COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

This profile refers to men, having deserted or defected from Al-Shabaab, as well as to boys who had been actively involved in the group, especially as fighters.

For the situation of women and girls having left Al-Shabaab, see 3.13.4. Women and girls who have left Al-Shabaab. The subsection herein should be read in conjunction with the subsection mentioned above.

In the context of leaving Al-Shabaab, the following terminology is used:

COI summary

Different factors may impact the decision to leave Al-Shabaab. The level of influence and control of Al-Shabaab over a certain area impacts directly on disengagement options as newly liberated territories open up opportunities to leave the group [AS Deserters, 2.2.2., pp. 44-50]. The time it takes to actually leave the group is also an important factor as Al-Shabaab ‘does not allow people living in its territory to readily leave’ [AS Deserters, 2.1.2., p. 34].

Family, clan, and other social networks play a crucial role in all aspects of an individual’s life in Somalia (see 1.2. The role of clans in Somalia). These social networks can encourage disengagement, sometimes securing safe passage of the defector with the security forces. As indicated by a source, ‘defection through one’s clan is more prevalent than defection through the Somali government’. This is reportedly the reason why Al-Shabaab tries to undermine the connection to one’s social networks and knowledge of the terrain by transferring members between locations, making most men serve the group from locations away from their home area. [AS Deserters, 2.1.1., pp. 32 34]  

The process of leaving Al-Shabaab can follow a formal pathway, which entails contact with the Somali authorities, implying going through government-organised processes. In comparison to the potential number of persons formerly associated with Al-Shabaab, the number of those going through the formal pathway appears very small, more people reportedly leaving Al-Shabaab informally, due to not being aware of amnesties or the rehabilitation programme or due to fear of the Somali authorities. [AS Deserters, 1.1., pp. 13-14; 2.1.1., p. 33]

In the period from December 2022 to mid-April 2023, various cases of defection were reported, including of high-ranking Al-Shabaab officials. Defections were said to be increasing, including among young people, as a consequence of the government counterinsurgency operations. Defections were, for example, reported in Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Hirshabelle, Bay and Galgaduud regions. Many Al-Shabaab members reportedly decided to leave the group because they did not want to be further endangered. The brutality of the group against local communities also was a prominent driver motivating individuals to leave Al-Shabaab. [COI Update 2023, 3.1., pp. 25-26]

a) Treatment by Al-Shabaab

Leaving Al-Shabaab is generally not accepted, and desertion is seen as an infringement of the jihadist ideology. Al-Shabaab would seek to punish deserters it can reach in order to provide a ‘shocking example' for others who might be considering desertion. [Targeting, 1.2., pp. 26-29]

Those willing to escape ‘fear the wrath of the organisation’ and especially the Amniyat which is charged with, among others, eliminating defectors. In several cases, people who attempted to leave Al-Shabaab have been killed. It has also been reported that ‘70 percent of the disengaged combatants [had] received death threats from Al-Shabaab’, including former Al-Shabaab members residing in rehabilitation centres [please refer to b) Treatment by government authorities hereunder to read more about the rehabilitation options], many of them feeling ‘hunted’ and some fearing to be killed upon exiting the rehabilitation centre [AS Deserters, 2.1.3., p. 38]. Some members less actively involved are reportedly allowed to leave the group on medical and compassionate grounds [AS Deserters, 2.1.1., p. 30]. Changing identity would not be an easy option for defectors given the interconnected clan-based society [AS Deserters, 2.1.1., pp. 30-31].

Family members of individuals attempting to leave Al-Shabaab are also at risk of being targeted. Cases of wives being executed or held back by Al-Shabaab when their husbands defected have been reported. Women may also receive threats from or can be regularly questioned by the group. In case where a defector has left the group with military equipment, family members are also asked to compensate in kind, often with livestock. ‘Wife inheritance’ in case of death or defection of an Al-Shabaab member has also been reported, since for Al-Shabaab, any man in the group can inherit the wife of a killed member, women also being inherited in case of defection of their husband. [AS Deserters, 2.1.4., p. 41]

Many children leave the group without approaching the government. They do not take part in the reintegration programme and remain vulnerable to Al-Shabaab appeals, calls and threats, with the group being able to trace them and track them down. [AS Deserters, 2.2.4., pp. 52 53] Depending on the role played for Al-Shabaab, such instances of targeting, chasing and reprisals tend to fade away over time. [AS Deserters, 2.3.3, p. 57] 

b) Treatment by government authorities

It has been noted that the government is actively encouraging defection from Al-Shabaab. In the absence of an amnesty law, presidential declarations have become the main tool for granting amnesty. However, they are reportedly unclear in terms of scope, lacking details about eligibility criteria and entitlements associated with the defector programme, and raising false expectations in the beneficiaries, such as continued education and post-rehabilitation employment. [AS Deserters, 1.2.1., p. 16]

Government authorities distinguish between ‘high-value’ and ‘low-value’ defectors [AS Deserters, 1.1., p. 16].

• High-value defectors are Al-Shabaab commanders or at times clan elders and warlords, in other words, individuals who can make many of their followers also leave. They enter in negotiation with the Somali authorities prior to defection and on an individual basis. Examples of such defectors include Ahmed Madobe, the current president of Jubbaland, and Muktar Robow, former deputy leader of Al-Shabaab, who was appointed Minister of Endowment, Religious Affairs and Counter-terrorism Ideology, ‘as a strategy to prevent the youth from joining Al-Shabaab'. [AS Deserters, 2.1.3., pp. 35-36; Security 2023, 1.1., p. 19]]

• Low-value defectors are further sorted out into high-risk defectors and low-risk defectors [AS Deserters, 1.1., p. 17]. The main objective of this screening process is to assess defectors’ past role within Al-Shabaab. The screening process has been said to lack transparency, often be highly politicised, and to lead to questionable outcomes. [AS Deserters, 1.1.3., pp. 17-19]

• ‘High risk’ defectors are generally considered ‘those believed to be amirs (i.e. commanders of some sort), who had engaged in the making of explosives, or who had killed someone’. They are handled by the security forces and the NISA and sent to military courts for prosecution and possible imprisonment. Most of them are sentenced to death and executed [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., p. 18; 2.1.3., pp. 35, 37]. Clan affiliation is a crucial variable in determining the sentence, as belonging to a clan with higher influence might shorten the sentence or allow the person to avoid death sentence and/or harsh treatment. Clan affiliation also has an influence on the possibility for high-risk defectors to negotiate with the authorities [AS Deserters, 2.1.3., p. 37].
• ‘High-risk’ children are those who still believe that siding with Al-Shabaab means siding ‘with the right side’, or whose parents are still with the group, or who could potentially engage in some sort of terrorist activity (such as spying, suicide bombing), or who could harm the local community, or go back to Al-Shabaab [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., pp. 21-22]. Children screened as ‘high-risk’ are hosted in a residential interim care centres where they receive counselling and psycho-social support, and they participate in the reintegration programme. Afterwards, they are reintegrated back into the community [AS Deserters, 2.4.3., pp. 55-56].
• ‘Low risk’ defectors are generally considered those ‘foot soldiers, porters, mechanics and the like’, while ‘those who had fundraised, preached jihad, or provided logistical support could be classified as either low-risk or high-risk’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., p. 18]. Those screened as ‘low risk’ reportedly received amnesty from prosecution. However, they did not seem ‘to receive explicit and legally-binding guarantees against future prosecution’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.4., p. 22]. They have access to the Defector’s Rehabilitation Programme as an alternative to going to court, where they would incur ‘a very substantial risk of being sentenced to death’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.5., pp. 22]. They are sent to rehabilitation centres in Serendi (Mogadishu), Baidoa, or Kismayo or in ‘reception centres’ in Galmudug while they await transfer to rehabilitation [AS Deserters, 1.2.5., p. 26].
• ‘Low-risk’ children are those who disapprove of Al-Shabaab activities and ideology [AS Deserters, 1.2.3., p. 21]. There are six reintegration centres across Somalia for children screened by government authorities as ‘low-risk’ [AS Deserters, 1.2.5., p. 29].

The lack of transparency of the screening of defectors is reportedly feared by low-level Al Shabaab associates willing to defect as they might be screened as high-risk defectors [AS Deserters, 2.1.1., pp. 32 34].

The arrest and detention of children allegedly associated with the group by the authorities in South-Central Somalia and in Puntland is a recurring measure. Coercive treatment and in some cases use of torture have been reported. Children were prosecuted as adults, notably in Puntland where the existent anti-terrorist legislation defines children as those under fifteen, with sentences ranging from some years to life imprisonment. Reportedly, as of October 2022, there were still a number of children kept in detention in Puntland, on grounds of association with Al-Shabaab, while some of them have been sentenced to death or to life sentences through military prosecution and courts. [AS Deserters, 2.3., pp. 52 53, 58] 

c) Treatment by the community

Deserters face stigma from their family members and their community as ‘men and boys tend to be immediately viewed as security threats when they are associated with ‘terrorists’’. Some defectors have been rejected by family members or their community. Disengaged combatants are also considered as risks, as they could either potentially re-join Al-Shabaab or potentially invite attacks from the group. Sustainable employment and income were other issues undermining effective reintegration. [AS Deserters, 2.1.3., pp. 39-40]

Children face stigma in the host community but the latter usually ‘does not show outright resentment’ towards children formally associated with Al-Shabaab. Recruited children are usually taken away from their place of origin, possibly to a training camp or facility in another region, some hundreds of kilometres away. This poses serious challenges to the possibility of being reunified with their family. With reintegration outside of the clan of belonging rarely viable, many of these children end up in IDP camps or as ‘street children’. [AS Deserters, 2.3.2., p. 53; 2.3.3, p. 57]

Conclusions and guidance 

Do the acts qualify as persecution under Article 9 QD?

Criminal prosecution in itself does not amount to persecution. However, acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. physical violence, torture, death penalty, detention or execution by Al-Shabaab). When the acts in question are of less severe nature (e.g. stigmatisation by the community), the individual assessment of whether they could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures. Being a child is to be taken into account in the assessment on whether an act reaches the threshold of persecution.

What is the level of risk of persecution (well-founded fear)?

In the case of deserters and defectors from Al-Shabaab, well-founded fear of persecution by the group would in general be substantiated in South-Central Somalia and Puntland. Additionally, well-founded fear of persecution by the government may be substantiated.

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution in Somaliland should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: the rank and role in Al-Shabaab (e.g. being considered ‘high-risk’ by the state authorities), the reach of Al-Shabaab in the area of origin, clan affiliation, clan and family views towards Al-Shabaab, distance of the area of deployment of boys for Al-Shabaab from the area of origin and possibility to be reunited with the family, level of assistance by a support/clan network, socio-economic situation, etc.

Family members of individuals under this profile, especially their wives, may also have a well-founded fear of persecution.

 Are the reasons for persecution falling within Article 10 QD (nexus)?

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion and/or religion.

Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile (see chapter 7. Exclusion).