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3.13.4. Women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

This profile refers to women and girls who had been wives of Al-Shabaab members or who were actively engaged in the group’s activities and who have left Al-Shabaab.

For the treatment of adult males and boys who had been actively involved in the group, especially as fighters, who desert or defect, see 3.4. Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab. The present subsection should be read in conjunction with the subsection mentioned above.

COI summary

For an overview of the factors affecting the decision to leave Al-Shabaab, see 3.4. Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab.

a) Treatment by Al-Shabaab

Women having had some role or function in the group, such as having been an Al-Shabaab wife, the mother of Al-Shabaab children, an Al-Shabaab widow, a defector’s wife, a business woman, a teacher, fundraiser or recruiter, or whose family members have joined security forces, are exposed to retaliation and threatening because of this role or function. [AS Deserters, 2.2.1., pp. 45‑46]

Once they have left the group, going back to Al-Shabaab territory is not an option for women, who would ‘most probably face execution as traitors’ [AS Deserters, 2.2.1., p. 44]. Women from minority clans are highly vulnerable to Al-Shabaab due to the subjugated status of their clan towards Al-Shabaab. They may face execution, imprisonment and interrogation and removal to unknown or fighting area. In this context, Somali Bantu women are more affected than women from other clans. [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., pp. 49-50] (see also Somali Bantu under 3.11.3. Ethnic minorities).

As far as children are concerned, many of them leave the group without approaching the government. They do not take part in the reintegration programme and remain vulnerable to Al-Shabaab appeals, calls and threats, with the group being able to trace them and track them down. [AS Deserters, 2.2.4., pp. 52‑53] Depending on the role played for Al-Shabaab, such instances of targeting, chasing and reprisals tend to fade away over time [AS Deserters, 2.3.3, p. 57]. 

b) Treatment by government authorities

For details about the formal pathway for leaving Al-Shabaab, see 3.4. Deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab.

The registration and screening of women leaving Al-Shabaab varies depending on the area. They either make contact with the authorities or they are referred to them or return to their communities and then the elders or the clan leaders are the ones who contact the authorities. All women are registered upon reception by the authorities. However, not all registered women, such as those women who merely lived in an Al-Shabaab territory and ‘wives and other non-participant women’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., p. 20], are screened by the NISA. [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., pp. 19-21]

Not all low-risk female defectors go through rehabilitation unless they have additional vulnerabilities. If no places are available in rehabilitation centres, women are put on a waiting list and those without additional vulnerabilities are sent back to their communities. Arrangements are made by the NISA with a guarantor, who is typically a relative or clan elder [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., pp. 21]. Most girls are sent directly to reunite with their families without following the rehabilitation programme [AS Deserters, 2.3.3., P. 55]. Some low-risk female defectors are sent to centres in Baidoa or Kismayo or in a community-based centre with a guarantor in Galmudug [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., pp. 19-21, 24-29]. Participation in the rehabilitation programme does not prevent women from being caught in a law enforcement operation by government security forces, because there is no national database for women having gone through rehabilitation. In such instances, women might need the intervention of clan elders or other members, or of the rehabilitation programme officers in order to be released. They would also still be potentially exposed to Al-Shabaab threats and retribution, depending on their past role and their personal circumstances. The level of risk tends to diminish over time. [AS Deserters, 2.2.3., pp. 44, 51-52]

Reportedly, up until early 2022, no woman had been screened as ‘high-risk’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., p. 20].

Women who are not brought to or do not report themselves to the authorities, and hence do not go through formal rehabilitation programmes, do not have access to the same services and assistance. Moreover, they are not formally cleared by the government, and consequently, are at risk of being arrested. [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., p. 44]

Both boys and girls can access the rehabilitation programme, ideally in equal numbers. However, most girls are often sent directly to reunite with their families. Overall, girls currently make up between 20 and 30 % of children benefitting from reintegration programmes. [AS Deserters, 2.3.3., p. 55]

The arrest and detention of children allegedly associated with the group by the authorities in South-Central Somalia and in Puntland is a recurring measure. Coercive treatment and in some cases use of torture have been reported. Children were prosecuted as adults, notably in Puntland where the existent anti-terrorist legislation defines children as those under fifteen, with sentences ranging from some years to life imprisonment. Reportedly, as of October 2022, there were still a number of children kept in detention in Puntland, on grounds of association with Al-Shabaab, while some of them have been sentenced to death or to life sentences through military prosecution and courts. [AS Deserters, 2.3., pp. 52‑53, 58]  

c) Treatment by the community

It has been reported that if women are to leave Al-Shabaab territory or move from one place to another in order to leave the group, their pathways can differ greatly depending on their destination, with big cities as Mogadishu offering the possibility to relocate ‘basically unnoticed’. The ease of integration depends on the places women move to, and the level of family or clan connection/support they can rely upon. Also, women who participate in a rehabilitation programme are better received by the communities than those who leave the group informally. [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., pp. 46, 47, 51]

Women reportedly face challenges in their new location, such as poverty, stigma and mistrust from the hosting community or the family circle, sexual exploitation and fear of Al-Shabaab. While some women can live with family or clan members, most need to find other housing solutions, often in IDP camps. In terms of potential stigma, women might be looked at very suspiciously, and community members might refuse to engage with them, but the level of stigma rarely reaches the point of outright expulsion. [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., pp. 47-48]

Many women and girls who managed to escape from Al-Shabaab marriages were subjected to threats and, in some cases, sexual exploitation in displacement settings where they had found refuge. Women coming from minority clans - such as the Bantu - or who are displaced and do not have access to clan protection reportedly end up without any protection and resources. [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., pp. 47-49]

As for children, they face stigma in the host community but the latter usually ‘does not show outright resentment’ towards children formally associated with Al-Shabaab. Recruited children are usually taken away from their place of origin, possibly to a training camp or facility in another region, some hundreds of kilometres away. This poses serious challenges to the possibility of being reunified with their family. With reintegration outside of the clan of belonging rarely viable, many of these children end up in IDP camps or as ‘street children’. [AS Deserters, 2.3.2., p. 53; 2.3.3, p. 57]

 

Conclusions and guidance 

   Do the acts qualify as persecution under Article 9 QD?   

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. execution and imprisonment, certain forms of physical violence including sexual violence torture, death penalty). When the acts in question are (solely) of discriminatory nature, the individual assessment of whether this could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures. Being a child is to be taken into account in the assessment on whether an act reaches the threshold of persecution.

   What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?   

In the case of women and girls having left Al-Shabaab, well-founded fear of persecution by the group would in general be substantiated in South-Central Somalia and Puntland.

Furthermore, women and girls may have a well-founded fear of persecution by the community and the government in individual cases. Risk-impacting circumstances could include: past role in Al-Shabaab, clan affiliation and protection, displacement situation, etc.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution in Somaliland should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: the past role in Al-Shabaab, the area of reintegration, participation in a rehabilitation programme, clan affiliation, level of assistance by a support/clan network, displacement situation, having left with their child(ren), distance of the area of deployment of girls for Al-Shabaab from the area of origin and possibility to be reunited with the family etc.

   Are the reasons for persecution falling within Article 10 QD (nexus)?   

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion. Persecution of women who have left Al-Shabaab marriages may also be for reasons of membership of particular social group based on their common background which cannot be changed (past marriage to an Al-Shabaab member) and distinct identity in Somalia (in relation to stigmatisation).

 

Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile, in particular for women and girls actively involved in the activities of Al-Shabaab (see chapter 7. Exclusion).