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3.2. Public officials and servants of the former government

COMMON ANALYSIS
Last update: January 2023

This profile refers to individuals affiliated with the previous government, such as civil servants and members of the judiciary.

The situation of lawyers is addressed under the profile 3.7. Human rights defenders, activists and others perceived as critical of the Taliban.

COI summary

During the years of conflict, employees of ministries which were at the forefront of the fight against insurgents, for example the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice, were regularly targeted by the Taliban. To a lesser degree, employees of other ministries not involved directly in the fight against insurgents were also targeted. Personal enmity or open statements against the Taliban could be seen as relevant circumstances in this regard [Anti-government elements, 2.6.2, pp. 24-25; Conflict targeting, 1.2.2, p. 31; Security 2020, 1.3.3, pp. 33-34; 1.3.4, pp. 35-36].

Judges, prosecutors, and other judicial staff were important targets for the Taliban. Targeted killings, abductions and threats were reported during the years of the conflict. Judges also frequently received threats from local leaders or armed groups [State structure, 3.3, p. 42; Conflict targeting, 1.2.2, p. 31; Security 2020, 1.3.3, p. 34; 1.3.4, pp. 35-36; 1.4.2, p. 41].

There were reports of civilians being threatened and/or killed for being employees or (perceived) supporters or spies for the former government, such as tribal or community elders and heads of villages, as well as local or provincial council members or government officials [Anti-government elements, 2.6.2, pp. 24-26; Security 2020, 1.3.3, pp. 33-34; 1.3.4, pp. 34-36; 2; Conflict targeting, 1.2.2, p. 31; 1.5.1.1, p. 68].

Individuals under this profile were also seen as a legitimate target by other insurgent groups, for example the ISKP and foreign armed groups [Security 2020, 1.2.2, p. 30; Anti-government elements, 3.5, p. 34; 3.6.3, p. 35; 4.3, pp. 38-39].

After the takeover, the Taliban announced in their first press conference a general amnesty, saying that they had pardoned ‘all of those who had fought against [them]’ [Security September 2021, 1.1.2, p. 13].  The Taliban called on government employees to resume their work; cases are reported in which threats or pressure were used in this regard [Targeting 2022, 4.1, pp. 78-81]. Most male workers of government ministries have reportedly returned to work. Female government workers have not been asked to resume their work, with the exception of some positions for which it is assessed that men cannot replace women, including education and healthcare workers, and positions in passport and post offices, and at Kabul’s international airport [Targeting 2022, 1.1.4, p. 27; 4, pp. 80-81; Country Focus 2022, 1.1.4, p. 19; 1.2.1, p. 20].

Despite the amnesty and the call on former government officials to resume work, retaliatory acts by Taliban members against persons under this profile were reported, albeit to a lesser extent than against former ANDSF personnel [Targeting 2022, 4, pp. 78-84; Country Focus 2022, 2.5, pp. 45-48].

Incidents of summary executions, torture and detentions of persons affiliated with the former government have been reported in various parts of the country [Targeting 2022, 2.1, pp. 58-60; 3.2, pp. 76-77; 4, pp. 78-80]. New York Times documented 490 cases in which former government officials and members of ANDSF were killed or disappeared in the first semester of Taliban rule [Targeting 2022, 2.1, pp. 57-58; 4.1, 4.3]. UNAMA reported on 160 extrajudicial killings, 178 arbitrary arrests, 23 incommunicado detentions and 56 instances of torture and ill-treatment of former ANDSF and government officials in the period 15 August 2021 – 15 June 2022. All these instances were carried out by the de facto authorities and occurred in almost all parts of Afghanistan. According to UNAMA, individuals on ‘differing level of affiliation to the former government’ fell victim to such acts, ‘from senior officials to drivers, bodyguards and relatives’ [Targeting 2022, 2.1, p. 57; 4.1, p. 80].

Former judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers remained mostly excluded from the de facto justice system. In late 2021, the de facto authorities announced that only Taliban-approved lawyers could work in their courts, which in practice could be interpreted as stripping former lawyers from their licenses. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and former law and court personnel were reportedly subjected to house searches, harassment, death threats and killings. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) deemed the situation of former judicial personnel a matter for particular alarm. Female judges were claimed to be at added risk due to their gender as the Taliban do not accept that women have the right to judge men. Female judges and prosecutors have been reported to live in hiding and searched after by Taliban and released prisoners [Country Focus 2022, 2.5, p. 45; Security 2022, 3.2, 4].

Sources also reported attacks on prominent officials, such as former members of parliament, by unknown assailants [Targeting 2022, 4.3, p. 84].

In Spring 2022, the Taliban set up a return commission in order to facilitate the return of exiled political and military personalities. Several former high-ranking persons returned to the country. However, it was reported that in general the initiative was met with scepticism [Targeting 2022, 4.3, p. 83].

Cases were also reported where family members were targeted. Also, family, friends and neighbours were said to have been pressed to reveal judges’ whereabouts [Targeting 2022, 2.1, p. 63; 2.2, p. 64; 4, p. 81; 4.2, p. 82; Country Focus 2022, 2.5].

Risk analysis

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe nature that they amount to persecution (e.g. killing, incommunicado detention, torture).

For judges, prosecutors and female former judicial personnel working under the former government, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.

For others under this profile, the individual assessment should take into account the institution they were employed by and their role and functions. Gender and possible personal enmities may also constitute risk-impacting circumstances.

Family members may also have a well-founded fear of persecution, for example in the context of the Taliban searching for the individual they are related to.

Nexus to a reason for persecution

Available information indicates that persecution of this profile is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion. In some cases, religion could also be seen as a relevant ground, such as in the case of former female judges.