Skip to main content

3.5. Individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

This profile is particularly relevant to individuals refusing to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab in South-Central Somalia and Puntland, given the group’s presence and influence in these areas. The term ‘taxes’ in this context includes protection money, extorsion and religious ‘taxes’.

COI summary

The Al-Shabaab taxation system applies in areas under the group’s control, but it has also been spreading into Mogadishu and other government-controlled areas, such as Bosasso and Jowhar and, to a lesser extent, Baidoa and Kismayo [Security 2023, 2.3.2., p. 112; Actors, 4.3.2, p. 63].

Checkpoints taxation, business extortion, imports taxation at major seaports, and real estate companies are multiple sources of funds for the group. Al-Shabaab’s tax system is described as a ‘sophisticated and efficient “taxation” apparatus’, where an average Somali pays only once at the beginning of a road, receives a receipt that is used to pass through any remaining Al-Shabaab checkpoints without having to pay again [Security 2023, 1.4.4., p. 52]. Al-Shabaab also taxes livestock, agricultural produce, and irrigation, collects the zakat (the annual religious obligation to pay a specific percentage of a person’s wealth, typically 2.5 %, to the poor) and sadaqa (a normally voluntary charitable contribution paid by Muslims). The group also raises emergency funds when the local Al-Shabaab government is short in cash, and taxes government officials who leave part of their salaries to the group so as to not be targeted by it. This taxation system is underpinned by intimidation, fears over business continuity and personal safety, and violence in the case of non-compliance. [Security 2023, 2.2.4., p. 107; Actors, 4.3.2.; Targeting, 6.4., p. 97]

Individuals who do not comply with those demands face threats or extreme violence [Security 2023, 1.4.4., p. 52, 2.3.2., pp. 112, 115] and allegedly torture as a punishment for failure to pay taxes. It has been reported that Al-Shabaab carried out killings when the ‘taxpayers’ refused to meet the group’s demands [Targeting, 6.4., p. 97].

 

Conclusions and guidance 

Do the acts qualify as persecution under Article 9 QD?

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. assassination).

What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?

In South-Central Somalia and Puntland, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated in the case of individuals who refuse to pay ‘taxes’ to Al-Shabaab.

At the time of writing, this claim does not appear to have particular relevance for Somaliland.

 Are the reasons for persecution falling within Article 10 QD (nexus)?

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile may be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.