Guidance note
Last updated: September 2020

This section refers to some of the profiles of Syrian applicants, encountered in the caseload of EU Member States. It provides general conclusions on the profiles and guidance regarding additional circumstances to take into account in the individual assessment. Some profiles are further split in sub-profiles, with different conclusions with regard to the risk analysis and/or nexus to a reason for persecution. The corresponding number of the profile and a link to the respective section in the common analysis are always provided for ease of reference.

The table below summarises the conclusions with regard to different profiles and sub-profiles and aims at providing a practical tool to case officers. While examples are provided with regard to sub-profiles at differentiated risk and circumstances which may increase or decrease the risk, these examples are non-exhaustive and to be taken into account in light of all circumstances in the individual case.

Moreover, an individual applicant could fall under more than one profile included in this guidance note. The protection needs associated with all such circumstances should be fully examined.

Persons who belonged to a certain profile in the past or family members of an individual falling under a certain profile may have protection needs similarly to those outlined for the respective profile. This is not explicitly mentioned in the table below, however, it should be taken into account in the individual assessment.

The conclusions regarding each profile should be viewed without prejudice to the credibility assessment of the applicant’s claims.

2.1.1. Members of anti-government armed groups

Risk analysis: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.1.1. Members of anti-government armed groups

2.1.2. Political activists, opposition party members and protesters seen as opposing the government

Risk analysis: For those who would be considered opposing the government, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated. The sole fact of participation in a protest in the past may not be sufficient to establish that an individual would fall under this category.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.1.2. Political activists, opposition party members and protesters seen as opposing the government

2.1.3. Civilians originating from areas associated with opposition to the government

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional aspects (who is in control in the area, whether it was considered an opposition stronghold, etc.)
  • level of (perceived) support or collaboration with anti-government forces
  • familial ties or other connection to (suspected) members of anti-government armed groups and/or political opposition members
  • (perceived) support for the GoS
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.1.3 Civilians originating from areas associated with opposition to the government

2.2.1. Draft evaders

Risk analysis: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated. While certain exemptions from military service are envisaged in law, their application in practice lacks predictability.

Potential nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.2.1. Draft evaders

2.2.2. Military deserters and defectors

Risk analysis: Well-founded fear would in general be substantiated.

Nexus for defectors / potential nexus for military deserters: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.2.2. Military deserters and defectors

2.3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL

Risk analysis for perceived members of ISIL and those perceived to have familial links to ISIL members: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

Risk analysis for civilians who resided in territories controlled by ISIL: Not all individuals would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether or not there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, in particular the perceived level of support for ISIL.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL

2.4. Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF and YPG

Risk analysis for areas where the SNA operates: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

Risk analysis for Kurdish-controlled areas: Not all individuals under this sub-profile would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (areas where ISIL continues to operate)
  • visibility of the applicant
  • position within the community
  • nature of activities undertaken by the individual
  • public expression of support for SDF/YPG or condemnation of ISIL’s actions
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion. In relation to persecution by SNA, also potential nexus: race/nationality.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.4. Members of and persons perceived to be collaborating with the SDF and YPG

2.5. Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (who is in control of the area of origin of the applicant, if the applicant was located in any of the IDP camps)
  • the nature of activities and degree of involvement in activities perceived by SDF/YPG as opposition
  • (perceived) affiliation with ISIL (see separate profile 2.3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL) or Turkish-backed forces (see also 2.1.1. Members of anti-government armed groups)
  • being known to the Kurdish authorities (e.g. previous arrest)
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to some sub-categories of this profile, such as ISIL members and members of the SNA.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.5. Persons perceived to be opposing the SDF/YPG

2.6. Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces

Risk analysis: Not all individuals from Kurdish-controlled areas would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • gender
  • falling within an exception ground
  • ethno-religious background
  • age
  • being in an IDP situation
  • etc.

Potential nexus in the case of forced recruitment: While the risk of forced recruitment as such may not generally imply a nexus to a reason for persecution, the consequences of refusal, could, depending on individual circumstances, substantiate such a nexus, among other reasons, to (imputed) political opinion.

Potential nexus in the case of child recruitment: The individual circumstances of the applicant need to be taken into account.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.6. Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces

2.7.1. Members of the Government of Syria and Baath party officials

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, in particular the regional specifics (depending on the presence and activity of anti-government armed groups).

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.7.1. Members of the Government of Syria and Baath party officials

2.7.2. Members of government armed forced and pro-government armed groups

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, in particular the regional specifics (depending on the presence and activity of anti-government armed groups).

With regard to the risk associated with leaving Syria, in addition to considerations related to The implications of leaving Syria see 2.2. Military deserters and defectors.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

* Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.7.2. Members of government armed forced and pro-government armed groups

2.7.3. Civilians perceived to be supporting the government

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (depending on the presence and activity of anti-government armed groups)
  • level of (perceived) support or collaboration
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.7.3. Civilians perceived to be supporting the government

2.8. Journalists, other media professionals and citizen journalists

Risk analysis for journalists who are seen as critical by the actor in control of the particular area: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

Risk analysis for other journalists: Not all individuals would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • topic they report on
  • regional aspects (reach of the actors they report on)
  • visibility
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion. In relation to persecution by extremist groups, such as HTS, also potential nexus: religion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.8. Journalists, other media professionals and citizen journalists

2.9. Human rights activists

Risk analysis for human rights activists perceived as critical of the actor in control of the particular area: well-founded fear would in general be substantiated.

Risk analysis for other human rights activists: Not all individuals would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • topic they work on
  • regional specifics
  • visibility
  • etc.

Nexus: (imputed) political opinion. In relation to persecution by extremist groups, such as HTS, also potential nexus: religion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.9. Human rights activists

2.10. Doctors, other medical personnel and civil defence volunteers

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances, could include:

  • regional specifics (the risk is higher in areas affected by armed confrontations)
  • perceived support for anti-government armed groups
  • nature of activities (e.g. members of the White Helmets would generally be at higher risk)
  • etc.

Potential nexus: (imputed) political opinion. In relation to risks such as kidnapping for ransom: generally, no nexus.

* Some medical personnel may have been involved in excludable acts, such as discriminating practices with regard to treatment of wounded or aiding and abetting torture.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.10. Doctors, other medical personnel and civil defence volunteers

2.11.1. Sunni Arabs

Risk analysis: Being a Sunni Arab in itself would normally not lead to the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. In most cases where a well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, it would be related to circumstances falling under other profiles included in this guidance, such as 1. Persons perceived to be opposing the government and 3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL. The individual assessment should also take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as the regional specifics (e.g. living in areas controlled by extremist groups).

Potential nexus: (Imputed) political opinion. In case of persecution by extremist groups, also: religion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.1. Sunni Arabs

2.11.2. Kurds

Risk analysis for Kurds from areas under the control of the SNA: well-founded fear would in general be substantiated.

Risk analysis for other Kurds: Not all individuals would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • statelessness
  • identity document
  • area of origin and/or residency
  • etc.

Potential nexus: race, nationality (statelessness) and/or (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.2. Kurds

2.11.3. Druze

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (presence of extremist groups)
  • perceived support for anti-government armed groups
  • etc.

Potential nexus: race and/or religion and in some cases (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.3. Druze

2.11.4. Alawites

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (presence of anti-government and extremist groups)
  • perceived opposition to the GoS
  • etc.

Potential nexus: (imputed) political opinion. In case of persecution by extremist groups, also: religion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.4. Alawites

2.11.5. Christians

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include regional specifics (e.g. Christians in areas where opposition armed groups or ISIL operate are at higher risk, lower risk in the GoS-controlled areas and in Kurdish-controlled areas where ISIL has no operational capacity), etc.

Nexus: religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.5. Christians

2.11.6. Yazidis

Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • regional specifics (presence and activity of extremist groups)
  • gender
  • etc. 

Nexus: race/nationality and/or religion.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.6. Yazidis

2.11.7. Palestinians

For Palestinians who availed themselves of protection or assistance by UNRWA: Refugee status is to be granted ipso de facto in accordance with Article 12(1)(a) QD.

For Palestinians who did not avail themselves of protection or assistance by UNRWA:

   Risk analysis: Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • area of habitual residence
  • identity documents
  • (perceived) involvement with a party in the conflict
  • etc.

   Nexus: (imputed) political opinion and/or nationality.

>>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.11.7. Palestinians

2.12. Women

The different forms of violence against women in Syria are often significantly interlinked. Therefore, the following subsections should be read in conjunction.

 

2.12.1. Violence against women and girls: overview

Risk analysis: Not all women and girls face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • perception of traditional gender roles in the family
  • poor socio-economic situation
  • social status (the risk of sexual and gender-based violence against women and adolescent girls is higher for those without a male protector, such as widows, divorced or separated women, displaced women and girls, women and girls with disabilities, female heads of households)
  • area of origin or residence (e.g. in relation to presence of extremist groups)
  • lack of documentation (e.g. death certificates of husbands)
  • etc.

Potential nexus: (imputed) political opinion (e.g. in case of perceived link to an anti-government armed group), religion (e.g. when persecution is by extremist groups), and/or membership of a particular social group (see examples below).

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.12.1. Violence against women and girls: overview

 

2.12.2. Women perceived to be associated with anti-government armed groups

See the profiles:

   2.1. Persons perceived to be opposing the government

   2.3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.12.2. Women perceived to be associated with anti-government armed groups

 

2.12.3. Forced and child marriage

Risk analysis: Not all women and girls would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in relation to forced/child marriage. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • young age
  • personal status
  • area of origin and residence
  • ethnicity
  • religion
  • perception of traditional gender roles in the family
  • poor socio-economic situation of the family
  • living in IDP situation
  • etc.

Potential nexus: membership of a particular social group (e.g. in relation to refusal to enter into a forced or child marriage).

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.12.3. Forced and child marriage

 

2.12.4. Women perceived to have violated family honour

Risk analysis: Not all women and girls would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in relation to violation of family honour. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • age
  • personal status
  • area of origin and residence
  • perception of traditional gender roles in the family or community
  • situation of the family
  • etc.

Potential nexus: membership of a particular social group (e.g. women who have previously been subjected to sexual violence).

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.12.4. Women perceived to have violated family honour

 

2.12.5. Single women and female-headed households

Risk analysis: Not all women and girls under this sub-profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  •  personal status
  • area of origin and residence
  • perception of traditional gender roles in the family or community
  • economic situation
  • availability of civil documentation
  • education
  • etc.

Potential nexus: membership of a particular social group (e.g. divorced women or widows).

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.12.5. Single women and female-headed households

2.13. Children

The section on children addresses certain child-specific circumstances of increased vulnerability and risks that children in Syria may be exposed to:

 

2.13.1. Violence against children: overview

Risk analysis: Not all children face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • family members perceived to be involved with the opposition or anti-government armed groups (see 2.1. Persons perceived to be opposing the government, 2.3. Persons with perceived links to ISIL)
  • poor socio-economic situation (e.g. residing in IDP camps)
  • social status (the risk of sexual violence and exploitation is higher for separated and unaccompanied children and for children in female-headed households)
  • area of origin or residence
  • lack of documentation
  • religion
  • etc.

Potential nexus: (imputed) political opinion (e.g. in case of perceived link to an anti-government armed group), religion (e.g. when persecution is by extremist groups), and/or membership of a particular social group (see examples below).

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.13.1. Violence against children: overview

 

2.13.2. Child recruitment

Risk analysis: Not all children face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in the form of child recruitment. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • poor socio-economic situation (for example, residing in IDP camps)
  • social status
  • area of origin or residence
  • ethnicity
  • etc.

Potential nexus: The individual circumstances of the applicant need to be taken into account.

* See also 2.6. Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by the Kurdish forces.

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.13.2. Child recruitment

 

2.13.3. Child labour

Risk analysis: Not all children would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in relation to child labour. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • age
  • gender
  • poor socio-economic status of the child and his or her family (e.g. being a member of a female-headed household)
  • being in an IDP situation
  • region of origin or residence
  • etc.

Potential nexus: The risk of child labour as such may not generally imply a nexus to a reason for persecution. However, the individual circumstances of the applicant need to be taken into account.

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.13.3. Child labour

 

2.13.4. Child marriage

See the section on 2.12.3. Forced and child marriage under the profile Women.

 

2.13.5. Access to education

Risk analysis: Not all children would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in relation to deliberate restrictions on access to education. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • identification documents
  • gender (girls are at a higher risk)
  • perception of traditional gender roles in the family
  • poor socio-economic situation of the child and the family
  • IDP situation
  • area of origin and residence
  • etc.

Potential nexus: The individual circumstances of the child should be taken into account. For example, in the case of denied identity documentation due to origin from an opposition-held territory, (imputed) political opinion may apply.

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.13.5. Access to education

 

2.13.6. Lack of documentation

Risk analysis: Not all children would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution in relation to deliberate restrictions on access to documentation. Risk-impacting circumstances could include:

  • deceased or missing fathers
  • being born out of wedlock or as a result of sexual violence
  • area of origin and residence
  • gender
  • poor socio-economic situation of the child and the family
  • IDP situation
  • member of a female-headed household
  • etc.

Potential nexus: The individual circumstances of the child should be taken into account. For example, in the case of children born as a result of sexual violence, persecution may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group.

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.13.6. Lack of documentation

2.14. LGBTI

Risk analysis: Well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

Nexus: membership of a particular social group.

     >>> Read more in the common analysis on 2.14. LGBTI