COMMON ANALYSIS
Last updated: June 2022
This profile refers to the situation of human rights and political opposition activists and protesters in Iraq and in the KRI.
For guidance on women willing to take part to protests and facing restrictions based on moral norms, see also the profile 2.13 Individuals perceived to transgress moral codes.
COI summary
[Protesters, Targeting 2022, 3.1.1, 3.1.2]
Freedom of expression as well as of assembly and peaceful protest are enshrined in the Iraqi constitution. Political protests have taken place regularly in Iraq over the past few years and, in many cases, they were met with a violent response both from state security forces and armed militias. The protests have varied in scope and focus between different regions. Protests were directly linked with many incidents in which political opposition and human rights activists were targeted.
On 1 October 2019, protests in Baghdad and several other governorates marked the beginning of the largest mass protest movement in Iraq’s recent memory. The protests can be divided in three stages: from 1 to 9 October 2019, from 25 October to March/April 2020, and protests that began in May/June 2020. [Targeting 2022, 3.1.1]
The number of protesters taking part varied throughout autumn and winter 2019/2020, with most sources referring to thousands or in some cases tens of thousands of protesters. Following the national curfew due to the COVID-19 pandemic, protests re-emerged in May/June 2020 with markedly fewer participants. During the period from August 2020 to October 2021, protests continued. The protesters’ demands included extensive reform, work opportunities, the improvement of public services, justice and accountability of those targeting protesters and activists, an impartial government, an increased accountability, and an end to corruption. Protests also took place due to the delays in the payment of salaries, because of the pandemic, as well as due to the electricity crisis. [Targeting 2022, 3.1.1]
As the protests developed, the demands raised developed with them, entailing systemic change, such as resignation of the government and new elections, as well as constitutional changes, and an end to Iraq’s post-2003 ethno-sectarian political system and to pro-Iran militias’ influence. Additionally, people took part in demonstrations due to anger at the violent response with which initial protests were met. [Targeting 2022, 3.1.1, 3.1.2]
a. Human rights and political opposition activists and protesters in Iraq
[Targeting 2022, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.4, 5.3, 5.4.1]
The protests predominantly took place in Baghdad and the central and southern Shia-majority provinces. The protesters mostly did not belong to any particular political party or subscribe to any particular view or ideology. Protesters from demographically diverse groups were taking part, such as young men, women, seniors, school children, students, and professionals. The protests did not have any unified or formal leadership. However, in October 2021, following the results of the parliamentary elections, many supporters of Shia parties protested in provinces throughout the country against the election results that were announced on 16 October 2021. See also ‘General remarks’.
The protests were met with violence on the part of Iraqi security forces and other forces, such as (Iran-backed) militias and parts of the PMF, causing a high number of casualties. Hundreds of fatalities and thousands of injuries during demonstration across Iraq were documented in the period between October 2019 to April 2020. Most of those killed died due to shots to the head or chest through live ammunition. Deaths because of the use of military grade teargas cannisters and because of arson of buildings were also recorded. Most of these incidents were attributed to state security forces. Armed militias, usually anonymous and aiming to suppress demonstrations, attacked protesters and activists at protests and elsewhere. It has been reported that, after the end of the October 2019 protests, violence against activists shifted from indiscriminate killings to targeted assassinations.
Large numbers of people have been arrested throughout the protests, typically without a warrant, but most of the demonstrators have been released and those remaining in detention have been charged pursuant to the Iraqi Criminal Code. By mid-February 2020, 2 800 people had been arrested, of which all but 38 had been released. Violent response, arbitrary arrests and detention continued in 2020 and 2021. In the period October 2019 until the end of 2020, clashes between protesters and security forces, including the PMF, resulted in the death of hundreds of protesters and security forces in Baghdad and other southern cities. As of May 2021, 20 protesters who had disappeared remained missing.
In relation to the protests that started across Iraq in October 2019, human rights defenders were reported to have been targeted with assassination attempts, attacks, abductions, arbitrary arrests, detentions, and threats by unidentified armed groups.
Since the start of the anti-government protests in October 2019, 81 attempted killings of activists were reported. Thirty-four activists were reportedly killed. Human rights defenders and activists were also reported to have been tried on charges of defamation.
Protests have not taken place in Sunni-majority areas as the authorities restricted the opportunity to hold demonstrations by either arresting people for calling for protests or even for expressing support on social media for protests taking place elsewhere.
Sources report that, in a limited number of cases, members of ISF have been removed from their positions, or have been arrested, charged, or sentenced, or in which arrest orders have been issued, on the basis of violence perpetrated against protesters. Little information is found concerning actions taken against other armed forces involved in violence against protesters.
There are no official investigations conducted by law enforcement authorities to locate the missing and to identify and prosecute those responsible. It was also reported that family members reporting persons missing to the police are not receiving any help. There were also cases where family members or a victim have reported kidnappings to the police, which in turn lead to the family being threatened and the victim being kidnapped by the same group again.
The government has started paying compensations to the injured and to the families of those killed.
Internet freedom in Iraq was limited, physical attacks by government authorities and armed groups against internet users for their online activities were reported. Online activists were among the categories being targeted due to their online activity, suffering both physical attacks and harassment. In Iraq, intimidation, arrests and assassinations of online activists was a relatively regular occurrence. As a result, online activists stopped posting content that criticised or expressed their opposition to the government and party policies online.
Social media platforms are reportedly monitored by so-called electronic armies and militias, in order to target activists and expose their physical location.
b. Human rights and political opposition activists and protesters in KRI
[Targeting 2022, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 5.1, 5.3, 5.4.2]
Throughout 2020 and in 2021, protests have been taking place in the KRI, mostly in the governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Halabja and Duhok, although to a smaller extent than in other parts of Iraq. In 2020 in the KRI, the number of protests reportedly rose significantly. The protesters’ demands included better basic services and job opportunities, the lifting of restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the payment of unpaid wages, an end to corruption and an investigation into the wealth of members of the two main parties in the region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK).
The KRG response to the protests was, in many cases, violent and caused clashes with the protesters.
In the August 2020 truck drivers’ protests, it has been reported that security forces were ‘deployed immediately to forcefully disperse the crowd and prevent any media coverage of it’. Following the protests, approximately 100 people, mostly activists and journalists, were detained. Campaigns aiming to intimidate political opposition-oriented activists continued taking place in the rest of 2020 in KDP and PUK-controlled areas.
In December 2020, protests took place in Sulaymaniyah and in other areas of the KRI, in relation to unpaid wages and corruption and were reportedly met with violent response from security forces who used excessive force against the protesters, which resulted in tens of fatalities, including of underage protesters. In addition, the authorities arrested and released activists and also limited internet access and banned press coverage of the protests.
In September 2021, residents in Erbil’s Taajili Nwe neighbourhood were protesting in relation to subpar public services. This constituted the latest in a series of protests in the area due to the government not providing basic infrastructure. Activists and protesters were arrested for criticizing COVID-19 lockdown measures, corruption and unpaid salaries and detained by the authorities. Some were released but a lot remained detained.
KRI was considered a safer place for online activists for many years, however that was no longer the case due to crackdowns on journalists and media in September 2020.
Online activists were being harassed and intimidated online. There were also cases where they were physically hurt, even killed, by state and non-state actors because of content they would post online. Courts in the KRI ruled in some cases against attempts to penalize activists for the content they posted online, however those who targeted them were very rarely punished. It has also been reported that, in December 2020, the KRI authorities arrested many young men because they were calling for protests in posts on social media.
Most of the incidents targeting activists were related to the attempts by the authorities to prevent media coverage of the protests and were recorded between March and August 2020.
In the KRI, the targeting of civil society activists has been reported to intensify since August 2020. As reported in October 2021, 55 out of 81 activists arrested by the KRI authorities in the period between August and October 2020 remained in detention, with only five activists being brought to trial. Most activists were arrested under the charges of ‘undermining the security and stability of the region, which is punishable by life imprisonment under Article 1 of Law No. 21 of 2003.
Human rights activists were reported to have faced arrests by the KRI authorities. Activists criticizing social and economic situation were arrested and tried on defamation charges. They may be subject to arbitrary arrests, abductions, death threats, killing and assassination. Investigations into killings have not been carried out with due diligence in the past and there has been little to no accountability in recent years.
Risk analysis
Legitimate actions of law enforcement would not amount to persecution.
The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. assassination, arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention, torture, beatings, abduction).
Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: leadership role and/or degree of involvement in the protests, nature of activities, political and/or sectarian background of the individual, gender, visibility, being known to the authorities (e.g. previous arrest), etc. The sole fact of participating in a protest in the past may not be sufficient to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion.