main campaigns have driven the conflict in Syria: the violence between the Syrian government and opposition forces; the efforts of a US-led coalition to defeat ISIL; and the military operations against Syrian Kurds by Turkish forces [Security 2021, 1.4]. Complex alliances, shifting allegiances, rivalries and conflicting interests between the actors involved continue to affect the balance of power and to foster uncertainty [Actors, 1.1].

Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed, with most international experts estimating the number at around 500 000 since the beginning of the conflict. The conflict has also caused the biggest displacement crisis in the world. According to estimates, it has driven some 5.6 million Syrian refugees out of the country and more than 6 million IDPs have been displaced in Syria, 70 % of whom have been displaced for over five years.  [Security 2021, 1.6.3, 1.6.5]

A combination of factors, including the financial crisis in neighbouring Lebanon, international economic sanctions, and the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a significant worsening of socio-economic conditions in Syria during the reference period. The economic situation has also contributed to a rapid deterioration of humanitarian conditions in the country. [Damascus 2021, 3.1.3]

The significant impact on the civilian population in the country has been the result of deliberate targeting by multiple actors, as well as risks associated with indiscriminate violence. The individual assessment of international protection needs should also take into account the presence and activity of different actors in the applicant’s home area and the situation in the areas the applicant would need to travel through in order to reach their home area. Moreover, the assessment should account for the dynamically changing security situation in the country. It should also be noted that in some cases, where international protection needs would be established, exclusion considerations may be relevant.

 The implications of leaving Syria

It is inherent in the situation of applicants for international protection that they have left their country of origin. In the context of Syria, and in particular of targeting by the government of Syria (GoS), this in itself could have implications for the treatment of an individual upon return.7F7F^[8] 

This section is to be read in conjunction with the other sections of this country guidance, and in particular those concerning different profiles under Refugee status, Article 15(b) QD, Actors of protection and Internal protection alternative.

Following the Syrian forces’ territorial gains over the past years, the government is trying to foster the image of stability and is now calling on refugees to return. These GoS statements constituted a change from the previous stance of the GoS, which had perceived the mass exodus as a means of gaining a more homogenous society and ensuring subservience from the civilian population [IDPs and returnees, 3.1]. On 11 November 2020 the GoS organised a two-day Russia-backed conference in Damascus aimed at facilitating the return of millions of Syrian refugees to Syria. The conference was attended by a few countries including Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, and Venezuela. The EU boycotted the conference, arguing that the situation in Syria was not conducive to a safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of refugees. The EU pointed out that the Syrian authorities continued to violate human rights, including forced conscription, indiscriminate detention, forced disappearances, torture, physical and sexual violence and discrimination in access to housing, land and property. Thus, the EU regarded the conference on return as premature. UNHCR and the US also boycotted the event [Returnees from abroad, 1.1; Damascus 2021, 2.2.1].

There are no available statistics on how many Syrians and stateless persons from Syria have returned from the EU to Syria in 2020 [Returnees from abroad, 1.2]. For the same year, 12 817 voluntary refugee returns from Lebanon and Jordan to Syria were recorded, while for the first three months of 2021, 2 107 such returns were recorded. The COVID-19 pandemic obstructed the process of return from Lebanon to Syria. On 22 March 2020, the Syrian authorities closed the land crossings between Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Syrians who had left Lebanon got stuck in the buffer zone between the two countries [Returnees from abroad, 1.3.3, 1.3.4]. The total number of self-organised refugee returns to Syria for 2020 was indicated by UNHCR to be 38 233, mainly from neighbouring countries [Damascus 2021, 2.2.1]. With regard to returns from Lebanon, sources noted that the extent to which these returns were truly ‘voluntary’ in nature could questioned. Lebanon was struck by a series of setbacks: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut Port explosion, and financial, economic and political crises, and Syrian refugees were among the most vulnerable and impoverished groups in Lebanese society, since many had neither legal residency nor a durable income [Returnees from abroad, 1.3.2].

In mid-October 2020, the Turkish Minister of Interior stated that over 414 000 Syrians had returned voluntarily to Syria, without clarifying whether the Syrians who had been ‘resettled’ in the buffer zone alongside the Turkish-Syrian border actually originated from this area. UNHCR had recorded 16 805 voluntary returns from Turkey to Syria in 2020 and 5 124 voluntary refugee returns during the first three months of 2021. [Returnees from abroad, 1.3.2]

The Syrian Ministry of Interior issued a circular in March 2019 waiving the punishment of illegal exit by means of imprisonment and/or fines which used to be in effect previously. However, a formal procedure referred to as ‘status settlement’ or ‘security clearance’ is a prerequisite for returning to Syria after having exited illegally. The aim of the processes is to legalise one’s status or to ‘sort out [one’s] affairs’. [Returnees from abroad, 2.1, 3.1]

According to the DIS, the application for a security clearance is a procedure through which the Syrian authorities cross-check whether a person is on any ‘wanted list’ and is to be considered a security threat, whereas settling one’s status involves a process in which a person settles their outstanding security issues with the Syrian authorities, like having left the country illegally, having participated in an anti-government demonstration, or having evaded the military service. However, several sources have noted that there was no clear distinction between applying for a security clearance and settling one’s status. [Returnees from abroad, 3.1]

As far as the procedure itself is concerned, a security clearance can be applied for at a Syrian embassy or consulate by the returnee himself/herself or inside Syria by a first-degree relative who will have to prove their family ties with the returnee. The completion of the application for a security clearance requires the ‘return’ or ‘reconciliation’ forms to be filled out. The forms contain questions requiring extensive information on any involvement they or their relatives have had with the political opposition. Depending on the applicant’s answer to the security-related questions, they may either incriminate themselves for being aware of ‘terrorism activities’ or they may fail to fulfil their citizen’s duty to report ‘terrorism’. According to some sources, the Syrian authorities are interested in persuading dissident returnees to come back home only to arrest them upon return either to quell their anti-government activism or to extort money from their families. [Returnees from abroad, 3.2]

Syrian refugees in Lebanon have pointed out that a risk they fear upon returning is the practice of writing a taqrir (a ‘report’, meaning reporting people to the security agencies). They reported on instances of detention upon return as a result of being denounced by neighbours or even family members. The practice of writing a taqrir is reportedly used either to avoid being targeted, for personal gain or vengeance. [IDPs and returnees, 3.5]

All applications are forwarded to Syria’s security apparatus. Once the security clearance is granted, the returnee would obtain written approval, a document stamped by the Syrian Ministry of Interior. There are also sources according to which applications could be rejected for numerous different reasons, for example, for criticising the GoS on social media, having a relative in detention, having a name that is similar to that of a wanted person, returning from a country that is deemed hostile to the GoS, hailing from a former opposition stronghold, etc. In general, the processing of applications for a security clearance is arbitrary and non-transparent. [Returnees from abroad, 3.2]

Returnees at the border may be detained for a short period - between one hour and several days. Even among the ‘voluntary returnees’, some may face issues such as extortion, forced conscription, arrest, detention, torture and death in custody, for example persons who had evaded military conscription or who, or family members of whom, had connections with an armed opposition group, or who are part of an NGO inside or outside Syria, or are travelling back and forth to Syria from abroad, etc. [Targeting, 1.3.6]. Disappearances and arrests on return to Syria, including at the airport in Damascus, have been reported. In 2020, SNHR documented 89 cases of arrests of returnees from abroad, without specifying the areas of return [Damascus, 2.2.1]. Between January and September 2020, SNHR documented 38 cases of arrests of Syrian returnees from abroad, either through Damascus Airport or from Lebanon, via official crossings or through smuggling routes. Those returning from Lebanon had previously undergone status settlement. In January 2020, Mazen al-Hummada, a prominent Syrian human rights activist was arrested upon his return to Syria at Damascus airport. His whereabouts remained unknown. According to multiple sources, obtaining a security clearance will by no means guarantee a safe return to Syria, and the Syrian authorities continued to arrest, (temporarily) detain, interrogate, torture and/or prosecute returnees in terrorism courts upon return. [Returnees from abroad, 5]

Returnees also face a lack of rule of law, widespread human rights violations, and poor economic prospects. State guarantees as part of reconciliation agreements are not fulfilled, for both individuals and communities. Returnees have been arrested, detained, harassed or conscripted after they had completed the reconciliation process and received protection papers [Targeting, 1.3.6]. In reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI) from August 2020 and January 2021, the UN observed that the Syrian authorities routinely denied Syrians return to their places of origin, most notably in formerly besieged areas that had been retaken by the Syrian armed forces. Some sources stated that some groups of returnees were denied access to a particular area of origin, because of their ethnicity, religion and/or political orientation [Returnees from abroad, 4.1].

Lacking civil documentation does not necessarily obstruct the process of return itself, according to some sources. Those who do not have a passport or whose passport expired, for instance, can apply for a laissez-passer at a Syrian diplomatic mission abroad. However, a lack of civil documentation certainly represents an obstacle upon return when seeking to access government services, to initiate legal procedures and to file property claims. [Returnees from abroad, 4.2]

According to some sources, there were no consequences known of having applied for asylum abroad and the sources had no information that such applicants were specifically punished on return. [Targeting, 1.3.6, Returnees from abroad, 2.2]

The fact of having left Syria in itself would not normally lead to the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. In most cases where a well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, this would be related to circumstances falling under other profiles included in this guidance, and in particular Persons perceived to be opposing the government. However, in some cases, returnees could be exposed to acts which are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. arrest, torture) and a nexus to a reason for persecution may be substantiated. In cases where no nexus can be substantiated, the implications of having left Syria may be a relevant consideration with regard to subsidiary protection. They should also be taken into account when assessing the willingness of the GoS to provide protection in the meaning of Article 7 QD and in the assessment of an internal protection alternative (IPA).