COMMON ANALYSIS
Last updated: June 2022

This profile refers to the situation of journalists and media workers in Iraq and the KRI. For guidance on political opposition activists, see the profile 2.3 Human rights and political opposition activists and protesters.

COI summary

[Targeting 2019, 1.11, 1.12; Targeting 2022, 5.1; Actors of protection, 8.3; Protesters, 3.1.5, 3.1.6]

The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 at art.38 guarantees ‘freedom of the press, printing, advertisement, media and publication’ if it ‘does not violate public order and morality’. However, Iraq is regarded as one of the world’s most dangerous countries for journalists.

Journalists targeted in Iraq are particularly those who engage in critical reporting on controversial political or other sensitive issues (e.g. corruption, abuse of authority, weak government capacity, protests) or are seen as criticising government officials. According to relevant sources, media workers, journalists and human rights activists who are particularly critical of PMF or militias have been targeted for their work. The attacks included intimidation, ill-treatment, abductions, arbitrary arrests, and killings. The perpetrators are not always clearly identifiable, however attacks in the context of protests have been attributed to both governmental agencies and PMF. It has also been reported that television stations were raided and live coverage from the protests was prohibited.

Media workers and journalists may also be targeted by militant opposition groups including ISIL. Their murders go unpunished and investigations generally yield no results.

Protests were directly linked with many incidents in which journalists and media workers were targeted.

a. Journalists and media workers in Iraq

[Targeting 2022, 3.1.3, 5.1]

The situation of journalists and media workers was reported to have deteriorated since the eruption of anti-government protests in October 2019. In September 2021, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) reported that many Iraqi journalists feared for their safety because of ‘an increase in targeted violence’ against journalists ‘during the past two years,’ while the authorities ‘failed to implement measure to support journalists and protect the rights to freedom of expression both online and offline.’ Besides being subjected to censorship, journalists and media workers risked arbitrary arrests and detention, intimidation and attacks, and abductions.

As noted by USDOS in its Human Rights Report for 2020, journalists, who covered sensitive topics, were threatened by various ‘nongovernmental and quasi-governmental actors, including militias outside of state control, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations.’ Hundreds of cases of targeting of media workers in the country were documented in 2020, including assassination, arrest, detention, beating, obstruction of coverage, confiscation of photographic equipment, as well as attacks on or closure of media institutions. Most of these incidents reportedly occurred during protests and demonstrations.

b. Journalists and media workers in KRI

[Targeting 2022, 3.2.4, 5.1, 5.2.2]

KRI was considered a safer place for journalists for many years, however that was no longer the case due to crackdowns on journalists and media in September 2020.

Between August 2020 and September 2021, the KRI security forces raided and, in some cases, closed media offices and headquarters in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah allegedly for covering the protests and violating Article 2 of Law 12 of 2010, which bars encouraging a public disturbance or harming social harmony in accordance with KRI law.

Several cases of criminal proceedings were initiated in the KRI from March 2020 to 30 April 2021 against journalists and social media activists, who either covered the protests or wrote critical opinions about the KRI authorities. Basic rights and procedural safeguards were reportedly either disrespected or limitedly respected during respective court trials. Journalists were detained ‘on charges of spying or endangering state security’ after their confession was ‘extracted under torture or by means of threats.

Risk analysis

The acts to which individuals under this profile could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to persecution (e.g. killings, arbitrary arrest, detention, ill-treatment, kidnapping).

Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: nature of activities (topic they report on), political and/or sectarian background of the individual, gender, visibility, being known to the authorities, etc.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion.