COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

This profile refers to people working in educational facilities, including schools and universities. Students could also be affected by association. In some cases, reports on targeting concern educational facilities and educational personnel as well as students. Therefore, it cannot always be discerned whether the targeting was intentionally directed towards educational personnel.

See also the sub-section Access to education under the profile 3.15 Women and girls.

COI summary

Following the Taliban takeover, primary and elementary school remained open but girls’ secondary schools were closed. The Taliban officially announced that secondary schools would remain provisionally closed for girls until a comprehensive plan has been prepared according to sharia and Afghan culture.

Several local and international initiatives providing alternative forms of education for girls after grade six have been reported Initiatives of underground schooling in Kabul and in other parts of the country, where female teachers meet in private homes or at unknown clandestine locations to teach girls were reported by several sources [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, p. 103]. 

The Taliban reportedly retained most of the teachers from the previous administration and allowed some female workers in education sector to resume their work [Targeting 2022, 1.1.4 c, p. 27; 4.1, pp. 78, 80-81]. The Taliban Ministry of Education also announced the recruitment of 7 000 teachers and administrative personnel, of which more than 2 000 vacancies reportedly were reserved for women [Targeting 2022, 5.2.1, pp. 99 – 102]. In May 2022, the Taliban have issued a decree instructing, among others, women to respect a strict dress code and mentioning that working women such as teachers could be fired if they did not obey the new guideline. It was reported that in some schools female teachers were fired and female students expelled for not complying with the prescribed dress code [Targeting 2022, 5.2.5, p. 121].

A media report claimed that the Taliban in Kandahar had ordered male teachers and high-school students to pledge in writing that they will conform with the Taliban’s interpretation of sharia, including traditional Afghan dress codes for men and growing a beard. Failure to sign or adhere to the pledge could lead to students and teachers being dismissed [COI Update 2022, 2, pp. 3-4].

Taliban policies towards education since August 2021 resulted in a collection of fragmented and sometimes incoherent policies. The lack of clear policies regarding women teachers and girls’ education, combined with non-payment of teachers’ salaries, led to low enrolment rates even where schools were open. There was reportedly a shortage of female teachers, a longstanding issue which worsened after the Taliban takeover as some teachers fled the country or left their jobs due to the non-payment of salaries. The lack of funds caused difficulties for the de facto authorities to ensure payment of salaries to education personnel, and impacted the operationality of schools, purchase of learning materials and teachers’ training. Some foreign aid initiatives still provided cash support to some public teachers in February 2022 [Targeting 2022, 12.1, p. 186; 12.2, pp. 186-187].

In January 2022, Afghan teachers employed at the British Council in Helmand Province were reportedly hiding from the Taliban out of fear of reprisals. According to more than 20 testimonies collected by Amnesty International from 16 September to 8 October 2021, teachers faced intimidation and death threats. A high school teacher reported to have been threatened to death by Taliban. On 18 August 2021, two students were reportedly beaten by the Taliban while attempting to go to English classes, as considered ‘infidels language’. A secondary school teacher said to be harassed and intimidated by the Taliban following a media interview in which she complained about teacher salaries and girls’ access to secondary education [Targeting 2022, 12.3, p. 187].

There were also incidents of the Taliban arresting university professors criticising them [Targeting 2022, 12.3, p. 187].

Several bomb blasts targeting crowded places, including education facilities, and leading to casualties were also reported. On 10 January 2022, for example, an explosion occurring near a school reportedly killed eight children and injured four others in Lalpur District in Nangahar province. On 19 April 2022, a twin explosion occurred in Abdul Rahim Shaheed High School, and close to the Mumtaz Education Centre. Both sites were within Hazara neighbourhoods in Kabul City. Six persons were killed and at least 11 injured, including children. In the aftermath of the attack, there was no immediate claim of responsibility, but ISKP has been attributed previous attacks in the area. In December 2021, a 170-member unit within the Special Forces was reportedly created by the de facto authorities to protect educational institutions [Targeting 2022, 12.3, p. 187; Security situation 2022, 2.1.1, p. 39, 3.2, pp. 62-71]. On 30 September 2022, a suicide bombing was carried out against the Kaaj educational centre in a Hazara-dominated area. UNAMA reported that at least 53 people had been killed and over 110 injured. Most victims were reported to be teenage girls [COI Update 2022, 3, p. 9].

Risk analysis

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing). When the acts in question are restrictions on the exercise of certain rights of less severe nature or (solely) discriminatory measures, the individual assessment of whether they could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: gender (i.e. female teachers), origin from areas where ISKP has operational capacity, the individual or the institution not following Taliban directives and/or curriculum, speaking out against the Taliban, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion. In some cases, religion could also be seen as a relevant ground, such as in the case of individuals persecuted for using a curriculum perceived as contravening the actor’s interpretation of Islam.