COMMON ANALYSIS
Last updated: June 2022

This profile refers to Sunni Arabs from Iraq.

For Sunni Arabs who may be perceived to be associated with ISIL, see 2.1 Persons (perceived to be) affiliated with ISIL.

For Sunni Arabs who may be affected by the de-Baathification process, see 2.7 Former Baath party members.

COI summary

[Main COI reference: Targeting 2022, 2.1]

Sunni Arabs are a minority in Iraq (making up 24% of the population) but form a majority in the Central governorates. There is a long history of tensions between Sunni and Shia Arabs. Sectarianism rapidly increased in violent waves after the 2003 US invasion. [Security 2022, 2.4.1, 2.5.1, 2.6.1, 2.7.1]

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni resistance movement against US occupation after the 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein, targeted not only US and foreign occupation forces, but also the local Shia population, thus fuelling sectarian tension that culminated in a civil war in 2006-2007.

Sunni marginalisation continues to be highlighted by Iraq experts and policy analysts when commenting on the status of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs.

Sources reported that the systematic disenfranchisement of the Sunnis and the shifting of power between communities provided fodder for non-state actors and extremist groups such as al-Qaida and ISIL to exploit grievances to gain community support along ethno-sectarian lines.

a. Perceived affiliation with ISIL

[Targeting 2022, 1.3.1, 2.2]

Sunni Arabs may be perceived to be affiliated with ISIL based on certain individual factors, such as (perceived) family links to ISIL members, area of origin and time of fleeing, tribe, name, etc.

Sunni Arab IDPs have reportedly been prevented by the KRG from returning to their homes in disputed territories and in areas that KRG forces had taken from ISIL, while Kurdish villagers were allowed to return. In 2020, entry limitations for IDPs and refugees reportedly depended on their ethno-sectarian background and the area to which they wished to return. Some Sunni Arab IDPs from certain governorates were reportedly explicitly barred from returning by militias under the pretext that they co-operated with ISIL during the period of conflict, while others feared revenge attacks by militias for non-ISIL-related reasons.

In 2020, the government continued to use the antiterrorism law as a pretext for detaining young Sunni men without due process. Numerous cases of arbitrary arrests, detentions, abuse and torture during arrest and in pretrial detention of Sunni Arabs by government forces were reported. Spouses and family members of Sunni Arabs who were wanted on terrorism charges were reportedly detained to compel their surrender.

In parts of the country where they form a minority, Sunnis reportedly continued to face verbal harassment and restrictions from authorities in 2020, such as confiscation of properties by Shia militias and the Shia Endowment. It has also been reported Sunni Arabs were stopped, harassed, and arrested in Salah al-Din on their perceived ties to extremist groups like ISIL. In addition, the militias were reportedly accused of extreme human rights violations, including unlawful killings of Sunni citizens, as well as land grabs and economic extortion that have damaged the private and general economic interests of Sunnis in the province. Shia militias continued to forcibly displace Sunnis, leading to widespread demographic changes, particularly in the Al-Madain district on the outskirts of Baghdad and along the Iraq-Iran border.

Moreover, in 2020 and 2021, ISIL and Shia militias operating as part of the PMF reportedly carried out attacks in the areas surrounding the capital (known as the ‘Baghdad Belts’) with the aim of perpetuating ethnic conflict and displacement, igniting tension between the local Sunni and Shia communities and, in the case of ISIL, increasing Sunni disillusion with and isolation from the Iraqi state.

See the profile 2.1 Persons (perceived to be) affiliated with ISIL.

b. Treatment in relation to the de-Baathification process

Sunnis report that they face discrimination in public sector employment as a result of the de-Baathification process, a process originally intended to target loyalists of the former regime. According to Sunnis and local NGOs, the government continues the selective use of the de-Baathification provisions of the law to render many Sunnis ineligible for government employment but did not do so to render former Shia Baathists ineligible.

See the profile below concerning 2.7 Former Baath party members.

c. Situation of Sunni Arabs in Baghdad

Militias in Baghdad are frequently accused by Sunnis of directing violence against them. Sunnis primarily fear being targeted for extortion, kidnapping, or having their property taken away by Shia militias in Baghdad. Sources reported that attribution of responsibility for attacks to specific perpetrators in Baghdad is difficult, and explosives are used for both political and criminal purposes to attack and intimidate targets. Determining actors can be difficult, though most likely they primarily involve militias and gangs; due to the strong links between the two, distinguishing between them is not always possible.

Risk analysis

The acts to which Sunni Arabs perceived to be affiliated with ISIL could be exposed to are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. arbitrary arrest, death penalty, torture). In other cases, individuals could be exposed to (solely) discriminatory measures, and the individual assessment of whether discrimination could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures.

Available information indicates that the mere fact that an individual is a Sunni Arab would normally not lead to a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: area of origin, tribe, age, gender etc.

In case of perceived affiliation with ISIL, in general, a well-founded fear of persecution would be substantiated (see 2.1 Persons (perceived to be) affiliated with ISIL). The assessment of whether the applicant would be perceived to be affiliated with ISIL would depend on individual circumstances, such as (perceived) family links to ISIL members, place of origin and/or residency in a formerly ISIL-held area during ISIL control and time of fleeing, (perceived) tribal affiliation with ISIL, name, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that, depending on the individual circumstances, persecution of this profile may be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion (e.g. ISIL affiliation, Baath party), and in individual cases, race (ethnicity, e.g. in cases of blocked returns by KRG) and/or religion.