COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: August 2023

The situation in Hiraan should be seen in conjunction with, among others, the situation in Middle Shabelle.

Main COI references: [Security 2023, 2.4.1., pp. 120-128; COI Update 2023, 1.3.1., pp. 12-13; 1.3.4., pp. 16-19; Security 2021, 2.4.1, pp. 97-100; Actors, 7.4, p. 92]

2023_CG_SOM_Hiraan

General information

Hiraan region is located in the south-west of Somalia and consists of three districts. The region’s capital is Beletweyne.

Hiraan is mainly inhabited by Hawiye clans (e.g. Hawadle, Jajele). The Hawadle sub-clan dominates the territory north-east of the Shabelle River, and Jajele, Galjaal (or Gaaljeel) and Baadi Adde sub-clans dominate the territory west of the river. The minority group Makane (Bantu/Jareer) also lives in part of the region.

In 2021, UNOCHA estimated the population of Hiraan region at 427 124 inhabitants.

Background and actors involved in armed confrontations

The major source of conflict in the region is the on-going confrontations between Al-Shabaab and anti-Al-Shabaab forces, including Ma’aawiisley local militia and armed locals. Hiraan is one of Al-Shabaab’s strongholds, where the group maintains courts and bases for its fighters. Al-Shabaab controls the rural areas while state and federal forces, with the help of AMISOM’s Djibouti contingent, control the major towns of the region. Al-Shabaab was involved in about 70 % of the incidents in Hiraan between 1 July 2021 and 30 November 2022.

As of December 2021, Al-Shabaab reportedly controlled large parts of the rural areas and main supply routes. As a result, state and federal officials and anyone refusing to submit to Al-Shabaab was able to travel to most of Hiraan’s cities only by air. Following the government’s military offensive in the summer of 2022, the government reportedly regained control over 40 settlements in the region, although a source reported in October 2022 that none of these settlements was a large town and that Al-Shabaab had regained control over some of them.

After the start of the government-led offensive against Al-Shabaab in August 2022, the group was also reportedly concentrating on retaking areas they lost in Hirshabelle region. Also, more than half of 170 non-violent transfer of territory events from Al-Shabaab to the Somali government forces in 2022, such as Al-Shabaab vacating its bases, occurred in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. [COI Update 2023, 1.1.1., pp. 5, 8]

In September 2022, Somali government forces had reportedly retaken areas in Mahas, Bulo Burto and Mataban districts from Al-Shabaab. Later, in October 2022, a local online news organisation reported on fighting between Al-Shabaab and government forces over the control around Bulo Burto town. As of 30 November 2022, Al-Shabaab fully controlled the western part of Bulo Burto district, while control over other parts of the region was mixed or unclear.

Hiraan is among the regions most affected by clan conflicts. For example, the aspirations of Hawadle clan to have Hiraan as a regional state in itself, and not a part of Hirshabelle, led to military confrontations between the Hawadle and the Abgal sub-clans. This conflict culminated in February 2022, in the context of the first visit of the elected state president in the region’s capital city. However, on 8 February 2022, during a meeting between Hawadle leaders and the president, an agreement was reached and the clan’s concerns were settled.

Since late 2017, ISS has also been active in Belet Weyne [Actors, 6.1., p.75].

Nature of violence and examples of incidents

On 30 January 2023, at least seven civilians including three children were reportedly killed in a drone strike targeting a village near Jalalaqsi town.

On 14 January 2023, at least 30 people were killed in three suicide attacks. On 4 January 2023, Al-Shabaab launched a twin suicide car bomb in Mahas (Maxaas) town killing at least 50 people, including security personnel and civilians.

In September 2022, Al Shabaab fighters reportedly attacked a convoy of seven vehicles carrying food and water from Beletweyne to Mahas town, killing at least 20 people, including women and children, and setting the vehicles on fire. Another source, which reported at least 21 victims for the same incident, quoted local elders claiming that most of the victims had been shot in the head.

Election-related incidents occurred. In March 2022, in Beletweyne district, two suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab at a polling station and in front of a hospital, respectively, killed at least 48 people and injured 108 others. Among the victims were two lawmakers, several security guards, and dozens of civilians. On 19 February 2022, at least 13 people were killed and 20 injured in a suicide attack by Al-Shabaab on a local restaurant, where local officials and politicians were present.

Other election-related killings and attacks on government officials included suicide bombings and other attacks in Beletweyne in May and October 2022 as well as a non-election related attack on the governor of Hiraan in Mataban in July 2022.

In December 2021, it was reported that three children were killed in an exchange of artillery fire between Al-Shabaab and SNA and AMISOM forces in Beletweyne district.

Al-Shabaab reportedly carried out a bomb attack on Bulo Burto airport in September 2021, resulting in the injury of at least five people.

Clashes between clan-based forces and with Al-Shabaab took place [COI Update 2023, 1.1.1., p. 4].

Incidents: data

ACLED recorded 288 security incidents (an average of 3.9 security incidents per week) in Hiraan region between 1 July 2021 and 30 November 2022. Out of those incidents, 146 were coded as ‘battles’, 83 as ‘explosions/remote violence’ and 59 as ‘violence against civilians’. In the period from 1 December 2022 to 14 April 2023, 114 security incidents were recorded in Hiraan representing an average of 6 security incidents per week.

Geographical scope

Security incidents occurred in all 3 districts of Hiraan with the largest overall number being recorded in Beletweyne (188 events).

Fatalities among civilians and non-civilians

In the 17 months between July 2021 and November 2022, ACLED recorded a total of 1 357 fatalities in the region. In the 4.5 months between December 2022 and mid-April 2023, ACLED recorded a total of 433 fatalities in the region. Compared to the figures for the population in the region as from 2021, this represents approximately 419 fatalities per 100 000 inhabitants for the whole reference period.

Displacement

Between July 2021 and November 2022, 257 147 individuals were newly displaced from Hiraan, according to PRMN. Almost all of them (98.54 %) were displaced within the same region, while the remaining 3 756 individuals were displaced to other regions, including Banadir, Bari, Lower Shabelle and Mudug.

Between December 2022 and March 2023, 769 individuals were newly displaced from Hiraan, according to PRMN.

Further impact on civilians

Fighting between local clans and non-state armed groups in the region of Hiraan resulted in the destruction of property and of water sources and telecommunication infrastructure, while the local population faced arson, immolation and executions.

Among the five humanitarian access incidents documented by UNOCHA during the reference period, the Al-Shabaab attack on Bulo Burto airport in September 2021 also resulted in significant damages of the airstrip and the airport building, which adversely affected humanitarian actors’ ability to deliver assistance since the town could only be reached by air. The group also reportedly used checkpoints to extort money from the local population. Insecurity has disrupted trade flows in parts of Hiraan (Bulo Burto and Jalalaqsi), and clan violence has cost livelihoods and resulted in the displacement of families.

Looking at the indicators, it can be concluded that ‘mere presence’ in the area would not be sufficient to establish a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD in the region of Hiraan. However indiscriminate violence reaches a high level, and, accordingly, a lower level of individual elements is required in order to show substantial grounds for believing that a civilian, returned to the territory, would face a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD.