2.3. Non-State actors

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Al-Shabaab is an Islamist Sunni Salafi jihadist armed group based in Somalia. Formed in the early 2000s, the group seeks to establish an Islamic State in the country. Its main unifying idea is the ‘opposition to the Western-backed government’. [Security 2023, 1.3.1., p. 24]

The group is organised in a ’military wing’ and an intelligence agency. Its ‘military wing’ Jabahaat, reportedly increased in size and resources in the reference period. Different estimations on the number of Al-Shabaab fighters range from 7 000 to 20 000 individuals [Security 2023, 1.3.1, pp. 24-25; COI Update 2023, 1.2.2., p. 11; Actors, 4.2.1., p. 59].

Amniyat, the group’s (counter) intelligence agency aims to undermine local governance and enforce Al-Shabaab rule in Somalia [Actors, 4.2.2., pp. 59-60].

Overall, Al-Shabaab controls parts of rural central, southern, and western Somalia as well as more limited areas in other parts of the country (Galgala range in the Golis mountains in Puntland). Specifically for South-Central Somalia, Al-Shabaab controls almost the entire Middle Juba region, with its ‘official’ headquarters stationed in Jilib town. [Security 2023, 2.1.2, p. 68]

The group also maintains an active network throughout the Lower Shabelle region while its military presence often extends from the rural areas to the main supply routes serving the urban centres and surrounding areas [Security 2023, 2.2.3., p. 100]. Al-Shabaab maintains sieges on population centres controlled by the allied forces by manning checkpoints, laying ambushes, and conducting harassment raids on allied bases [Actors, 4.2.3., pp. 60-61; Targeting, 6.1., pp. 88-91; 6.2., pp. 91-92].

Reportedly, the group also changed its approach towards the population, realising its coercive model for securing obedience has backfired [COI Update 2023, 1.1.1., p. 5]. Likely as a tactic to gain local support, Al-Shabaab launched an operation targeting business owners, narcotics dealers, and Ciyaal Wero (local youths), who are known to rob civilians in Mogadishu [COI Update 2023, 1.1.1., p. 5].

Al-Shabaab has limited capacity to carry out attacks in Somaliland because it has only a small presence there and not necessarily the support of the local population [Targeting, 6.1., p. 90].

The relations between Al-Shabaab and clans are ambiguous. Though the Hawiye clan members dominate the different levels of the organisational structure of the group, all major lineages are represented in the organization, with Digil/Mirifle and Bantu constituting the main source of foot soldiers [Targeting, 1.1. pp. 17-18]. While, traditionally, the xeer and the clan logic rule Somali life, Al-Shabaab asserts that religion is what binds all clans together. At the same time, the group often appears to take advantage of clan loyalty as an effective attraction tool, using the frustration of minor clans with major clans for its own interest. [Actors, 3.5. pp. 55-56]

Following Al-Shabaab’s change in approach towards the population, some clan elders reached an agreement with the group to withdraw their support to the government’s offensive. Still, Al-Shabaab was accused of kidnapping relatives of the Ma’aawiisley militia, which had joined the government offensive against the group [COI Update 2023, 1.1.1., p. 5].  

Al-Shabaab’s preferred type of attack is the use of vehicle- or person-born improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks which have resulted in a high civilian casualty toll [Security 2023, 1.1., p. 18]. Complex attacks, hit-and-run attacks involving heavy gunfire, mortar attacks, assassinations, the use of hand grenades are other tactics used by the group [Actors, 4.2.2., pp. 60-61]. 

Al-Shabaab was reportedly involved in most security incidents in Somalia. Despite the main target of Al-Shabaab’s attacks being the anti-Al-Shabaab forces, UNSG attributed 788 civilian casualties to Al-Shabaab for the period between 8 May 2021 and 23 August 2022 . In the same time period, the group was responsible for about 60 % of grave violations against children, including attacks on schools, abductions, maiming, and killings [Security 2023, 1.4.1., pp. 40-42].

Reportedly, the offensive launched against it by government and allied forces that failed to weaken Al-Shabaab’s attacks capabilities. In retaliation, the group conducted a series of large-scale attacks on military basis on 11 February 2023 and on civilians and civilian infrastructure, such as houses, restaurants, hotels and markets in various locations in South Central Somalia. These attacks took place in areas mostly frequented by civilians. [Security 2023, 1.1., p. 18; 1.4.3., pp. 49-50; COI Update 2023, 1.2.2., p. 10] Al-Shabaab’s capabilities were also demonstrated through a wave of suicide-vehicle born improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) attacks in central Somalia in January 2023 [COI Update 2023, 1.2.1., p. 9].

Al-Shabaab also operates its own justice mechanism in areas under its control and elsewhere, via mobile courts, and may impose severe punishments, such as executions and amputations [Actors, 4.4]. See also relevant profile of 3.8.1. Individuals (perceived as) contravening Islamic laws in Al-Shabaab controlled areas. For more information on Al-Shabaab’s justice mechanism, see 5.2.1. Al-Shabaab under 5. Actors of protection.

Women’s rights and freedom of movement are limited by Al-Shabaab. For more information on the treatment of women by Al-Shabaab, see 3.13. Women and girls.

For further analysis and guidance in relation to human rights violations committed by Al-Shabaab and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see chapter 7. Exclusion.

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Clan rivalries and competitions over political power and resources are another source of conflict pervading the Somali society and clan militias are important actors of political life across Somalia. Their actions can be violent, uncontrollable and, sometimes, random. A clan militia is generally an armed group based on lineage and the result of the convergence of several individuals’ interests. [Actors, 3.4., p.52]

The clan militia Ma’awiisley (also Macawiisleey, Macawiisley, Macawisley, among others) was operating mainly in the Middle Shabelle region. Since August 2022, the clan militia, supported by SNA, ATMIS/AMISOM, US and Turkish drones, joined the government offensive to regain areas under the control of Al-Shabaab. Ma’awiisley reportedly ‘benefit from their network and have an understanding of rural communities’, including about the terrain, Al-Shabaab’s positions, and the minefields. [Security 2023, 1.1., p. 17; 1.3.3., p. 32]

The leadership of the multi-clan Ahlu Sunna Wal-Jama’ah (ASWJ) armed Sufi group reportedly reappeared in Galmudug in mid-2021. From late 2021 to May 2022, the group clashed with Galmudug State’s forces and the FGS forces. [Security 2023, 1.3.3., p. 34]

Clashes can occur between and within clan militias. They are reported all over Somalia and constitute a relevant part of the security incidents. These clashes are mainly driven by land and resource disputes and by vendetta. [Actors, 3.6., p. 57]

Numerous human rights violations were attributed to clan militias, including killings and sexual violence. Violations against children were also documented, including child recruitment, deprivation of liberty, killing and maiming of children, rape and sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abductions, and denial of humanitarian access. Clan militias have also been responsible for cases of torture and other degrading treatment. [Security 2023, 1.4.1., pp. 36-46]

Clan members have also been involved in clan revenge, killings and blood feuds [Actors, 3.2.1]. See also 1.2. The role of clans in Somalia and profile 3.9. Individuals involved in blood feuds/clan disputes.

With regard to the relationship between clans, their militias and Al-Shabaab, see 2.3.1. Al-Shabaab under chapter 2. Actors of persecution or serious harm.

For further analysis and guidance in relation to human rights violations committed by clan militias and/or clan members and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see chapter 7. Exclusion.

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Formed in October 2015, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS or otherwise known as ISIS-Somalia) is a jihadist Islamist group with base in Puntland. Since December 2017, it is affiliated to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). [Security 2023, 1.2., p. 22]

The number of militants of the group is reported to have further decreased from 200 to 250 from the 340 combatants estimated in 2019 [Security 2023, 1.3.3., pp. 33-34; COI Update 2023, 1.2.2., p. 11]. In terms of clan composition of the group, Mumin, ISS leader, a clan elder from the Ali Saleban / Majeerteen / Darood lineage, gave prevalence to the Ali Saleban/Darood clan and progressively tried to include individuals from the Hawiye clan. [Actors, 6.2, p. 76]

Although ISS is described ‘largely [as] a Puntland group’, it carried out attacks mostly in Mogadishu (Benadir). Attacks in the regions of Lower Shabelle and Bari were also reported.

From May to July 2021, the Puntland Forces conducted anti-ISS operations in the Bari region, reportedly limiting the group’s capacity in the area [Security 2023, 1.2., p. 22; 1.3.3., p. 33]. In Somaliland, ISS has established links with human traffickers and considers the region as a collection and transit hub for new recruits. [Actors, 6.1, p. 75]

While the group conducted few attacks compared to Al-Shabaab, it continued to engage with the use of propaganda and other media activities. [Security 2023, 1.3.3., p. 33; Actors, 6.1., p. 75]

For further analysis and guidance in relation to human rights violations committed by ISS and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see chapter 7 .  Exclusion.

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Since 2007, AMISOM was tasked to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed groups, to support the transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali Security Forces (SSF) and to assist the FGS, FMS and SSF in providing security for the political process at all levels. AMISOM relies on contingents from troops-contributing countries. AMISOM bases often located in urban centres and along supply routes, while others are in more remote areas. [Actors, 5.1.2., pp. 69-71]

On 31 March 2022, under the UN SC resolution no. 2628, the African Union Mission in Africa (AMISOM) was reconfigured as African Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), maintaining a similar mandate. [Security 2023, 1.3.3., p. 32; Actors, 5.1.1., pp. 68-69]

According to UN reports, AMISOM’s overall conduct with regard to international humanitarian law and human rights law standards has improved in the last few years. Harm to civilians was more frequently reported in the past. However, still in 2020, AMISOM was listed among the actors conducting extra-judicial killings of civilians and its forces were implicated in rapes and other grave abuses of human rights while conducting military operations against Al-Shabaab. [Actors, 5.1.3., pp. 71-72]

For further analysis and guidance in relation to human rights violations committed by AMISOM and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see chapter 7. Exclusion.

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)’s East Africa Counterterrorism Operation seeks to ‘disrupt, degrade, and deny victory to Al-Shabaab and ISS in Somalia and neighbouring countries’ [Actors, 5.2.1, p. 72].

In May 2022, the US military troops, which were mostly withdrawn as of January 2021, were sent back to Somalia to provide assistance to Somali and African Union forces, as well as to Danab special forces [Security 2023, 1.3.3., pp. 32-33].

AFRICOM was particularly engaged in drone and airstrike campaigns, in supporting the training of the Somali special forces, in sustaining the development of the Somali National Security Architecture and of the revised Somali Transition Plan and in providing operational, technical and material support to Somali military operations. [Actors, 5.2.2., p. 73]

From July 2021 to November 2022, the new US administration limited the number of airstrikes. Between August 2022 and the end of the year, US forces carried out 18 airstrikes. For the period from 1 December 2022 to 18 April 2023, 19 US air/drone strikes were reported.  [Security 2023, 1.3.3., p. 33; COI Update 2023, 1.2.2., p. 10; 1.3.1., p. 12].]

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

Besides the actors mentioned above, the family and/or clan members can be actors of persecution or serious harm, such as in the case of domestic violence, violence against LGBTIQ persons, forced and child marriage, female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C), etc. FGM/C practitioners, including traditional circumcisers and healthcare professionals, are another potential example of non-State actors of persecution or serious harm. See, for example, the profiles 3.12. LGBTIQ persons, 3.13. Women and girls, etc.

Human rights violations, which could amount to persecution or serious harm, are also committed by other non-State actors, such as criminal groups.

For further analysis and guidance in relation to human rights violations committed by certain non-State actors and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see chapter 7. Exclusion.