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COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: November 2021

[Main COI reference: Security 2021, 2.12]

General information

Dar’a governorate is located in southern Syria, bordering the governorates of Quneitra, Rural Damascus and Sweida. It also shares an international border with Jordan to the south. The governorate is divided into three districts: Dar’a, Izra’ and As Sanamayn. In a March 2021 report, UNOCHA estimated the population of Dar’a governorate to be of 1 022 990 inhabitants.

The M5 motorway which runs through the governorate and connects Damascus to Jordan and to Aleppo, as well as its proximity to the Golan Heights, give Dar’a its strategic importance. These characteristics have also traditionally made it one of the most militarised regions in Syria. The population of Dar’a is almost entirely Sunni Muslim, with some Christian communities.

Background of the conflict

Dar’a city (the largest city of the governorate) is where the first protests broke out in 2011. Large parts of Dar’a governorate were brought under control of mainly moderate rebel factions from 2012, with the GoS remaining in control of some parts of the territory. In addition, ISIL and ISIL-affiliated groups had briefly captured portions of the governorate before they were pushed back to Yarmouk Basin. In 2017, Dar’a was designated as one of the ‘de-escalation’ zones by the US, Jordan and Russia. In June-July 2018, the GoS, through a combination of military campaigns and reconciliation agreements backed by the Russians, regained control of the governorate.

It is reported that these reconciliation deals resulted in a ‘patchwork’ of agreements across different actors in Dar’a, leading to ‘space for the emergence of unprecedented levels of instability’ post-reconciliation. Government civilian institutions and local councils were reportedly established and operating in all areas including those under the control of reconciled former non-state armed groups, according to a May 2019 UN report on Dar’a.

Since June 2019 and through 2020 the indirect competition between different foreign state actors for the governorate’s strategic geographical location has led to an escalation of violence and insecurity.

Actors: control and presence

As of the beginning of 2020, sources indicate that Dar’a governorate is under the nominal control of the GoS. In practice, the region is subjected to a complex web of political control with multiple, overlapping, uncoordinated branches of the security and military. According to the UN, territories ‘currently under the effective control’ of GoS and its forces are those taken by military operations, including 80 % of eastern and north-eastern rural Dar’a, areas of western rural Dar’a, and parts of Dar’a City, while ‘the rest of Dar’a is under effective control of former non-State armed groups, including those that agreed to the “reconciliation deals”’.

Russia exerts great influence in the governorate through the 8th brigade, which is a main armed actor in eastern Dar’a and a significant part of which is formed of reconciled rebel fighters.

Iran-backed groups and Hezbollah are also active in the southern and western parts of the governorate and they have been accused of being involved in assassinations against those opposed to their presence. They see the 8th brigade as an impediment to their plans to establish a long-term presence in Dar’a.

Since 2018, a number of new opposition armed groups have also emerged in Dar’a, such as Popular Resistance which is considered the most relevant in Dar’a governorate. This group whose ‘origins, memberships, and affiliations are largely unknown’ has carried out a number of attacks against government targets, including hit and run assaults and bombings on military headquarters and checkpoints, as well as assassinations of reconciled figures. Other emerging anti-GoS armed groups include the Southern Companies, the Special Task Companies and the Freemen of Kanaker.

ISIL has reportedly been active in Dar’a since 2019 and in 2020 and 2021 there were several attacks in the governorate attributed to them.

Nature of violence and examples of incidents

Since 2019, southern Dar’a has been in a state of lawlessness, as the GoS failed to maintain effective control in the region and the fragmented political and security environment combined with the frequent security incidents have created an unstable climate. It has been reported that since the return of the province to GoS control in 2018, assassinations, kidnappings, IED attacks and fatalities in seemingly hit-and-run incidents have been frequent occurrence in Dar’a. Throughout 2020, the security situation in Dar’a has significantly deteriorated as the result of a growing insurgency and the competition between multiple armed actors vying for control. There were reported clashes between different armed groups comprised of former opposition members and attacks against GoS targets.

Former rebels, ISIL cells and criminal groups launched attacks that resulted in the deaths of combatants as well as civilians and there were recorded numerous assassinations of civilians such as activists and doctors. On 1 March 2020, Syrian forces launched an operation to secure greater control over al-Sanamayn city, which had become a ‘hotbed of insurgent and anti-regime activity’. This attack prompted reaction from the population, and demonstrations quickly became violent with gunmen exchanging fire with the GoS military and security personnel until a mediated solution was achieved.

In May 2020 there were recorded two rounds of likely Israeli airstrikes against Iranian proxy and GoS targets. At the same time, ISIL were escalating their attacks in Dar’a governorate, although their operations remained small-scale. Between January and February 2021, a military escalation took place between former opposition fighters and GoS forces in Tafas, Dar’a governorate, an area described as an enclave for former opposition fighters. Clashes between the two sides involved shelling which led to casualties among the combatants [see also Security 2021, 1.5.1]. It was also reported that Iran-backed militia attacked a bus transporting soldiers of the 8th Brigade on 20 June 2020.

Incidents: data

ACLED recorded 716 security incidents (average of 11 security incidents per week) in Dar’a governorate in the period from 1 January 2020 to 31 March 2021. Of the reported incidents, 336 were coded as ‘battles’, 147 as ‘explosions/remote violence’, and 233 incidents of ‘violence against civilians’.

Geographical scope

Security incidents were recorded in all of Dar’a districts during the reporting period, with the highest number of overall incidents recorded in Dar’a district.

Civilian fatalities: data

VDC recorded 202 civilian fatalities in 2020 and 51 civilian fatalities in the first three months of 2021. SNHR recorded 217 civilian fatalities in 2020 and 44 civilian fatalities in the first three months of 2021. For the full reporting period, this represented 253 civilian fatalities in total or approximately 25 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants according to VDC data; and 265 civilian fatalities in total or approximately 26 civilian fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants according to SNHR.

Displacement

In 2020, 1 011 IDP movements were recorded within the governorate of Dar’a. In the first three months of 2021, approximately 10 300 IDP movements were registered by UNOCHA. Movements were primarily linked to the January 2021 clashes in Tafas, when around 10 000 people left the city and were displaced due to fears of an attack by the SAA to the city.

In 2020, 13 275 persons spontaneously returned to Dar’a, mostly from locations within the governorate itself. UNOCHA recorded 858 return movements to Dar’a in the first three months of 2021. Dar’a was one of the areas where the GoS has denied people return.

Further impact on civilians

A significant amount of residential properties as well as the water, sewage and irrigation systems in Dar’a city have suffered damages, resulting in unreliable and unevenly distributed electricity and water. Many civilians were unable to return due to the widespread destruction and damage to their homes, as well as problems of looting. Access to water, housing, education, and basic needs in the governorate was reported to be difficult for many residents. All of the governorate’s seven public hospitals have suffered damages except one located in Dar’a city. Explosive ordnance continues to cause injuries and death and to impede the safe use of residential areas and key infrastructure (roads, schools, health centres, agricultural land, and settlements).

 

Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that ‘mere presence’ in the area would not be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD in the governorate of Dar’a. However indiscriminate violence reaches a high level and, accordingly, a lower level of individual elements is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the territory, would face a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.

It should also be noted that the situation in the governorate is particularly volatile and the decision-maker is reminded that the most-up-to-date COI would need to be taken into account in this regard.